PEOPLE OF MI V JEFFREY JUANN JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 20, 2008
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 275438
Wayne Circuit Court
LC Nos. 06-011698-01
06-012320-01
JEFFREY JUANN JONES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Advance Sheets Version
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Murphy and Borrello, JJ.
FITZGERALD, P.J.
The prosecution appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence and dismissing the charges against him. We reverse and remand.
I
The police received information from an informant regarding defendant’s alleged
possession and sale of marijuana. The informant indicated that defendant had been arrested
several times in the past for possessing illegal narcotics, that defendant kept a small amount of
marijuana for personal use at his 24975 South Sylbert residence in Redford Township, and that
defendant kept larger amounts of illegal narcotics at his 15888 Southfield Road residence in
Detroit. A Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) check revealed that defendant had a
misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana and two felony convictions for
delivery/manufacture of a controlled substance. Prompted by this information, the police
arranged to have a trained narcotics-detection dog brought to the defendant’s Southfield
residence so that a canine sniff could be conducted. The dog gave a positive indication for
narcotics at the front door of the residence. On the basis of the dog’s reaction, as well as their
prior information, the police obtained a search warrant to search both premises.
Defendant was charged in lower-court Docket Number 011698 as a fourth-offense
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, with possession of a firearm by a felon (felon-in-possession),
MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b, as the result of a search of the South Sylbert premises. Defendant was charged
in lower-court Docket Number 012320 as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, with
the manufacture of 5 to 45 kilograms of marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(ii), felon-in possession,
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MCL 750.224f, possession with intent to deliver less than 5 kilograms of marijuana, MCL
333.7401(2)(d)(iii), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, as a result of a search of the Southfield
Road premises.
Defendant moved to suppress all the items of evidence that had been seized during the
two searches. Defendant argued that the canine sniff outside his front door, which alerted the
officers to the presence of a controlled substance inside his house, was an illegal search. In
support of his argument, defendant relied on State v Rabb, 920 So 2d 1175 (Fla App, 2006) (a
canine sniff from outside a home to detect narcotics inside the home uses extra-sensory
procedure that violates the firm line at the door of the home protected from intrusion by the
Fourth Amendment).1 The prosecution relied on Illinois v Caballes, 543 US 405, 408-409; 125
S Ct 834; 160 L Ed 2d 842 (2005), in arguing that the canine sniff was not a search at all because
the police were lawfully present at the front door of defendant’s residence and defendant
possessed no reasonable expectation that his drugs would go undetected. Following a hearing on
the motion, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress. In support of its decision, the
trial court relied on Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 29; 121 S Ct 2038; 150 L Ed 2d 94 (2001).
In Kyllo, the Court held that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of
heat within a private home was a Fourth Amendment search and must be supported by probable
cause and a warrant. The Kyllo Court held that where the government uses “a device that is not
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.” Id. at 40. In the present case, the trial court found that a
canine sniff is akin to the use of a thermal-imaging device. The trial court concluded that the
canine sniff is a search that must be supported by probable cause and a warrant.
II
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly suppressed the evidence
against defendant on the ground that the canine sniff, which provided the probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant, was obtained in violation of the rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 Resolution of this issue requires a determination
whether the canine sniff of the front door of defendant’s residence is a search under the Fourth
Amendment. We review a trial court’s factual findings at a suppression hearing for clear error,
but review de novo the ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress. People v Davis, 250 Mich App
357, 362; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).
1
The prosecution noted that Rabb is a Florida state court decision not binding on Michigan
courts. Rabb has not been cited in any subsequent decisions for the holding that a canine sniff at
a residence’s front door constitutes an illegal search. Rabb relied on United States v Thomas,
757 F2d 1359 (CA 2, 1985), a decision that has been criticized by other federal circuit courts and
appears never to have been followed by any federal courts outside the second circuit.
2
There is no dispute that a positive reaction by a properly trained narcotics dog can establish
probable cause to believe that contraband is present. See, e.g., United States v Berry, 90 F3d
148, 153 (CA 6, 1996). The prosecution concedes in this case that probable cause is lacking
absent the result of the canine sniff.
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Both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; see
Illinois v McArthur, 531 US 326; 121 S Ct 946; 148 L Ed 2d 838 (2001). The Michigan
Constitution in this regard is generally construed to provide the same protection as the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. People v Levine, 461 Mich 172, 178; 600 NW2d
622 (1999). A search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “occurs when an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” United
States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109, 113; 104 S Ct 1652; 80 L Ed 2d 85 (1984).
The United States Supreme Court has held that a “canine sniff” does not unreasonably
intrude upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v Place, 462 US
696, 706-707; 103 S Ct 2637; 77 L Ed 2d 110 (1983). In Place, the Court held that a canine sniff
of a traveler’s luggage in an airport was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because the information obtained through this investigative technique revealed only
the presence of absence of narcotics. As the Court explained:
[T]he canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative
procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure. [Id. at
707.]
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Place Court’s holding in Jacobsen, supra. In
Jacobsen, supra at 123, the Court held that a chemical field test of a white substance found
inside a package was not a Fourth Amendment search because the test “merely discloses whether
or not a particular substance is cocaine . . . .” Because there is no legitimate interest in
possessing cocaine, the field test did not compromise any legitimate privacy interest. Id. The
Court further explained that “the reason [the Place canine sniff] did not intrude upon any
legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about
noncontraband items.” Id. at 124 n 24 (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court later held in Caballes, supra at 407-408, that a canine sniff of a
vehicle during a traffic stop, conducted absent reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity, did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not implicate any legitimate privacy interest.
The Court explained that, because there is no legitimate interest in possessing contraband, the
use of a well-trained narcotics dog that “only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises
no legitimate privacy interest’” and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 408 (quoting
Jacobsen, supra at 123). The Court also noted:
This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use
of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home
constituted an unlawful search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 [121 S Ct
2038; 150 L Ed 2d 94] (2001). Critical to that decision was the fact that the
device was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case, intimate details in a
home, such as “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna
and bath.” Id., at 38. The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly
lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from
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respondent’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in
the trunk of his car. [Caballes, supra at 409-410.]
The majority of the federal circuit courts have viewed the Place Court’s holding as a
general categorization of canine sniffs as nonsearches. See, e.g., United States v Reed, 141 F3d
644, 648 (CA 6, 1998) (holding that a canine sniff of the inside of an apartment was not a search
when the canine team was lawfully present in the building); see also United States v Roby, 122
F3d 1120 (CA 8, 1997); United States v Brock, 417 F3d 692 (CA 7, 2005); United States v
Vasquez, 909 F2d 235 (CA 7, 1990).3 Similarly, the vast majority of state courts considering
canine sniffs have recognized that a canine sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search.4 Binding
and persuasive authority convinces us that a canine sniff is not a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment as long as the sniffing canine is legally present at its vantage point when
its sense is aroused. Reed, supra at 649; see also Place, supra at 709 (noting that the sniffed
luggage was located in a public place), and United States v Diaz, 25 F3d 392, 397 (CA 6, 1994).
The trial court rejected the holding in Place on the ground that an individual has a greater
privacy interest with regard to his or her residence than one has in a public space. However, the
holding in Place did not turn on the location of a canine sniff. Central to the holding in Place
and its progeny is the fact that a canine sniff detects only contraband, in which there is no
3
But see United States v Thomas, n 1 supra. Thomas held that a canine sniff of an apartment is a
search, distinguishing Place on the basis of the heightened expectation of privacy in homes. But
Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the status of a canine sniff does not depend on the
object sniffed. For this reason, a number of other courts have criticized Thomas as inconsistent
with Place and its progeny. See Reed, supra at 650 (explaining that Thomas’s holding “ignores
the Supreme Court’s determination in Place that a person has no legitimate privacy interest in
the possession of contraband, thus rendering the location of the contraband irrelevant to the
Court’s holding that a canine sniff does not constitute a search”).
4
See, e.g., State v Box, 205 Ariz 492, 496-497; 73 P3d 623 (Ariz App 2003); Sims v State, 356
Ark 507; 157 SW3d 530 (2004); People v Ortega, 34 P3d 986, 991 (Colo, 2001); Bain v State,
839 So 2d 739 (Fla App, 2003); Cole v State, 254 Ga App 424; 562 SE2d 720 (2002); State v
Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357; 17 P3d 301 (Idaho App, 2000); People v Cox, 318 Ill App 3d 161;
739 NE2d 1066 (2000); Bradshaw v State, 759 NE2d 271 (Ind App, 2001); State v Bergmann,
633 NW2d 328 (Iowa, 2001); State v Barker, 252 Kan 949; 850 P2d 885 (1993); State v Kalie,
699 So 2d 879 (La, 1997); State v Washington, 687 So 2d 575 (La App, 1997); Fitzgerald v
State, 384 Md 484; 864 A2d 1006 (2004); Commonwealth v Feyenord, 62 Mass App 200; 815
NE2d 628 (2004); Millsap v State, 767 So 2d 286 (Miss App, 2000); State v LaFlamme, 869
SW2d 183 (Mo App, 1993); Gama v State, 112 Nev 833; 920 P2d 1010 (1996); State v
VanCleave, 131 NM 82; 33 P3d 633 (2001); People v Offen, 78 NY2d 1089; 578 NYS2d 121;
585 NE2d 370 (1991); State v Fisher, 141 NC App 448; 539 SE2d 677 (2000); State v Kesler,
396 NW2d 729 (ND, 1986); State v Rusnak, 120 Ohio App 3d 24; 696 NE2d 633 (1997); Scott v
State, 927 P2d 1066 (Okla App, 1996); State v Smith, 327 Or 366; 963 P2d 642 (1998);
Commonwealth v Johnston, 515 Pa 454; 530 A2d 74 (1987); State v England, 19 SW3d 762
(Tenn, 2000); Rodriguez v State, 106 SW3d 224 (Tex App, 2003); State v Miller, 256 Wis 2d
80; 647 NW2d 348 (Wis App, 2002); Morgan v State, 95 P3d 802 (Wy, 2004).
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legitimate expectation of privacy. The heightened expectation of privacy that a person has in his
residence is irrelevant under Place’s rationale. Whether or not a heightened expectation of
privacy exists, the fact remains that a canine sniff reveals only evidence of contraband. Place,
supra at 707; Jacobsen, supra at 122-124. The only relevant locational determination is whether
the canine was lawfully at the location where the object was sniffed. The location or
circumstance of the sniff is relevant only to determine whether the presence of the canine and the
officer at the location was constitutional. See also Reed, supra at 396.
III
Here, the canine was lawfully present at the front door of defendant’s residence when it
detected the presence of contraband. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy at the
entrance to property that is open to the public, including the front porch. See People v Custer
(On Remand), 248 Mich App 552, 556, 561; 640 NW2d 576 (2001) (under Michigan law, the
police can lawfully stand on a person’s front porch and look through the windows into the
person’s home, as long as there is no evidence that the person expected the porch to remain
private, such as by erecting a fence or gate). The record contains no evidence that the canine
team crossed any obstructions, such as a gate or fence, in order to reach the front door, or that the
property contained any signs forbidding people from entering the property. Any contraband
sniffed by the canine while on defendant’s front porch—an area open to public access—fell
within the “canine sniff” rule. Consequently, there was no search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
IV
We find it necessary to address some of the issues and points raised in our colleague’s
dissenting opinion. First, we wholeheartedly agree with the dissent that the United States
Supreme Court has historically recognized the significant privacy interest that an individual has
in his or her home and has guardedly protected that interest against governmental invasions and
intrusions, i.e., searches, that offend the Fourth Amendment. See Payton v New York, 445 US
573, 590; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm
line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”). However, the dissent fails to grasp that a canine
sniff is simply not a search or an intrusion on an expectation of privacy that implicates the Fourth
Amendment under Caballes, Place, and their progeny, where the police and the canine are
lawfully present at the location at issue, even if it is at the front door of a defendant’s home.
Contrary to the assertions made by the dissent, Place and Caballes contain no language
suggesting that the analysis would differ under the circumstances presented here in which the
canine sniff occurred outside the home from a lawful vantage point. The high court’s fleeting
reference to a “public place” in Place simply indicated, at most, that the luggage containing
contraband was in an area in which the police and the canine were lawfully present. Place,
supra at 707. The Place Court recognized that a person “possesses a privacy interest in the
contents of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Id. However, the
canine sniff was unique and disclosed “only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
item.” Id. Therefore, there was no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Here, defendant likewise possessed a general privacy expectation with respect to his home that
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was absolutely protected by the Fourth Amendment, but the canine sniff from outside the home
and from a lawful vantage point could only disclose the presence of narcotics and not lawful
activity and thus did not constitute a search of the home under the Fourth Amendment because
no legitimate privacy interest was implicated. Any intrusion on defendant’s expectation of
privacy was insufficient to find a Fourth Amendment infringement, given that the canine sniff
could only intrude to the extent that illegal drugs or activities, for which there is no legitimate
privacy interest, were detectable. A person has a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding his
or her home, but there is no legitimate privacy interest in contraband that may be inside the
home; however, this does not mean that the state has free reign to invade the person’s general
expectation of privacy without a warrant in order to obtain contraband on the basis that there is
no legitimate privacy interest in the contraband. This is because, typically, such an invasion or
search would compromise both illegitimate and legitimate interests or expectations and that is
the danger against which the Fourth Amendment protects.
The dissent’s discussion of Caballes and contention that it supports the proposition that a
canine sniff at a home would be treated differently is even more misplaced than its attempt to
distinguish Place. The dissent states, “Similarly, in Caballes, which relied on the reasoning of
Place, the Court recognized that the expectation of privacy that an individual has regarding
‘intimate details in a home’ is ‘categorically distinguishable from [a person’s] hopes or
expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car.’” Post at ___,
quoting Caballes, supra at 409-410. The two quoted excerpts taken from Caballes in this
passage are cited out of context, coming from two different sentences and then grafted together.
As indicated earlier in this opinion, the Caballes Court actually stated:
Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog—one that
“does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from
public view,”—during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate
legitimate privacy interests. In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the
exterior of respondent's car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation.
Any intrusion on respondent's privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a
constitutionally cognizable infringement.
This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision [in Kyllo]
that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a
home constituted an unlawful search. Critical to that decision was the fact that the
device was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case, intimate details in a
home, such as “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna
and bath.” The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful
activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent's
hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of
his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals
no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any
right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment. [Id. (citations omitted).]
Thus, the Court did not state or suggest that police activity at a home is categorically
distinguishable from police activity involving the trunk of a car for purposes of analyzing the
constitutionality of a canine sniff. Rather, the categorical distinction of which the Court spoke
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related to the difference between police activity that reveals lawful as well as unlawful conduct,
thereby invading a zone of privacy and implicating Fourth Amendment protections, and a canine
sniff that reveals only the presence of contraband (unlawful conduct) and does not intrude on
legitimate privacy interests. Indeed, the Court distinguished Kyllo not because a home was
involved there, but because lawful as well as unlawful activity could be detected in Kyllo. If the
dissent were correct in its analysis, the Court in Caballes could have simply disregarded or
distinguished Kyllo on the basis that the Kyllo search was of a home.
The dissent states, “If, as the majority suggests, a person never has an expectation of
privacy in contraband, irrespective of the location of the contraband, then it would follow that a
search of contraband would never be unreasonable and such evidence would therefore never be
suppressed.” Post at ___. The dissent misconstrues our holding. As reflected in the preceding
few paragraphs, the principle that a person does not have a legitimate privacy interest in
contraband does not equate to a conclusion that the seizure of the contraband does not violate the
Fourth Amendment protection against an unreasonable search. Defendant certainly had
legitimate privacy expectations or interests with respect to his home because we can safely
assume that legal activities were also taking place in the home and that some of the home’s
contents were legal to possess. But the canine sniff did not invade these legitimate privacy
interests or defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy because of the uniqueness of the canine
sniff that focused only on contraband, for which there was no legitimate privacy interest. Had
the police entered the front door of defendant’s home without a warrant and located the
narcotics, absent exigent circumstances, the entry would have been an unlawful intrusion on
defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy, violating the Fourth Amendment, because, despite
the presence of the illegal narcotics, the police could also observe and handle contents of the
home that were lawfully possessed. Under such circumstances, it would be incorrect to conclude
that the search was legal merely because defendant had no expectation of privacy in the
contraband, nor does our opinion suggest that such a search would be lawful. The canine sniff
here was constitutionally sound, not because defendant had no legitimate privacy interest in the
contraband, which will always be the case in Fourth Amendment disputes over seized
incriminating evidence, but because no legitimate privacy interests or expectations were intruded
upon by the canine sniff. As indicated in Place, it is the uniqueness and attributes of a canine
sniff that dictate a finding that the Fourth Amendment was not violated in the case at bar.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not
retained.
Murphy, J., concurred.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ William B. Murphy
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