PEOPLE OF MI V JAMIL B THOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 21, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 193869
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-009634
JAMIL B. THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Sawyer and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317;
MSA 28.549, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2). We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by giving a state of mind instruction that
improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant and created a conclusive presumption of guilt. We
disagree. Defendant waived review of this issue by failing to object to the instruction and manifest
injustice does not result from our refusal to review. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 230; 530
NW2d 497 (1995). The instruction was not erroneous because it only informed the jury that they may
infer an intent to kill from the circumstances of the alleged killing. People v Martin, 392 Mich 553,
561; 221 NW2d 336 (1974) (malice may not be presumed or implied as a matter of law, but a jury
may draw a permissive inference of malice from the use of a deadly weapon). Further, the jury
instructions as a whole sufficiently conveyed to the jury that the burden of proof was on the prosecution,
not the defense. People v Bell, 209 Mich App 273, 276; 530 NW2d 167 (1995) (jury instructions are
to be read as a whole rather than extracted piecemeal to establish error). Defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to this instruction was not properly presented as
required by MCR 7.212(C)(5) and also fails on the merits because trial counsel did not err by failing to
object as the instruction was not erroneous or otherwise objectionable. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich
643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994) (to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that “counsel's performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
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professional norms” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of
the proceedings would have been different”).
Defendant next argues that the admission into evidence of the weapon he was arrested with as
well as testimony that he was known to carry a gun was improper. We disagree. Defendant waived
review of this issue by failing to object to the admission of this evidence and manifest injustice does not
result from a refusal to review. People v Considine, 196 Mich App 160, 162; 492 NW2d 465
(1992). The gun was relevant under MRE 401 and 402 as either evidence that defendant committed
the murder with that weapon, despite the inconclusive ballistics examination, or as evidence
corroborating defendant’s statement to the police that he disposed of the gun used in the shooting after
the incident. The evidence was also relevant in demonstrating that defendant had access to such
weapons. See People v Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 61; 489 NW2d 99 (1992). This evidence was
not prejudicial because it could have been utilized by either the prosecution or the defense and because,
in defendant’s statement to the police, which was admitted into evidence, defendant admitted that he
shot at the victim with a weapon of the same caliber. The testimony that defendant had previously been
seen with a nine millimeter weapon could have been relevant evidence utilized by either party and was
not prejudicial due to the admission of defendant’s statement. Defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to object to this instruction was not properly presented as required by
MCR 7.212(C)(5) and also fails on the merits because trial counsel did not err by failing to object as
the instruction was not erroneous or otherwise objectionable. Stanaway, supra at 687-688.
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court improperly
exceeded the sentencing guidelines based on its own impermissible determination that defendant was
guilty of first-degree murder. We disagree. The trial court did not make an impermissible finding that
defendant actually committed first-degree murder. The court considered the circumstances of the killing
and determined that it was an aggravated second-degree murder that was very close to being a first
degree murder and that therefore, it was proper to exceed the sentencing guidelines. Although the
sentence imposed exceeded the sentencing guidelines range, the trial judge presented sufficient reasons
for exceeding the guidelines due to their inadequacy in this particular instance. See People v Milbourn,
435 Mich 630, 660; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
Defendant also argues that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s denial of his
motion for expenses to obtain records from the Social Security Administration. We disagree.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court was required to grant his request in the absence
of an inquiry into the need for these records. See People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 518; 503
NW2d 457 (1993) (an indigent defendant is entitled to a waiver of costs for court fees, transcripts, and
expert witness services “reasonably necessary for his defense”). Although defendant did not specify the
basis for his motion for expenses in either the motion itself or on appeal, a request for costs of obtaining
records from a third-party is more closely analogous to the payment of expert witness fees, than to the
appointment of appellate counsel or the provision of transcripts to indigent defendants at no cost. It is
not error for a trial court to decline to appoint an expert witness in the absence of a showing that the
expert testimony would likely benefit the defense, People v Jacobson, 448 Mich 639, 641; 532
NW2d 838 (1995), and therefore, it would not be error to decline defendant’s request because he has
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failed to demonstrate the need for these documents. Defendant claims that these records could
demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, but given the result of the evidentiary
hearing that was held on that issue and the findings of the trial judge, it is not likely that the result of that
hearing could have been altered by the presentation of the social security records, even assuming that
they exist. See Stanaway, supra. Therefore, even though the trial court did not explicitly deny
defendant’s motion on the basis that he failed to demonstrate a sufficient need for the documents, it was
not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion. Cf. In re Klevorn, 185 Mich App 672, 678-679; 463
NW2d 175 (1990) (trial court abused its discretion by failing to pay fees for expert who provided
valuable criticism of the conclusions reached by the prosecution’s accident reconstruction expert).
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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