PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD EARL DIBELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 194433
Barry Circuit Court
LC No. 95-000149 FC
RICHARD EARL DIBELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Wahls and J. R. Weber*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury conviction of one count of first degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(b); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(b). Defendant was duly and timely notified before
trial, pursuant to MCL 769.13(1); MSA 28.1085(1), of the prosecutor’s intent to seek an enhanced
sentence based on defendant’s status as a second offender. The judgment of sentence reflects this
status, although the question was not mentioned specifically during sentencing. Defendant contends that
the prosecutor’s decision to charge him as a second offender was an abuse of discretion, and that the
judgment of sentence improperly reflects a recidivist status the trial judge did not mention at sentencing.
MCL 769.13(5); MSA 28.1085(5), requires the trial judge, at sentencing, or at any separate
hearing scheduled for the purpose before sentencing, to determine the existence of any charged prior
conviction. The statute does not specify how this determination shall be made. It does specify
acceptable sources of information concerning the issue, including information contained in a presentence
report. Here, the presentence report reflects both defendant’s 1957 conviction for larceny in a building
and that the present offense is subject to enhancement (“criminal sexual conduct, first degree and
habitual offender, second.”). Defendant conceded the accuracy of the presentence report in this
respect at sentencing. Accordingly, given that the fact of such status is unchallenged, reflection of this
fact in the judgment of sentence constitutes an acceptable means by which the trial court made the
statutorily requisite determination of second offender status. See Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96,
126; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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The prosecutor’s exercise of charging discretion in proceeding against defendant as a second
offender reflects executive action which is subject to judicial oversight only if unconstitutional, illegal, or
ultra vires. Const 1963, art 3, §2; People v Barksdale, 219 Mich App 484, 488; 556 NW2d 521
(1996). Defendant makes no contention that the recidivist statutes are unconstitutional, that the
prosecutor’s reasons for charging him as a second offender are unconstitutional or illegal, as being in
violation of statute or based on some proscribed personal characteristic, such as race, religion, etc., nor
is it suggested that the prosecutor was without authority to seek such enhancement. Accordingly, no
abuse of power has occurred. People v Gwinn, 111 Mich App 223; 314 NW2d 562 (1981).
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ John R. Weber
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