AFSCME LOCAL 25 V COUNTY OF WAYNE (Authored Opinion)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
AFSCME LOCAL 25, AFSCME LOCAL 101,
AFSCME LOCAL 409, and AFSCME LOCAL
1659,
FOR PUBLICATION
August 2, 2012
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
and
MICHIGAN AFSCME COUNCIL 25,
Intervening Plaintiff/CounterDefendant-Appellee,
v
No. 306414
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 10-012269-CZ
WAYNE COUNTY,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellant,
and
WAYNE COUNTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER,
Advance Sheets Version
Defendant-Appellant.
AFSCME LOCAL 25, AFSCME LOCAL 101,
AFSCME LOCAL 409, and AFSCME LOCAL
1659,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
and
MICHIGAN AFSCME COUNCIL 25,
Intervening Plaintiff/CounterDefendant-Appellee,
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v
No. 306415
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 10-012269-CZ
WAYNE COUNTY,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellant,
and
WAYNE COUNTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Advance Sheets Version
Before: M.J. KELLY, P.J., and FITZGERALD and DONOFRIO, JJ.
DONOFRIO, J.
Defendants, Wayne County (or the county) and the Wayne County Chief Executive
Officer (the CEO), appeal both as of right and by leave granted the trial court’s orders granting
partial summary disposition in favor of intervening plaintiff, Michigan AFSCME Council 25, on
its claim that defendants unlawfully imposed a wage reduction for county employees, and
denying defendants’ motion for reconsideration regarding the applicability of governmental
immunity. Because defendants were not required to obtain approval from the Wayne County
Commission before implementing the terms of the “last best offer,” we reverse and remand for
entry of summary disposition in defendants’ favor.
Plaintiffs (four AFSCME local unions) and defendants were parties to a collectivebargaining agreement (CBA). After the CBA expired, the parties unsuccessfully engaged in
negotiations to reach a successor agreement. On October 21, 2010, plaintiffs filed this action,
alleging that defendants were in violation of the Wayne County charter and had engaged in
improper collective-bargaining practices. In a December 1, 2010, letter to plaintiffs, Mark
Dukes, director of Wayne County’s labor relations division, declared that negotiations had
reached an impasse and indicated that the county would be implementing the terms of its “last
best offer” (LBO), which required union employees to accept a 20-percent wage decrease and
other concessions. The LBO was issued through the labor relations division, under the authority
of the CEO, and was not submitted to or approved by the Wayne County Commission. The
county filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court
granted the motion to intervene of Council 25. Like plaintiffs, Council 25 alleged that the CEO
violated Wayne County ordinances by imposing the wage decrease without commission
approval.
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The trial court granted defendants summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claims for lack of
jurisdiction 1 and, with respect to intervening plaintiff Council 25, the court granted partial
summary disposition in its favor regarding the CEO’s failure to obtain commission approval for
the wage decrease. The trial court’s order invalidated the CEO’s imposition of the LBO because
it fixed the rates of compensation for county employees without the commission’s approval. The
court stated that the “matter will proceed on the issue of damages.” The court specifically
“declare[d] that under the Wayne County Charter and ordinances, to be lawful, any mandate that
fixes the rate of compensation for county employees . . . must have the approval of the Wayne
County Commission.”
Defendants moved for reconsideration or, alternatively, for a stay of proceedings pending
appeal, arguing for the first time that they were immune from suit pursuant to the governmental
tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., for violations of a county ordinance.
Defendants contended that the trial court therefore erred by granting partial summary disposition
in favor of Council 25. The trial court denied defendants’ motion and request for a stay.
Defendants now appeal in this Court.
“This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary
disposition.” Latham v Barton Malow Co, 480 Mich 105, 111; 746 NW2d 868 (2008). “A
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by
the pleadings alone.” Smith v Stolberg, 231 Mich App 256, 258; 586 NW2d 103 (1998).
Summary disposition under subrule (C)(8) is appropriate when a claim “is so clearly
unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could establish the claim and
justify recovery.” Id.
Public employment labor relations are governed by the public employment relations act
(PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq. The underlying purpose of PERA “is to resolve labormanagement strife through collective bargaining.” Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n, IAFF Local 344
v Detroit, 482 Mich 18, 28-29; 753 NW2d 579 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Following the expiration of a CBA, PERA requires that a public employer bargain collectively
and in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
that are “mandatory subjects of bargaining . . . .” Jackson Community College Classified &
Technical Ass’n, MESPA v Jackson Community College, 187 Mich App 708, 711-712; 468
NW2d 61 (1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted). These subjects “survive the expiration
of an agreement by operation of law until an impasse in negotiation occurs.” Id. at 712.
Consequently, “[b]efore an impasse in the bargaining process is reached, neither party may take
unilateral action with respect to a mandatory subject of bargaining . . . .” Id.
Section 15 of PERA, MCL 423.215(1), provides:
1
The trial court determined that jurisdiction was proper in the Michigan Employment Relations
Commission. That ruling pertained to plaintiffs only, not to intervening plaintiff Council 25, and
it is not at issue in this appeal.
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A public employer shall bargain collectively with the representatives of its
employees as described in [MCL 423.211] and may make and enter into
collective bargaining agreements with those representatives. Except as otherwise
provided in this section, for the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
to perform the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or to negotiate an
agreement, or any question arising under the agreement, and to execute a written
contract, ordinance, or resolution incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but this obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or make a concession.
In constructing this provision, our Supreme Court has recognized:
The primary obligation placed upon the parties in a collective bargaining
setting is to meet and confer in good faith. . . . The law does not mandate that the
parties ultimately reach agreement, nor does it dictate the substance of the terms
on which the parties must bargain. In essence the requirements of good faith
bargaining is [sic] simply that the parties manifest . . . an attitude and conduct that
will be conducive to reaching an agreement. [Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v
Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 53-54; 214 NW2d 803 (1974).]
If the parties have negotiated in good faith regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining, their
statutory duty under PERA has been met. Id. at 55.
Intrinsic to the duty to collectively bargain in good faith is the authority to unilaterally
implement an LBO when negotiations have reached an impasse. The parties here do not dispute
this authority, which is a product of the evolution of the common law as it pertains to collective
bargaining. 2 See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n, 391 Mich at 56; AFSCME Council 25 v Wayne
Co, 152 Mich App 87, 93-94, 97; 393 NW2d 889 (1986). Council 25 argues, however, that
because the LBO in this case affected wages and benefits, commission approval was required
before the terms of the LBO could be implemented. This argument contravenes the notion that
the authority to implement an LBO when an impasse is reached is part of the negotiation process
itself. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “impasse and an accompanying
implementation of proposals constitute an integral part of the bargaining process.” Brown v Pro
Football, Inc, 518 US 231, 239; 116 S Ct 2116; 135 L Ed 2d 521 (1996). Similarly, the authority
to unilaterally implement the terms of an LBO following impasse has been characterized as a
“bargaining ‘tactic[]’. . . utilized in the collective bargaining process.” Brown v Pro Football,
Inc, 50 F3d 1041, 1054 (DC Cir, 1995), aff’d 518 US 231 (1996). Thus, the implementation of
an LBO is a continuation of the collective-bargaining process and inherent to the statutory
obligation to negotiate in good faith to reach a CBA. Because the authority to implement the
2
With the exception of MCL 423.207a(4), which applies to public school employers, there is no
statutory authority granting public employers the right to take unilateral action following a
collective-bargaining impasse.
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LBO was integral to the negotiation process, and § 4.323(b) of the Wayne County Charter
required the labor relations division to “act for the County under the direction of the CEO in the
negotiation and administration of collective bargaining contracts,” commission approval was not
required before the LBO could be implemented.
In support of its argument that commission approval was required, Council 25 relies on,
and the trial court found dispositive, Wayne County Ordinance 90-847, 3 pertaining to the
rulemaking authority of county agencies. “The rules of statutory construction apply to
ordinances . . . .” Wayne Co v Wayne Co Retirement Comm, 267 Mich App 230, 244; 704
NW2d 117 (2005). “When interpreting statutory language, the primary goal is to discern and
give effect to the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the language of the
statute.” Id. at 243. When language is unambiguous, courts must apply the provision as written.
Id. We accord words used in a provision their common and ordinary meanings and “must ‘give
effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render
any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.’” Id. at 244, quoting State Farm Fire & Cas Co v
Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002).
Ordinance 90-847, § 3(a) provides:
Subject to county commission approval as hereinafter provided, each
county agency shall formulate and promulgate rules to prescribe the organization,
procedures and methods by which it serves the public or regulates any public or
private activity, process, facility, operation or agency. These rules shall also
specify where, when and how a person may obtain information from or submit
requests to the agency for service, advice and other assistance.
Ordinance 90-847, § 2, defines “rule” as follows:
Rule means a directive, statement, standard, policy, regulation,
proclamation, ruling, determination, order, instruction or interpretation, which is
of general effect and future application, which applies, implements or makes more
specific those express laws enforced, implemented or administered by an officer
or agency, or which prescribes the organization, procedure or practice of that
office or agency, including the amendment, suspension or rescission thereof.
Ordinance 90-847, § 3, sets forth requirements that must be met before an agency adopts a rule,
including:
(f) Before adopting a rule, an agency shall give notice of a public hearing
and offer any person a reasonable opportunity to present data, views and
arguments pertaining to it. Unless otherwise provided by law, the notice shall be
3
The provisions contained in Ordinance 90-847 are also found in Chapter 5 of the Wayne
County Code of Ordinances.
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given at least ten days before the hearing and at least 20 days before adoption of
the rule. The notice shall include all of the following:
(1) An exact reference to the statutory, charter or ordinance authority
under which the rule is made.
(2) A concise summary of the key terms of the rule, and its proposed
effective date.
(3) The time and place of the public hearing, and how, where and when
data and viewpoints may be submitted to the agency other than at the hearing.
(g) Before setting a public hearing on a proposed rule, agencies subject to
supervision of the chief executive officer shall also obtain his or her approval. All
county agencies shall provide a copy of a proposed rule to the corporation
counsel, who shall rule on the legality and liability potential of the proposed rule.
The legislative research bureau shall advise the agency as to matters of form,
citation, classification, arrangement, numbering, cross-reference, textual clarity
and the need or not for county commission approval.
(h) Each agency shall keep a mailing list of persons who ask notice of
proposed rules. A renewal card shall be sent to each person each January to
update and purge the list. Notice shall be mailed first class to all listed persons as
to each pertinent public hearing.
(i) The agency shall publish the notice of public hearing as required by
law or ordinance, and if none, then in a manner best calculated to give notice to
those persons likely to be affected by the proposed rule, such as: a newspaper of
general circulation, or a trade journal, or neighborhood newsletters, depending on
circumstances.
* * *
(k) An agency shall submit the proposed rule, revised when appropriate
due to the public hearing, to the county commission by delivering six copies to
the clerk thereof. The chairman shall refer the proposed rule to the most
appropriate standing committee or committees for prompt consideration. The
clerk shall retain one copy for commission files, and post one copy on a common
bulletin board to which other commissioners may refer. The proposed rule shall
be considered by the committee to which transmitted within 15 days. If approved
by all committee members, it shall be deemed approved by the commission, and
so certified by the clerk to the issuing agency. If not approved, the proposed rule
shall be forwarded to and scheduled for full board action within 30 days of
receipt. If not rejected within 30 days of receipt, a rule is effective.
* * *
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(o) A rule shall not be valid and enforceable unless processed in
substantial compliance with the notice requirements of this chapter. Failure,
however, to give a person notice of a proposed rule shall not invalidate the rule if
those persons who are in fact notified are reasonably representative of the
interests and viewpoints of the classes affected by the rule.
Ordinance 90-847, § 6, exempts certain rules from the requirements of notice and commission
approval, including “[a] determination, decision, order or opinion in a case,” “[a] declaratory
ruling or opinion as applied to a fixed and stated set of facts,” and “[a]n individual decision by an
agency to exercise or not to exercise a legal power, although private rights and interests are
affected by that decision.” The exemptions in § 6, however, are subject to Ordinance 90-847,
§ 7, which provides, in pertinent part:
A memorandum, directive, order or determination which governs the
internal management, organization or procedures of an agency, but which also
addresses or substantially impacts upon the following matters, shall not be valid
and of effect unless in full compliance with the commission approval
requirements of this chapter:
(1) Fix the rate of compensation for county officers and employees,
including fringe benefits, per diem rates and lump sum payments in lieu of
reimbursed expenses, where these rates are not otherwise fixed by contract or law.
[Emphasis added.]
Council 25 principally relies on Ordinance 90-847, § 7, and contends that commission
approval before implementation of the LBO was required because the LBO affected county
employees’ rates of compensation and benefits. The plain language of § 7, however, pertains to
“the internal management, organization or procedures of an agency[.]” Moreover, as is readily
apparent from the other quoted provisions of Ordinance 90-847, the ordinance involves agency
rulemaking and is wholly inapplicable to collective bargaining and negotiations, a matter that
§ 4.323 of the Wayne County Charter imparted to the labor relations division, under the direction
of the CEO. Because Ordinance 90-847 does not apply to the collective-bargaining process, the
trial court erred by relying on the ordinance and granting partial summary disposition for Council
25. As previously discussed, the labor relations division, under the CEO’s direction, was
authorized to implement the LBO as part of the negotiation process in an effort to reach a
successor CBA. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to summary disposition in their favor.
Further, we note that MCL 46.11(g) empowered the commission to approve county
employee salaries once a successor CBA was reached. That provision states:
A county board of commissioners, at a lawfully held meeting, may do 1 or
more of the following:
* * *
(g) Prescribe and fix the salaries and compensation of employees of the
county if not fixed by law . . . .
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Under this provision, once negotiations resulted in a successor CBA, the commission had the
authority to approve employee salaries before the new CBA took effect. The parties indicated at
oral argument that this process is the one that was actually used when plaintiffs and defendants
reached a successor CBA at year’s end 2011. Thus, the commission ultimately had the
opportunity to ratify the successor CBA, including approving employee salaries, and did so
before the CBA took effect. Notably, the procedure outlined in Ordinance 90-847, § 3, was not
employed when the parties reached a successor CBA. Rather, the CBA was placed on the
commission’s agenda and simply ratified. The process that was used confirms our conclusion
that Ordinance 90-847 is inapplicable in these circumstances. Moreover, application of the
ordinance in these circumstances would conflict with the Wayne County Charter because it
would infringe on the exclusive authority conferred on the executive to negotiate CBAs. See
Wayne County Charter, § 4.323. To accept the interpretation of Council 25 would require the
legislative branch, the commission, to intrude into the negotiation process, exclusively granted to
the executive, rather than to perform its overseeing function in ratifying or rejecting the CBA
upon its submission.
Having determined that the trial court erred by denying summary disposition for
defendants, we need not address defendants’ argument that governmental immunity precluded
plaintiffs from proceeding on the issue of damages.
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in defendants’ favor.
Defendants, being the prevailing parties, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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