ELIZABETH MORDEN V GRAND TRAVERSE CNTY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Estate of CHRISTOPHER R. MORDEN,
Deceased.
ELIZABETH MORDEN, Personal Representative
of the Estate of CHRISTOPHER R. MORDEN,
FOR PUBLICATION
April 24, 2007
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
GRAND TRAVERSE COUNTY, GRAND
TRAVERSE COUNTY JAIL, MARGARET
SCHOFIELD, RN, ELAINE LOZEN, RN, SANDI
MINOR, RN, GRAND TRAVERSE SHERIFF,
No. 272505
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 04-024311-NM
Defendants-Appellees,
and
MARILYN CONLON, MD,
Defendant-Appellant,
Official Reported Version
and
WELL-SPRING PSYCHIATRY, PC, ANNE
MARIE BAASE, JIM TALBOT, and TONY
KARLIN,
Defendants.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case arises out of the death of Christopher R. Morden (the decedent). Plaintiff
Elizabeth Morden, as personal representative of the estate of her son, the decedent, has sued
defendants Marilyn E. Conlon, M.D., and David J. Wilcox, D.O., among others, asserting state
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law malpractice claims and federal constitutional claims under 42 USC 1983. After the state law
claims were dismissed, Conlon moved for summary disposition of the federal claims under MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10), which the trial court denied, finding an issue of fact regarding whether
Conlon acted with deliberate indifference in treating the decedent, to the extent that Conlon was
not entitled to qualified immunity. Because we hold that (1) no genuine issue of material fact
exists regarding plaintiff 's claim of deliberate indifference, and (2) Conlon would be entitled to
qualified immunity even if an issue of fact did exist, we reverse and remand for the entry of
summary disposition in Conlon's favor.
I
The essential facts are largely undisputed. After being arrested on February 4, 2002, the
decedent claimed that he was hearing voices and expressed thoughts of self-harm. A suicide
alert was issued. The decedent was already taking prescribed medications. Wilcox, the jail
physician, continued the decedent's psychotropic medications of 1 mg Risperdal1 three times
daily and 40 mg Celexa2 daily, the doses prescribed in December 2001.
On or around February 10, 2002, the decedent was hearing voices and wanted to hurt
someone in his cell. Conlon (a consulting psychiatrist) and Wilcox visited the decedent on
February 12, 2002. Conlon recommended that Wilcox increase the decedent's Risperdal dose.
Conlon asserts that Wilcox was free to implement or reject that recommendation. That
decedent's Risperdal dose was increased according to Conlon's recommendation.
On February 27, 2002, a sheriff 's deputy found the decedent unresponsive in his cell. He
was rocking back and forth in a fetal position. His speech was slow. On March 5, 2002, the
decedent was again put on suicide watch after reporting that voices were telling him to stab
himself with his pencil. When Conlon visited the decedent on March 12, 2002, although she
noted some improvement, she recommended an increase of Risperdal.
Plaintiff visited the decedent on March 15, 2002, and found him acting "druggy."
Plaintiff told a social worker at the jail that she was worried about her son. On March 18, 2002,
the social worker reported that the decedent got dizzy and that his vision blacked out when he
stood up. Wilcox noted that on March 19, 2002, the decedent suffered from head rushes, and
that the side effects had started the last time his Risperdal dosage was increased. Wilcox took
the decedent's blood pressure.3 Wilcox recommended a psychiatric consultation.
1
Risperdal is an antipsychotic medication. It is categorized as an "atypical" antipsychotic (like
Clozaril, Zyprexa or Seroquel). Its method of action is that of a serotonin and dopamine receptor
antagonist (SDA). Tarascon Pocket Pharmacopoeia 2000, p 70.
2
Celexa is an antidepressant medication. It is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI).
The maximum recommended daily dose is 40 mg. Tarascon Pocket Pharmacopoeia 2000, p 68.
3
Plaintiff posits that Wilcox apparently thought he was ruling out postural or orthostatic
hypotension (a condition in which the blood pressure abnormally decreases when moving from a
(continued…)
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On March 23, 2002, Conlon visited the decedent and noted the decedent's complaints of
tingling, head rush when he stood up, and that he could not stand without holding onto a wall.
Conlon stated that improvement with Risperdal was apparent, but that the drug was likely
causing orthostatic hypotension,4 so she suggested switching to a different neuroleptic, according
to the following schedule:
•
Seroquel (another antipsychotic medication) 100 mg at bedtime for
two days, then 200 mg at bedtime for two days, then 300 mg for four days, then
400 mg at bedtime;
•
Decrease Risperdal by 2 mg with each increase of Seroquel; and
•
Continue Celexa dosage unchanged.
On March 26, 2002, Wilcox noted that the decedent had lost more weight, spoke in a low voice
with few words, walked stiffly without head or arm movement, and was "statue-like."
On April 1, 2002, the decedent began clenching his fists and exhibiting seizure-like
activity. He was held up by another inmate in order to prevent him from falling to the floor. The
decedent was eventually lowered to the floor while the other inmates called for assistance.
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was initiated at the scene. The decedent was defibrillated within
90 seconds of the witnessed cardiac arrest but did not respond. Paramedics took the decedent to
a hospital emergency department, where he arrived without any heart activity and was
pronounced dead.
An autopsy found no determinable cause of death. Dr. Bader Cassin, Washtenaw County
Chief Medical Examiner, testified that in his opinion the decedent "probably" died of a cardiac
arrhythmia caused by medications. Dr. Cassin testified that he did not believe that the decedent
had neuroleptic malignant syndrome (NMS) when he died. Plaintiff 's expert, Dr. Joel
Silberberg, opined that the decedent suffered from NMS when he died. Dr. Silberberg stated that
the basis for his opinion was that the decedent was suffering from symptoms of EPS
(extrapyramidal syndrome) and autonomic instability.
According to the testimony in the record, EPS consists of symptoms resembling
Parkinson's tremors that are side effects of psychotropic medications. NMS, on the other hand,
is a fatal disease and a medical emergency. It is a rare reactive condition to psychotropic
medications that can occur after just the first dose, or after several months of treatment. NMS
occurs mostly in males, and involves lead-pipe rigidity, high fever, dehydration, sweating,
elevated blood pressure, fast heart rate and respiration, agitation, elevated white blood cell count,
(…continued)
sitting to a standing position), which plaintiff asserts is a sign of neuromalignant syndrome
(NMS).
4
Orthostatic hypotension, or postural hypotension, occurs when a patient stands after sitting or
lying down. Falling blood pressure may cause the patient to faint. The Signet Mosby Medical
Encyclopedia (Revised Edition, 1996), p 407.
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difficulty swallowing, and autonomic instability. According to plaintiff, muscle wasting and
elevated myoglobin are also signs. The decedent had a myoglobin level of 562, which plaintiff
asserts is very high. Wilcox testified that the decedent was exhibiting lead-pipe rigidity.
II
We review the trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition de novo. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim on the basis of the pleadings alone to
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. We are
required to accept all of plaintiff 's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe those
allegations in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v Detroit, 457 Mich 695,
701; 579 NW2d 895 (1998). Only if no factual development could justify the plaintiff 's claim
for relief can the motion be granted. Koenig v South Haven, 460 Mich 667, 674; 597 NW2d 99
(1999).
When considering a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a trial
court must consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence
filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Such materials
are considered only to the extent that they are admissible in evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(6). Our
"task is to review the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it and determine whether a
genuine issue of any material fact exists to warrant a trial." Muskegon Area Rental Ass'n v City
of Muskegon, 244 Mich App 45, 50; 624 NW2d 496 (2000), rev'd in part on other grounds 465
Mich 456 (2001). "'Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any
material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Taylor v Laban, 241
Mich App 449, 452; 616 NW2d 229 (2000) (citation omitted).
III
A
Any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the
constitution or laws of the United States, is liable under 42 USC 1983. Monell v Dep't of Social
Services of the City of New York, 436 US 658, 690-691; 98 S Ct 2018; 56 L Ed 2d 611 (1978).
"[T]o survive summary [disposition] in a 1983 action, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact as to the following 'two elements: 1) the deprivation of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States and 2) the deprivation was caused by a person
acting under color of state law.'" Johnson v Karnes, 398 F3d 868, 873 (CA 6, 2005) (citation
omitted).
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall
not be required . . . nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." "Cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment may include the denial of medical or
psychological treatment." Mosqueda v Macomb Co Youth Home, 132 Mich App 462, 471; 349
NW2d 185 (1984). "Medical treatment that is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive
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as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness violates the eighth
amendment." Rogers v Evans, 792 F2d 1052, 1058 (CA 11, 1986).
The Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees, such as the decedent.
However, detainees are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive Due Process
Clause to the same care as prison inmates. Graham v Washtenaw Co, 358 F3d 377, 383 (CA 6,
2004) (the Fourteenth Amendment "affords pretrial detainees a due process right to adequate
medical treatment that is analogous to the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners"). The same
standard, deliberate indifference, applies to both detainees and convicts. See id.; Watkins v
Battle Creek, 273 F3d 682, 686 (CA 6, 2001). A "failure or refusal to provide medical care, or
treatment so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all, may, in the case of serious medical
problems, violate the Fourteenth Amendment." Tolbert v Eyman, 434 F2d 625, 626 (CA 9,
1970).
In Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 98-101; 97 S Ct 285; 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976), the United
States Supreme Court, in determining whether a cause of action existed under § 1983, analyzed
Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments. Id. at 102-103. The
Court concluded that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 104
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court recognized, however, that a violation
does not occur every time a prisoner receives inadequate medical treatment. Id. It held that "an
inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care" is not actionable and that a "complaint that
a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a
valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 105-106 (emphasis
added). Rather, "a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Id. at 106.
It is a high standard. "Deliberate indifference" is the reckless disregard of a substantial
risk of serious harm; mere negligence, or even gross negligence, will not suffice. Farmer v
Brennan, 511 US 825, 835-836; 114 S Ct 1970; 128 L Ed 2d 811 (1994); Williams v Mehra, 186
F3d 685, 691 (CA 6, 1999) (en banc).
A claim of cruel and unusual punishment has both objective and subjective components.
The objective component requires a showing that the plaintiff 's medical needs were sufficiently
serious. Hunt v Reynolds, 974 F2d 734, 735 (CA 6, 1992). The subjective component requires a
showing that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff 's serious medical needs.
See id. In other words, the deliberate indifference standard contains both an objective
component (Was the deprivation sufficiently serious?) and a subjective component (Did the
officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind?). Wilson v Seiter, 501 US 294, 298; 111
S Ct 2321; 115 L Ed 2d 271 (1991).
In the instant case, plaintiff 's complaint alleges negligence or, alternatively, gross
negligence by Conlon. In addition, plaintiff relies on expert testimony to support the theory that
Conlon may not have complied with the standard of care applicable to a psychiatrist. The
allegations and the evidence regarding whether Conlon complied with a standard of care
unmistakably suggest a malpractice theory, but we find no authority that a § 1983 claim may be
brought solely on the basis that a professional has committed malpractice. Farmer, supra at 835-
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836; Williams, supra at 691. Moreover, evidence that Conlon may have failed to comply with
the requisite standard of care is insufficient to prove cruel and unusual punishment because the
constitutional claim cannot be based on negligence. Estelle, supra at 105-106. Accordingly,
summary disposition should have been granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10).
Plaintiff 's theory of causation is also insufficient as a matter of law to establish the
requisite proximate cause for a § 1983 claim. Plaintiff suggests that Conlon's treatment caused
NMS, and that NMS caused the decedent's death. However, Conlon testified that she did not
believe the decedent had NMS and that she did not treat him for it. In addition, the medical
examiner who performed the autopsy and plaintiff 's expert pathologist opined that the decedent
did not die from NMS. While plaintiff 's psychiatrist-expert concluded that the decedent died
from NMS, this testimony amounts to speculation and conjecture, because it does not exclude
other possibilities to a reasonable degree of certainty.5 See Robins v Garg, 270 Mich App 519,
527; 716 NW2d 318 (2006); Wiley v Henry Ford Cottage Hosp, 257 Mich App 488, 496; 668
NW2d 402 (2003); see also Horn v Madison Co Fiscal Court, 22 F3d 653, 659 (CA 6, 1994)
("[P]roximate causation is an essential element of a § 1983 claim for damages."). Therefore, the
evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact. Self v Crum, 439 F3d 1227 (CA 10,
2006) (physician who provided medication for respiratory infection and to reduce fever and
coughing did not consciously disregard the substantial risk of serious harm arising from the
prisoner's symptoms, and the prisoner's allegation that the physician diagnosed his heart problem
but ignored it was based on speculation and conjecture).
Plaintiff also failed to demonstrate that defendant Conlon acted "with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind." Wilson, supra at 298. "[M]ere negligence does not amount to deliberate
indifference." Jackson v Detroit, 449 Mich 420, 430; 537 NW2d 151 (1995). Deliberate
indifference requires that the "official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, supra at
837. A claim of deliberate indifference necessarily "'implies that [the] defendant[] knew or
should have known that [he or she was] doing something "wrong" or "unconstitutional."'"
Dampier v Wayne Co, 233 Mich App 714, 739; 592 NW2d 809 (1999) (citation omitted).
Conlon cites Horn for the proposition that the conduct for which liability attaches must
demonstrate deliberateness tantamount to an intent to punish. Horn involved a juvenile detainee
who, like the decedent, had been suicidal. The plaintiff in Horn, through his limited conservator,
sought damages following his attempted suicide. The Horn court stated:
Officials may be shown to be deliberately indifferent to such serious needs
without evidence of conscious intent to inflict pain. However, the conduct for
which liability attaches must be more culpable than mere negligence; it must
5
While plaintiff posits that the decedent died from NMS, the medical examiner opined that the
decedent died from cardiac arrhythmia, and not from NMS. Plaintiff 's evidence simply does not
exclude other reasonable possibilities regarding causation to a reasonable degree of certainty.
See Robins, supra at 527; Wiley, supra at 496; Horn, supra at 659.
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demonstrate deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish. Knowledge of the
asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such
needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference. [Horn, supra at 660
(citations omitted).]
The Horn court cited Bowen v City of Manchester, 966 F2d 13, 17 (CA 1, 1992), for the
proposition that "evidence must show the official had actual knowledge of, or was willfully blind
to, the serious risk of suicide," and quoted Colburn v Upper Darby Twp, 946 F2d 1017, 10241025 (CA 3, 1991), for its holding that the circumstances of the treatment "must be such that the
official knew or should have known of the 'particular vulnerability to suicide' or the 'strong
likelihood' that self-inflicted harm would occur." The Horn court observed that the record did
"not contain evidence that defendants knew of the frequency of juvenile detainee suicides and
deliberately chose not to employ reasonable preventative measures." Horn, supra at 661.
We believe that Horn is relevant because its facts include an outcome that Conlon was
here attempting to avoid: an attempt at suicide by the decedent. Conlon recommended an
increased dose of Risperdal (and later recommended a tapering off of Risperdal with the gradual
addition of Seroquel), in order to help diminish the decedent's symptoms of psychosis, and to
diminish the risk of suicide, because the decedent was on suicide watch.
Horn is supported by Farmer, supra at 835, which held that deliberate indifference
requires a degree of culpability greater than mere negligence, but "something less than acts or
omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." A
plaintiff
need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm
actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act
despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. . . . Whether a prison
official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact
subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from
circumstantial evidence . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official
knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. [Id. at
842.]
Similarly, in Miller v Calhoun Co, 408 F3d 803, 820 (CA 6, 2005), the court held that the
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the defendant. The Miller court noted:
Deliberate indifference requires a degree of culpability greater than mere
negligence, but less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm
or with knowledge that harm will result. The prison official's state of mind must
evince deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish. Knowledge of the asserted
serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is
essential to a finding of deliberate indifference. Thus, an official's failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction
of punishment. [Id. at 813 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).]
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The Miller court cited the same phrase in Horn upon which Conlon now relies, namely,
"deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish," but Miller also stated that deliberate indifference
is "less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will result." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).
Thus, the standard is more than simple negligence, and it approaches, but does not reach,
an intent to punish. "[W]hen a prison doctor provides treatment, albeit carelessly or
inefficaciously, to a prisoner, he has not displayed a deliberate indifference to the prisoner's
needs, but merely a degree of incompetence which does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation." Karnes, supra at 875 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis
added). "However, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to show that the official acted for the very
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). "[D]eliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a
prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk." Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Here, no genuine issue of material fact with regard to deliberate indifference exists.
Conlon was attempting to treat the decedent's symptoms of mental illness by increasing his
Risperdal dose. At the time Conlon increased the Risperdal dose, the decedent had recently been
put on suicide watch, was experiencing symptoms of psychosis (hearing voices), and wanted to
hurt someone in his cell. Such symptoms suggested that the current dose was insufficiently
effective. Suicidal ideation, the hearing of voices, and wanting to hurt someone are serious
symptoms requiring aggressive treatment. Plaintiff 's expert, Dr. Joel Silberberg, testified that an
increase in medication such as in this case is within the standard of care. Conduct that was
arguably within the standard of care (not malpractice) cannot simultaneously rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. Farmer, supra at 835-836; Williams, supra at 691.
The Farmer court acknowledged that
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
. . . [A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have
perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases
be condemned as the infliction of punishment. [Farmer, supra at 837-838.]
Here, even assuming that the decedent did suffer from NMS (which is speculative), no evidence
indicates that Conlon drew the inference that the decedent suffered from NMS. Therefore, there
is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the subjective component of the claim of cruel and
unusual punishment. Farmer, supra at 838.
B
Even if there were a genuine issue of material fact concerning plaintiff 's claim of a
constitutional violation, Conlon would still be entitled to qualified immunity. Whether a
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law that we review de novo. Thomas
v McGinnis, 239 Mich App 636, 644; 609 NW2d 222 (2000).
-8-
Qualified immunity is an established federal defense against claims for damages under §
1983 for alleged violations of federal rights. Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800; 102 S Ct 2727;
73 L Ed 2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity is a question of law for the court. Spurlock v
Satterfield, 167 F3d 995, 1000 (CA 6, 1999). The doctrine applies an objective standard to the
conduct of defendants, not to their state of mind. Harlow, supra at 816. Bare allegations of
faulty subjective intent should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of
trial or to the burden of broad-reaching discovery. "We therefore hold that government officials
performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818. In other words, public officials enjoy
qualified immunity for mistakes with regard to the legality of their actions. Saucier v Katz, 533
US 194; 121 S Ct 2151; 150 L Ed 2d 272 (2001).
It is a high standard. "A right is clearly established if there is binding precedent . . . that
is directly on point." Risbridger v Connelly, 275 F3d 565, 569 (CA 6, 2002). "The contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right." Brosseau v Haugen, 543 US 194, 198; 125 S Ct 596; 160 L Ed 2d 583
(2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Hunter v Bryant, 502 US 224, 227; 112
S Ct 534; 116 L Ed 2d 589 (1991), stated: "First, . . . [i]mmunity ordinarily should be decided by
the court [and not the jury] long before trial. Second, the court should ask whether the agent
acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more
reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed . . . after the fact." (Citations
omitted.)
The United States Supreme Court has aggressively enforced qualified immunity. In
Saucier, the Court reaffirmed the strong protection provided, and reversed a court of appeals
decision in which qualified immunity was denied because of concerns about the merits of the
underlying claim. The Court stressed that qualified immunity is immunity from suit and not
merely from liability, and that the determination should be made as early in the proceedings as
possible. Saucier, supra at 200. Saucier outlined two components: First: "Taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct
violated a constitutional right?" Saucier, supra at 201. "If no constitutional right would have
been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries
concerning qualified immunity." Id. Second: "[I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable
view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly
established. This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of
the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . ." Id.
Saucier stressed that qualified immunity ought not be denied merely because of a genuine
issue of fact on the merits of the underlying claim. Id. at 202-204. The issue of qualified
immunity is distinct from the merits of a claim; indeed, liability on a constitutional claim does
not preclude qualified immunity. Wilson v Layne, 526 US 603; 119 S Ct 1692; 143 L Ed 2d 818
(1999) (media "ride along," where the police brought the media into a home to observe the
execution of an arrest warrant, violated Fourth Amendment rights of the homeowners, but this
was not clearly established at the time, so qualified immunity applied to damages claim).
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In Brosseau, the Court held that a police officer, who used deadly force against a suspect
fleeing in a motor vehicle, was entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim. The
Court reversed the court of appeals, which had denied a motion for summary judgment.
Brosseau, supra at 195.
In Brosseau, the Court reaffirmed the key distinction between the validity of the
underlying claim and the qualified immunity defense: "We express no view as to the correctness
of the Court of Appeals' decision on the constitutional question itself. We believe that, however
that question is decided, the Court of Appeals was wrong on the issue of qualified immunity."
Id. at 198 (emphasis added). "Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a
decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the
circumstances she confronted." Id. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, even if there were a genuine issue of material fact regarding the underlying
claim, the next step is to ask whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established.
Saucier, supra at 201. "This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . ." Id.
Even if Conlon's actions, in increasing the decedent's Risperdal dose (in response to a
potential suicide and to symptoms of psychosis) and in weaning decedent off of Risperdal while
slowly adding Seroquel, constituted a violation of the decedent's right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, plaintiff fails to show that such right was clearly established at the time of
Conlon's actions. Because there was no court precedent predating Conlon's actions that clearly
establish that such actions by a psychiatrist constitute deliberate indifference, we find that
Conlon was cloaked with qualified immunity for her treatment of the decedent.
IV
Plaintiff 's claim is based on a theory of malpractice. As such, it fails to raise a genuine
issue of material fact regarding a constitutional claim of cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff 's claim is also based on speculation and conjecture regarding causation, thus failing to
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding proximate causation, an essential element of a §
1983 claim. Finally, even if a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the constitutional
claim, Conlon is entitled to qualified immunity, because she did not violate a clearly established
constitutional right of which a reasonable governmental actor in her position would have known.
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in Conlon's favor. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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