PATRICK MULLEAVY V BUS TRANSPORTATION CREDIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK MULLEAVY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 190519
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 92-439527 CK
BUS TRANSPORTATION CREDIT UNION
a/k/a NORTHWOOD TRANSPORTATION
CREDIT UNION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Gribbs and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
This is a wrongful discharge case. Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of oral representations and
breach of written policies regarding just-cause employment. Defendant moved for summary disposition,
which was denied. Defendant’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. The parties proceeded to
trial. After plaintiff’s opening arguments, a mistrial was declared. Subsequently, the chief judge
reassigned the case to another judge pursuant to MCR 8.110. Defendant renewed its original motion
for summary disposition, which was granted by the second judge.
Plaintiff first argues that the second judge was without authority under MCR 2.613(B) to grant
defendant’s motion for summary disposition where the first judge had previously denied the motion. We
disagree.
MCR 2.613(B) provides:
Correction of Error by Other Judges. A judgment or order may be set aside or
vacated, and a proceeding under a judgment or order may be stayed, only by the judge
who entered the judgment or order, unless that judge is absent or unable to act. If the
judge who entered the judgment or order is absent or unable to act, an order vacating
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or setting aside the judgment or order or staying proceedings under the judgment or
order may be entered by a judge otherwise empowered to rule in the matter.
In Totzkay v D
uBois (After Remand), 140 Mich App 374; 364 NW2d 705 (1985), this
Court had occasion to construe GCR 1963, 529.2, the predecessor to MCR 2.613(B), which
provided as follows:
“No judgment or order shall be set aside or vacated, and no proceeding under
a judgment or order shall be stayed by any circuit judge except the one who made the
judgment or order, unless he is absent or unable to act. If the circuit judge who made
the judgment or order is absent or unable to act, an order vacating or setting aside the
judgment or order or staying proceedings under the judgment or order may be made by
any of the other judges of the circuit or any judge assigned to the circuit.” [Totzkay,
supra at 379-380 (quoting GCR 1963, 529.2).]
In Totzkay, this Court remanded the case to the circuit court where it was initially assigned to a
pretrial judge. Id. at 378-379. The pretrial judge denied the defendant’s motion for accelerated
judgment. Id. at 379. The case was then reassigned to a second judge, who granted the plaintiff’s
motion for summary disposition on the issue of the defendant’s liability. Id. The case was then
reassigned to a trial judge for trial on the issue of damages. Id. At that time, the defendant renewed his
motion for accelerated judgment, which was granted by the trial judge. Id. The plaintiff appealed,
contending that the trial judge did not have the authority under GCR 1963, 529.2 to grant the motion in
light of the fact that the pretrial judge had denied the same motion. Id. The defendant argued that the
trial judge had the authority to grant the motion because, pursuant to a local court rule, the pretrial
judge’s authority ended when the case was assigned for trial. Id. at 380.
This Court held that the trial judge had acted outside its authority in granting the defendant’s
motion for accelerated judgment and that, therefore, the motion “now stands denied pursuant to the
order of the pretrial judge.” Id. at 381. This Court reasoned that the pretrial judge had not been
“‘absent or unable to act’ as envisioned by GCR 1963, 529.2” because, even though the local court
provided that the authority of a pretrial judge to decide preliminary matters ended when the trial began,
the pretrial judge’s authority to hear subsequent motions concerning preliminary matters continued until
those matters were finally and fully resolved. Id. at 380. This Court also reasoned that “the
reassignment of a case for trial purposes, in and of itself,” did not “somehow work[] to make the
pretrial judge ‘absent or unable to act.’” Id. at 380-381. This Court further noted that no evidence has
been presented that suggested the pretrial judge was absent or otherwise unavailable to fulfill his judicial
duties. Id. at 381. Finally, this Court, citing Berar Enterprises, Inc v Harmon, 101 Mich App 216,
228-229; 300 NW2d 519 (1980), noted that the construction of GCR 1963, 529.2 urged by
defendant would be contrary to the policy behind this rule. Totzkay, supra.1
However, a converse result was reached in People v Watkins, 178 Mich App 439; 444
NW2d 201 (1989), rev’d on another ground 438 Mich 627 (1991). In that case, the initial trial judge
ordered that the trial of two of the five defendants be severed from the trial of the remaining defendants.
Id. at 448. The chief judge then transferred the defendants’ cases to another judge, who overruled the
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severance order. Id. On appeal, one of the defendants argued that under MCR 2.613(B) only the
initial trial judge could have overruled his severance order and that the case represented an example of
“judge shopping.”2 Watkins, supra.
This Court held that the second judge did not violate MCR 2.613(B) by overruling the first
judge’s severance order. Watkins, supra at 449. This Court reasoned that the chief judge had the
authority to reassign the defendants’ cases pursuant to MCR 8.110 and MCR 8.111, and that there
was no indication of “judge shopping” in the record.” Watkins, supra at 448-449.
We conclude that Watkins presents the better construction of MCR 2.613(B) for the resolution
of this issue. Here, the chief judge had the authority to assign the case to another judge pursuant to
MCR 8.110.3 Thus, the original judge was no longer available to hear the case. Moreover, pursuant to
MCR 2.116(E)(3), a party may file more than one summary disposition motion as long as it is not done
in bad faith. Plaintiff does not argue that the motion was renewed in bad faith. As well, pursuant to
MCR 1.105, the court rules are to be construed to secure the just, speedy, and economical
determination of every action and to avoid the consequences of error that does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties. To this end, we find that the purpose of reassigning cases for a more efficient court
system would be defeated if only the original judge was allowed to dispose of a case. Thus, we find
that the trial court did not violate MCR 2.613(B) by ruling on the motion.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s summary disposition motion
because he raised genuine issues of material fact regarding the existence of a just-cause employment.
We disagree.
As explained in Lash v Allstate Ins Co, 210 Mich App 98, 101; 532 NW2d 869 (1995):
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
support for a claim. The court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and
other documentary evidence available to it and grant summary disposition if there is no
genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. A party opposing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in that party’s pleadings, but must by
affidavit, deposition, admission, or other documentary evidence set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
A trial court may not assess credibility or determine facts on a motion for summary judgment. Skinner
v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). “Summary disposition is reviewed de
novo, because this Court must review the record to determine whether the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Stehlik v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206 Mich App 83, 85; 520 NW2d
633 (1994).
It appears that plaintiff is first arguing that defendant breached its written policies of just-cause
employment because the 1961 seniority policy stated that seniority rights would be lost if an employee
was discharged for cause, among other reasons. We do not find that this wording clearly and
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unambiguously created a just-cause employment policy sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of
contract. Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 137; 507 NW2d 591 (1993). Moreover,
plaintiff offered no proof beyond his mere allegations that the 1961 policies were in effect when he was
terminated. Plaintiff contends that he did not need to do so because defendant did not assert that the
policies were inapplicable to his termination. In its original summary disposition motion, defendant
specifically stated that the 1961 written policies were not in effect when plaintiff was terminated. It
included affidavits from employees to support that fact. Plaintiff failed to provide any proof to the
contrary. Furthermore, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant’s production of the 1961 policies
pursuant to plaintiff’s discovery request for all applicable policy manuals did not amount to an admission
that the policy was applicable to plaintiff.
Plaintiff further argues that his and Janet Morrison’s sworn testimony evidenced that the 1961
written policies were in effect.4 However, we do not find this testimony in the lower court record and
this Court’s review is limited to the record presented below. Amorello v Monsanto Corp, 186 Mich
App 324, 330; 463 NW2d 487 (1990).
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that an express contract did not
exist between defendant and himself. Plaintiff contends that he had an express contract because it was
his understanding that he would not be terminated as long as he did his job. However, the statements
made were similar to those made in Rowe v Montgomery Ward, 437 Mich 627; 473 NW2d 268
(1991) and Rood, supra. Thus, we find that there was not an intent on the part of defendant to form a
just-cause employment contract. Rowe, supra at 645. The statements were not so clear and
unequivocal as to overcome the presumption of an at-will employment policy. Rood, supra at 119.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
1
In Berar, this Court explained the policy behind GCR 1963, 529.2:
The policy behind GCR 529.2 is that “[i]f a judgment or order is to be set
aside, vacated or stayed, it should normally be done only by the judge who made the
judgment or order, since he is best qualified to pass upon the matter, and since it would
obviously detract from the dignity and stability of judicial action if a dissatisfied litigant
could run about seeking to have it upset by other trial judges.” [Berar, supra at 228
(quoting 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated [2d ed], p 230).]
2
See note 2, supra.
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3
Plaintiff’s brief on appeal indicates that the case was reassigned to another judge as part of a docket
reduction program.
4
Janet Morrison was defendant’s office manager. She was fired at the same time as plaintiff and also
brought wrongful discharge suit against defendant. The trial court subsequently granted defendant’s
motion for a directed verdict and entered a judgment of no cause of action in favor of defendant. This
Court affirmed. See Morrison v Northwood Transportation Credit Union, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 12, 1997 (Docket No. 181679). Morrison has
submitted a delayed application for leave to appeal to our Supreme Court. See Morrison v
Northwood Transportation Credit Union (Supreme Court Docket No. 110853).
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