CHRYSLER CORP V DICLEMENTE SIEGEL ENGINEERING INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHRYSLER CORPORATION,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 1996
Plaintiff/Counter
Defendant-Appellee,
v
No. 184700
LC No. 93-00282-CK
DICLEMENTE SIEGEL ENGINEERING,
INC., a Michigan corporation,
Defendant/Not
Participating,
and
UHLMANN ASSOCIATES/ARCHITECTS,
a Michigan corporation,
Defendant/Counter
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Smolenski and T.G. Power,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Uhlmann Associates/Architects provided design and consulting services to plaintiff
for a Cold Emissions/Driveability Test Facility (“CTF”) project in Chelsea, Michigan. Plaintiff began
experiencing problems with the CTF soon after its initial start-up. Defendant expended resources in
attempts to correct these problems with varying degrees of success. Plaintiff eventually brought suit.
Defendant filed a counterclaim predicated on its performance of ameliorative services, alleging that these
services were beyond the scope of its contract with plaintiff, and that it was, accordingly, entitled to
compensation. The circuit court found that the terms of the contract between the parties expressly
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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precluded defendant’s counterclaims, and granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendant now appeals as of right, and we affirm.
We review an order granting or denying summary disposition de novo. Grebner v Clinton
Twp, 216 Mich App 736, 740; 550 NW2d 265 (1994). In reviewing a grant of summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court must give the benefit of reasonable doubt to the nonmovant
and determine whether a factual record might be developed that would leave open a material issue upon
which reasonable minds could differ. Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 617-618; 597
NW2d 185 (1995). Summary disposition of a breach of contract claim is appropriate where the
relevant contract language is unambiguous. Mt Carmel Hospital v Allstate Ins Co, 194 Mich App
580, 588; 487 NW2d 489 (1992).
I
Defendant first argues that the Consultant Purchase Order (“PO”) Rider, which contained
language that the circuit court determined to govern changes to the initial contract,1 was not part of the
initial contract. The Consultant PO Rider provided that defendant was to be paid a lump sum for its
work and that any changes to the contract had to be approved by plaintiff in writing. Defendant submits
that because this rider was not part of the initial contract, subsequent changes to the terms of the
contract need not have been in writing.
We find defendant’s position unpersuasive. The purchase order that plaintiff placed with
defendant for consultant services for the CTF project clearly indicated on its face that the Consultant
PO Rider was to apply to the purchase order. Extraneous writings may be incorporated into a contract
by reference. Arrow Sheet Metal Works, Inc v Bryant & Detwiler Co, 338 Mich 68, 78; 61 NW2d
125 (1953). Thus, the Consultant PO Rider was properly incorporated into the purchase order.
Because it is undisputed that plaintiff gave no written approval for defendant’s expenditure with respect
to the work orders in issue, summary disposition was appropriate. Mt Carmel Hosp, supra.
Defendant brings several arguments designed to defeat the pertinent clauses of the Consultant
PO Rider. First, defendant claims that the PO Rider was not in existence at the time the purchase order
was issued, and, thus, could not have been incorporated by reference. The purchase order was issued
in July 1991, and, defendant maintains, the booklet containing the PO Rider was not created until
September 1992. However, the September 1992 date set forth in the purchase order refers to a forms
booklet, not to the PO Rider in issue. The PO Rider was dated June 1989, and, therefore, existed at
the time the purchase order was issued in 1991. Accordingly, it was subject to incorporation by
reference.
Second, defendant complains that the PO Rider was not attached to the purchase order as
indicated on the face of the purchase order. Defendant, therefore, concludes that the PO Rider was not
properly incorporated by reference. However, our review of the record indicates that defendant
offered no evidence in support of this allegation. The existence of a disputed fact must be established by
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admissible evidence. Cox v Dearborn Hts, 210 Mich App 389, 398; 534 NW2d 135 (1995).
Therefore, we decline to address this argument further where it is not supported by the record.
Finally, defendant contends that, regardless of the court’s resolution of the issues set forth
above, recovery is appropriate in quantum meruit. Following its notification that the CTF was not
operating as anticipated, defendant issued bulletins and field orders to correct the problems. Defendant
argues that such work was beyond the scope of the contract because the bulletins addressed changes to
the completed CTF design work.
Defendant misapprehends the circumstances in which recovery in quantum meruit is warranted.
Quasi-contractual theories of recovery are precluded where the parties are bound by an express
contract which governs the matter at issue. Martin v East Lansing School District, 193 Mich App
166, 180; 483 NW2d 656 (1992). We noted above that the contract between the parties specified
that any changes to the contract had to be approved by plaintiff in writing. Because the contract
expressly addresses this contingency, it would defeat the intention of the parties to allow recovery for
“extra-contractual” work where the contractual mechanisms for approving additional work were not
followed. See Martin, supra. Hence, the trial court properly granted summary disposition with respect
to defendant’s quantum meruit claim.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition with respect to
its claim of breach of the implied duty of good faith. Defendant’s claim is based on a blanket purchase
order issued by plaintiff to defendant in February 1994, which plaintiff terminated three weeks later.
This termination occurred in the wake of failed settlement negotiations. The circuit court refused to
impose a duty of good faith upon plaintiff because the terms of the blanket purchase order provided that
plaintiff had the right to terminate the purchase order “at any time without cause.”
Defendant first argues that the termination language was not part of the parties’ contract
because it was not located in the purchase order, but rather in a separate document entitled “General
Terms and Conditions.” However, our review of the record indicates that the blanket purchase order
expressly incorporated the “General Terms and Conditions” document by reference. The form number
of the booklet containing the General Terms document was clearly indicated on the final page of the
blanket purchase order. We conclude that the termination language was part of the parties’ contract.
Martin, supra.
Defendant argues that, regardless of whether the termination language was part of the contract,
the general black letter rule that an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot override express
contractual terms should not be applied to the instant case due to the disparity in bargaining power
between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant bases its argument on dicta found in United Roasters Inc v
Colgate-Palmolive Co, 649 F 2d 985, 989 (CA 4, 1981). However, United Roasters is not binding
on this Court because it is a federal case interpreting North Carolina law. Further, we do not find
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United Roasters to be persuasive because Michigan law provides that a lack of good faith cannot
override an express provision in a contract. Eastway & Blevins Agency v Citizen Ins Co of
America, 206 Mich App 299; 520 NW2d 640 (1994); see also General Aviation Inc v Cessna
Aircraft Co, 915 F 2d 1038, 1041 (CA 6, 1990). No evidence suggests that plaintiff and defendant
entered into the blanket purchase order agreement other than voluntarily, with full knowledge of the
applicable terms. Therefore, the termination language of the contract cannot be overridden by any lack
of good faith.
In addition, we conclude that there is no indication in the record of plaintiff’s alleged lack of
good faith. Defendant offers little other than speculation with respect to plaintiff’s lack of good faith,
relying primarily on the timing of plaintiff’s termination of the blanket purchase order. Without more, this
amounts to a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument. We do not find defendant’s position to be
persuasive, nor sufficient to withstand plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition.
III
Defendant also advances a fraud claim based upon two arguments. First, defendant argues that
plaintiff never intended to tender performance of its obligations when it issued the 1994 blanket
purchase order because it terminated the order just three weeks after issuing it. We disagree.
Generally, an action for fraudulent misrepresentation may not be based upon future performance unless
made in bad faith with no intention to perform. Boston Piano & Music Co v Pontiac Clothing Co,
199 Mich 141; 165 NW2d 856 (1917). The record indicates that plaintiff issued blanket purchase
orders to defendant annually from 1981 to 1993. Plaintiff again issued a blanket purchase order to
defendant on February 25, 1994, in spite of litigation pending between the parties. The trial court
scheduled a settlement conference for March 14, 1994. After the settlement conference, it became
apparent that the parties were not going to be able to reach a settlement and that the case would
proceed to litigation. On March 16, 1994, plaintiff terminated the 1994 blanket purchase order
because it had a policy of not doing business with firms involved in litigation against the company. It is
apparent from this timeline that plaintiff had no way of knowing whether the case would settle at the time
it issued the blanket purchase order. Defendant has failed to offer any evidence to this Court that
plaintiff issued the 1994 blanket purchase order without any present intent to perform it.
Second, defendant claims that plaintiff made representations to defendant that it would continue
to do business with defendant despite of the pending litigation and despite plaintiff’s policy of not doing
business with parties litigating against the company, thereby committing the tort of fraudulent
concealment. We find no basis for a fraudulent concealment action. The elements of a fraudulent
concealment action are (1) a material representation which is false; (2) known by defendant to be false,
or made recklessly without knowledge of its truth or falsity; (3) that defendant intended plaintiff to rely
upon the representation; (4) that, in fact, plaintiff acted in reliance upon it; and (5) thereby suffered
injury. McMullen v Joldersma, 174 Mich App 207, 213; 435 NW2d 428 (1988). The false material
representation needed to establish fraud may be satisfied by the failure to divulge a fact or facts the
defendant has a duty to disclose. Id.
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Defendant cannot show that it relied to its detriment upon plaintiff’s alleged representations of
continuing business. Defendant alleges that plaintiff’s representations were made in 1993. However,
plaintiff issued the blanket PO to defendant in 1994. Defendant admits that plaintiff called defendant
before the settlement conference and indicated that it intended to terminate the 1994 blanket PO if a
settlement was not reached. Therefore, defendant had knowledge before the settlement conference of
plaintiff’s intended course of action. Defendant cannot now claim that it somehow relied on plaintiff’s
1993 alleged representations of continuing business in making its decision not to settle the case. The
trial court properly granted summary disposition of defendant’s fraud claims.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Thomas G. Power
1
We refer to the agreement in issue, negotiated in July 1991 and memorialized in July 1993, variously
herein as the initial contract and the purchase order.
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