PEOPLE OF MI V SHANNON J GRIFFITH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
____________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 178791
Ogemaw County
LC No. 93-000630-FH
SHANNON J. GRIFFITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
Before: Corrigan, P.J., and Sullivan* and T.G. Hicks,** JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial conviction of assault with intent to commit armed
robbery, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, and habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10; MSA
28.1082. The court sentenced defendant to two concurrent fifteen to forty year terms of imprisonment.
We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand with directions to vacate the judgment of sentence
imposed for the underlying felony.
After consuming a gallon of Southern Comfort and six cases of beer, defendant, Brian Coffel,
and two other men decided to go to the victim’s house and “scare him.” Coffel armed himself with a
broomstick and defendant grabbed an ice spud (a spadelike tool used for ice fishing). When they
arrived at the home, one of the men told Coffel and defendant to “hospitalize” the victim. Coffel pushed
his way inside the home when the victim answered the door. Defendant pointed the spud at the victim
and told him to lie face down on the floor. Coffel beat the victim with the broomstick until it broke. As
Coffel disconnected the wires to the television and the videocassette recorder, defendant struck the
victim with the spud. Coffel and defendant took the items from the home as they left.
Defendant first claims that his attorney’s performance was deficient for failing to cross-examine
Coffel, who testified for the prosecution, about Coffel’s plea bargain arrangement. Our review of a
claim of i effective assistance of counsel is de novo and limited to the facts contained in the record.
n
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
** Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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People v Hedelsky, 162 Mich App 382, 387; 412 NW2d 746 (1987). This Court presumes that
counsel was effective, and a defendant bears the heavy burden of demonstrating otherwise. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). To prevail, a defendant must show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and “that counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive . . . defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” People v
Reed, 449 Mich 375, 401; 535 NW2d 496 (1995) (citations omitted). A defendant must also show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result would have been different
and that the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Poole, 218 Mich
App 702, 718; ___ NW2d ___ (1996).
Even if the jury had been made aware of Coffel’s plea bargain, the reliability of the outcome
would not have been undermined in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Defendant
admitted his role in the crime and gave an audiotaped confession. Defendant’s only defense was that he
never intended to rob the victim, but only wanted to render the victim unconscious so Coffel would stop
beating him. The jury apparently found this defense incredible. Defendant attacked the victim after
Coffel had stopped beating the victim, which negates defendant’s contention that he hit the victim only to
make Coffel stop. Also, defendant hit the victim while Coffel was unplugging the television and
videocassette recorder to take them. That fact counters defendant’s assertion that he did not intend to
rob the victim. Further contradicting defendant’s defense is that he kept the videocassette recorder
after the beating. Additionally, the record does not support defendant’s claim that Coffel’s testimony
was influenced by his desire to shift the blame to defendant to avoid more severe punishment. Coffel’s
conviction for unarmed robbery is consistent with his testimony that the men formed the intent to steal
after he hit the victim with the broomstick but before defendant hit the victim with the ice spud.
Defendant next claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s
closing remarks. The trial court, however, sustained defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s
comment that defendant “had used mental illness to get off.” The prosecutor did not pursue the subject.
Even if the prosecutor’s remarks were somewhat improper, the court’s instruction to the jury that the
attorneys’ statements were not evidence dispelled any prejudice. Under such circumstances, this Court
generally has held that a defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial. See People v Potra, 191
Mich App 503, 513; 479 NW2d 707 (1991); People v Dreyer, 177 Mich App 735, 738-739; 442
NW2d 764 (1989).
Next, defendant claims that the prosecutor’s characterization of defendant’s confession as “self
serving” deprived him of a fair trial because it impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. When
evaluated in the context of defendant’s intoxication defense, as required under People v Fields, 450
Mich 94, 115; 538 NW2d 356 (1995), the prosecutor’s references to defendant’s statements as “self
serving” merely confirmed that neither the evidence nor the testimony supported defendant’s claim that
he was too intoxicated to form the specific intent to rob. See People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 105 n
10; 351 NW2d 255 (1984). Moreover, the court’s instructions to the jury regarding the burden of
proof overcame any potential prejudice.
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Defendant also contends that a new trial is warranted because of the prosecutor’s statements
during closing argument that defense counsel was trying to “fragment the evidence” and “distract” the
jury. A prosecutor may not question the veracity of defense counsel. Wise, supra at 101-102. The
Wise Court nonetheless affirmed the defendant’s conviction in view of the strong evidence of guilt,
including his confession. Id. at 105-106. More recently, in People v Minor, 213 Mich App 682, 688
689; 541 NW2d 576 (1995), this Court held that even where a prosecutor’s remarks are improper,
reversal is not required where the remarks could not have affected the trial’s outcome. Although
defense counsel here did not object or request a cautionary instruction, the court instructed the jury that
the attorneys’ statements were not evidence and were not to be considered and that the prosecution
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant specifically intended to commit
robbery when he committed the assault. Defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial because the
jury instructions adequately dispelled any potential prejudice. See Potra, supra at 513; Dreyer, supra
at 738-739.
Defendant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted testimony
regarding the prior consistent statements of other witnesses. The admission of hearsay testimony is
harmless error when the testimony merely is cumulative. People v Van Tassel (On Remand), 197
Mich App 653, 655; 496 NW2d 388 (1992). “The Court of Appeals and the federal courts
repeatedly [have held] that improperly admitted hearsay evidence constitutes harmless error when it is
merely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.” Solomon v Shuell, 435 Mich 104, 146; 457
NW2d 669 (1990). The trial court’s statements on the record indicate that the court applied this
authority. Additionally, the victim’s statement to the police was admissible under MRE 801(d)(1)(C) as
a prior statement of identification because the victim reaffirmed that statement at trial. People v
Malone, 445 Mich 369, 386; 518 NW2d 418 (1994). Moreover, admission of the disputed testimony
could not have prejudiced defendant in the presentation of his defense because he was not contesting
the facts to which the witnesses testified. Defendant disputed only the specific intent element of the
crime. None of the testimony to which defendant objects was probative of this element. Therefore,
admission of this evidence was harmless error.
Defendant next argues that this Court should reverse his conviction for assault with intent to
commit armed robbery because the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence of the specific intent to
rob. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that sufficient
evidence was introduced at trial to justify a rational trier of fact in finding that the essential elements of
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748 (1992), modified on other grounds 441 Mich 1201 (1993). A police detective testified that
defendant admitted that the men planned the robbery before entering the victim’s house. Coffel stated
that the men decided to rob the victim before defendant hit him with the ice spud. This version of events
was supported by the victim, who testified that defendant hit him when he tried to raise his head as
Coffel was unplugging the video equipment. “[Q]uestions of the credibility of the witnesses are for the
trier of fact.” People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 16; 472 NW2d 289 (1991). Therefore,
sufficient evidence was introduced to support defendant’s conviction of assault with the intent to rob
while armed.
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Finally, defendant argues that his sentence of fifteen to forty years is disproportionate in
comparison to the sentences received by his codefendants. Under the standard endorsed in People v
Wright, 432 Mich 84, 93; 437 NW2d 603 (1989), the greatest minimum sentence possible for
conviction under the habitual offender statute, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, is two-thirds of the
statutory maximum for the underlying felony. In this case, the underlying felony of which defendant was
convicted, assault with intent to commit armed robbery, carries a maximum sentence of life in prison.
MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284. Defendant’s minimum sentences of fifteen years do not exceed the
Wright standard. Moreover, defendant has an extensive criminal history and was charged while on
bond for the instant offense with delivery of an imitation controlled substance, malicious destruction of
property and escape while awaiting trial.
Notwithstanding the above proportionality analysis, this case must be remanded on a sentencing
issue. Although the trial court recognized at sentencing that it was sentencing defendant “on one charge,
habitual offender,” it also stated that “it is the sentence of this court on both charges [that defendant be
incarcerated by] the Michigan Department of Corrections for not less than 15 nor more than 40 years.”
The judgment of sentence reflects that the court ordered defendant to serve two concurrent sentences of
fifteen to forty years: one for the assault conviction, and one for the habitual offender conviction. “The
habitual offender statute does not create a substantive crime that is separate from and independent of
the principal charge.” People v Connor, 209 Mich App 419, 426; 531 NW2d 734 (1995). We
direct the court to amend defendant’s judgment of sentence to vacate his sentence for the underlying
felony.
Affirmed and remanded for action in accordance with this opinion.
jurisdiction.
We do not retain
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
/s/ Timothy G. Hicks
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