PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH MCINTOSH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 166587
LC No. 92-010859
JESSIE LEE AGNEW,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 169875
LC No. 92-010859
KENNETH MCINTOSH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Smolenski and R.R. Lamb,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants were originally tried together before separate juries. Defendant Agnew was
convicted of felony murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83;
MSA 28.278, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction, with such sentence to be followed consecutively by concurrent terms of life in prison without
parole for the felony murder conviction and twenty to fifty years' imprisonment for the assault conviction.
Defendant Agnew appeals as of right in Docket No. 166587.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Defendant McIntosh was acquitted by the first jury of felony murder. The jury was unable to
reach a verdict on the remaining counts. After a second trial, defendant McIntosh was convicted of
assault with intent to murder and felony-firearm. Defendant McIntosh was sentenced to consecutive
terms of two years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction and eleven to twenty-five years'
imprisonment for the assault conviction. Defendant McIntosh appeals as of right in Docket No.
169875.
Defendants' convictions arise out of events occurring on September 9, 1992, when three men
entered a house at approximately 9 p.m. armed with guns and demanded money from the occupants.
Linda Hollingsworth was living in the h
ouse with her boyfriend, Sam Mack. Hollingsworth was an
admitted heroin user who also distributed drugs. Hollingsworth later identified the three men as
defendant Agnew, defendant McIntosh and Andre Manley, although she was initially reluctant to, or
could not, name the men. While the men were inside the house, they searched for money.
Hollingsworth was forced to lead two of the men around the house after she was told to remove her
clothing. All three men were eventually in the basement with Hollingsworth and Mack when they again
demanded money. Defendant Agnew shot Hollingsworth in the head, neck, arm and hand while Manley
apparently shot Mack before all three men left with money that Mack had given them. Hollingsworth
survived the attack but Mack, who also suffered multiple gunshot wounds, died from his injuries.
I
Defendant Agnew contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial
where several references were made before his jury to a statement defendant McIntosh made to the
police. The grant or denial of a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. A mistrial should
be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the defendant's rights and impairs his ability to get
a fair trial. People Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995).
Introduction of a nontestifying codefendant's powerfully incriminating statement violates a
defendant's right to confrontation.1 See US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, 20; People v Frazier
(After Remand), 446 Mich 539, 542, 567 (Brickley, J., with Griffin and Mallett, JJ., concurring), 568
(Riley, J., with Boyle, J., concurring); 521 NW2d 291 (1994); People v Banks, 438 Mich 408; 475
NW2d 769 (1991).
In this case, while references to defendant McIntosh's statement to the police were made before
defendant Agnew's jury, the actual substance of defendant McIntosh's statement was never brought out
before this jury. At most, defendant Agnew's jury could infer that the police learned of defendant
Agnew's identity through defendant McIntosh,2 not that defendant McIntosh implicated defendant
Agnew in this crime. Because there was other evidence that defendant McIntosh knew defendant
Agnew, we conclude that this inference did not powerfully incriminate defendant Agnew. Therefore,
defendant Agnew was not denied his right of confrontation. Frazier, supra at 541-452 (Brickley, J.,
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with Griffin and Mallett, JJ., concurring), 568 (Riley, J., with Boyle, J., concurring). Nor was this the
type of antagonistic evidence that required separate trials. People v Hana, 447 Mich 325; 524 NW2d
682 (1994). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant Agnew's motion for a
mistrial.
II
Defendant Agnew next cites error with the court's use of the same venire in picking both juries.
Having reviewed the record, we do not believe that the trial court's procedures prejudiced defendant
Agnew's substantial rights for several reasons. Hana, supra at 351-352. First, defendant Agnew failed
to raise an objection to the court's use of the same venire when picking both juries. Second, defendant
Agnew's claim of error is premised upon statements made during voir dire on March 15, 1993, about
McIntosh's confession. However, according to the lower court record, none of the venire members
who were present on that day were involved in jury selection for defendant Agnew's case because an
entire new panel of venire members was required on March 16, 1993, to conclude jury selection for
defendant McIntosh and to begin picking a jury for defendant Agnew. On March 16, 1993, there were
no references made to defendant McIntosh's statement in the voir dire for either defendant.
Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record that defendant Agnew was prejudiced by the use of the
same venire for jury selection for both defendants. Id. at 362.
III
Defendant Agnew next argues that the trial court erred when it did not give the jury a
supplemental instruction on aiding and abetting second-degree murder after the jury asked to be
reinstructed on the crimes of felony murder and second-degree murder. After the court reread the
instructions on the crimes, one juror questioned whether "Second Degree Murder is he actually killed
him?" When the court asked for clarification of this question, the juror just asked the court to again
explain the crime of second-degree murder, which the court did. Defendant Agnew did not object to
the court's handling of the matter. However, the prosecutor later voiced an objection that the court
should have instructed on aiding and abetting for second-degree murder because that was what the
juror was really asking about.
Because defendant Agnew did not object below, the issue is waived unless manifest injustice
would result. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545; 494 NW2d 737 (1993). Manifest
injustice has not been shown. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in responding to the jury's
questions when it was not clear what the jury wanted to know. The jury did not ask for reinstruction on
aiding and abetting. The jury was given a general instruction on aiding and abetting in the court's final
instructions. Had defendant Agnew objected to the court not reinstructing on aiding and abetting, the
court might have been swayed to so instruct. It appears that defendant Agnew did not object due to
trial strategy. Therefore, manifest injustice has not been shown.
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IV
Defendant Agnew argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its handling of the jury's
request to have the testimony of the prosecution's key witness, Linda Hollingsworth, read back. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion.
When a jury requests that testimony be read back to it both the reading and the extent of the
reading is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion. This Court reviews the trial court's decision
for an abuse of discretion. MCR 6.414(H); People v Howe, 392 Mich 670, 675; 221 NW2d 350
(1974).
In this case, the jury asked for all of Hollingsworth's testimony. The court reporter read back
the first day of her testimony. However, because the court reporter apparently did not have the
remaining portion of Hollingsworth's cross-examination readily available to read to the jury, the court
instructed the jury that it should resume deliberations in the meantime while the court reporter tried to
locate her records. If the jury still needed to hear the remaining testimony, the court would have the rest
of the testimony read back to the jury. The jury returned its verdict without a request for the remainder
of Hollingsworth's testimony.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. When the transcript was
not readily available, it was reasonable for the court to ask the jury to resume its deliberations. Because
the trial court did not foreclose the possibility of rereading the rest of Hollingsworth's testimony in the
near future if needed, error has not been shown. People v Austin, 209 Mich App 564, 569; 531
NW2d 811 (1995), lv gtd in part on other grounds ___ Mich ___; 1996 Mich LEXIS 2842 (decided
11/13/96, Docket No. 103521). See also People v Terry Williams, 134 Mich App 639, 642-643;
351 NW2d 878 (1985).
V
Defendant McIntosh contends that the trial court erred in allowing in evidence of other crimes,
contrary to MRE 404(b). The trial court did not abuse its discretion. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 76;
537 NW2d 909 (1995).
Evidence of other crimes committed as part of this incident was properly admitted by the trial
court under the res gestae exception for evidence of bad acts. Because the evidence was admissible
under the res gestae exception, this Court need not decide if the evidence was also admissible under
MRE 404(b). People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 5; 532 NW2d 885 (1995).
Defendant McIntosh did not object to the admission of the evidence that he was a drug dealer.
Therefore, this issue is not preserved. People v Mooney, 216 Mich App 367, 378; 549 NW2d 65
(1996). In any event, we find no error. The evidence of defendant McIntosh's drug dealing was
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relevant to motive where the prosecution's theory was that both Hollingsworth and defendant McIntosh
were dealing drugs and that defendant McIntosh therefore knew that Hollingsworth might have money in
her house. MRE 404(b). Moreover, defendant McIntosh stated during his direct examination that he
was a drug dealer. To the extent that the prosecutor questioned defendant McIntosh concerning the
source of his drug supply, we note that the court sustained defense counsel's objection.
VI
Defendant McIntosh argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions for a
mistrial and a new trial. Specifically, defendant McIntosh contends that the prosecutor erroneously
impeached him with a prior drug conviction and the length and details of the resulting sentence. A trial
court's decision on a motion for a mistrial or new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Cunningham, 215 Mich App 652, 645; 546 NW2d 715 (1996); People v Legrone, 205 Mich App
77, 83; 517 NW2d 270 (1994).
When a defendant testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached like that of any
other witness. People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 110; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). However, for the
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, only prior convictions containing an element of
dishonesty, false statement or theft are admissible. MRE 609(a). All other convictions are inadmissible
for impeachment. People v Frey, 168 Mich App 310, 318; 424 NW2d 43 (1988).
Moreover, evidence of a witness's pending charges or arrests not resulting in conviction
generally may not be used for impeachment purposes. People v Rappuhn, 390 Mich 266, 270-271;
212 NW2d 205 (1973). However, an exception to this general rule exists where the evidence is being
offered to show that pending charges give the witness a motive to testify falsely. People v Yarbrough,
183 Mich App 163; 454 NW2d 419 (199); People v Hall, 174 Mich App 686, 690-691; 436
NW2d 446 (1989). Cross-examination is a proper means to attempt to illicit the existence of a
possible interest. Hall, supra at 691.
In addition, it is generally error to cross-examine a defendant about the duration and details of
prior prison sentences to test his credibility. Rappuhn, supra at 270-274; People v Coffey, 153 Mich
App 311, 313; 395 NW2d 250 (1986). However, an exception to this rule exists where the sentence
status of a defendant gives the defendant a motive for testifying falsely. People v Clements, 91 Mich
App 103; 284 NW2d 132 (1979). Sentence time yet unserved has just as direct an impact on witness
motivation and credibility as does a promise of leniency to an accomplice. Id. at 108.
In this case, the prosecutor's questioning of defendant McIntosh concerning his prior arrest for
selling drugs and resulting probation was not in blatant disregard of MRE 609. Rather, the prosecutor's
general cross-examination of defendant McIntosh was an attempt to specifically impeach or contradict
defendant McIntosh's direct examination testimony that he had only testified in court one time
previously, i.e., in the previous trial of this case.3 The prosecutor's questioning in this regard initially
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went unchallenged. When finally challenged by defense counsel, a side bar ensued after which the
prosecutor made no further reference to defendant McIntosh's prior drug arrest or resulting probation
for the remainder of defendant McIntosh's cross-examination.
On redirect examination, defense counsel specifically elicited from defendant McIntosh that he
had been charged with and pleaded guilty to selling drugs, that there was not a trial, and that he had not
testified. The trial court later indicated that defense counsel, over the trial court's request to "stay away
from the whole area," insisted on presenting this evidence to rebut the prosecutor's previous cross
examination of defendant McIntosh.
During the prosecutor's recross-examination of defendant McIntosh, the prosecutor attempted
to establish over strenuous objection by defense counsel that a conviction in this case would result in a
probation violation. The prosecutor's purpose in so questioning defendant McIntosh was to establish
that the pending probation violation and possible prison sentence resulting from such violation gave
defendant McIntosh a motive to lie in this case. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor could go into
the fact that a conviction in this case could result in a probation violation, but that the prosecutor could
not go into the particular penalty resulting from such violation. Misunderstanding the court's ruling, the
prosecutor asked defendant McIntosh the following question: "If you're found guilty of another offense,
then you could go to jail for up to 20 years on your drug case; isn't that true?" The court sustained
defense counsel's immediate objection and no answer to the question was given. The prosecutor made
no further reference to possible penalties for a probation violation.
During jury instructions, the jurors received a curative instruction concerning the evidence of
defendant McIntosh's probation status as well as an instruction that the lawyers' questions did not
constitute evidence.
In denying defendant McIntosh's motions for mistrial and new trial, the court balanced any error
in the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant McIntosh with the following factors: (1) that defense
counsel insisted in specifically setting forth for the jury defendant McIntosh's prior drug conviction; (2)
that defendant McIntosh's previous drug conviction was not a "bombshell" to the jury in light of the
unchallenged evidence already in the record concerning defendant McIntosh's drug dealing; (3) that the
specific penalty for a probation violation did not come into evidence; and (4) that the jury presumably
followed their instructions, including the curative instruction. The court concluded that under the
circumstances of this case, defendant McIntosh had not been prejudiced. In agreeing with the court's
reasoning and conclusion, we further note that the complainant, who was the prosecution's primary
witness, was herself an admitted heroin addict and drug dealer. Thus, in light of this record, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant McIntosh's motions for a mistrial
or a new trial.
VII
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Defendant McIntosh next challenges the propriety of the prosecutor's opening statement and
closing argument. We do not believe error has been shown.
Defendant McIntosh failed to object to the prosecutor's opening statement. The issue may only
be reviewed for the first time on appeal if an instruction could not have cured the prejudicial effect or if
the failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich
643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
The prosecutor's opening statement did not involve an improper statement regarding the jurors'
civic duty. The prosecutor's comments were limited to the evidence. If there was any error here, it
could have been cured with a cautionary instruction and a miscarriage of justice has not been shown.
Id.
Defendant McIntosh also claims error with the prosecutor's rebuttal argument. We do not
believe the argument warrants reversal. The prosecutor was responding to a defense argument that
other suspects were not properly eliminated during the police department's investigation. The court
sustained defendant McIntosh's objection to the argument and gave the jury a cautionary instruction.
Because that instruction should have cured the error, reversal is not required. People v Spivey, 202
Mich App 719, 723-724; 509 NW2d 908 (1993); People v Vaughn, 200 Mich App 32, 39; 504
NW2d 2 (1993).
VIII
Defendant McIntosh next argues that the trial court erred by not barring the admission of his
statement to the police at his second trial pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We disagree.
"Collateral estoppel precludes litigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action
between the same parties where the prior proceeding culminated in a valid, final judgment and the issue
was (1) actually litigated, and (2) necessarily determined." People v Gates, 434 Mich 146, 154; 452
NW2d 627 (1990). There is no set formula for deciding whether relitigation of an issue is precluded. It
is sufficient to preclude the defense of collateral estoppel if a court is unable to determine on what basis
an acquitting jury reached its verdict. Id. at 155, 158. The doctrine will only apply where the basis of
the prior judgment can be ascertained clearly, definitely and unequivocally. Id. at 158.
The prior jury's acquittal of defendant McIntosh on the charge of felony murder does not
support the conclusion that the jury rejected the validity of defendant McIntosh's statement in total.
Defendant McIntosh's statement included assertions that he was a willing participant in the robbery and
the assault of Hollingsworth, but that he did not want to see anyone killed during the crime. The jury
may have found defendant McIntosh not guilty of felony murder based upon the portion of his statement
that he did not want anyone killed. The conflict in the content of defendant McIntosh's statement was
enough reason for the trial court to refuse to apply collateral estoppel to preclude the admission of the
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statement at the second trial. This Court, as well as the
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trial court, is unable to determine why the first jury acquitted defendant McIntosh and if the jury
completely, or only partially, rejected defendant McIntosh's statement. Id.
IX
Defendant McIntosh's last issue is a challenge to the great weight of the evidence. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. People v Herbert, 444 Mich
466, 477; 511 NW2d 654 (1993). While the prosecution's key witness may have had some credibility
problems, her testimony was not so incredible that the jury could not believe her and find defendant
McIntosh guilty. While defense witnesses offered a different version of events, their testimony was no
more credible than the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court therefore properly held
that the jury's verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Richard R. Lamb
1
We assume for the purpose of analysis that this rule of law is applicable to this case. However, we
note that it appears that defendant McIntosh was not a nontestifying codefendant where he waived his
Fifth Amendment rights concerning the events in question and testified before his own jury in the first
trial. Defendant Agnew has not addressed this issue and we decline to do so. But see People v Hana,
447 Mich 325, 361; 524 NW2d 682 (1994) (Where each defendant testified before his own jury in a
dual-jury trial, it became permissible for the prosecution to call that defendant as a witness in trial of the
codefendant.); People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 257; 537 NW2d 233 (1995) (The failure to call a
witness does not deny a defendant the right to confrontation.).
2
However, contrary to this supposition, we cannot help but note that the jury twice asked how the
police had come to suspect defendant Agnew in this case.
3
The attempted impeachment was not on a collateral matter, but rather went to defendant’s theory of
the case. Defendant’s theory was that he had not been at the scene of the crime and that he was being
framed by the investigating officer who took defendant’s incriminating statement. Defendant testified
that he had not made an incriminating statement to the officer, but rather had only told the officer the
names of those persons in his neighborhood known for carrying guns. Defendant testified that he knew
such persons because he was a drug dealer who made it his business to know everyone in his
neighborhood who would carry a gun because drug dealing is a dangerous business. Defendant further
contended that he had signed his statement only because the officer had beaten him. As part of
defendant’s theory of being framed, defendant sought to portray himself as inexperienced in the ways of
the court system, having only testified once before in court, when compared to the more experienced
investigating officer, who had testified many times.
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