AJAY SHAH V CITY OF FARMINGTON HILLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
AJAY SHAH,
FOR PUBLICATION
February 21, 2008
Plaintiff/Intervening Defendant,
and
BHARATI SHAH
Plaintiff,
v
No. 271252
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2001-033790-CZ
CITY OF FARMINGTON HILLS,
Defendant,
Advance Sheets Version
and
OXFORD ESTATES CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION,
Intervening Plaintiff/GarnishorAppellee,
and
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Garnishee Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Hoekstra and Meter, JJ.
METER, J. (dissenting).
Because I do not believe that the severance payment at issue in this case constituted
"earnings" under 15 USC 1672(a), I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court's order.
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15 USC 1672(a) defines "earnings" as "compensation paid or payable for personal
services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes
periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program." As noted in Vanderlaan v TriCounty Community Hosp, 209 Mich App 328, 332; 530 NW2d 186 (1995), clear statutory
language should be applied as written. The severance payment Shah received was not provided
"for personal services." Instead, it was provided, in essence, in exchange for having Shah cease
to provide personal services. As Ford's Involuntary Salaried Separation Policy (ISSP) manual
states, the separation policy "applies during times when it is necessary to have an involuntary
reduction in the U.S. salaried workforce." Ford's severance payments under the ISSP help to
ease the burden of unemployment but are not provided in exchange for personal services, and the
fact that they are based, in part, on the number of years that an employee worked for Ford does
not change this fact.
Moreover, Shah elected an enhanced benefits package under the ISSP. He received a
larger lump-sum payment in exchange for agreeing to forgo any legal action against Ford in
connection with the termination of his employment. Therefore, in Shah's individual case, a large
part of the severance payment was received in exchange for a liability waiver and not in
exchange for personal services. This lends further support to my conclusion that the severance
payment at issue here should not be considered "earnings" under 15 USC 1672(a).
I would affirm the trial court's order. While the trial court may have relied on slightly
different reasoning from mine, this Court will not reverse a trial court's decision if it reached the
right result for a different reason. Lane v KinderCare Learning Centers, Inc, 231 Mich App 689,
697; 588 NW2d 715 (1998).1
I would affirm.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
1
Although its opinion is not entirely clear, the trial court appeared to find dispositive the fact that
the severance payment was disbursed as a lump sum and not as periodic payments. While this
type of analysis is supported by Pallante v Int'l Venture Investments, Ltd, 622 F Supp 667 (ND
Ohio, 1985), I do not find that case to be dispositive here because it relied on Kokoszka v
Belford, 417 US 642; 94 S Ct 2431; 41 L Ed 2d 374 (1974). See Pallante, supra at 669. In
Genesee Co Friend of the Court v Gen Motors Corp, 464 Mich 44, 56 n 7; 626 NW2d 395
(2001), the Michigan Supreme Court rejected as dicta the pertinent portion of Kokoszka.
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