PEOPLE OF MI V PAUL CHRISTOPHER VINSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 12, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 194867
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 95-001305-FC
PAUL CHRISTOPHER VINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Jansen and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(b);
MSA 28.548(b) (murder committed in the perpetration of larceny and/or robbery), and armed robbery,
MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. The trial court sentenced defendant, a second habitual offender, to life
imprisonment on each count. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in the manner in which it instructed the jury at the
close of trial respecting the homicide offenses. Defendant did not object to the trial court’s jury
instructions at trial. Failure to object to jury instructions waives error unless relief is necessary to avoid
manifest injustice. MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052; People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 573; 540
NW2d 728 (1995); People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 230; 530 NW 2d 497 (1995).
At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury on each of the homicide offenses for which
it could return a conviction; namely, first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary
manslaughter. The trial court tendered its instructions respecting first-degree felony murder pursuant to
CJI2d 16.4. Noticeably, however, the trial court neglected to instruct the jury that it must find “that the
killing was not justified, excused, or done under circumstances that reduce it to a lesser crime.” CJI2d
16.4(5). The commentary to CJI2d 16.4 provides that this instruction should be read if the jury is being
instructed on manslaughter or any offense less than manslaughter. Because the trial court in this case
instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter, it should have instructed the jury as contemplated by
CJI2d 16.4(5).
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Following instructions on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, the trial court
concluded its instructions regarding the homicide offenses by instructing the jury on the order in which it
must consider those offenses. The trial court instructed the jurors that they must consider the crime of
first-degree felony murder first. If they found defendant not guilty of felony murder or could not agree
about that crime, then they must consider the less serious offense of second-degree murder; and if they
could not agree about the crime of second-degree murder, then they must consider the crime of
voluntary manslaughter.
This ordering instruction is found verbatim in CJI2d 3.11(5), which embodies our Supreme
Court’s holding in People v Handley, 415 Mich 356, 361; 329 NW2d 710 (1982).1 Although the
ordering instruction comports with prior case law, when read in conjunction with the trial court’s
instruction on first-degree felony murder, the instructions allowed the jury to convict defendant of felony
murder without considering whether defendant committed the homicide under circumstances that would
reduce it to voluntary manslaughter.
In order to convict a defendant of felony murder, the prosecutor must establish the following: (1)
that the defendant killed a human being; (2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a
very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the
probable result; (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the
felonies enumerated in MCL 750.316(b); MSA 28.548(b). Turner, supra at 566. To establish
second degree murder, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) there was a
death, (2) caused by defendant, (3) absent circumstances of justification, excuse or mitigation, and (4)
done with the intent to kill, the intent to inflict great bodily harm or the intent to create a very high risk of
death with knowledge that the act probably will cause death or great bodily harm. People v Bailey,
451 Mich 657, 669; 549 NW2d 325 (1996). First-degree felony murder, therefore, is second-degree
murder committed during the perpetration of one of the felonies enumerated in MCL 750.316(b); MSA
28.548(b).
Voluntary manslaughter, on the other hand, is murder that is reduced because “the defendant
acted out of passion or anger brought about by adequate cause and before the defendant has had a
reasonable time to calm down.” CJI2d 16.9(1). Provocation is not an element of voluntary
manslaughter; rather, provocation “negates malice and reduces a killing that would otherwise be murder
to manslaughter.” People v King, 98 Mich App 146, 150; 296 NW2d 211 (1980). Stated
differently, adequate and reasonable provocation that “causes the defendant to act out of passion rather
than reason” “mitigate[s] a h
omicide from murder to manslaughter.” People v Pouncey, 437 Mich
382, 389; 471 NW2d 346 (1991). Thus, voluntary manslaughter requires a finding of murder (second
degree) which the jury may then reduce because “the law . . . looking at the frailty of human nature . . .
considers great provocations sufficient to excite the passions beyond the control of reason.” People v
Scott, 6 Mich 287, 294-295 (1859).
We find that by not instructing the jury that it could reduce first-degree felony murder to
manslaughter, the trial court deprived defendant of the opportunity of having the jury consider his theory
that he committed the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter because the jury could have found that
defendant committed first-degree felony murder but also decided that he was guilty of the lesser offense
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of voluntary manslaughter due to mitigating circumstances. The trial court’s ordering instruction,
however, permitted the jury to ignore the instructions on voluntary manslaughter once it found that the
elements of first-degree felony murder were satisfied.
While jury instructions are to be read as a whole rather than extracted piecemeal to establish
error, People v Bell, 209 Mich App 273, 276; 530 NW 2d 167 (1995), it is precisely such a reading
in this case that leads to the conclusion the trial court erroneously instructed the jury, i.e., the instructions
did not fairly present the issues to be tried or insufficiently protected defendant’s rights. While the
omission of the manslaughter reference from the felony-murder instruction alone permits us to find error,
we conclude that error is present when the omission in the felony-murder instruction is considered in
conjunction with the trial court’s ordering instruction.
As stated above, however, defendant failed to object to the complained-of jury instructions, and
thus, our review is limited to whether relief is necessary to avoid manifest injustice. MCL 768.29; MSA
28.1052; Haywood, supra at 230. In order to protect defendant’s rights, the instructions must include
all elements of the crime charged and must not exclude consideration of material issues, defenses, and
theories for which there is evidence in support. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 53; 523 NW2d
830 (1994). We find that the evidence in this case did not support a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
Therefore, manifest injustice will not result if we deny defendant relief.
Before a court instructs on a cognate lesser offense such as voluntary manslaughter, it must
examine the evidence to determine whether it would support a conviction of the lesser offense.
Pouncey, supra at 387. The evidence in this case did not support a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter.
As indicated above, defendant theorized that he lacked the intent necessary to commit murder
because he was under the influence of crack cocaine and that his addiction to crack cocaine affected his
mental capacity to the extent that he lacked the intent necessary to commit murder. Although it is
unclear whether defendant argued these two explanations for his behavior as alternative or coexisting
reasons for mitigating the murder to manslaughter, neither supports the trial court’s decision to tender
the voluntary manslaughter instruction.
Our Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the voluntary intoxication defense in People
v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630; 331 NW2d 171 (1982). First-degree murder is a specific intent crime,
while second-degree murder requires only a showing of general intent. Id. at 650-651. Michigan joins
the majority of jurisdictions in holding that as between first- and second-degree murder, the defendant’s
voluntary drunkenness may be a legitimate subject of inquiry, but voluntary intoxication can never be a
material or a pertinent consideration when the debate involves whether the defendant is guilty of second
degree murder or manslaughter. Id. at 652. Indeed, voluntary intoxication may negate the specific
intent necessary for a conviction of first-degree murder, but it does not negate the general intent required
for a second-degree murder conviction. Id. at 651. Thus, while a showing of adequate provocation
might reduce a murder to manslaughter, voluntary intoxication is not adequate provocation that can
reduce to manslaughter what would otherwise be murder. Id. at 652. Therefore, defendant’s theory
that the crack cocaine he used affected his mental state at the time of the homicide may be a valid
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defense as between first- and second-degree murder but not as between second-degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter. The trial court erred, therefore, to the extent that it instructed the jury regarding
voluntary manslaughter on the basis of evidence showing that defendant was under the influence of
crack cocaine at the time of the killing.
Defendant also theorized that his crack cocaine craving, in general, negated the intent necessary
to commit murder. This theory is akin to a diminished capacity defense. Like the defense of voluntary
intoxication, however, “[e]vidence of diminished capacity is only relevant to the question of a
defendant’s ability to form the specific intent necessary to commit a particular crime.” People v Jones,
151 Mich App 1, 5; 390 NW2d 189 (1986). Because second-degree is a general intent crime,
Langworthy, supra, 416 Mich 652, the defense of diminished capacity is not available to reduce
second-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial court erred to the extent that it
instructed the jury that it could convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter on the basis of evidence
showing that defendant was suffering from the effects of crack cocaine addiction at the time of the
killing.
Thus, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict defendant of voluntary
manslaughter. Accordingly, because the evidence did not justify the giving of the manslaughter
instruction, there can be no manifest injustice in the trial court’s failure to give the instruction in a proper
manner.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to provide the jury any
evidentiary support for the defense theory that defendant’s use and addiction to crack cocaine so
severely affected his state of mind as to render his behavior consistent with voluntary manslaughter. As
we have just discussed, however, evidence of drug use or addiction is insufficient to reduce a crime of
murder to manslaughter. Therefore, defense counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to
provide evidence in support of these meritless theories because counsel’s actions did not deprive
defendant of a substantial defense. See People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569
(1990); People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 537-538; 462 NW2d 793 (1990).
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because three witnesses testified
respecting their opinion of defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing. Defendant did not object
to these alleged instances of improper testimony. We will not review an unpreserved claim of improper
admission of evidence unless we find error that could have affected the outcome of the trial or where
prejudice is presumed or reversal is automatic. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 553; 520 NW2d 123
(1994). Our review of the record reveals that no error occurred in the admission of the now-challenged
testimony, and thus, we decline to review defendant’s claims.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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1
This Court decided People v Handley (On Remand), 135 Mich App 343; 352 NW2d 343 (1984),
which our Supreme Court reversed in part at 422 Mich 859; 365 NW2d 752 (1985).
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