PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN CRAIG LAPWORTH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
December 28, 2006
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 271142
Newaygo Circuit Court
LC No. 05-008701-FC
KEVIN CRAIG LAPWORTH,
Defendant-Appellee.
Official Reported Version
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Sawyer and Bandstra, JJ.
SAWYER, J.
We granted leave to appeal in this case to address the question whether an invocation of
the right to counsel constitutes an objection to the consent given by a cotenant to enter a
residence, thereby negating that consent. We hold that a mere invocation of the right to counsel,
or the right to remain silent for that matter, following an advice of rights does not constitute an
express objection to a consensual entry into the premises and, therefore, is insufficient to negate
a cotenant's consent to such entry.
Officer Kevin England was investigating an attempted arson at Sally's Restaurant in
White Cloud. Footprints and tire marks were found at the rear of the building and a red gasoline
can was found in the restaurant. Security video from a nearby store showed defendant and his
roommate, Brian Hall, at the store around the time of the attempted arson. It also showed Hall
with a gas can and defendant going inside to pay for the gasoline purchase. Officer England then
visited defendant's residence to speak with him and Hall.
When defendant answered the door, England asked to speak with Hall. Hall agreed to
speak with England, stepping outside to do so. He gave a statement that placed him at the scene
but only implicated defendant as actually committing the crime. England then spoke with
defendant, who, after being read his Miranda1 rights, stated that he wished to speak with an
attorney. England, believing that he had probable cause to arrest defendant on the basis of Hall's
statement, handcuffed defendant and placed him in a squad car. England then obtained
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 865 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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permission from Hall, who went back in the house, to enter the premises and use the phone.
England stated that he wanted to call the assistant prosecutor on duty regarding the case. Inside
the house, England saw a pair of shoes on the floor with a tread pattern similar to that observed
at the crime scene. After speaking with the prosecutor, the decision was made to release
defendant from custody. England left the house without taking the shoes with him.
Outside, England asked defendant whether he could take the shoes or whether he needed
to obtain a warrant. Defendant told him to get a search warrant. England obtained a warrant
and, as a result, the shoes were seized and photographs were taken of the tire tread on a vehicle
at the home. Thereafter, defendant was arrested and the vehicle seized.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that England did not have valid
consent to enter the premises because defendant had invoked his right to remain silent and right
to counsel. The trial court agreed with defendant. We do not, and we reverse the trial court's
grant of defendant's motion to suppress. While we review the trial court's factual conclusions for
clear error, we review the trial court's decision on a motion to suppress de novo.2
At the time Officer England entered the house, he had permission from Hall to enter the
home and use the telephone. Defendant, although he had invoked his rights to remain silent and
to counsel, had not expressly granted or denied England permission to enter the home. In the
absence of express denial of permission to enter, the consent by Hall was sufficient to allow
England access to the common areas of the home.
This case is largely controlled by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Georgia
v Randolph3 and United States v Matlock.4 The facts in Matlock are somewhat similar to the
case at bar: the defendant was arrested and placed in a squad car and consent to search the
premises was obtained from a cotenant without inquiry of the defendant. The Court held that
"the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against
the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared."5 Thus, under the
reasoning in Matlock, Hall could give consent to England to enter the premises in the absence of
defendant.
The Supreme Court revisited the issue in Randolph, addressing the somewhat different
issue of the police's authority to enter the premises where one cotenant gives consent and the
other cotenant, who is present, objects. The Supreme Court held that under such circumstances
the police are not authorized to enter.6 But the Court did reaffirm the rule in Matlock that, in the
absence of such objection, the consent of the cotenant is sufficient authority to justify entry and,
2
People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 732; 705 NW2d 728 (2005).
3
___ US ____; 126 S Ct 1515; 164 L Ed 2d 208 (2006).
4
415 US 164; 94 S Ct 988; 39 L Ed 2d 242 (1974).
5
Id. at 170.
6
Randolph, 126 S Ct at 1528.
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also, that the police are under no obligation to seek consent from the absent suspect. This is true
even if the potentially objecting tenant is nearby, such as in a squad car outside (though the
police may not procure the tenant's absence for the purpose of denying the tenant an opportunity
to object).7
Therefore, in the case at bar, Hall's permission to enter the premises is adequate if
defendant did not, in fact, object. Defendant argues that his invocation of his rights following
the Miranda warnings constituted a tacit objection and negated the consent given by his
roommate. We disagree. First, we think it a rather long stretch to classify either the invocation
of the right to remain silent or the right to counsel following Miranda warnings as even a tacit
objection to consent to search. Second, the Supreme Court made it clear that "a physically
present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him,
regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant."8 Accordingly, even if we were to regard an
invocation of rights following Miranda warnings as a tacit objection to consent to search, a tacit
objection is insufficient under Randolph.
Indeed, this highlights the flaw in the trial court's reasoning in this case. The trial court
centered on the question whether defendant could consent to Officer England's entering the
home after he invoked his right to counsel. But, even assuming that the trial court is correct that
a suspect is incapable of giving consent to search after invoking his right to counsel (a question
we need not address here), that is irrelevant in this case. The officer's authority to enter the
premises is not based on defendant's consent, but on his roommate's consent. And, under
Randolph, that consent is sufficient authority unless defendant expressly objected, which he did
not.
Furthermore, we do not agree with defendant's argument that Hall's consent is
insufficient because Officer England removed defendant and placed him in the cruiser in order to
avoid his ability to deny consent to enter the premises. The Supreme Court in Randolph did
suggest that where the police purposely remove the suspect so that the suspect will be unable to
object, the cotenant's consent may not be sufficient.9 But the Court did not create a blanket rule
covering every situation in which the suspect's absence was attributable to the actions of the
police. Rather, the Court was specifically referring to situations where the police intentionally
removed the suspect for the express purpose of preventing the suspect from having an
opportunity to object.10 There is no indication that that is the case here.
We agree with Officer England that Hall's statement, especially when combined with the
video surveillance, established probable cause to arrest defendant. Nothing in the facts suggests
to us that the officer's motivation was to remove defendant from a position of being able to
7
Randolph, supra at 1527.
8
Id. at 1528 (emphasis added).
9
Id. at 1527.
10
Id.
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object to the officer's entry into the home. Indeed, when viewed in the totality of the
circumstances, the officer's actions appear to be overly conscientious of defendant's rights. First,
although the officer determined (correctly, in our view) that there was probable cause to arrest
and could have taken defendant to jail, the officer chose instead to contact the prosecutor to
determine whether to take that step or to release defendant from custody. Second, having seen
the shoes and possessing probable cause to believe that they were evidence of a crime, he could
have seized them. Instead, he asked defendant if he could take them and, in the absence of
defendant's consent, obtained a warrant instead. This represents the actions of a police officer
who is not even fully exercising his authority under the Fourth Amendment, not one who is
aggressively avoiding the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, we note that the
trial court did not find that the arrest was made for the purpose of preventing defendant from
objecting to the subsequent request to enter the premises.
The trial court's decision also seems to suggest that, even if Officer England's entry into
the home was lawful, the subsequent search was not because the officer saw the shoes before
obtaining a warrant. We disagree. England's testimony clearly established that he saw the shoes
lying on the floor next to the phone. He further testified that he could see the tread pattern on the
shoes without touching them and that before he touched the shoes he recognized the tread pattern
as being the same distinctive tread pattern found at the crime scene. A police officer is
authorized to seize without a warrant an item in plain view if the officer is lawfully in the
position to observe the item and the item's incriminating nature is immediately apparent.11
Because that is the case here, Officer England would have been justified in seizing the shoes
when he first saw them. Thus, merely using those observations to establish probable cause to
obtain a search warrant cannot be a violation of the Fourth Amendment that renders the warrant
invalid.
For the above reasons, we conclude that the entry into the residence and the subsequent
observation of the shoes were lawful. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting defendant's
motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
11
Wilkens, supra at 733.
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