PEOPLE OF MI V JOE LUIS BOATMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
December 28, 2006
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 270564
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 99-017170-FH
JOE LUIS BOATMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Official Reported Version
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
TALBOT, J.
This matter is on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court for consideration, as on
leave granted, "of whether defendant's plea was understanding when defendant was not informed
of the maximum possible sentence as an habitual offender." People v Boatman, 475 Mich 862
(2006). Defendant appeals the order denying his request to withdraw his 1999 guilty plea to a
charge of resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.479(1)(b). Defendant was
sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to a prison term of 3 to 15 years.
When a motion to withdraw a plea is made following sentencing, the decision to grant the
motion rests within the discretion of the trial court. The trial court's decision will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
People v Eloby (After Remand), 215 Mich App 472, 475; 547 NW2d 48 (1996). We vacate
defendant's plea and remand for further proceedings.
Initially, addressing only the specific question posed by the Supreme Court, we note that
MCR 6.302 requires, in relevant part:
(B) An Understanding Plea. Speaking directly to the defendant or
defendants, the court must advise the defendant or defendants of the following
and determine that each defendant understands:
* * *
(2) the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense and any
mandatory minimum sentence required by law[.]
If the plain language of a court rule is unambiguous, courts "'must enforce the meaning
expressed, without further judicial construction or interpretation.'" People v Phillips, 468 Mich
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583, 589; 663 NW2d 463 (2003), quoting Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich 188,
193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000).
At the time of entry of defendant's plea, the trial court indicated the maximum sentence
faced by defendant for the underlying charge of resisting and obstructing by inquiring, "Do you
understand that you're pleading guilty to a felony—or to a misdemeanor, which carries with it a
maximum penalty of two years in a state prison?" As such, defendant was informed of the
maximum sentence for the charged "offense," because "[t]he habitual-offender statute does not
create a substantive offense that is separate from and independent of the principal charge."
People v Oswald (After Remand), 188 Mich App 1, 12; 469 NW2d 306 (1991). Nothing in the
wording of the court rule can be construed to require a trial court to address every possible
configuration or consequence of sentencing. In accordance with the dictates of MCR
6.302(B)(2), when pleading guilty, the court rule requirement that a defendant be advised of the
consequences of his or her plea does not encompass advice extending beyond the maximum
possible sentence and any mandatory minimum sentence necessitated by law. See People v
Johnson, 413 Mich 487, 490; 320 NW2d 876 (1982) (addressing a previous version of the rule,
GCR 1963, 785.7). Although a guilty plea must be made "with knowledge of the consequences,"
People v Schluter, 204 Mich App 60, 66; 514 NW2d 489 (1994), "the trial judge need not inform
the defendant of all sentence consequences—only the maximum sentence for the crime to which
he was pleading guilty," People v Jahner, 433 Mich 490, 502; 446 NW2d 151 (1989), and "any
mandatory minimum sentence required by law." MCR 6.302(B)(2). In reviewing adherence to
the mandates of the court rule, a doctrine of "substantial compliance" applies. The doctrine holds
that "[w]hether a particular departure from [the court rule] justifies or requires reversal for
additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance." Guilty Plea Cases, 395
Mich 96, 113; 235 NW2d 132 (1975) (addressing GCR 1963, 785.7). In this case, the trial court
complied with the mandate of MCR 6.302(B)(2) by informing defendant of the maximum
sentence for the charged offense of resisting and obstructing.
This Court has long recognized that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of
all potential sentencing consequences. Specifically, there exists "no authority that holds
collateral consequences should be considered in allowing a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea
after having been sentenced." People v Davidovich, 238 Mich App 422, 430; 606 NW2d 387
(1999); see also Johnson, supra at 490. However, because of the existence of specific and
separate guidelines applicable to the sentencing of habitual offenders, the effect of a defendant's
habitual-offender status on sentencing does not comprise a "collateral consequence." In addition,
the existence of separate guidelines for use with habitual offenders creates a tension between the
specific language and implied spirit of the court rule. Clearly, an important focus of MCR 6.302
is to assure that any defendant who has entered into a sentencing agreement has made a knowing,
understanding, and informed plea decision. This requires a defendant to be informed of the
consequences of his or her plea and, necessarily, the resultant sentence. Unfortunately, the
language of the court rule does not encompass a specific requirement to inform a habitual
offender regarding the effect this status has on sentencing. This is at odds with the intent of the
law, which is to assure an informed decision by a defendant in accepting or entering into a plea
agreement by requiring that the most significant repercussion of that agreement, by actual
duration of the sentence to be imposed, be known and understood in advance.
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Despite our recognition of the disparity between the actual language of the court rule,
which requires that information related to the "offense" be conveyed to a defendant, and the
spirit of the rule, which aims to ensure a knowing and informed plea decision, this Court lacks
authority to expand the scope of the rule's language. Rather, we are constrained by our
recognition that it is within the exclusive province of the Supreme Court to "promulgate and
amend general rules governing practices and procedure." MCL 600.223. While we
acknowledge that a defendant's status as an habitual offender and the commensurate guidelines
enhancement applicable in sentencing may significantly affect the attainment of an
understanding plea, we respectfully submit that any expansion of the scope or language of MCR
6.302 to coincide with the clear intent of the rule must be initiated by the Supreme Court rather
than through this Court's broadened interpretation of the existing language. We would further
note concerns pertaining to the retrospective effect of such a determination by this Court and the
potential to promote and incur an influx of appeals on this issue when compared to the orderly
and restrictive prospective application of any rule change initiated by the Supreme Court.
In certain cases, such as this one, an obvious disparity will occur between an
understanding of the sentence for the offense and the effect of the habitual-offender guidelines
on that sentence. A review of the lower court record reveals a procedural failure by the trial
court that must be addressed and that governs our ultimate ruling. Notably, although defendant
acknowledged his status as a fourth-offense habitual offender, no mention was made during the
plea hearing, sufficient to inform defendant, that the "guidelines" being referenced and intended
for use in his sentencing would be those guidelines applicable to his habitual-offender status.
Instead, the trial court referred to "guidelines" without specifying whether the offense guidelines
or habitual-offender guidelines would be implicated in his sentencing, then assured defendant
that he would be permitted to withdraw his plea should sentencing not conform to the agreement
as he understood it. Specifically, when discussing the plea and imposition of the "guidelines,"
the following discourse occurred:
The Court: It's my understanding, Mr. Boatman, that the plea agreement
that's been entered into between you and your attorney and the prosecutor's office
in this case is that the prosecutor is recommending to the Court that the Court stay
within the guidelines in sentencing.
Is that your understanding of the plea agreement?
Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Has anyone represented to him what the guidelines are?
Prosecutor: No, Your Honor, I don't believe so.
* * *
Defense Counsel: Yes, Your Honor, I have.
* * *
The Court: What have you indicated to him?
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Defense Counsel: Six to 12.
* * *
Prosecutor: Your Honor, I don't know that the People would be
stipulating to that as being—
The Court: I understand that, but so that we know that that's the
representation that Ms. Boozer has made to Mr. Boatman, if the guidelines don't
fall on what, we'll—we'll determine whether he's—whether he wants to withdraw
his plea.
* * *
Prosecutor: I've worked it five to 46 months.
A guilty plea "not only must be voluntary but must be [a] knowing, intelligent ac[t] done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." People v
Thew, 201 Mich App 78, 95; 506 NW2d 547 (1993) (quotation omitted). In evaluating
defendant's plea, we agree that there exists "no 'talismanic chant' that must be uttered by the trial
court during plea proceedings." Boatman, supra at 863 (Young, J, dissenting) (quotation
omitted). However, it is obvious to this Court that for a plea to be "understanding," at a
minimum, a defendant must be informed of the nature and consequences of his or her bargain.
This would necessitate a designation of which guidelines are being agreed to in order "to inform
the defendant of the most serious consequences he faces if he pleads guilty." People v Shannon,
134 Mich App 35, 38; 349 NW2d 813 (1984). At the time of defendant's plea, the trial court's
reference to use of the "guidelines" failed to specify whether the standard guidelines for the
offense, or the enhanced guidelines consistent with defendant's habitual-offender status, would
be used for sentencing. The existence of separate guidelines specified for use with habitual
offenders demonstrates the necessity of informing a defendant of the use of these guidelines to
assure "understanding" of the consequences of a plea, particularly under the circumstances of
this case where the difference in sentencing comprised a distinction between a misdemeanor and
a felony, and a difference of 13 years in the sentence imposed. See MCL 750.479; MCL 769.10
et seq.; People v DeLong, 128 Mich App 1; 339 NW2d 659 (1983).
"The purpose of a plea colloquy is to protect the defendant from an unintelligent or
involuntary plea." People v Watkins, 247 Mich App 14, 24; 634 NW2d 370 (2001), aff 'd in part
and mod in part 467 Mich 868 (2002) (quotation omitted). The failure of the trial court to
specify that it would be using guidelines applicable to habitual offenders for sentencing
constituted more than merely an imprecise recital. People v Ingram, 166 Mich App 433, 437;
424 NW2d 19 (1988). A review of the record demonstrates that this failure constituted a
procedural flaw that resulted in the failure to properly inform defendant of the consequences of
his plea, rendering it unintelligent.
Defendant entered his plea on the basis of an understanding that he would be sentenced in
conformance with the "guidelines." However, throughout the entire discussion between the trial
court and counsel, there is no indication that the guidelines being referenced were those
applicable to defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender. It is nonsensical to assume,
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particularly in light of the apparent confusion of defendant's own counsel regarding the
applicable guidelines range, that defendant understood the consequences of his plea. This, when
coupled with the trial court's own indication that defendant would be permitted to withdraw his
plea if his sentencing did not conform to the guidelines as represented by his counsel,
demonstrates that defendant's plea was not understanding, as required by MCR 6.302. On the
sole basis of this procedural failure, we vacate and remand.
Defendant's plea is vacated and we remand this matter to the trial court for further
proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Fitzgerald, J., concurred.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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