PEOPLE OF MI V SEAN MICHAEL KERN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 25, 2010
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 289478
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-001222-FH
SEAN MICHAEL KERN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: METER, P.J., and MURRAY and BECKERING, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case involves the interplay of provisions in the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.1 et
seq., and Corrections Code, MCL 791.201 et seq., pertaining to lifetime electronic monitoring.
Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520c(1)(a)
(victim under 13 years of age), arising out of a January 13, 2008 incident. The trial court
sentenced him to five years’ probation, with 365 days to be served in jail. Defendant was also
ordered to register as required by the Michigan Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL
28.721 et seq. The prosecution appeals by delayed leave granted the trial court’s refusal to
sentence defendant to lifetime electronic monitoring and, more specifically, the court’s
conclusion that such monitoring applies only to persons who have been released on parole, from
prison, or both. We affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree CSC pursuant to a plea
agreement under which the prosecution agreed to dismiss a second count of second-degree CSC
and an additional count of selling or furnishing alcohol to a minor, MCL 436.1701(1), and to
recommend that defendant receive a five-year probationary sentence with no more than one year
to be served in jail. The trial court also granted the prosecution’s motion to amend the
information to state that a second-degree CSC conviction carries an additional penalty of lifetime
electronic monitoring. At the sentencing hearing, the court adopted the prosecution’s
recommended sentence of five years’ probation, with 365 days to be served in jail.
The probation officer assigned to defendant subsequently requested that the trial court
amend the judgment of sentence to require lifetime electronic monitoring. At a resentencing
hearing, the court denied the request. The court considered the statutes at issue, an opinion by
Kent Circuit Judge Dennis Kolenda in an unrelated case, which held that lifetime electronic
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monitoring does not apply to probationers under the current statutory scheme, and the legislative
analysis undertaken by the prosecution. The trial court took note of the severity of the offense by
commenting that “I think we can all agree that the, we find any sexual attack on a child 13 years
or younger is an abhorrent attack against not only the child, but against society and needs to be
punished severely. There’s no question about that.” The court expressed concerns, however,
about funding the monitoring and the issue of lifetime sanctions. In conclusion, the court stated:
I think the whole thing is in a tremendous state of flux. Certainly we
appreciate your efforts to get through this cloud, but I have to balance your
analysis against Judge Kolenda’s analysis.
I don’t think, I don’t think anybody in the state at this point is prepared to
either affirm or deny, absent another look at these various positions. It is very
clouded at this point.
So at this point I’m going to deny the motion to install this lifetime tether
without prejudice, and we’ll take another look at it and you can bring it later as
well.
The trial court subsequently entered a sentence disposition specifying that defendant is not
subject to lifetime electronic monitoring.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES FOR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Whether defendant is subject to the statutory requirement of lifetime electronic
monitoring involves statutory construction, which is reviewed de novo. People v Osantowski,
481 Mich 103, 107; 748 NW2d 799 (2008).
“The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.”
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The statute’s words are the most reliable indicator
of the Legislature’s intent and should be interpreted based on their ordinary meaning and the
context within which they are used in the statute.” People v Lowe, 484 Mich 718, 721-722; 773
NW2d 1 (2009). An unambiguous statute is enforced as written. People v Holder, 483 Mich
168, 172; 767 NW2d 423 (2009). It is only where statutory language is ambiguous that a court
may look outside the statute to ascertain legislative intent. Id. A statutory provision is
ambiguous if it irreconcilably conflicts with another provision or is equally susceptible to more
than one meaning. People v Gardner, 482 Mich 41, 50 n 12; 753 NW2d 78 (2008).
In general, “[s]tatutes that address the same subject or share a common purpose are in
pari materia and must be read together as a whole.” People v Harper, 479 Mich 599, 621; 739
NW2d 523 (2007) (emphasis omitted). No one provision may be viewed in a vacuum. See
Jansson v Dep’t of Corrections, 147 Mich App 774, 777; 383 NW2d 152 (1985). “The object of
the in pari materia rule is to give effect to the legislative purpose as found in harmonious
statutes.” People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998).
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III. APPLICABLE LAW
The Penal Code expressly provides for its provisions to be “construed according to the
fair import of their terms, to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law.” MCL 750.2.
Before August 2006, MCL 750.520c(2) provided that a second-degree CSC conviction was
punishable by “imprisonment for not more than 15 years.” As amended by 2006 PA 171,
effective August 28, 2006, subsection (2) provides:
Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree is a felony punishable as
follows:
(a) By imprisonment for not more than 15 years.
(b) In addition to the penalty specified in subdivision (a), the court shall
sentence the defendant to lifetime electronic monitoring under section 520n if the
violation involved sexual contact committed by an individual 17 years of age or
older against an individual less than 13 years of age.[1] [MCL 750.520c(2)
(emphasis added and footnote omitted).]
Section 520n of the Penal Code was also enacted as part of 2006 PA 171, effective
August 28, 2006. MCL 750.520n(1) provides:
A person convicted under section 520b or 520c for criminal sexual
conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual
less than 13 years of age shall be sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring as
provided under section 85 of the corrections code of 1953, 1953 PA 232, MCL
791.285. [Emphasis added.]
The Department of Corrections was created under the Corrections Code. MCL 791.201.
Its exclusive jurisdiction includes, but is not limited to, probation officers, the administration of
probation orders, paroles, penal institutions, and the “lifetime electronic monitoring program
established under section 85.” MCL 791.204. The lifetime electronic monitoring program was
established by 2006 PA 172, effective August 28, 2006. MCL 791.285 provides:
(1) The lifetime electronic monitoring program is established in the
department. The lifetime electronic monitoring program shall implement a
system of monitoring individuals released from parole, prison, or both parole and
prison who are sentenced by the court to lifetime electronic monitoring. The
lifetime electronic monitoring program shall accomplish all of the following:
1
A similar provision was added to MCL 750.520b, the statute governing first-degree CSC.
MCL 750.520(2)(d). Because a defendant convicted of first-degree CSC may not be sentenced
to probation, however, the concerns addressed herein do not apply to that statute. See People v
Nyx, 479 Mich 112, 117, n 8; 734 NW2d 548 (2007); People v Wells, 138 Mich App 450, 451;
360 NW2d 219 (1984).
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(a) By electronic means, track the movement and location of each
individual from the time the individual is released on parole or from prison until
the time of the individual’s death.
(b) Develop methods by which the individual’s movement and location
may be determined, both in real time and recorded time, and recorded information
retrieved upon request by the court or a law enforcement agency.
(2) An individual who is sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring shall
wear or otherwise carry an electronic monitoring device as determined by the
department under the lifetime electronic monitoring program in the manner
prescribed by that program and shall reimburse the department or its agent for the
actual cost of electronically monitoring the individual.
(3) As used in this section, “electronic monitoring” means a device by
which, through global positioning system satellite or other means, an individual’s
movement and location are tracked and recorded. [Emphasis added.]
IV. ANALYSIS
Considering MCL 750.520c, MCL 750.520n, and MCL 791.285 together, we agree with
the trial court that lifetime electronic monitoring applies only to persons who have been released
on parole, from prison, or both and, therefore, does not apply to defendant, who was sentenced to
five years’ probation, with 365 days to be served in jail.
Standing alone, the terms of MCL 750.520c and MCL 750.520n indicate that all
defendants convicted of second-degree CSC for conduct committed by an individual 17 years old
or older against an individual less than 13 years old are subject to lifetime electronic monitoring,
without exception. Both statutes unambiguously state that such defendants shall be sentenced to
lifetime electronic monitoring. MCL 750.520c(2)(b); MCL 750.520n(1). The term “shall” in a
statute generally indicates a mandatory, rather than permissive, duty. People v Francisco, 474
Mich 82, 87; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).
But subsections 520c(2)(b) and 520n(1) are only portions of longer statutes. When one
statute explicitly references provisions of another statute, those provisions are applicable and
binding as though incorporated and reenacted in the statute under consideration. Attorney
General ex rel Dep’t of Natural Resources v Sanilac Co Drain Comm’r, 173 Mich App 526, 531;
434 NW2d 181 (1988). The referenced provisions must be treated as though they are part of the
statute at issue. Id. Subsection 520c(2)(b) states that defendants shall be sentenced to lifetime
electronic monitoring “under section 520n,” and subsection 520n(1) states that defendants “shall
be sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring as provided under section 85 of the corrections
code of 1953, 1953 PA 232, MCL 791.285.” Those phrases define the scope of the lifetime
electronic monitoring requirement, meaning that the requirement is limited to the dictates of
MCL 791.285. See People v Perks, 259 Mich App 100, 106; 672 NW2d 902 (2003); Sanilac Co
Drain Comm’r, 173 Mich App at 531.
MCL 791.285(1) requires the Department of Corrections, through the lifetime electronic
monitoring program, to “implement a system of monitoring individuals released from parole,
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prison, or both parole and prison who are sentenced by the court to lifetime electronic
monitoring.” Likewise, MCL 791.285(1)(a) provides that the monitoring is to occur “from the
time the individual is released on parole or from prison until the time of the individual’s death.”
Under section 285, the Department of Corrections must implement a lifetime electronic
monitoring program only for those persons who are released on parole, from prison, or both.
Only persons who are sentenced to prison can be released from prison or released on parole.
Accordingly, as will be explained further, such monitoring does not apply to persons put on
probation or sent to jail.
The Legislature often uses the term “imprisonment” to mean confinement in jail or
confinement in prison. People v Spann, 469 Mich 904, 905; 668 NW2d 904 (2003). But it is
clear that the terms “jail” and “prison” have distinct legal meanings. See Kent Co Prosecutor v
Kent Co Sheriff, 425 Mich 718, 730 n 10; 391 NW2d 341 (1986). A “[j]ail” is defined in the
Corrections Code as “a facility that is operated by a local unit of government . . . .” MCL
791.262(1)(c). “Prison” is synonymous with a penitentiary, not a city or county jail. See People
v Harper, 83 Mich App 390, 398; 269 NW2d 470 (1978).
Similarly, the terms “probation” and “parole” have distinct legal meanings. Probation is,
by definition, a matter of grace imposed by a sentencing court. Harper, 479 Mich at 626. Under
the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et seq., probation is available in “all prosecutions
for felonies, misdemeanors, or ordinance violations other than murder, treason, criminal sexual
conduct in the first or third degree, armed robbery, or major controlled substance offenses, if the
defendant has been found guilty upon verdict or plea and the court determines that the defendant
is not likely again to engage in an offensive or criminal course of conduct and that the public
good does not require that the defendant suffer the penalty imposed by law . . . .” MCL 771.1(1).
It is treated as an intermediate sanction for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, with
“intermediate sanction” defined in MCL 769.31(b) as “probation or any sanction, other than
imprisonment in a state prison or state reformatory . . . .” Parole matters, by contrast, fall within
the Department of Corrections’ exclusive jurisdiction, subject to limited judicial review.
Hopkins v Mich Parole Bd, 237 Mich App 629, 646; 604 NW2d 686 (1999). “Parole is a
conditional release; a paroled prisoner is technically still in the custody of the Department of
Corrections, which is executing the sentence imposed by the Court.” People v Raihala, 199
Mich App 577, 579; 502 NW2d 755 (1993).
Further, the Legislature has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to use the terms
“probation” and “parole” when it intends that a statute apply to both. This is evident from the
Legislature’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Department of Corrections in the Corrections
Code with respect to both “paroles” and the “administration of all orders of probation.” MCL
791.204. See also MCL 333.5129(11) (providing for the allocation of payments if “an individual
is ordered to pay a combination of fines, costs, restitution, assessments, probation or parole
supervision fees, or other payments upon conviction”); MCL 750.110a(4)(b)(i) and (ii)
(providing that the elements of one form of third-degree home invasion include violation of a
“probation term or condition” or “parole term or condition”); MCL 769.1a(11) (stating that “[i]f
the defendant is placed on probation or paroled or the court imposes a conditional sentence under
section 3 of this chapter, any restitution ordered under this section shall be a condition of that
probation, parole, or sentence”).
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In MCL 791.285, the Legislature used the terms “parole” and “prison” and did not use
the terms “probation” or “jail.” A court may not engraft upon a statutory provision a term that
the Legislature might have added to a statute, but did not. People v Jahner, 433 Mich 490, 504;
446 NW2d 151 (1989). The Legislature’s distinction between “parole” and “probation,” and
“prison” and “jail,” must be respected. Cf. People v Poole, 218 Mich App 702, 712; 555 NW2d
485 (1996) (explaining that the legislative distinction between “conviction” and terms such as
“commit” or “violation” in repeat offender statutes must be respected). Subsection 520n(1) of
the Penal Code directs that defendants shall be sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring as
provided under section 285 of the Corrections Code. Because the latter statute only provides for
the implementation of a lifetime electronic monitoring program for those defendants who are
released on parole, from prison, or both, defendants given probation or sent to jail are not subject
to such monitoring.
Because there is no ambiguity in the statutes at issue, we must decline to consider the
legislative analysis on which the prosecution relies on appeal. A “resort to legislative history of
any form is proper only where a genuine ambiguity exists in the statute. Legislative history
cannot be used to create an ambiguity where one does not otherwise exist.” In re Certified
Question, 468 Mich 109, 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003) (emphasis in original). In any event,
“not all legislative history is of equal value . . . . ” Id. As explained in Gardner, 482 Mich at 58:
Some historical facts may allow courts to draw reasonable inferences about the
Legislature’s intent because the facts shed light on the Legislature’s affirmative
acts. For instance, we may consider that an enactment was intended to repudiate
the judicial construction of a statute, or we may find it helpful to compare
multiple drafts debated by the Legislature before settling on the language actually
enacted. Other facts, however, such as staff analyses of legislation, are
significantly less useful because they do not necessarily reflect the intent of the
Legislature as a body.
Here, the prosecution relies on a staff analysis of four house bills to amend provisions of the
Penal Code and Corrections Code and, in particular, the Senate Fiscal Agency Bill Analysis, HB
5531 (Substitute H-3) and HB 5532 (Substitute H-1), dated May 9, 2006. The analysis states
that it “was prepared by nonpartisan Senate staff for use by the Senate in its deliberations and
does not constitute an official statement of legislative intent.” Arguably, the analysis assumes
that lifetime electronic monitoring would apply to probationers convicted of second-degree CSC.
It states, in part:
In the case of an offender convicted of second-degree CSC and sentenced
to a term of probation, it is unclear whether the lifetime electronic monitoring
sentence would run concurrently with the term of probation, or consecutively to
the term of probation. The minimum probation term for an offender convicted of
second degree CSC is five years. If the lifetime electronic monitoring sentence
ran after imprisonment and probation sentences, the DOC would not incur the
cost of operating the monitoring program until the first offender convicted after
the effective date of the bills was released from imprisonment or probation.
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Examined in the context of the statutory scheme, the lack of clarity noted in the analysis appears
to reflect nothing more than that the lifetime electronic monitoring program established by MCL
791.285 contains no provision for probationers and, hence, no startup date for monitoring.
The prosecution persuasively argues that persons convicted of second-degree CSC for
conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual less than 13 years
old, and sentenced to probation or jail time, present a similar, if not the same, risk to the public
as those sentenced to time in prison and, therefore, should be subject to lifetime electronic
monitoring. But “arguments that a statute is unwise or results in bad policy should be addressed
to the Legislature.” People v Kirby, 440 Mich 485, 493-494; 487 NW2d 404 (1992). Whether
the Legislature’s actions are due to concerns about taxing county resources, a strategic decision
that crimes resulting in sentences to jail or probation2 do not merit the time and expense involved
with lifetime electronic monitoring in addition to maintaining the defendant’s listing on the
Michigan Public Sex Offender Registry, or a mere drafting oversight, is not for us to decide.
While the Legislature may deem it necessary to make changes to the statutory scheme to provide
for the monitoring of persons sentenced to probation or jail time, such changes are not within the
province of the judicial branch. Because this is a particularly important matter of public interest,
we urge the Legislature to review whether it was indeed the intent of that body to exclude from
lifetime electronic monitoring individuals convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
who are sentenced to probation or jail time.
V. CONCLUSION
Because MCL 791.285 only provides for the implementation of lifetime electronic
monitoring of persons who have been released on parole, from prison, or both, defendant, who
was sentenced to five years’ probation, with 365 days to be served in jail, is not subject to
lifetime electronic monitoring.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
2
As stated above, a trial court may grant probation under circumstances where the court
determines that the defendant is “not likely again to engage in an offensive or criminal course of
conduct” and “the public good does not require that the defendant suffer the penalty imposed by
law.” MCL 771.1(1).
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