EMMANUEL JOHNSON V MARY THOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EMMANUEL JOHNSON,
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 177956
LC No. 91-000409-DO
MARY THOMAS (GALLET),
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Markey and T.G. Kavanagh,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff originally brought this action seeking a divorce from defendant. He later amended his
complaint to seek a declaratory judgment as to the legal status of the parties. The trial court declared
that there was no valid marriage between the parties and awarded $3,000.00 in sanctions against
plaintiff for filing a frivolous suit pursuant to MCR 2.114(E) and (F). Plaintiff now appeals as of right.
We affirm.
First, plaintiff argues that he was denied justice because of the trial court’s bias. Plaintiff has not
preserved this issue for appeal because he did not move for disqualification below. In re Jackson, 199
Mich App 22, 29; 501 NW2d 182 (1993); In re Forfeiture of $53, 178 Mich App 480, 497; 444
NW2d 182 (1989). In any event, the record does not support plaintiff’s assertions.
Second, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside a stipulation
wherein defendant had agreed to withdraw her answer and be judged in default. Plaintiff correctly notes
that a stipulation is binding on the parties. Nuriel v Young Women’s Christian Assoc of Metropolitan
Detroit, 186 Mich App 141, 147; 463 NW2d 206 (1990). Any error on the part of the trial court in
setting aside the stipulation is harmless, however, because the stipulation had been fully performed by
the time defendant filed its motion to set aside the default, i.e., defendant’s answer had been withdrawn
and a default judgment entered. The stipulation did not waive defendant’s right under MCR 2.603(D)
to move to set aside the default judgment. A stipulation may not be construed to effect the waiver of a
right unless such an intent is plainly indicated. Nuriel, supra. The parties’ agreement could not be
* Former Supreme Court justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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construed to supersede the procedures and conditions of the court rule. In re Ford Estate, 206 Mich
App 705, 708; 522 NW2d 729 (1994). We therefore find no error.
We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding that defendant had
presented the good cause and meritorious defense necessary to set aside a default judgment. See
Harvey Cadillac Co v Rahain, 204 Mich App 355, 358; 514 NW2d 257 (1994). A substantial
defect in the proceedings upon which the default was based can constitute good cause for setting aside
a default. Gavulic v Boyer, 195 Mich App 20, 24-25; 489 NW2d 124 (1992). Here, the trial court’s
failure to consider defendant’s filed objections to the stipulation and entry of the default judgment before
the trial court entered the order constituted good cause for setting aside the default judgment.
Defendant further demonstrated a meritorious defense when she argued that the amended complaint
was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Defendant adequately supported that defense by attaching
copies of opinions and orders from courts in Iowa and Texas and from the federal bankruptcy court
demonstrating that the issues and parties in those actions were identical to the instant action. King v
Mich Consolidated Gas Co, 177 Mich App 531, 535; 442 NW2d 714 (1989).
Third, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in awarding sanctions against him for filing a
frivolous claim. We find no clear error in the court’s determination that plaintiff’s claim was frivolous.
Siecinski v First State Bank of East Detroit, 209 Mich App 459, 466; 531 NW2d 768 (1995).
Using an objective standard of reasonableness, plaintiff’s counsel did not sufficiently inquire into the
facts before filing this action. Briarwood v Faber’s Fabrics, Inc, 163 Mich App 784, 792-794; 415
NW2d 310 (1987). When an attorney signs a document, that attorney is certifying that the document is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law. MCR 2.114(D); In re Pitre, 202 Mich App 241, 243-244;
508 NW2d 140 (1993). In this case, the facts do not support plaintiff’s allegation of a valid marriage in
Texas at the time plaintiff filed either the complaint or amended complaint. Because the validity of the
Iowa marriage was in issue when plaintiff filed his first complaint, that complaint cannot be considered as
unfounded. By the time plaintiff filed his amended complaint, which alleged a common law marriage in
Texas, however, plaintiff and his counsel should have known, with reasonable inquiry, that there was no
valid marriage in Texas.
Although plaintiff correctly notes that Tex Code Ann 2.22 provides that a marriage deemed
void because of an impediment becomes valid when that impediment is removed, he ignores the facts
that a divorce was entered regarding his Texas marriage before the impediment was removed; further,
instead of moving to validate the marriage according to Tex Code Ann 2.22 or 1.91, plaintiff specifically
requested that the Texas court declare his marriage void from its inception. In addition, in a motion
requesting that the trial court give full faith and credit to the Texas decree voiding the divorce decree,
plaintiff acknowledged that the Texas decree voided his marriage. In any event, under Tex Code Ann
1.91, plaintiff missed the obvious statute of limitations for seeking a declaration of a common law
marriage. Thus, at the time plaintiff filed his amended complaint, there was no basis in law or fact for
seeking a declaration of a valid Texas marriage between the parties. Sanctions were therefore
appropriate pursuant to the mandatory sanction provision of MCR 2.114(E).
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The trial court also correctly imposed the $3,000.00 in sanctions against plaintiff for filing a
frivolous claim as provided in MCR 2.114(F). Sanctions may be imposed where the claim is frivolous
and the party’s primary purpose in initiating the action is to harass, embarrass or injure the prevailing
party. Dep’t of Natural Resources v Bayshore Associates, Inc, 210 Mich App 71, 86; 533 NW2d
593 (1995). Plaintiff’s actions in pursuing this matter in numerous courts, including filing suit in Oakland
County on most of the same issues at the time this action was pending, demonstrate that his primary
purpose was to harass defendant. His continued vigorous arguments for the finding of a valid Texas
marriage in the face of overwhelmingly opposite facts further reveal his purpose to harass and support a
finding that the instant appeal is frivolous and vexatious. MCR 7.216(C)(1)(a); Briarwood, supra at
795. Consequently, we also order that sanctions are to be assessed against plaintiff for this frivolous
appeal in the amount of $1,000.00. Briarwood, supra; MCR 7.216(C).
Plaintiff correctly argues he was entitled to an award of mandatory costs as the losing party in
the motion to set aside default judgment as provided in MCR 2.603(D)(4). Plaintiff apparently failed to
allege or prove, however, any “taxable costs incurred by [plaintiff] in reliance on the default,” MCR
2.603(D)(4), so no costs were awarded at the hearing to set the default judgment aside or at any
subsequent hearing. 1 Because plaintiff has been on notice since at least October 1994 that the trial
court could not assess costs under the court rule absent a bill of costs or other appropriate accounting
yet he failed to submit those costs to either the trial court or this Court, we find that plaintiff has waived
his right to recover his costs under MCR 2.603(D)(4).
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award costs for
defendant’s violation of certain orders of the court and for failing to enforce its orders. Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. Barlow v John CraneHoudaille, Inc, 191 Mich App 244, 251; 477 NW2d 133 (1991). The total costs of $4,000.00 are
joint and several, to be imposed upon both Ms. Randall, the person who signed the frivolous pleadings
in both this Court and the trial court, and the plaintiff per MCR 2.114(E).
In addition, we believe it appropriate at this time to remind counsel and plaintiff, who is also
apparently an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Michigan, of their professional
responsibilities and specifically refer them to Rules 3.6 and 3.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
/s/ Thomas Giles Kavanagh
1
In the trial court’s October 12, 1994 order denying plaintiff’s motion for costs, the court found that the
“motion is unsupported by any evidence as to the amount of costs incurred.” Notably, this order was
entered seven months after the March 1994 hearing where the trial court frst acknowledged that
i
plaintiff was entitled to costs and fees. Our review of the record shows that in the seven months
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between these two events, plaintiff did not submit to the trial court a list of taxable costs incurred in
reliance on the default. Clearly, it was plaintiff’s obligation to inform the court of these costs, and
plaintiff has failed to cite any authority for the proposition that the court had to award them absent
plaintiff’s bill of costs.
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