PEOPLE OF MI V HENRY JAMES JACKSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 17, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193481
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 95-000609-FC
HENRY JAMES JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markman, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316; MSA
28.548, which he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.1 We affirm.
This case stems from the stabbing death of Angela Taylor, a prostitute in Kalamazoo. The
prosecutor’s theory of the case was that defendant and James Edwards, both cross-dressing
prostitutes, were angry with Taylor for revealing to potential customers that they were men. The two
men confronted Taylor, defendant roughed her up and stole money from her, and Edwards stabbed her
to death. The defense maintained that defendant never planned to kill Taylor, and that Edwards was
solely responsible for her death.
I
Defendant argues that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to sustain the
jury’s verdict that he was guilty of first-degree felony murder. We disagree.
The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being, (2) with malice; that is, with
the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with
knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result, (3) while committing, attempting to
commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in MCL 750.316;
MSA 28.548, including larceny from a person. People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 566; 540
N.W.2d 728 (1995). Defendant’s challenge on appeal is that the prosecution failed to establish the
element of malice.
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As defendant correctly notes, malice may not be presumed merely from the intent to commit the
underlying felony. People v Datema, 448 Mich 585, 601; 533 NW2d 272 (1995). The jury may,
however, infer malice from the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s involvement in the underlying
felony. People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 398; 563 NW2d 31 (1997). Indeed, “if it can be shown
that an aider and abettor participated in a crime with knowledge of his principal’s intent to kill or to
cause great bodily harm, he was acting with wanton and wilful disregard sufficient to support a finding of
malice.” People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169, 178; 477 NW2d 473 (1991). Moreover, a jury can
properly infer malice from evidence that a defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause
death or great bodily harm. Id. at 177.
The evidence in the present case, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes
that defendant knew that Edwards was armed with a knife when the two confronted Taylor about her
interference in their prostitution. Defendant was well aware that Edwards had a violent temper and that
he would not hesitate to use the weapon in an argument. During the confrontation, defendant pushed
Taylor down, grabbed money from her bra, and went through her purse, while Edwards stabbed
Taylor. We find that when presented with this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found that the
essential elements of first degree felony murder, including malice, were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Turner, supra, at 572.
II
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because evidence regarding certain bad
acts by defendant was admitted into evidence. We disagree.
A
Defendant did not object to most of the evidence he now challenges on appeal, and thus
appellate review is precluded unless a curative instruction could not have eliminated the prejudicial effect
or the failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Mayfield, 221
Mich App 656, 661; 562 NW2d 272 (1997). We have carefully reviewed the record and find that the
evidence now challenged on appeal was either not indicative of bad acts or was properly admitted
pursuant to MRE 404(b) and its res gestae exception. See People v Robinson, 128 Mich App 338,
340; 340 NW2d 303 (1983). Manifest injustice will not result in our failure to review these claims
further.
We also reject defendant’s contention that by failing to preserve these matters for appeal,
defense counsel was ineffective. To establish such a claim, defendant must show that (1) the
performance of his counsel was below an objective standard of reasonableness under the prevailing
professional norms, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that, in the absence of counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. People v Leonard,
224 Mich App 569, 592; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). Defendant must also overcome the presumption
that the challenged action or inaction was a matter of trial strategy. Id.
-2
In the present case, defense counsel chose not to attempt to hide certain aspects of defendants’
life which were inextricably linked to the facts surrounding the charged offenses. We will not second
guess such matters of strategy. People v Sawyer, 222 Mich App 1, 3; 414 NW2d 378 (1997).
B
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because the jury learned that he had taken,
and apparently failed, a polygraph examination. Contrary to defendant’ assertion on appeal it appears
that the references to a polygraph examination were redacted from the preliminary examination
testimony read into the record at defendant’s trial. Consequently, we find no error here.
Although a police officer testified that his second interview with defendant occurred in the “same
place that the polygraph exam took place, in that area,” defendant did not contemporaneously object,
thus failing to preserve this issue for review. Mayfield, supra at 661. Nonetheless, we find that the
mere mention of the word “polygraph” does not give rise to error requiring reversal. See People v
Rocha, 110 Mich App 1, 8-9; 312 NW2d 657 (1981).
C
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because the jury overheard a conversation
between counsel and the trial court regarding whether evidence of defendant’s prior prostitution
convictions should be admitted. Ultimately, the trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible. Insofar as
this evidence was excluded and the jury was expressly instructed that it was not to consider matters that
were not admitted into evidence, we find no error requiring reversal.
III
Defendant next challenges the admission of numerous portions of testimony he characterizes as
“hearsay.” Specifically, defendant argues that it was improper for certain police officers to incorporate
statements of other people in their description of the investigation of Taylor’s murder. Again, we
disagree.
Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the statements of others were not offered to prove
the truth of the matters asserted, and thus was not hearsay. MRE 801(c). To the contrary, this
evidence helped the jury understand the steps taken by the police in their lengthy investigation of
Taylor’s murder as they focused first on Edwards, and eventually on defendant as well. See City of
Westland v Okopski, 208 Mich App 66, 77; 527 NW2d 780 (1994); People v Knowlton, 86 Mich
App 424, 429; 272 NW2d 669 (1978). The trial court repeatedly advised the jurors regarding the
proper use of this testimony, and admonished them that this testimony was not to be used as substantive
evidence of defendant’s guilt. The jury is presumed to have followed these instructions. People v
Torres, 222 Mich App 411, 423; 564 NW2d 149 (1997).
We further note that even if the evidence were improperly admitted as hearsay, any error would
be harmless because the substance of the challenged testimony was presented by the declarants
themselves, whom defendant subjected to rigorous cross-examination. See People v Lewis, 168 Mich
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App 225, 268; 423 NW2d 637 (1988). Also, defendant’s own statements were cumulative to much of
the evidence at issue. We find no error here.
IV
Defendant’s final issue is that the trial court erred in quashing a subpoena duces tecum which
sought numerous police reports involving attacks on other area prostitutes by a white or Hispanic male
john. We disagree.
The subpoena was quite extensive, and it is unclear whether the Department of Public Safety
had the ability to locate the requested reports. Defendant admitted that he knew the names of the
prostitutes involved in these other attacks, but was having trouble locating most of them. Further,
defendant presented evidence regarding his theory of defense, including the testimony of the investigating
officers and one of these other victims.2 After a careful review of the record, we find that the trial
court’s decision to quash the subpoena duces tecum was not an abuse of discretion. People v Valeck,
223 Mich App 48, 50; 556 NW2d 26 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
1
Defendant was also convicted of larceny from a person, MCL 750.357; MSA 28.589. However, the
court vacated this count to avoid any double jeopardy violation. See People v Minor, 213 Mich App
682, 690; 541 NW2d 581 (1995).
2
Accordingly, we find defendant’s claim that his counsel failed to present a valid defense, and thus
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, to be without merit.
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