PEOPLE OF MI V JOANN ELLEN MORLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 17, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 180764
LC No. 94-996-FC
JOANN ELLEN MORLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Taylor and W.J. Nykamp,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c;
MSA 28.788(3). She appeals as of right. We reverse.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting cross-examination of the
complainant regarding the contents of certain psychological reports and records pertaining to certain
allegedly false statements made by the complainant while she resided at the Children’s Home of Detroit.
Defendant argues that the court’s ruling infringed on her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. We
agree and reverse.
After reviewing the documentary evidence in camera, the court explained its ruling:
All I did was give the material that in any way could be looked at that could
lead to what is admissible, and I haven’t heard anything yet that is admissible and,
therefore, I’m going to continue to remain constant with what my previous rulings have
been, and that in this Court’s opinion, that is a collateral matter, does not go to
credibility, and it’s very prejudicial and inappropriate, and I’m not going to allow for it.
***
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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If this conduct[]—if the statements relate to this occurrence, it would be—in
any way whatsoever to this occurrence, I would agree, but if it doesn’t, it doesn’t. And
that’s where I would interpret where her statements could or could not be used. And
there again, I don’t know what she said or didn’t say to a lot of these people, and that’s
the reason why I provided both parties with whatever information that even conceivably
looked remotely possible that could lead you to a situation to explore that if you felt it
was necessary.
Thus, the court precluded cross-examination of the complainant regarding prior allegedly false
accusations of a sexual nature unless the complainant’s statements related directly to the charged
incident. We find this ruling to be contrary to established case law, which requires that the trial court
conduct a careful balancing of the complainant’s rights under the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j(1);
MSA 28.788(10)(1), and defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. In
People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338; 365 NW2d 120 (1984), our Supreme Court held that, while prior
sexual conduct is irrelevant to prove consent or for general impeachment, it may be properly admitted
for other limited purposes, such as to show bias, motive for false charge, or the fact of prior false
accusations. Id. at 348; see also People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 682, n 43; 521 NW2d 557
(1994). Here, defendant sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding allegations that she had
falsely accused others at the Children’s Home of sexually abusing her and that she had falsely claimed
on one occasion that she was pregnant. The importance of such impeachment evidence, in a case such
as this one, was well stated in People v Mikula, 84 Mich App 108, 115-116; 269 NW2d 195 (1978):
In a prosecution for a sexual offense, the defendant may cross-examine the
complainant regarding prior false accusations of a similar nature and, if she denies
making them, submit proof of such charges. People v Werner, 221 Mich 123; 190
NW 652 (1922), People v Wilson, 170 Mich 669; 137 NW 92 (1912), People v
Evans, 72 Mich 367; 40 NW 473 (1888). In a case such as the one before us, where
the verdict necessarily turned on the credibility of the complainant, it is imperative that
the defendant be given an opportunity to place before the jury evidence so
fundamentally affecting the complainant’s credibility.
We emphasize that the complainant is not to be put on trial for any prior sexual
activity. The evidence here discussed seeks to impeach her not because she is shown
to be unchaste but because she has lied concerning similar charges in the past. See
People v Wilson, supra, at 673-674.
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling in this case, there is no requirement that prior false allegations
of sexual misconduct be related to the charged incident before they may be used to impeach the
complainant. Because there was no direct corroborating evidence of the complainant’s allegations, and
her credibility was the ultimate issue in this case, we cannot say that the court’s error was harmless. See
People v Adamski, 198 Mich App 133, 140-141; 497 NW2d 546 (1993). Accordingly, we reverse
defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial. 1
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Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting cross-examination
of the complainant regarding the specific nature of allegations by defendant to the authorities of sexual
misconduct by the complainant that resulted in her being removed from defendant’s home and sent to
the Children’s Home of Detroit. We find no abuse of discretion. At trial, defense counsel was able to
elicit from the complainant on cross-examination that defendant had made certain “allegations” against
her, resulting in the complainant being removed from her home. Hence, defendant was able to show that
the complainant had a motive to fabricate the charges against defendant. Given that the specific nature
of defendant’s allegations against the complainant was not probative of defendant’s guilt or innocence,
and admission of this evidence would have violated the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j(1); MSA
28.788(10)(1), we find that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in limiting defendant’s cross
examination of the complainant.
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing expert testimony
concerning past behavior of the complainant. Defense counsel had moved several times for the
appointment of an expert to perform an independent psychological examination of the complainant. The
defense sought to have the expert testify regarding the victim’s prior false accusations and other prior
acts of a sexual nature to show that the victim’s story was not credible and that she had a motive to lie.
The court held that there was no legal basis to allow what amounted to personality profiling and expert
opinion of the complainant’s veracity. The court reasoned that to allow such testimony would infringe
upon the jury’s responsibility to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. We find no abuse of discretion.
See People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349; 537 NW2d 857 (1995). See also People v Graham, 173
Mich App 473, 477-478; 434 NW2d 165 (1988).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings as directed, including a new trial.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Wesley J. Nykamp
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Before the complainant is impeached on retrial with the contents of these documents, the trial court
must conduct another in camera review of the documents to determine whether an adequate foundation
can be laid for the trustworthiness of the contents of the psychological reports and juvenile home
records. For example, the court must determine the reliability of the evidence of false allegations, such
as whether the complainant acknowledged their falsity. See People v Garvie, 148 Mich App 444,
447-449; 384 NW2d 796 (1986). In the event that the trial court holds that the complainant may be
impeached with the contents of these documents, it must also ensure that any implicated statutory
privileges are properly waived.
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