LEUWANIA BYGRAVE V STANLEY R VAN REKEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LEUWANIA BYGRAVE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 21, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 196949
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-494181 CK
STANLEY R. VAN REKEN and HARRIET E.
VAN REKEN,
Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants,
and
BANNER REALTY & INVESTMENT and JOHN
E. MCCAUSLIN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and O’Connell and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the Oakland Circuit Court’s July 19, 1996 order granting
defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).1 Defendants Stanley and
Harriet Van Reken cross-appeal the court’s September 27, 1995 order denying in part their motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10).2 We reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On May 15, 1990, plaintiff acquired a purchaser’s interest in a land contract in the amount of
$43,312.21; plaintiff paid $8,542.00 to Letitia Horton for the assignment of the latter’s interest. When
plaintiff failed to pay the installments for November and December, 1990, and failed to pay taxes or
insurance, the vendors commenced an action against her in district court. On January 31, 1991, the
court entered a forfeiture judgment against plaintiff in the amount of $3,876.06 for delinquent real estate
taxes and land contract payments.
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Under the law, plaintiff had a ninety day redemption period in which to pay the balance owing
on the forfeiture judgment. On April 30, 1991, plaintiff contacted defendant Stanley Van Reken, a
licensed real estate broker and friend/acquaintance of plaintiff, for assistance in redeeming the property
and in reinstating her purchaser’s interest in the land contract. Plaintiff met with Mr. Van Reken and his
attorney, defendant John McCauslin. According to plaintiff, Van Reken told her that he could not loan
her the money unless she signed certain “blank” papers as security for the loan. According to Van
Reken, plaintiff agreed that he would take over her interest in the forfeited contract, tender redemption
of the balance due, challenge the writ, and then rent the property to plaintiff on favorable terms. The
parties executed an assignment of plaintiff’s purchaser’s interest in the land contract, a quit claim deed
(conveying the property to the Van Rekens for the consideration of one dollar), and a rental agreement.
According to plaintiff, she did not read the papers and was not given a copy of the signed documents.
Redemption funds were tendered to the district court on that same day. Thereafter, on May 13, 1991,
plaintiff, represented by defendant McCauslin, appeared before the district court. The court vacated
the writ of restitution, determining that the redemption had been properly made.
On June 10, 1991, the Van Rekens, represented by McCauslin, initiated a non-payment of rent
action against plaintiff. This was to be the first of thirteen such rent actions, resulting in eight consent
judgments, two default judgments and one judgment after a hearing, one dismissal, and one action that
was still pending at the time plaintiff claimed an appeal. Plaintiff maintains that throughout these
proceedings, she repeatedly appeared in the district court and that she continuously asserted that she
was a land contract purchaser rather than a tenant. Plaintiff also argues that she tried to assert
ownership of the property, but that the district court told her, on several occasions, that she would have
to go to circuit court to litigate such issues.
The first hearing at which plaintiff appeared took place on December 31, 1991. At this time,
plaintiff contested the amount due, but agreed to pay all rents that were due. On February 24, 1992,
plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment, arguing that the Van Rekens had no legal title to the
property and that the rental agreement was void. At the hearing on plaintiff’s motion, the trial court told
plaintiff that she should have raised these defenses at the December 31, 1991 hearing. The court also
told plaintiff that she could litigate the issues if she paid $ 2,569.00 by March 3, 1992. Thereafter, at a
hearing on May 18, 1992, defendants agreed to withdraw their writ of restitution in exchange for the
payment of the outstanding rental balance.
Subsequently, almost three years later, plaintiff filed an answer to a complaint for nonpayment of
rent, again asserting that she was a land contract purchaser rather than a tenant. At a hearing on March
15, 1995, the trial court informed plaintiff’s attorney that he should institute “an action in Circuit Court
for declaratory judgment of some kind” because the dispute was not just a “simple landlord and tenant
matter” but required a determination of the interests of the parties. The court stated that it would set the
matter of trial, or allow plaintiff the opportunity to file an action within ten days in the circuit court.
Plaintiff chose the latter option, and on March 24, 1995, an action was filed in Oakland Circuit Court.
In her first amended complaint filed on April 13, 1995, plaintiff sought equitable relief in the
form of an order declaring the quit claim deed to be an equitable mortgage. Plaintiff argued that she
should be restored to her former status as a land contract purchaser because the amount that Mr. Van
Reken advanced to her to redeem the initial land contract forfeiture was a loan. Plaintiff also sought
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compensatory damages in the amount of $150,000 arising from defendants’ alleged real estate fraud
and $1,000,000 in exemplary damages arising from defendants’ abuse of process in initiating the
nonpayment of rent actions. In their answer and counterclaim, defendants asserted the affirmative
defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel and laches. Defendants filed separate motions for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). On June 28, 1995, defendants filed a motion for
partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), asserting that plaintiff could not
establish one of the elements for the imposition of an equitable mortgage (inadequate consideration). In
an order entered on September 27, 1995, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants’
motion.
Defendants then filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) alleging
that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because she failed to preserve
the issues in the twelve prior proceedings in district court. According to defendants, plaintiff’s claims of
fraud arising from the April 30, 1991 transaction should have been raised by way of an affirmative
defense in the district court summary proceedings. Following motion hearings on February 21 and July
10, 1996, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff’s first
amended complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s failure to pursue the issues in the prior summary
proceedings barred her claims under Sprague v Buhagiar, 213 Mich App 310; 539 NW2d 587
(1995).
I
Plaintiff first argues that the circuit court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) de novo to determine whether the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Huron Tool and Engineering Co v Precision
Consulting Services, Inc, 209 Mich App 365, 376-377; 532 NW2d 541 (1995).
In granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the court relied upon Sprague v
Buhagiar, 213 Mich App 310; 539 NW2d 587 (1995). In Sprague, this Court found that the
plaintiff’s claim seeking rescission of a land contract on the basis of fraud and misrepresentation was
barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 313. The plaintiff in Sprague had stopped her
monthly land contract payments after learning that two of her six rental units had been condemned by
the City of Port Huron. Id. at 312. When the defendant filed an action for summary possession in the
district court and the plaintiff did not respond, the court forfeited the land contract and entered a writ of
restitution. Id. The plaintiff then filed an action in circuit court seeking to rescind the land contract. Id.
This Court held that the plaintiff’s claims should have been raised as a counterclaim to the summary
possession proceedings, and that since plaintiff had failed to do so, her claims were barred under this
state’s broad rule of res judicata. Id. at 313.
At first glance, the trial court’s reliance upon Sprague appears proper. As this Court noted in
Sprague, res judicata bars not only claims actually litigated in the prior action, but every claim arising
out of the same transaction which the parties, “exercising reasonable diligence,” could have raised but
did not. Id. at 313 (quoting Courtney v Feldstein, 147 Mich App 70, 75; 382 NW2d 734 ([1985]).
Since plaintiff’s claims arise from the April 30, 1991 transaction, they could have been raised in the
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subsequent district court proceedings. As the district court observed, plaintiff never raised these issues
during the summary proceedings on December 31, 1991, when she stipulated that a writ of restitution
would issue on January 23, 1992, if $2,569.00 were not paid. Alternatively, plaintiff could have
appealed the district court’s decisions. Nevertheless, given the fact that the district court led plaintiff to
believe that her claim of equitable mortgage could only be raised in circuit court, we believe that
summary disposition was improper.3
Res judicata should not apply where, as plaintiff alleges, the district court did not adjudicate any
of plaintiff’s legal or equitable claims. Plaintiff raised these claims in the district court by way of her
February 24, 1992 motion to set aside judgment, her March 8, 1995 answer to defendants’ complaint
for nonpayment of rent, and her repeated attempts throughout the summary proceedings to verbally
assert her status as a land contract purchaser. At the February 24 hearing, the court told plaintiff that
she could litigate her claim, but only if she could come up with $2,569.00 in rent by March 3, 1992.
The court also informed plaintiff that she could raise “any other issues,” including a claim for equitable
mortgage, in circuit court, and that “[s]he could be in circuit court in five minutes and raise the issue. So
the issues are not foreclosed.” Similarly, at the March 15, 1995 hearing on plaintiff’s answer to
defendants’ complaint for nonpayment of rent, the district court told plaintiff that she should take her
case to circuit court because it was not just a “simple landlord and tenant matter” but required a
determination of the interests of the parties. The court allowed plaintiff to file in circuit court rather than
proceed to trial on her claim in the district court.
Contrary to the dissenting opinion in this case, the district court did not “refuse” to hear
plaintiff’s affirmative defenses. Rather, as discussed above, the court gave plaintiff the choice of having
her case proceed to trial in the district court or the circuit court. When given this choice, plaintiff
exercised her right to take her claim to circuit court. Thus, we perceive no specific decision of the
district court that plaintiff might have appealed.
Despite plaintiff’s efforts to assert her status as a land contract purchaser, the district court
never decided the merits of plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff relied on the district court’s insistence that
plaintiff’s claim belonged in circuit court. Since plaintiff’s decision to file in circuit court rather than
proceed to trial in district court was based on this reliance, we believe that application of res judicata
would deny plaintiff due process of law. As this Court noted in Cummings v Wayne Co, 210 Mich
App 249, 253; 533 NW2d 13 (1995), due process in civil cases generally requires “notice of the
nature of the proceedings, an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and manner, and an impartial
decisionmaker. . . . The opportunity to be heard does not require a full trial-like proceeding, but it does
require a hearing to allow a party the chance to know and respond to the evidence.” Id. In the present
case, plaintiff’s claim should not be barred because the district court effectively denied plaintiff the
opportunity to present her claim in that forum. Plaintiff raised the issues related to her claim on several
occasions and was told that she could litigate her claim later and that she could take her claim to circuit
court. To apply res judicata under these circumstances would effectively deny plaintiff her opportunity
to be heard.
Since we conclude that the circuit court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), we remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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II
Plaintiff’s next argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred in granting and issuing a written
order to disburse escrow to defendants in violation of the 21-day automatic stay rule. We review
decisions relating to the automatic stay rule, MCR 2.614(A)(1), for an abuse of discretion. Gerbig v
White Motor Credit Corp, 165 Mich App 372, 375; 418 NW2d 468 (1987). Given the
circumstances, we find no such abuse.
Subsequent to the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint, defendants moved for disbursement of the
rent escrow; the court granted defendants’ motion in an order entered on August 7, 1996. On August
9, 1996, plaintiff, acting in propria persona, filed a motion for stay of proceedings, waiver of bond, and
request for reinstatement of the escrow order. On August 12, 1996, plaintiff filed the instant claim of
appeal with this Court. On August 21, 1996, the circuit court denied plaintiff’s motion for immediate
stay and found that “all other motions are improper due to pendency of appeal.” Nevertheless, on
August 23, 1996, plaintiff filed a new pleading requesting an order to show cause and a show cause
hearing regarding the return of the escrow funds. The court denied plaintiff’s motion and imposed
sanctions against plaintiff. Plaintiff now argues that the court violated that automatic stay rule in
disbursing the escrow funds. We disagree.
MCR 2.614(A)(1) provides:
Except as provided in this rule, execution may not issue on a judgment and
proceedings may not be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 21 days after its
entry. If a motion for a new trial, a motion to alter or amend the judgment, a motion for
judgment not withstanding the verdict, or a motion to amend or for additional findings of
the court is filed and served within 21 days after entry of the judgment, execution may
not issue on the judgment and proceedings may not be taken for its enforcement until
the expiration of 21 days after the entry of the order on the motion, unless otherwise
ordered by the court on motion for good cause. Nothing in this rule prohibits the court
from enjoining the transfer or disposition of property during the 21-day period.
Under the present circumstances, this rule did not operate to prevent the trial court from entering an
order releasing the rent escrow. As defendants point out, the order was effectively a consent order
because the parties agreed to it. Thus, it is governed by the principles set forth in Walker v Walker,
155 Mich App 405, 406-407; 399 NW2d 541 (1986):
When a party approves an order or consents to a judgment by stipulation, the resultant
judgment or order is binding upon the parties and the court. . . Absent fraud, mistake or
unconscionable advantage, a consent judgment cannot be set aside or modified without
the consent of the parties . . . nor is it subject to appeal. (Citations omitted).
Since disbursement of the funds was made pursuant to a court order after a hearing at which plaintiff’s
counsel did not object to disbursal, we find no abuse of discretion and decline to reverse.
III
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Plaintiff’s final argument is that the court erred in imposing attorney fee sanctions as “costs”
against her for challenging the release of escrow funds. The court imposed such sanctions when, after
telling plaintiff that her August 14, 1996 motion for rehearing and other related motions were improper
because plaintiff had already filed an appeal to this Court, plaintiff nonetheless filed a new pleading
requesting an order to show cause and show cause hearing regarding the immediate return of the
escrow funds. The court denied plaintiff’s request and imposed sanctions against plaintiff in the amount
of $150 in favor of each of the three defense attorneys who appeared in response to the notice. Plaintiff
claims that the court’s actions were in violation of MCR 7.209(A)(2). We disagree.
Pursuant to MCR 7.208, a trial court may not set aside or vacate an appealed order or
judgment (barring an exception, none of which applies to this case).4 Since plaintiff had already
appealed the escrow release order to this Court, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the
matter. See Admiral Ins Co v Columbia Cas Ins Co, 194 Mich App 300, 314; 486 NW2d 351
(1992). Therefore, the court’s determination that plaintiff’s pleading was frivolous, and that there was
no basis for filing another motion for reconsideration, is supported by the evidence.
IV
The final issue for our resolution concerns a cross-appeal by the Van Rekens. Defendants claim
that the trial court erred in not dismissing plaintiff’s equitable mortgage claim pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) and/or (10) because the consideration paid by the Van Rekens was adequate.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual
support for a claim. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). A trial court
must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other available documentary
evidence. Id. Giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the nonmovant, the court msut determine
whether a record might be developed which will leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds
could differ. Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 617-618; 537 NW2d 185 (1995). On
appeal, we review the trial court’s findings de novo. Pinckney Community Schools v Continental
Casualty Co, 213 Mich App 521, 525; 540 NW2d 748 (1995).
Summary disposition may be granted to a party under MCR 2.116(C)(8) when the opposing
party has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion for summary disposition for
failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the claim and should be granted only if the claim is so
clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possible justify recovery.
ABB Paint Finishing, Inc, v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co, 223 Mich App 559, 561; 567 NW2d 456
(1997). The court should liberally permit the parties to amend their pleadings unless the amendment
would not be justified. Id.
In the present case, plaintiff claims that she received a loan from Mr. Van Reken; she denies
knowledge of the quit claim deed or rental agreement. Consequently, plaintiff argues that the
conveyance should be treated as an equitable mortgage because the real estate conveyed was in fact
intended to serve as security for plaintiff’s obligation to repay the loan. See Schultz v Schultz, 117
Mich App 454, 457-459; 324 NW2d 48 (1982). Defendants argue, however, that an equitable
mortgage may not be declared because the consideration exchanged for the property was adequate.
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We are unable to determine from the record the basis for the trial court’s decision on this issue.
It appears that the court denied defendants’ motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10), yet the
reasons for the court’s decision are not in the record. Furthermore, it appears to this Court that
discovery on this matter was not yet complete (e.g., plaintiff claims that Mr. Van Reken never submitted
to a deposition as mandated by the trial court’s February 21, 1996 order). Finally, we note that
defendants’ claim relates primarily to Count I of plaintiff’s amended complaint (the claim for an equitable
mortgage). Thus, even if we were to agree with defendants that Count I should have been dismissed,
plaintiff has a number of other claims that must still be resolved on remand.5
Given these facts, we feel that this claim needs further factual development and that such
development should take place under the guidance of the trial court. Accordingly, on remand, the trial
court is instructed to permit any necessary discovery, to find the facts necessary for resolution of the
equitable mortgage issue, and to determine whether summary disposition is appropriate in light of these
facts.6 If the trial court determines that summary disposition is appropriate, it should then decide
whether the remainder of plaintiff’s claims may be heard independently or whether plaintiff’s claims are
dependent upon the finding of an equitable mortgage.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
MCR 2.116(C)(7) provides that a summary judgment motion may be premised on the fact that:
The claim is barred because of release, payment, prior judgment, immunity
granted by law, statute of limitations, statute of frauds, an agreement to arbitrate, infancy
or other disability of the moving party, or assignment or other disposition of the claim
before commencement of the action.
2
According to defendants, Banner Real Estate is a d/b/a which the Van Rekens abandoned five or ten
years before meeting plaintiff.
3
It is important to note that the facts in this case are extremely unique; our determination rests heavily on
the trial court’s statements and the nature of the proceedings at issue.
4
MCR 7.208(A) provides:
After a claim of appeal is filed or leave to appeal is granted, the trial court or tribunal
may not set aside or amend the judgment or order appealed from except by order of
the Court of Appeals, by stipulation of the parties, or as otherwise provided by law. . .
5
Count II is an action for specific performance. Count III asserts an abuse of legal process. Count IV
alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count V is a claim for conversion, and Count VI is an
action for fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.
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6
In this respect, we note that the facts in this case are extremely similar to those in Koenig v Van
Reken, 89 Mich App 102; 279 NW2d 590 (1979), and Grant v Van Reken, 71 Mich App 121; 246
NW2d 348 (1976). In both cases, this Court concluded that the evidence supported an equitable
mortgage declaration. However, given the paucity of factual development in the record for this case, we
decline to decide this issue.
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