JUDITH JOHNSON V JOHN R SAATIO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDITH JOHNSON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 17, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 189497
LC No. 92-8263-DM
JOHN R. SAATIO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and MacKenzie and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order modifying the parties’ judgment of divorce to award
physical custody of their minor child, Nichole Lynn Saatio (born 3/3/87), to defendant. We affirm.
Plaintiff and defendant separated in 1991, after years of physical abuse and alcoholism on the
part of both parties. On July 20, 1992, plaintiff filed for divorce. The judgment of divorce, entered on
October 4, 1993, awarded plaintiff physical custody of the parties’ child. Since the divorce, defendant
has undergone treatment for alcohol abuse, become committed to a life of sobriety, and remarried.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, continues to abuse alcohol and provided an unstable living environment for
the child. At one point after the divorce, plaintiff temporarily relinquished custody of the child to
defendant’s mother when the Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a neglect petition following a
suicide attempt by plaintiff’s boyfriend in plaintiff’s home.
At the time defendant filed his petition to change custody, DSS was engaged in an ongoing
investigation with regard to the child and her home with plaintiff. In his petition, defendant alleged that
plaintiff allowed her other minor children, both of whom have been in trouble with the law, to baby-sit,
that she left the child alone, and that she failed to provide the child with a bed of her own. Following a
four-day hearing on defendant’s petition, the trial court determined that, although an established
custodial environment existed with plaintiff, there w clear and convincing evidence that it was in the
as
child’s best interests to modify the judgment of divorce and award physical custody to defendant.
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the trial court’s findings of fact were too conclusory to
determine what evidence the court determined justified the change of physical custody. We review
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decisions of the trial court de novo and will not reverse unless there are findings of fact against the great
weight of evidence, the decision was a palpable abuse of discretion, or there was a clear legal error on a
major issue. MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8); Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871; 526 NW2d 889
(1994). We defer to the trial court’s findings regarding credibility and preferences under the statutory
factors. Harper v Harper, 199 Mich App 409, 414; 502 NW2d 731 (1993).
Where a custodial environment has already been established, a trial court should not modify a
custody order unless the evidence presented demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that such a
modification would be in the best interest of the child. MCL 722.27; MSA 25.312(7)(c). MCL
722.23; MSA 25.312(7) lists the factors that must be “considered, evaluated and determined by the
court”:
As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means the sum total of the
following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties
involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,
affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or
her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under
the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment,
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be
of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or
the child and the parents.
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(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against
or witnessed by the child.
(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
The trial court must make specific findings of fact as to each of the statutory factors. Schubring v
Schubring, 190 Mich App 468, 470; 476 NW2d 434 (1991). Brief, definite, and pertinent findings,
without over-elaboration of detail or particularization of fact, will suffice. MCR 2.517; Fletcher supra,
at 883.
In this case, the trial court’s findings of fact were sufficient. In its opinion, the court evaluated
each of the statutory factors, referring in detail to the key evidence that influenced its conclusions and
noting whether each factor was more, less, or equally favorable to each party. Notably, the court
found, among other findings, that the child’s environment was not favorable or stable, and that the child
preferred to live with her father. Short of having the court set out all of its thought processes and explain
why it rejected each and every piece of evidence presented, there is no more the trial court could have
done by way of its opinion. The court’s opinion was thorough, articulate, and provided a sufficient basis
upon which to rule in favor of defendant, as required by MCR 2.517 and Fletcher, supra at 883-884.
Moreover, as required by Fletcher, supra at 884, the record demonstrates that the trial court was
aware of and considered all the facts involved in this custody case. The judge listened to testimony,
participated in questioning witnesses, and issued a comprehensive five-page opinion and order.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court’s findings of fact were against the great weight of the
evidence. Upon a thorough review of the record, we find that the facts as found by the trial court were
fully supported, and therefore plaintiff’s claim that they were against the great weight of the evidence has
no basis.
Plaintiff next claims that, because seven of the eleven factors weighed equally for both parties,
the court was prohibited from modifying the custody award. However, a court should never apply a
mathematical formulation to determine the best interest of the child or hold that a party cannot satisfy a
clear and convincing evidentiary standard where many of the factors weigh equally. Heid v
AAASulewski (After Remand), 209 Mich App 587; 532 NW2d 205 (1995).
Finally, we find no merit in plaintiff’s argument that the court improperly considered evidence
that plaintiff still consumes alcohol and that the minor child no longer wished to live with her mother.
Plaintiff claims that evidence on both of these issues was presented by way of inadmissible hearsay.
Since there were no objections to this testimony at the hearing, the issue is not properly preserved.
Thames v Thames, 191 Mich App 299, 303; 477 NW2d 496 (1991). Even if it were, plaintiff herself
testified that she continued to use alcohol; such testimony is not hearsay but is a party admission. MRE
801. In addition, the trial court was required to take into account the preference of the child, and
therefore it was not improper for the court to consider the child’s wishes along with evaluating all of the
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other factors. MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3). See also Treutle v Treutle, 197 Mich App 690, 694;
495 NW2d 836 (1992).
The record supports a finding that the best interests of the child dictated the change in physical
custody from plaintiff to defendant. We find no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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