JOSEPH KASBERG V YPSILANTI TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOSEPH KASBERG,
FOR PUBLICATION
March 16, 2010
Petitioner-Appellant,
and
NATIONAL CHURCH RESIDENCES OF WIN
YPSILANTI,
Appellant
v
No. 287682
Michigan Tax Tribunal
LC No. 00-338289
YPSILANTI TOWNSHIP,
Respondent-Appellee.
Advance Sheets Version
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and BANDSTRA and MURRAY, JJ.
MARKEY, P.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While appellants appealed a property tax assessment “under the
property tax laws of this state,” their sole basis for relief was a claim to an exemption that did not
arise “under the property tax laws of this state.” Consequently, I would affirm. The Tax Tribunal
could not grant an exemption that the Legislature has plainly entrusted to the State Housing
Development Authority (SHDA) to grant. MCL 125.1415a. Moreover, even if the Tax Tribunal
has jurisdiction, I would still affirm because appellant National Church Residences of Win
Ypsilanti, MI (National), did not obtain its certified § 1415a exemption until 2007, the tax year at
issue. National could not have complied with § 1415a by filing its exemption “with the local
assessing officer before November 1 of the year preceding the tax year in which the exemption is
to begin.” Id. (emphasis added).
Petitioner, Joseph Kasberg, originally filed this appeal with the Tax Tribunal asserting
that respondent wrongfully denied a property tax exemption known as a “payment in lieu of
taxes” (PILOT) pursuant to MCL 125.1415a. Petitioner asserted that National is “a non-profit
charitable corporation, which makes it PILOT eligible.” The materials filed with this appeal
indicate that in late 2006, National acquired the subject property from an entity that had for many
years been certified by the SHDA as PILOT eligible. After closing, the SHDA processed and
granted National PILOT certification in early 2007. Respondent assessed National for property
taxes for the 2007 tax year because National had not complied with the provisions of MCL
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125.1415a. Respondent moved in the Tax Tribunal for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(4), on the ground that the Tax Tribunal lacked jurisdiction, asserting that the PILOT
exemption is a creature of the state’s police power, not of the General Property Tax Act, MCL
211.1 et seq. The hearing officer agreed with respondent and dismissed the appeal.
Whether the Tax Tribunal has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to review de novo.
W A Foote Mem Hosp v Dep’t of Pub Health, 210 Mich App 516, 522; 534 NW2d 206 (1995).
“[A] court is continually obliged to question sua sponte its own jurisdiction over a person, the
subject matter of an action, or the limits of the relief it may afford . . . .” Yee v Shiawassee Co
Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 399; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). This is so because any actions
of a court regarding a matter over which it lacks jurisdiction are void. Fox v Univ of Mich Bd of
Regents, 375 Mich 238, 242; 134 NW2d 146 (1965).
The Legislature has granted the Tax Tribunal “exclusive and original jurisdiction” over
certain proceedings, including the following:
(a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling,
determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates,
special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of
this state.
(b) A proceeding for a refund or redetermination of a tax levied under the
property tax laws of this state. [MCL 205.731(a) and (b) (emphases added).]
In Wikman v City of Novi, 413 Mich 617, 635-636; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), our Supreme
Court held that some special assessments that are “exacted through the state’s police power as
part of the government’s efforts to protect society’s health and welfare,” or that “may be
collected in connection with a regulatory program to defray the cost of such regulation . . . are
not ones under the property tax laws and are not within the jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.”
This Court has applied the reasoning of the Wikman Court in determining that the Tax Tribunal
lacked jurisdiction regarding a tax exemption granted under the authority of the Michigan
Energy Employment Act, MCL 460.801 et seq. See Beattie v East China Charter Twp, 157
Mich App 27, 35; 403 NW2d 490 (1987).
I find Beattie, supra, decided before the operative date of the conflict rule, MCR
7.215(J)(1), and therefore not binding on this Court, persuasive. Appellants’ petition calls for
interpretation of part of the State Housing Development Authority Act, MCL 125.1401 et seq.,
not any part of the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.1 et seq. I would hold that the Tax
Tribunal properly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner
qualified for the exemption or to grant relief on the basis of an interpretation of MCL 125.1415a.
The majority holds that because appellants frame this appeal as one seeking review of an
assessment of property under the general property tax laws of this state, this case falls within the
plainly expressed exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. MCL 205.731(a) and (b). But
when examining the question of jurisdiction, “‘this Court will look beyond a plaintiff’s choice of
labels to the true nature of the plaintiff’s claim.’” Michigan’s Adventure, Inc v Dalton Twp, 287
Mich App 151, 155; 782 NW2d 806 (2010), quoting Manning v Amerman, 229 Mich App 608,
613; 582 NW2d 539 (1998). A court’s jurisdiction “‘is the power to hear and determine a cause
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or matter.’” Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 36; 490 NW2d 568 (1992), quoting Langdon v Wayne
Circuit Judges, 76 Mich 358, 367; 43 NW 310 (1889). “A court has subject-matter jurisdiction
to hear a case if the law has given the court the power to grant the rights requested by the
parties.” Cipri v Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc, 213 Mich App 32, 39; 539 NW2d 526 (1995).
Here, the relief petitioner sought from the Tax Tribunal was a determination that National
was exempt from property taxation for the 2007 tax year under MCL 125.1415a; such relief
cannot be granted “under the property tax laws of this state” as that phrase is used in MCL
205.731(a) and (b). Further, the Legislature has plainly vested the power to certify whether a
property owner is eligible for a PILOT exemption with the SHDA: “The owner of a housing
project eligible for the exemption shall file with the local assessing officer a notification of the
exemption, which shall be in an affidavit form as provided by the authority. The completed
affidavit form first shall be submitted to the authority for certification by the authority that the
project is eligible for the exemption.” MCL 125.1415a(1) (emphasis added). Consequently, the
Tax Tribunal does not have the authority to grant petitioner a PILOT exemption when the SHDA
has not certified one for petitioner. Moreover, the Tax Tribunal may not ignore the requirement
of the statute that a certificate of exemption be filed “with the local assessing officer before
November 1 of the year preceding the tax year in which the exemption is to begin.” MCL
125.1415a(1) (emphasis added). Because appellants underlying claim is to an exemption under a
nontax statute, I conclude that the Tax Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine petitioner’s
claim to the exemption or to grant the relief petitioner sought.
As noted already, my conclusion is supported by our Supreme Court’s decision in
Wikman, supra. The majority diminishes Wikman by referring to its discussion of the meaning
of the phrase “under the property tax laws of this state” as dicta. Statements contained in an
opinion that pertain to law not essential to a determination of the case are dicta and do not have
the force of an adjudication. See Reynolds v Bureau of State Lottery, 240 Mich App 84, 95; 610
NW2d 597 (2000). But the Wikman Court’s discussion of the meaning of “under the property
tax laws of this state” was essential to its opinion and differentiated its conclusion from that of
the dissent. See Wikman, 413 Mich at 633-636, 638-640 (COLEMAN, C.J.); 655 (LEVIN, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, the Wikman Court held that the phrase “under the property tax laws of this
state” modified the words “special assessment” in the jurisdictional grant of MCL 205.731.
Wikman, 413 Mich at 633. While noting that some special assessments do not arise from the
property tax laws, the ones at issue “levied against property owners for public improvements to
realty which especially benefit their property are special assessments under the property tax laws
for the purposes of the Tax Tribunal Act.” Id. at 636. Hence, the Court held that MCL 205.731
granted the Tax Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction over direct review of a municipal special
assessment for a public improvement. Id. at 626. The clear lesson of the Wikman decision is
that a matter that does not arise “under the property tax laws of this state” cannot be within the
jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal under MCL 205.731(a) and (b). Wikman, 413 Mich at 635-636.
I also find In re Petition of the Wayne Co Treasurer for Foreclosure, 286 Mich App 108;
777 NW2d 507 (2009), inapposite. That case held that whether the petitioner was entitled to a
tax exemption under the General Property Tax Act, specifically, MCL 211.7s, regarding houses
of public worship, was a factual determination within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax
Tribunal. But, as discussed earlier in this opinion, appellants’ claimed exemption here flows
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from the State Housing Development Authority Act, MCL 125.1401 et seq., not the General
Property Tax Act.
The Legislature declared that it enacted the State Housing Development Authority Act to
address myriad concerns, including the need for “safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations
within the financial means of low income or moderate income families or persons,” and that “the
existence of blight, the inability to redevelop cleared areas, and the lack of economic integration
is detrimental to the general welfare of the citizens of this state and the economic welfare of
municipalities in this state,” and in order to “promote the financial and social stability of housing
for families and persons of low and moderate income . . . .” MCL 125.1401(1). The Legislature
additionally determined “that it is a proper public purpose to prevent the erosion of the supply of
existing low and moderate cost housing available for occupancy by certain persons with
disabilities and elderly persons by taking appropriate action to prevent the displacement of those
persons with disabilities and elderly persons from existing low and moderate cost housing . . . .”
MCL 125.1401(2). These and many other purposes set forth in MCL 125.1401 clearly establish
that the State Housing Development Authority Act arises not from the tax laws of this state, but
from “the state’s police power as part of the government’s efforts to protect society’s health and
welfare . . . .” Wikman, 413 Mich at 635. Accordingly, appellants’ claim to an exemption under
MCL 125.1415a, payment in lieu of taxes, stems from the state’s police powers, not its property
tax laws. The Tax Tribunal properly recognized that it lacked jurisdiction in this case and
properly dismissed this case for that reason. Beattie, 157 Mich App at 35.
Additionally, even if the majority were correct in concluding that the Tax Tribunal erred
by ruling it lacked jurisdiction, I would still affirm because appellant did not obtain certification
of its exemption under MCL 125.1415a until 2007, the tax year at issue in this appeal. Petitioner
could not have filed “the certified notification of the exemption with the local assessing officer
before November 1 of the year preceding the tax year in which the exemption is to begin.” MCL
125.1415a(1) (emphasis added). This Court will affirm a lower court when it reaches the correct
result even if for the wrong reason. Hess v Cannon Twp, 265 Mich App 582, 596; 696 NW2d
742 (2005).
I would affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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