PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL EDWARD EDGERTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 198850
Allegan Circuit Court
LC No. 96-10061 FC
MICHAEL EDWARD EDGERTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and White and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by jury of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, assault with a dangerous
weapon, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, home invasion in the first degree, MCL 750.110a(2); MSA 28.305(a)(2), and three
corresponding counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The charges against defendant arose out of an incident that occurred on March 18, 1996, in
which Rosario Jose Gonzales was beaten and robbed by two men in his home. At trial, defendant presented an
alibi defense, asserting that defendant could not possibly have committed the armed robbery. A jury found
defendant guilty on each charge. Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender to forty-five to seventy-five
years’ incarceration for the armed robbery, to be served concurrently with thirty-two to forty-eight months’
incarceration for assault with a dangerous weapon, also to be served concurrently with eight to twenty years’
incarceration for first-degree home invasion. Those sentences are to be served consecutively to a mandatory
period of two years’ incarceration for each of the three concurrent sentences for felony-firearm. Defendant appeals
his convictions and sentence as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
victim’s in-court identification of defendant, arguing that it was based upon a tainted pretrial lineup identification.
Defendant’s challenge to the propriety of the in-court identification rests on four separate arguments: (1) that a
police trooper provided defendant’s identification to the victim; (2) that the lineup itself was unduly suggestive; (3)
that the victim’s mental and physical condition at the time of the incident was insufficient to provide him with a
valid identification of the assailants; and (4) that the victim allegedly saw defendant in a courtroom prior to trial.
We review the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion to suppress the in-court identification under a
clearly erroneous standard, People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 675; 528 NW2d 842 (1995), and affirm.
Defendant first argues that the identification was tainted because, before the lineup, a state
police trooper allegedly provided defendant’s identification as a suspect to Gonzales. A corporal lineup
is not tainted by the fact that a witness is told by the police that it contains several suspects. People v
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Smith, 108 Mich App 338, 344; 310 NW2d 235 (1981). In any case, the record indicates that the
trooper told Gonzales that he had three suspects and identified them as Scott Edgerton and his two
brothers without identifying the brothers by name. Given these facts, it can not be said that the
comments made to the victim gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
People v Lee, 391 Mich 618, 626; 218 NW2d 655 (1974).
Next, defendant argues that the lineup itself was unduly suggestive because he was the only
individual in the lineup with tattoos. Differences in physical characteristics among lineup participants
may taint the lineup to the extent that the identification must be suppressed. People v Kurylczyk, 443
Mich 289, 312; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). However, if defense counsel was present at the lineup, the
defendant bears the burden of showing that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive. People v
McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 286; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). Defendant has failed to meet this
burden. There is no indication in the record that defendant was the only person in the lineup with
tattoos. Further, the police apparently did not know before the lineup was conducted that Gonzales had
seen tattoos on one of the robbers; tattoos were not listed in the original eyewitness description of
defendant. Accordingly, given the evidence in the record, we do not conclude that reversal is required.
Finally, defendant argues that the identification was tainted because the victim’s mental and
physical condition at the time of the incident was impaired to the extent that he could not make a valid
identification of the assailants. It is true that the physical and psychological state of the victim may be a
relevant factor in judging the reliability of the witness’ perceptions. People v Kachar, 400 Mich 78,
96; 252 NW2d 807 (1977). However, the facts do not indicate that Gonzales’ mental state was
impaired when he initially recognized defendant or when he later identified him in the lineup.
Furthermore, there is no indication that Gonzales’ perceptions were influenced by a weakened state
when the suspects initially entered his home. Gonzales’ subsequent state of mind, after the beating, does
not preclude the possibility that he recognized defendant initially and was later able to recall his
identification upon seeing him in the lineup.
In any event, even if the identification procedure was improper, the victim’s in-court
identification was proper because there was an independent basis for the identification. Kachar, supra
at 91. In this case, the victim had prior knowledge of defendant, as defendant’s brother had worked in
the victim’s store and defendant had come into the store to visit his brother. Furthermore, the victim
also had an opportunity to observe defendant during the robbery; defendant was in close proximity of
the victim for approximately fifteen minutes during the offense. These factors, when combined with the
fact that there were no discrepancies between the pre-lineup description and defendant’s actual
description, and that the victim never mistakenly identified anyone else as the perpetrator, lead this
Court to conclude that defendant failed to show that the lineup had a substantial likelihood of
misidentification. Kurylczyk, supra at 306.1
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the prior statement of William
Chamberlain, a co-defendant. Chamberlain testified for the prosecution regarding a written statement
that he gave to the police on the day the crime was committed. Defendant argues that Chamberlain’s
statement should not have been admitted because he invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and chose not to testify. Whether the admission of Chamberlain’s statement as
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substantive evidence violated defendant’s right of confrontation depends first on whether he was
available for cross-examination at trial. It has long been held that the admission of a declarant’s out-of
court statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject
to cross-examination. California v Green, 399 US 149; 90 S Ct 1930; 26 L Ed 2d 489, 497-499
(1970); People v Malone, 445 Mich 369, 382-383; 518 NW2d 418 (1994).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that defendant’s right of confrontation was not
violated. Despite the fact that Chamberlain was informed that he could remain silent regarding the
statement and despite his declaration that he wished to exercise that right, Chamberlain was
nevertheless subjected to cross-examination regarding the statement and he continued to testify in that
regard. Defendant was able to cross-examine Chamberlain and elicit testimony that Chamberlain could
not remember defendant being involved in the crime and that he could not remember his statements to
the police because he was under the influence of drugs. Since we conclude that defendant had the
opportunity to convince the jury that Chamberlain’s prior statement was incorrect, according to Green,
supra, Chamberlain’s prior out-of-court statement was admitted without compromising defendant’s
right of confrontation.2
Even if we were to agree with defendant that Chamberlain’s statements were inadmissible, we
would find that the error was harmless. In People v Spinks, 206 Mich App 488, 492; 522 NW2d 875 (1994), this
Court explained that whether the admission of a co-defendant’s statement would violate a defendant’s right of
confrontation “depends on whether it bears ‘adequate indicia of reliability’.” Id . In that case, the Court found that
the statement should not have been admitted, but concluded that the erroneous admission constituted harmless
error. Id . at 493-494. An error is harmless where the appellate court is confident beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury’s verdict was unaffected by the error. Id . at 493. The erroneous admission of a codefendant’s prior
statement constitutes harmless error where another witness’ testimony is sufficient by itself to prove the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 494. In the present case, the victim gave a detailed description of the robbery
and confidently identified defendant as someone he had previously met. In light of this independent evidence, it is
not likely that the jury’s verdict was affected by the admission of Chamberlain’s prior statement. Therefore, we
decline to reverse.
Defendant next argues that he was denied his right of confrontation because a co-defendant’s prior
statement was excluded. This argument focuses on the admissibility of a letter written by co-defendant Scott
Edgerton, while he was incarcerated, to defendant, implying that defendant was not involved in the crime. The
trial court ruled that the letter was inadmissible because it had not been disclosed the prosecution and because the
statement did not contradict Edgerton’s testimony.
In criminal cases tried after January 1, 1995, discovery is governed by MCR 6.201. People v Tracey, 221 Mich
App 321, 324; 561 NW2d 133 (1997). MCR 6.201(I) permits a trial court in its discretion to exclude evidence for
failure to comply with a discovery order. Since we conclude that the evidence sought to be admitted provided
marginal value to the case and was cumulative to the witness’ testimony, it was not an abuse of discretion to
exclude the evidence as a remedy for defendant’s failure to comply with the court’s discovery order.
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Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing defendant to be impeached by
a prior conviction. However, since defendant did not testify and did not indicate an intention to testify, nor did he
indicate the intended nature of such testimony, this issue is waived on appeal. People v Finley , 431 Mich 506, 509; 431
NW2d 19 (1988); People v Gaines, 198 Mich App 130, 131; 497 NW2d 210 (1993).
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor erred in eliciting testimony regarding defendant’s post-arrest
silence during the following exchange:
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Q [Prosecutor]: Had you had the opportunity to ever personally interview Michael
Edgerton?
A [Detective Averill]: No, Mr. Edgerton did not wish to be interviewed.
It is well settled that it is erroneous for the prosecutor to elicit, and the witness to offer, testimony regarding a
defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent at the time of his arrest. People v Swan, 56 Mich App 22, 31; 223
NW2d 346 (1974). However, such an error can be harmless and does not require reversal if it did not prejudice the
defendant. People v Gilbert , 183 Mich App 741, 747; 455 NW2d 731 (1990); Swan, supra at 31. Two inquiries must be
made to determine whether an error was harmless: (1) whether the error was so offensive to the maintenance of a
sound judicial system that it can never be regarded as harmless, and (2) whether it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Gilbert, supra at 747; Swan, supra at 31.
Applying the analysis in Swan, we conclude that although the prosecutor erred in eliciting testimony
regarding defendant’s silence, it was not done so deliberately and defendant was not deprived of a fundamental
element of the adversary process. Therefore, it did not so interfere with the integrity of the trial process as to
require reversal. Id . at 32. Furthermore, since the improper comment was fleeting and substantial evidence of
defendant’s guilt was presented, we find no reasonable probability that the testimony contributed to defendant’s
conviction and, therefore, reversal is not required on that basis. People v Dixon, 84 Mich App 675, 684; 270 NW2d 488
(1978); Swan, supra at 33-34.
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sentence, arguing that the
sentence far exceeded the guidelines and violated the principle of proportionality. We disagree.
Appellate review of habitual offender sentences is limited to a review of proportionality, without any
consideration of, or reference to, the guidelines. People v Hansford (On Remand), 454 Mich 320, 323; 562 NW2d 460
(1997); People v Gatewood (On Remand), 216 Mich App 559, 560; 550 NW2d 265 (1996). The trial court’s discretion in
imposing sentence is broad, to tailor each sentence to the circumstances of the case and the offender. People v Van
Etten, 163 Mich App 593, 595; 415 NW2d 215 (1987). Appellate review is limited to whether the sentencing court
abused its discretion. People v Odendahl, 200 Mich App 539, 540-541; 505 NW2d 16 (1993). A sentencing court abuses
its discretion when it violates the principle of proportionality: a sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness
of the crime and the defendant’s prior record. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 635-636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
Defendant argues that his sentence was disproportionately harsh in comparison to the codefendants’ in
this case. However, sentences are to be individualized and the court need not consider the sentences of
codefendants. In re Jenkins, 438 Mich 364, 376; 475 NW2d 279 (1991). Considering defendant’s status as an habitual
offender, the extent of his criminal record, the severity of the present crimes, and the fact that the present crimes
mark an escalation from property crimes to crimes against persons, there is no indication that the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing a 45-year minimum sentence for defendant’s conviction of armed robbery.
Hansford, supra at 324-326.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
1
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s pre-trial motion on the
basis that the victim allegedly viewed defendant in the courtroom prior to trial. However, the victim
testified that he had not been in the courtroom and that he had not seen defendant. The trial court found
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that the victim’s testimony was more credible and denied defendant’s motion. We defer to the trial
court’s special opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses appearing before it, MCR 2.613(C),
People v Thomas, 387 Mich 368; 197 NW2d 51 (1972), and decline to reverse on this basis.
2
We recognize that the trial court held that Chamberlain’s statement was admissible on the basis of its
finding that he was “unavailable” for cross-examination. The trial court allowed the statement under the
exception to the hearsay rule provided in MRE 804(b)(3) (statements against penal interest). Since we
conclude that defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated by the court’s decision to allow
Chamberlain’s testimony, we find no need to discuss this hearsay exception.
3
Our conclusion that the statement was cumulative to the witness’ testimony provides an independent
basis for our determination that exclusion of the statement was not erroneous. Edgerton testified at trial
that he did not believe that defendant was involved with the crime, but that he could not clearly
remember the incident or the statement that he gave to the police because he was under the influence of
drugs at the time. Since the letter did not contradict Edgerton’s testimony and because it was, at most,
cumulative, it was inadmissible under MRE 403. Haberkorn v Chrysler Corp, 210 Mich App 354,
362; 533 NW2d 373 (1995).
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