MILDRED SMITH V FLINT COMM SCHOOL DIST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MILDRED SMITH,
UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 202119
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-044779-CL
FLINT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Reilly and Allen*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendant in this age discrimination case. We affirm.
Plaintiff was born in 1927, and began her career with defendant in 1954 as a teacher.
Throughout her career, plaintiff held various positions, both administrative and teaching. In the summer
of 1995, plaintiff applied for two administrative positions. Plaintiff was among the candidates who were
interviewed for both positions. Each candidate met with a committee of four to six individuals who
asked the candidate a series of predetermined questions, and the candidates were given numerical
scores based on the quality of their answers. Both positions were offered to other candidates who were
younger than plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that she presented a prima facie case of age discrimination and offered sufficient
evidence to establish that defendant’s legitimate reasons for the adverse employment decisions were
merely a pretext for discrimination. We disagree.
A trial court’s grant of summary disposition is reviewed de novo on appeal. Plieth v St
Raymond Church, 210 Mich App 568, 571; 534 NW2d 164 (1995). A motion for summary
disposition may be granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) when, except with regard to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id. Giving the benefit of doubt to the nonmoving party, this Court must determine
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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whether a record might be developed which will leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds
could differ. Id. This Court is not permitted to assess credibility, or to determine factual issues.
Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). The party seeking summary
disposition must identify the issues for which it claims there is no factual support. Id. at 160. The
nonmoving party must then respond with affidavits or other evidentiary materials that establish the
existence of a factual issue for trial. Id. Where the burden of proof at trial rests on the nonmoving
party, the nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings or allegations in the complaint. Quinto
v Cross & Peters, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). If the opposing party cannot present
documentary evidence to establish that a material dispute exists, summary disposition is proper. Id. at
362-363.
Plaintiff’s claim of age discrimination is based upon the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCA),
which provides:
(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an
individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege
of employment, because of . . . age. [MCL 37.2202; MSA 3.548 (202).]
In a claim under the ELCA, the burden of proof is allocated as follows: (1) the plaintiff has the burden
of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) if the plaintiff is
successful in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; and (3) the plaintiff then has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant was merely a pretext.
Lytle v Malady, 456 Mich 1, 28-30; 566 NW2d 582 (1997).
A prima facie case of age discrimination can be established by proving either intentional
discrimination or disparate treatment. Barnell v Taubman Co, Inc, 203 Mich App 110, 120-121; 512
NW2d 13 (1993). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the intentional
discrimination theory, plaintiff must show that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was
denied the promotions; (3) she was qualified for the positions; and (4) younger persons were given the
jobs. Id. Plaintiff’s age does not need to be the only reason or even the main reason for the adverse
employment decision, but it must be one of the reasons that made a difference in determining whether to
promote plaintiff. Plieth, supra at 572.
Here, plaintiff established a prima facie case of age discrimination under an intentional
discrimination theory. Plaintiff was 68 years old at the time she applied for the positions, and, therefore,
was a member of the protected class. Even defendant acknowledged, by granting plaintiff an interview
for each position, that plaintiff was at least minimally qualified for the two positions. Plaintiff was not
offered the positions, which eventually were filled by younger individuals. Because plaintiff established a
prima facie case of age discrimination, defendant was required to come forth with legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decisions. Lytle, supra at 29.
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We find that defendant met its burden. Defendant asserted that its reason for failing to promote
plaintiff was that she simply was not the best candidate for the positions. The successful applicants were
better suited for the positions and had relevant experience in the areas for which they were hired. While
plaintiff possessed a Ph.D. and met the minimum qualifications for each position, she had no
administrative experience in the previous 17 years.
Because defendant raised legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions not to promote plaintiff, the burden shifted to plaintiff to
establish that the reasons offered by defendant were merely a pretext for discrimination. Lytle, supra at
29-30. We find that plaintiff was unable to carry this burden.
[A] plaintiff must present factual allegations allowing the inference that the defendant had
a discriminatory reason that was more likely its true motivation or factual allegations that
show the defendant's proffered reason was unworthy of credence. The plaintiff must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial; conclusory allegations
are insufficient to rebut evidence of nondiscriminatory conduct. [Featherly v Teledyne
Industries, Inc, 194 Mich App 352, 362-363; 486 NW2d 361 (1992) (quoting Clark
v Uniroyal Corp, 119 Mich App 820; 826; 327 NW2d 372 (1982)).]
In an effort to prove pretext, plaintiff relies on much of the same evidence that she used to establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination. However, plaintiff must offer more than allegations and the initial
assertions contained in her pleadings in order for her claim to survive a motion for summary disposition.
Quinto, supra at 362. Plaintiff failed to offer any factual evidence to establish that defendant’s
legitimate reasons for selecting the younger candidates were unworthy of credence. Instead, plaintiff
offered conclusory allegations that she was more qualified for the positions, and that she failed to apply
for the position of Parent Involvement Advocate because an employee of defendant intentionally misled
into believing that she did not have to apply. However, there is no factual support for these assertions.
Plaintiff also alleged that the principal of the school where plaintiff worked had a discriminatory motive
when she asked plaintiff when she was going to retire. However, the principal was not involved in
deciding whom to hire for the positions at issue in this case. Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that
the members of the interviewing committee, who made the actual decisions regarding the promotions,
harbored any discriminatory bias or motivation.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the trial court did not err in granting
defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff failed to offer additional evidence apart from mere
conclusory allegations to establish that defendant’s reasons for failing to promote plaintiff were a pretext
for discrimination.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ Glenn S. Allen, Jr.
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