PEOPLE OF MI V CHAVEZ N DOOLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 19, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 201642
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-004008
CHAVES N. DOOLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 201716
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 96-004009
CHAVEZ N. DOOLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and O’Connell and Young, Jr., JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Chavez1 N. Dooley appeals as of right from his bench trial convictions for receiving
and concealing stolen property in excess of $100, MCL 750.535(1); MSA 28.803(1), and larceny
from a motor vehicle, MCL 750.356a; MSA 28.588(1). For each offense defendant was sentenced to
two to five years’ imprisonment, the sentences to run concurrently.2 We affirm.3
Defendant challenges his conviction solely on the basis that the prosecution failed to present
sufficient evidence to support his convictions. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal
case, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime were proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 296; 519 NW2d 108 (1994).
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The felony of receiving or concealing stolen property requires a showing that property worth
over $100 was stolen, and that the defendant received or concealed that property knowing that it was
stolen. Michigan v Adams, 202 Mich App 385, 390; 509 NW2d 530 (1993). The felony of larceny
from a motor vehicle requires a showing that the defendant, without the owner’s consent, removed
specified property or property worth more than $5 from a motor vehicle, intending permanently to
deprive the owner of the property. People v William James, 142 Mich App 225, 228; 369 NW2d
216 (1985); People v Nichols, 69 Mich App 357, 359; 244 NW2d 335 (1976). On appeal,
defendant does not dispute that the crimes took place, but instead argues that there was insufficient
evidence to link defendant to the crimes.
The prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of James McGhee, who witnessed the crimes
while patrolling the Focus Hope parking lot in Detroit as a security guard. According to McGhee, in the
first incident, he noticed defendant carrying a car radio when leaving a mini-van whose window had
been broken. McGhee recognized defendant’s face, but did not know defendant’s name. Several
months later, McGhee witnessed two individuals stealing a car from the Focus Hope lot, one of whom
he recognized as defendant. McGhee identified defendant as the person he recognized from the crimes,
both in open court and from several photographs that police had presented.
However, McGhee’s initial statements to police did not comport perfectly with the evidence.
Regarding the first incident, McGhee estimated that the culprit was five foot six, and regarding the car
theft, McGhee estimated the culprit’s height at five foot seven or eight. In fact, defendant stands at six
foot three. Further, McGhee failed to mention the radio in connection with the first incident. Defendant
argues that McGhee fabricated his testimony in order to relieve himself of responsibility for failing to
prevent the crimes. We do not find these arguments persuasive.
Inaccuracies in identification do not render testimony invalid, but rather present a credibility
question for the trier of fact. People v Pennington, 113 Mich App 688, 694; 318 NW2d 542 (1982).
McGhee’s description of defendant was deficient only with respect to defendant’s height. The trial
court could reasonably credit McGhee’s unequivocal identification of defendant in open court despite
that single discrepancy. Similarly, McGhee’s failure to mention the radio in initial statements to police
presents at best a minor credibility question in light of McGhee’s subsequent testimony regarding seeing
both defendant carrying a car radio and discovering that the vehicle had been broken into and had a
hole where a radio belonged. Finally, defendant’s hypothesis that McGhee had a motive to lie was
purely a question of credibility for the trier of fact to resolve. Credibility is a matter for the trier of fact
to ascertain; this Court will not consider it anew. People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 380; 465
NW2d 365 (1990). The trial court was free to credit McGhee’s description of events and identification
of defendant in the face of doubts raised by the defense.
Thus, the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could reasonably
lead a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had perpetrated the
crimes for which he was convicted.
Affirmed. In accordance with footnote 3, we instruct the trial court to enter amended judgments
of sentence that accurately reflect the applicable statutory provisions.
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/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Robert P. Young, Jr.
1
Defendant’s given name appears variously in the lower court files as Chavez, Chaves, Chivas, and
Chavis.
2
The two lower court files were consolidated for trial. These cases have likewise been consolidated for
appeal.
3
Although neither party mentioned it, we observe that the judgments of sentence inaccurately cite the
criminal statutes under which defendant was convicted. Receiving stolen property is given as MCL
“750.535A,” but should read MCL 750.535(1); larceny from a motor vehicle is given as MCL
“750.356A-B,” but the applicable portion of the statute is in fact MCL 750.356a.
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