PEOPLE OF MI V LUVIQ PLUMAJ
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 2009
APPROVED FOR
PUBLICATION
June 30, 2009
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 285534
Wayne Circuit Court
LC Nos. 07-005810;
07-009020
LUVIQ PLUMAJ, a/k/a LUVIC PLUMAJ and
LUVIG PLUMAJ,
Defendant-Appellee.
Advance Sheets Version
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Talbot and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals by leave granted the trial court’s orders granting defendant’s
motions to withdraw his plea of guilty of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and pleas of
nolo contendere to manslaughter with a motor vehicle, MCL 750.321, and failure to stop at the
scene of an accident when at fault, resulting in death, MCL 257.617(1), (3). Because the trial
court erred in granting defendant’s motions to set aside his pleas without first determining
whether the pleas were understandingly, voluntarily, and accurately made, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Circuit court Docket No. 07-005810 arises out of the January 28, 2007, death of Robert
Brown. A truck driven by defendant struck Brown as Brown was standing near a stalled vehicle.
Defendant was charged with manslaughter and failure to stop at the scene of an accident when at
fault. Circuit court Docket No. 07-009020 arises out of the February 21, 2007, shooting death of
Timothy Porter and assault of Kenneth Hart. The prosecutor alleged that the shooting of Porter
was done with the assistance, and at the direction, of defendant. Defendant was charged with
first-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to murder, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony.
At an August 27, 2007, hearing, the parties placed a plea agreement on the record. The
agreement was that, in circuit court Docket No. 07-009020, defendant would plead nolo
contendere to second-degree murder in exchange for a sentence of 25½ to 35 years in prison. In
circuit court Docket No. 07-005810, defendant agreed to plead nolo contendere to manslaughter
in exchange for a sentence of 10 to 15 years in prison, which is to run concurrently with the
-1-
sentence in circuit court Docket No. 07-009020. The trial court ultimately accepted defendant’s
pleas. However, at no point during the plea hearing did the trial court place defendant under
oath. The trial court sentenced defendant on September 13, 2007, pursuant to the agreement of
the parties.1
In February 2008, defendant moved to set aside both pleas, claiming that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel, that the trial court erred in failing to place him under oath
before taking the pleas, and that the trial court failed to comply with other aspects of the pleataking procedure. A hearing on the motion was held on April 25, 2008, before a different trial
judge. The prosecutor conceded that the oath requirement was not met in this case, but argued
that the noncompliance “does not require reversal” because the failure to administer the oath
does not necessarily mean that the plea was involuntary. The trial court disagreed with the
prosecutor, stating that MCR 6.302(A) “isn’t concerned with whether the plea is full, fair and
voluntary. It says the plea shall be taken under oath.” The trial court went on to state that “the
plea taking procedure wasn’t complied with as laid out in the court rule” and ruled, “I’m setting
aside the plea.”
The prosecutor now appeals by leave granted the trial court’s decision to allow defendant
to withdraw his pleas. The prosecutor argues that the oath requirement of MCR 6.302(A) is
simply a tool to assist a court in determining the voluntariness of a plea, and the failure to give
the oath does not require automatic reversal. According to the prosecutor, regardless of the error
in failing to place defendant under oath at the plea hearing, the trial court could not set aside the
plea without a finding that the plea was, in fact, involuntary. Defendant argues that MCR
6.302(A) clearly and unambiguously mandates administering the oath, and compliance with the
oath requirement is not a mere technicality but is necessary in every case to impress upon a
defendant the importance of telling the truth and that the absence of an oath renders a plea
unacceptable.
A trial judge’s decision to accept or reject a plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
People v Grove, 455 Mich 439, 460; 566 NW2d 547 (1997). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Questions of law,
including interpretation of court rules, are reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Petit, 466 Mich
624, 627; 648 NW2d 193 (2002).
The procedures governing the acceptance of a guilty plea were first adopted by [our
Supreme Court] in 1973 and are currently set forth in MCR 6.302. MCR 6.302(A) provides that:
“[t]he court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is
convinced that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate. Before
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must place the defendant
1
The maximum sentence imposed on the second-degree murder conviction was increased, by
agreement of the parties, in order to comply with the rule of People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683; 199
NW2d 202 (1972). The sentence imposed was 25½ years to 38 years and 3 months in prison.
-2-
or defendants under oath and personally carry out subrules (B)-(E).”[2] [People v
Saffold, 465 Mich 268, 272; 631 NW2d 320 (2001).]
Strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not essential; rather, our Supreme Court has
“adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, holding that ‘whether a particular departure from
Rule 785.7 [now MCR 6.302] justifies or requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings
will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.’” Saffold, supra at 273, quoting Guilty Plea
Cases, 395 Mich 96, 113; 235 NW2d 132 (1975). Automatic reversal is required only when the
trial court fails to procure “an enumeration and a waiver on the record of the three federal
constitutional rights as set forth in Boykin v Alabama [395 US 238; 89 S Ct 1709; 23 L Ed 2d
274 (1969)]: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and
the right to confront one’s accusers.” Saffold, supra at 281. This Court may consider “the record
as a whole” to determine whether the Boykin requirements were satisfied and whether a guilty
plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. People v Bettistea (After Remand), 181 Mich App
194, 197; 448 NW2d 781 (1989).
The prosecutor persuasively argues that the oath requirement of MCR 6.302(A) “does not
stand alone,” but rather is intended to aid the trial court in determining whether the defendant’s
plea was understandingly, voluntarily, and accurately made. In contrast, we are not persuaded by
defendant’s argument that the “substantial compliance” doctrine articulated in In re Guilty Plea
Cases, applies only to subrules B through E and that the Court could have moved the oath
requirement when it amended the rule in 1995 had it wanted to include the oath within the
doctrine. This argument glosses over Saffold, decided in 2001, which reiterated that there are
only three reasons for automatic reversal, as enumerated above. Similarly unconvincing is
defendant’s assertion that even if the substantial compliance doctrine were applicable to MCR
6.302(A), that subsection uses the word “must” when it refers to “place the defendant . . . under
oath” and therefore the failure to do so cannot be substantial compliance. This reasoning ignores
the fact that the word “must” in subsection A also refers to “personally carry out subrules (B)(E).”
Indeed, our Supreme Court has said on many occasions that “rules of automatic reversal
are disfavored.” People v Hawthorne, 474 Mich 174, 182 n 4; 713 NW2d 724 (2006). The
preferred method is to determine the type of error and then apply the proper test:
2
Under MCR 6.302(B), which relates to an understanding plea, the court must speak directly to
the defendant and determine that he or she understands the name of the offense and the
maximum possible prison sentence, the trial rights being waived, and loss of the right to appeal.
Pursuant to MCR 6.302(C), which relates to a voluntary plea, the court must make inquiries
regarding the existence and details of any plea agreements and whether the defendant was
promised anything beyond what was in the agreement, if any, or otherwise. The court must also
ask the defendant whether he or she had been threatened and if the plea was his or her choice.
MCR 6.302(D), which relates to an accurate plea, requires the court to establish a factual basis
for a guilty plea and state why a plea of nolo contendere is appropriate. Finally, under MCR
6.302(E), the court must make additional inquiries, including whether the prosecutor and defense
counsel are “aware of any promises, threats, or inducements other than those already disclosed
on the record, and whether the court has complied with subrules (B)-(D).”
-3-
Constitutional errors that are structural in nature are subject to automatic
reversal. If a case involves nonstructural, preserved constitutional error, an
appellate court should reverse unless the prosecution can show that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the constitutional error is not preserved, it is reviewed for plain error. In
cases involving preserved, nonconstitutional errors, the defendant must establish
that it is more probable than not that the error undermined reliability in the
verdict. Unpreserved, nonconstitutional errors are reviewed for plain error.
[People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 363 n 16; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).]
In People v Mosly, 259 Mich App 90; 672 NW2d 897 (2003), this Court held that
violation of a court rule was not structural error requiring automatic reversal. In Mosly, because
the trial court believed defendant’s written waiver sufficient, “the trial court expressly declined
to question defendant on the record to ascertain the validity of defendant’s waiver of his right to
trial by jury,” contrary to MCR 6.402(B). Id. at 93. This Court stated that “we are not persuaded
that the trial court’s failure to follow the rule requires reversal if the record establishes that
defendant nonetheless understood that he had a right to a trial by jury and voluntarily chose to
waive that right.” Id. at 96. The Court then cited federal case law holding that
a trial court’s failure to follow procedural rules for securing a waiver of the right
to a jury trial does not violate the federal constitution nor does it require
automatic reversal. Indeed, compliance with the court rules only creates a
presumption that a defendant’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. If
a defendant’s waiver was otherwise knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
made, reversal will not be predicated on a waiver that is invalid under the court
rules, because courts will disregard errors that do not affect the substantial rights
of a defendant.” [Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).]
Furthermore, the Mosly Court noted that “rules of automatic reversal are disfavored, for a host of
obvious reasons.” Id. at 97 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court held, therefore,
that the “defendant was required to establish that the waiver was neither understandingly nor
voluntarily made, not merely that the trial court failed to strictly comply with MCR 6.402(B).”
Id. Similarly, in the case at bar, it was error for the trial court to apply a rule of automatic
reversal for failure to strictly comply with MCR 6.302(A) instead of determining whether
defendant’s pleas were understandingly, knowingly, voluntarily, and accurately made.
Although MCR 6.302(A) requires that the court place the defendant under oath before
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a failure to do so, by itself, is not determinative.
Because the oath obligation is not one of the protected rights requiring reversal, the trial court
must make the initial determination regarding whether the pleas were understandingly,
knowingly, voluntarily, and accurately made. While an oath may assist the trial court in making
its determination, an oath by itself does not establish any of the necessary requisites of a valid
plea. The trial court must employ the decisional process to either grant or deny a motion to
withdraw a plea and make findings in a hearing to support the application of discretion. Guided
by the facts of a particular case, it is for the trial court to determine the ultimate issue whether the
defendant’s pleas were understandingly, knowingly, voluntarily, and accurately made.
-4-
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.