PEOPLE OF MI V CARLOS RICHARD MARINES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 21, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 196571
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 96-069807-FH
CARLOS RICHARD MARINES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Holbrook and Doctoroff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of operating a motor vehicle under
the influence of intoxicating liquor or controlled substance (OUIL) causing death, MCL 257.625(4);
MSA 9.2325(4), and two counts OUIL causing serious impairment of a bodily function, MCL
257.625(5)(a); MSA 9.2325(5)(a). Defendant was sentenced to twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment
for each of the convictions of OUIL causing death, and six and one half to ten years’ imprisonment for
each of the convictions of OUIL causing serious injury. He now appeals as of right. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the jury was not adequately instructed on the issue of
substantial cause. He argues that the jury should have been instructed that a substantial cause is one that
was so strong as to dominate any intervening causes, that defendant’s driving would have been different
had he been sober, and that the accident would not have occurred had defendant been sober.
However, because defendant stipulated to the instruction given by the trial court, our review is limited to
relief necessary to avoid manifest injustice. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545; 494
NW2d 737 (1993).
We find no manifest injustice here. On the issue of substantial cause, the trial court instructed
the jury, “[n]ow, if you find that Liza Lutman [the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident]
was negligent, you may only consider that negligence in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct was a
substantial cause of the accident.” In order for a defendant to be convicted of OUIL causing death or
serious impairment of a bodily function, the prosecution must prove, among other things, that
defendant’s conduct was a substantial cause of the accident. People v Lardie, 452 Mich 231, 259
260; 551 NW2d 656 (1996). This may be done by proving that the defendant’s culpable conduct, his
decision to drive while intoxicated, substantially contributed to the resulting deaths and injuries. Id. at
-1
260 n 51. Although the victim’s negligence is admissible in determining whether the defendant was
negligent, it is not a defense. People v Tims, 449 Mich 83, 98; 534 NW2d 675 (1995). Therefore, it
would have been erroneous for the court to instruct the jury, as defendant now requests, that a
substantial cause must be the dominant cause, or that the people must prove that defendant’s driving
would have been different had he been sober, or that the accident would not have occurred had he been
sober. The instruction given comports with the holding in Lardie and did not cause the defendant to
suffer manifest injustice.
Defendant next argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. We
disagree. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court must view the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences arising therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether
a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Hutner, 209 Mich App 280, 282; 530 NW2d 174 (1995).
The prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions for two counts
of OUIL causing death and two counts of OUIL causing serious injury. The elements of the offense
are, (1) the defendant was operating his motor vehicle when he was intoxicated, (2) that he voluntarily
decided to drive knowing that he had consumed alcohol and might be intoxicated, and (3) that the
defendant’s intoxicated driving was a substantial cause of the victim’s death or serious injury. Lardie,
supra at 259-260.
The prosecution presented evidence that defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.18. Gonzales, a
passenger in the vehicle driven by defendant, testified that defendant was driving at the time of the
collision. Further, Kobiska and Creaser, two witnesses to the aftermath of the accident, testified that
they each saw defendant behind the wheel after the collision. This evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution is sufficient to establish that defendant was intoxicated and operating a
motor vehicle. Gonzales also testified that defendant had asked for the keys in order to drive. Evidence
was admitted that after the accident defendant tried to start the vehicle, and, when that failed, he
climbed out a window and started running. This evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution is sufficient to establish that defendant voluntarily decided to drive knowing that he was
intoxicated. Evidence was presented that defendant was intoxicated, he was speeding at the time of the
accident, and defendant made no attempt to brake prior to the collision. When this evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it supports a rational trier of fact’s finding that defendant’s
intoxicated driving was a substantial cause of the deaths and injuries in this case. Finally, evidence was
presented that as a result of the accident, Liza Lutman and one of the passengers in her vehicle died,
and Gonzales and another passenger in Lutman’s vehicle were injured. Therefore, viewed in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact in
concluding all the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
-2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
