DEBRA DOREE HERRINGTON V LESTER HERRINGTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DEBRA DOREE HERRINGTON,
UNPUBLISHED
November 14, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 197829
Marquette Circuit Court
LC No. 94-029839
LESTER HERRINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment granting the parties a divorce but reserving the
issue of property distribution, and an addendum to the judgment of divorce, which distributed the
property and was entered nunc pro tunc relating back to the entry of the divorce judgment. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by entering a judgment of divorce without
determining the property rights of the parties as required by MCR 3.211(B)(3), and that a new trial is
warranted. A judgment of divorce must comply with the requirements of MCR 3.211(B)(3). Yeo v
Yeo, 214 Mich App 598, 601; 543 NW2d 62 (1995). In pertinent part, MCR 3.211(B)(3) provides
that a judgment of divorce must include a determination of the property rights of the parties. In this
case, the trial court erred when it entered the judgment of divorce without resolving all issues required
by MCR 3.211(B)(3). Moreover, the trial court did not cure the error by entering the addendum to the
judgment of divorce nunc pro tunc because this cure was not an available remedy. The function of a
order nunc pro tunc is to supply an omission in the record of action previously taken by the court but
not properly recorded; an order nunc pro tunc may not be utilized to supply previously omitted action.
Sleboede v Sleboede, 384 Mich 555, 558-559; 184 NW2d 923 (1971). Resolution of the property
issues by the trial court was “previously omitted action.” It was not action that was previously taken but
erroneously omitted. Therefore, it was improper for the trial judge to enter the addendum to the
judgment of divorce nunc pro tunc in an effort to remedy the omission of the property issues from the
judgment of divorce.
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In Yeo, the judgment of divorce was vacated because, at the time of appeal, the trial court had
not complied with the requirements of MCR 3.211(B)(3). Compliance with MCR 3.211(B)(3) ensures
that divorce cases are not tried piecemeal, subjecting the parties to a multiplicity of orders that could be
appealed. Yeo, supra at 601. However, the facts of Yeo can be distinguished from the case at bar. In
this case, the trial court entered the judgment of divorce, held a two-day hearing in order to resolve the
parties’ property issues, and then entered an addendum to the judgment of divorce. Although the
procedure was not in compliance with the court rule, all the elements required by MCR 3.211(B)(3)
have been addressed. It would be redundant to order a new trial because the trial court has already
gathered information about the parties’ marriage and determined their respective shares of the marital
assets. Furthermore, allowing the decision of the trial court to stand does not offend the policy rationale
behind MCR 3.211(B)(3), which is to avoid multiple orders that can be appealed. Thus, the trial
court’s error was harmless.
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred by failing to make specific findings of fact or
conclusions of law with regard to alimony. In his trial brief and post-trial statement, defendant uses the
term “alimony” in the context of plaintiff’s inheritance. Our interpretation of defendant’s claim is more
that defendant felt entitled to that particular asset than he is entitled to alimony in general. Defendant
does not appear to ask for alimony outside the context of the inheritance. As a result, we question
whether defendant properly raised the issue of alimony below and preserved it on appeal. In any event,
based on our review of the record, reversal is not required.
Michigan provides a statutory basis for alimony. MCL 552.23; MSA 25.103. Whether to
award alimony is within the trial court’s discretion. Demman v Demman, 195 Mich App 109, 110;
489 NW2d 161 (1992). We have recognized several factors that are considered in determining
whether alimony should be awarded. Lee v Lee, 191 Mich App 73; 477 NW2d 429 (1991). These
factors include:
(1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the marriage,
(3) the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the source and amount of property awarded
to the parties, (5) the parties’ ages, (6) the abilities of the parties to pay alimony, (7) the
present situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties, (9) the parties’ health, (10)
the prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is responsible for the
support of others, and (11) general principles of equity. [Id. at 80.]
These “factors are to be considered wherever they are relevant to the circumstances of the particular
case.” Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 159; 485 NW2d 893 (1992). In the case at bar, although
the trial court did not specifically set forth each of the above factors in the context of an alimony
analysis, it is apparent from the trial court’s findings and conclusions that it was aware of the appropriate
factors. We do not believe that the trial court’s failure to specifically state its findings regarding each
consideration requires reversal because our review of the record indicates that we w
ould not have
reached a different result. Lee, supra at 80.
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred when it failed to determine whether plaintiff’s
inheritance proceeds should be distributed for the suitable support and maintenance of defendant. We
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disagree. Courts have discretion to treat inheritance proceeds as either marital or
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separate property. Demman, supra at 112. In Charlton v Charlton, 397 Mich 84, 94; 243 NW2d
261 (1976), the Supreme Court recognized that “plaintiff’s inheritance could be awarded as part of the
property to be divided with defendant either if [as provided by MCL 552.401; MSA 25.136] the
husband had contributed to the ‘acquisition, improvement or accumulation of such property’ or if an
award otherwise was insufficient to maintain either party.” In our opinion, because the trial court
determined that alimony was not necessary, it implicitly held that the award was otherwise sufficient to
maintain defendant. Therefore, it would not be improper to invade plaintiff’s inheritance.
On cross appeal, plaintiff claims that because the trial court attributed the breakdown of the
marriage to defendant, it erred in not awarding her more than fifty percent of the marital assets. We
disagree. The value to be given the fault element in a particular case is a matter to be left to the trial
court’s discretion, subject to the requirement that the distribution not be inequitable. Hanaway v
Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 297; 527 NW2d 792 (1995). Fault is but one factor among many to
be considered. Id. We find no abuse of discretion and cannot conclude that the distribution was
inequitable in this ground alone.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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