FREDIE STOKES V DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FREDIE STOKES,
FOR PUBLICATION
October 26, 2006
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 268544
WCAC
LC No. 02-000388
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Official Reported Version
Before: Saad, P.J., and Jansen and White, JJ.
SAAD, P.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because of the numerous legal errors in the WCAC's en banc
opinion. Though I agree with the majority's conclusion that the WCAC's majority opinion
contains several misstatements of law, I disagree with the majority's ruling that the result reached
here should nevertheless be affirmed. Because the commission's and the magistrate's actions in
this case repudiated our Supreme Court's holding in Sington v Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144; 648
NW2d 624 (2002), and effectively prevented defendant from preparing and presenting a defense
under Sington, I would reverse the WCAC decision and remand this matter to the magistrate.
Definition of Disability
The WCAC clearly erred in its ruling that "work suitable to that person's qualifications
and training" under MCL 418.301(4) and Sington is limited to the jobs the claimant performed,
without reference to whether the claimant possessed any other "transferable" skills by which he
could earn wages. Contrary to Sington, both the WCAC and the magistrate improperly limited
this pivotal inquiry to plaintiff 's employment history with defendant rather than the plaintiff 's
qualification and training to perform any other work. I disagree with the majority's "harmless
error" conclusion that "[i]n the instant case . . . the employee's qualifications and training were
straightforward and limited," see ante at ___, because the WCAC used the wrong legal definition
of disability and defendant was denied a meaningful opportunity to discover evidence and
present proofs regarding plaintiff 's actual qualifications and training.
Discovery
Also, the WCAC erred by ruling that the magistrate had no authority to order plaintiff to
provide discovery to defendant. Clearly, the WCAC erred as a matter of law by upholding the
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magistrate's refusal to order discovery because, under Boggetta v Burroughs Corp, 368 Mich
600; 118 NW2d 980 (1962), the magistrate had authority to order discovery to allow a party to
prepare and present its case. This issue was neither fully argued nor fully developed, because the
magistrate and the WCAC erred as a matter of law regarding defendant's right to discovery.
Accordingly, it is appropriate and necessary to reverse and remand this matter to the magistrate,
with directions to order discovery reasonably necessary to allow defendant to prepare its defense
under Sington.
Causal Connection
Further, the WCAC's statements regarding whether plaintiff needed to show loss of
wages were also incorrect, unnecessary, and confusing, and constitute legal error. Even if
plaintiff proves both a work-related injury and the loss of wage-earning capacity, he must also
show that his work-related injury caused his current loss of wage-earning capacity pursuant to
MCL 418.301(4). Sweatt v Dep't of Corrections, 468 Mich 172, 186; 661 NW2d 201 (2003)
("there must be a linkage between the disabling work-related injury and the reduction in pay").
This is a fundamental part of plaintiff 's proofs under the Act.
Burden of Proof
Finally, I disagree with the majority's analysis regarding defendant's argument that the
WCAC erroneously concluded that defendant-employer bore the burden of disproving disability
under Sington by affirmatively proving the existence of jobs within the injured employee's
qualifications and training. It is well established that the plaintiff in a workers' compensation
matter must establish his work-related disability and entitlement to benefits by a preponderance
of the evidence. MCL 418.851; Aquilina v Gen Motors Corp, 403 Mich 206, 211; 267 NW2d
923 (1978). This broad burden of proof includes the burden of showing disability under Sington
and the Supreme Court's order in Rea v Regency Olds/Mazda/Volvo, 450 Mich 1201; 536 NW2d
542 (1995). The Rea order specifically states that "the 1987 definition of disability in the
Worker's Disability Compensation Act [the present version of § 301(4)] requires a claimant to
demonstrate how a physical limitation affects wage-earning capacity in work suitable to the
claimant's qualifications and training."1 Id. (emphasis added). Because the WCAC committed a
clear error of law by concluding otherwise, we should reverse.
/s/ Henry William Saad
1
Though the defendant-employer may have the obligation to provide or pay for vocational
rehabilitation services under MCL 418.319, nothing in § 319 or any other provision in the act
suggests that the burden of proving the existence of work within the claimant's qualifications,
training, and current physical abilities somehow shifts to the defendant.
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