WILLIAM HILL V CITY OF ROYAL OAK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM HILL, Personal Representative of the
Estate of DONNA LYNN TEKELY, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
February 3, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 198640
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-504972 NO
CITY OF ROYAL OAK and ROYAL OAK
POLICE OFFICERS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Markman, P.J., and McDonald and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff William Hill, as personal representative of the estate of Donna Tekely, appeals as of
right from the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10).1 We affirm.
On appeal, an order granting or denying summary disposition is reviewed de novo. A motion
for summary disposition may be granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) when, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the nonmovant, the trial court must determine
whether a record might be developed that would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds
might differ. Moore v First Security Casualty Co, 224 Mich App 370, 375; 568 NW2d 841 (1997).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his claims under the public duty doctrine.
Specifically, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in finding that there was no special relationship
between the decedent and defendants.
The public duty doctrine insulates police officers from tort liability for the negligent failure to
provide police protection unless an individual plaintiff satisfies the special-relationship exception. White
v Beasley, 453 Mich 308, 313; 552 NW2d 1 (1996). A special relationship exists between police
officers and a plaintiff when the following factors are present:
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(1) an assumption by the police officer, through promises or actions, of an
affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured;
(2) knowledge on the part of the police officer that inaction could lead to harm;
(3) some form of direct contact between the police officer and the injured party;
(4) the plaintiff’s justifiable reliance on the police officer’s affirmative
undertaking. [Gazette v Pontiac (On Remand), 221 Mich App 579, 582-583; 561
NW2d 879 (1997).]
Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to provide police protection to the decedent. However,
police officers do not owe a duty in tort to any individual unless the facts of a case fit the special
relationship doctrine. White, supra at 324. We find that the facts of this case do not establish that a
special relationship existed between defendants and the decedent. While there was direct contact
between the decedent and defendants, plaintiff has not established the existence of the three remaining
requirements for a special relationship.
First, plaintiff has not shown that defendants assumed an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the
decedent. Defendants’ response to a call to a particular location is insufficient to constitute a promise or
assurance to undertake an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured. See id. at
314, 324-325.
Plaintiff asserts that defendants “failed to follow through” with their attempts to get the decedent
and/or her husband to leave the residence. However, even if defendants’ offer to take the decedent
somewhere were to be considered an affirmative duty to act, because the evidence is undisputed that
the decedent refused the offer, plaintiff cannot show that she relied on any such affirmative undertaking
by defendants.
In addition, plaintiff has not established that defendants had knowledge that inaction could lead
to harm. The officers were responding to a call that the decedent’s husband was threatening to commit
suicide. When defendants arrived, both decedent and her husband denied that the husband had
threatened her. Defendants had responded to calls from the residence in the past when the decedent’s
husband had been intoxicated and had never taken either the decedent or her husband into custody. On
those occasions the decedent and her husband had also refused to be taken to a different location, and,
to defendants’ knowledge, no harm to either of them had resulted.
Plaintiff maintains that the bullet holes in the door jam of the bedroom should have put
defendants on notice that their inaction could lead to harm to the decedent. However, the mere
presence of the bullet holes did not indicate any danger to the decedent, particularly as the decedent
told defendants that her husband had not threatened her. Moreover, the decedent’s husband testified
that the bullet holes were old and had been made before his marriage to the decedent.
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Plaintiff also contends that defendants knew that inaction could lead to harm because there were
firearms on the premises. However, the decedent, her husband, and her sister all informed defendants
that there were only two guns in the house. Thus, after defendants confiscated two guns, there was no
reason for them to believe that the decedent was in jeopardy.
Finally, plaintiff did not show that the decedent relied on an affirmative undertaking by
defendants. Plaintiff states, without citing support from the record, that the decedent “relied on the
police when they promised to get help and when the [sic] promised to help her.” However, plaintiff
does not identify any specific promise on which the decedent allegedly relied. Defendants, on the other
hand, presented evidence that the decedent told them that her husband had not threatened her and she
was not afraid of him. She also refused to follow defendants’ suggestion that she and her husband
separate for a few hours. Under these facts, we conclude that plaintiff has not established that the
decedent relied on an affirmative undertaking by defendants.
In sum, plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
defendants and plaintiff’s decedent had a special relationship. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
Plaintiff also asserts that his claim was not barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity.
However, both because the trial court did not address this question and because plaintiff has given it
only cursory treatment in his brief, we decline to address this issue. See McCready v Hoffius, 222
Mich App 210, 218; 564 NW2d 493 (1997); Community Nat’l Bank of Pontiac v Michigan Basic
Property Ins Ass’n, 159 Mich App 510, 520-521, 407 NW2d 31 (1987).
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). The trial
court did not indicate under which subrule it granted defendants’ motion. However, because the trial court
appears to have considered documentary evidence in addition to the pleadings, we presume that the grant of
summary disposition was pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). See MCR 2.116(G)(5); Shirilla v Detroit, 208 Mich App 434,
436-437; 528 NW2d 763 (1995).
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