PEOPLE OF MI V JOEY ALLEN SIMMONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 22, 1996
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 186455
LC No. 94-004557-FC
JOEY ALLEN SIMMONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Griffin, and M. H. Cherry,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL
750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), and sentenced to a term of six to twenty years' imprisonment. He appeals
of right, and we affirm.
Defendant's victim was thirteen years old and was the daughter of friends of defendant and his
wife. The victim testified that she frequently spent the night at defendant's home and that he had begun
assaulting her when she was nine years old. The victim's parents became concerned about her behavior
and questioned her. She informed them of the assaults and they notified the police, who investigated the
allegations. Defendant confessed to the police. At trial, defendant presented an alibi defense. He
claimed that his confession had been untruthful and had been induced by promises of leniency. The trial
court held a Walker1 hearing and found that the confession was voluntary.
Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in finding his confession to have been voluntary and
in permitting it to go before the jury. We disagree. A trial court's ruling on the issue of voluntariness is
reviewed by this Court de novo. People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 557; 194 NW2d 709 (1972);
People v Brannon, 194 Mich App 121, 131; 486 NW2d 83 (1992). However, deference is given to
the trial court's assessment of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, and the trial
court's findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. People v Young, 212 Mich App
630, 634; 538 NW2d 456 (1995). Where a determination of voluntariness depends largely on witness
credibility, this Court should defer to the trial court's findings. People v Heffron, 175 Mich App 543,
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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547; 438 NW2d 253 (1988). Defendant averred that he was innocent and that he had confessed only
because the police officer who interviewed him had advised that the police would “come down real
hard” if he did not but would “go easy” on him if he did so. The police officer denied that any promises
of leniency had been made. The trial court found the police officer to have been the more credible
witness, and there is nothing in the record that indicates that the trial court's finding was clearly
erroneous.
Next, defendant asserts that admission of the victim’s testimony regarding uncharged sexual
assaults violated MRE 404(b), which generally prohibits evidence of other wrongs. We disagree. This
Court reviews trial court determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 517; 503 NW2d 457 (1993). Similar acts evidence
may be introduced under the following circumstances:
First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b);
second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice;
fourth, that the trial court may, upon request provide a limiting instruction to the jury.
[People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993).]
Here, the victim's testimony was offered to bolster her credibility, which was a proper purpose.
In People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410, 414-415; 213 NW2d 97 (1973), the Supreme Court held:
The principal issue confronting a jury in most statutory rape cases, and
particularly so where the charged offense is attempted statutory rape, is the credibility
of the alleged victim. Limiting her testimony to the specific act charged and not allowing
her to mention acts leading up to the assault would seriously undermine her credibility in
the eyes of the jury. Common experience indicates that sexual intercourse and attempts
thereat are most frequently the culmination of prior acts of sexual intimacy. [Emphasis in
original.]
While DerMartzex was decided prior to the adoption of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, it was cited
recently in People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604; 439 NW2d 471 (1992), a CSC case involving child
victims, both of whom testified against the defendants and whose testimony contained details of prior
sexual offenses committed against them. This Court concluded:
[O]ur review of the challenged testimony of each of the victims leads us to the
conclusion that the testimony challenged by [defendant] would be admissible pursuant to
MRE 404(b) and People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410; 213 NW2d 97 (1973).
[Wilson, supra at 615.]
Finally, defendant argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of the prior acts
testimony, because it deprived him of his alibi defense. We disagree. Witnesses for the prosecution,
including the victim, her parents, and another witness testified that defendant assaulted the victim on
March 25, 1994. Defendant presented an alibi for that date that was corroborated by the testimony of
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his parents, his brothers, his wife, and the girlfriend of one of his brothers. The jury was charged with
evaluating the credibility of those witnesses and it apparently believed the prosecution witnesses. In
addition, defendant confessed to the crime. The record does not indicate that admission of the victim's
testimony about other assaults unfairly prejudiced defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael H. Cherry
1
People v Walker, 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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