PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES JOHN GIOVANNINI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
June 20, 2006
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 261017
Wayne Circuit Court
LC Nos. 03-011792-01; 03-013243
JAMES JOHN GIOVANNINI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Official Reported Version
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Neff and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted from sentences of five years' probation
imposed for plea-based convictions of second-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(3), in each
of two separate cases. At issue is whether the trial court erred in ruling that it was precluded
from sentencing defendant under the Youthful Trainee Act (YTA), MCL 762.11 et seq., on the
basis that defendant was convicted of more than one criminal offense. We hold that defendant
was not ineligible for sentencing under the YTA solely because he was convicted of two criminal
offenses. We therefore reverse and remand for reconsideration of defendant's YTA request.
I. Background
Defendant was involved in a series of home invasions, culminating in a second-degree
home invasion charge against defendant and another youth for an incident that occurred on
August 19, 2003. Defendant was also separately charged with second-degree home invasion for
an incident that occurred on August 14, 2003. The lower court records indicate that defendant
was 17 years old when he committed the offenses.
Defendant sought to plead guilty in both cases and request assignment as a youthful
offender under the YTA. The prosecutor objected, arguing that defendant was ineligible for
sentencing under the YTA because his case involved more than one offense, contrary to the YTA
statutory language that referred to "a criminal offense" and "the criminal offense" in the singular.
The trial court reluctantly agreed on the basis that the Michigan Supreme Court had vacated in
part People v Harns, 227 Mich App 573; 576 NW2d 700 (1998) (Harns I), in which this Court
concluded that the references in the singular in the YTA were not jurisprudentially significant
and thus a defendant convicted of more than one crime may be placed on YTA status. People v
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Harns, 459 Mich 895 (1998) (Harns II). The trial court expressly stated that were it permitted to
do so, it would grant defendant youthful trainee status.
II. Standard of Review
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision concerning a
defendant's assignment under the YTA. People v Bobek, 217 Mich App 524, 532; 553 NW2d 18
(1996); People v Fitchett, 96 Mich App 251, 254; 292 NW2d 191 (1980).
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Roberts
v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002); Bobek, supra at 528. "In
interpreting the YTA, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Statutory
language should also be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act." Bobek,
supra at 528 (citations omitted).
III. Analysis
"The YTA offers a mechanism by which youths charged with committing certain crimes
between their seventeenth and twenty-first birthdays may be excused from having a criminal
record." Bobek, supra at 528-529. This remedial legislation was "designed to alleviate problems
with young offenders by permitting the use of rehabilitation procedures prior to conviction . . . ."
People v Perkins, 107 Mich App 440, 444; 309 NW2d 634 (1981). The act establishes an
administrative procedure exercisable at the discretion of the trial judge when requested to do so
by the affected youth. People v Bandy, 35 Mich App 53, 58; 192 NW2d 115 (1971).
At the time defendant sought assignment under the YTA, the act provided, in pertinent
part:1
If an individual pleads guilty to a charge of a criminal offense, other than a
felony for which the maximum punishment is life imprisonment, a major
controlled substance offense, or a traffic offense, committed on or after the
individual's seventeenth birthday but before his or her twenty-first birthday, the
court of record having jurisdiction of the criminal offense may, without entering a
judgment of conviction and with the consent of that individual, consider and
assign that individual to the status of youthful trainee. . . . [MCL 762.11.]
The question raised is whether the statutory references to "a criminal offense" and "the
criminal offense" in the singular preclude assignment under the YTA for a youthful defendant
who pleads guilty of more than one offense. "This Court should first look to the specific
statutory language to determine the intent of the Legislature," which "is presumed to intend the
meaning that the statute plainly expresses." Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc v Watersmeet
Twp (After Remand), 217 Mich App 7, 12; 551 NW2d 199 (1996). If the language is clear and
1
The act was amended, effective October 1, 2004, to exclude individuals convicted of various
criminal sexual conduct offenses or who are registered sex offenders.
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unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent and judicial
construction is not permitted. Id.; Tryc v Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545
NW2d 642 (1996). Statutory language is to be given its ordinary and generally accepted
meaning, although if the statute defines a given term, that definition is controlling. Tryc, supra
at 135-136.
Contrary to the prosecutor's argument, we do not find that the statute clearly and
unambiguously limits granting youthful trainee status to those defendants who have committed a
single offense. Because the provision necessarily includes placement for defendants who
commit only a single offense, references to "criminal offenses" in the plural would not comport
with the substantive intent of the act and would be grammatically cumbersome. Likewise, there
is no language referring to more than one criminal offense. The statute is therefore ambiguous
and subject to interpretation.
A. Harns II as Precedent
In Harns I, this Court held that despite references to "a criminal offense" and "the
criminal offense," a defendant who pleads guilty of more than one offense is eligible for YTA
consideration. Harns I, supra at 577-578. The Court further held that because the statute refers
to a guilty plea, a defendant who pleads no contest is ineligible for YTA consideration. Id. at
579-580.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the portion of this Court's opinion addressing one
versus more than one conviction, finding it "unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to address this
issue in light of its conclusion that the defendant could not be placed on Youthful Trainee Act
status because he pled nolo contendere instead of guilty." Harns II, supra at 895.
To the extent the trial court determined that Harns II precluded it from finding defendant
eligible for YTA status, it erred. Supreme Court orders that include a decision with an
understandable rationale establish binding precedent. People v Crall, 444 Mich 463, 464 n 8;
510 NW2d 182 (1993); People v Phillips (After Second Remand), 227 Mich App 28, 38 n 11;
575 NW2d 784 (1997). When the Supreme Court vacated the relevant portion of Harns I, it did
not express agreement or disagreement with this Court's analysis or otherwise address the merits
of the issue. Rather, the Supreme Court determined that consideration of the issue was
unnecessary. Thus, the Supreme Court's order cannot be understood as expressing an opinion on
how the issue should be decided.
This Court's decision in Harns I also no longer has precedential effect, because "[a] Court
of Appeals opinion that has been vacated by the majority of the Supreme Court without an
expression of approval or disapproval of this Court's reasoning is not precedentially binding."
People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 550 n 8; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). Thus the issue raised by
defendant was essentially one of first impression, id. at 551, leaving the trial court free to decide
the issue itself.
B. Ruling on the Merits
If Harns II were the only basis for the trial court's decision, a proper remedy would be to
remand the case and permit the court to decide the issue in the first instance. Appellate review is
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generally limited to issues raised before and decided by the trial court. Fast Air, Inc v Knight,
235 Mich App 541, 549; 599 NW2d 489 (1999). However, this Court may consider an
unpreserved issue "if the question is one of law and all the facts necessary for its resolution have
been presented or where necessary for a proper determination of the case." Providence Hosp v
Nat'l Labor Union Health & Welfare Fund, 162 Mich App 191, 194-195; 412 NW2d 690 (1987)
(citations omitted).
In the relevant portion of its opinion, Harns I, supra at 577-578, the Court stated:
The Legislature has provided us with the necessary rule of statutory
construction to decide this issue. MCL 8.3b; MSA 2.212(2) provides in pertinent
part: "Every word importing the singular number only may extend to and
embrace the plural number, and every word importing the plural number may be
applied and limited to the singular number." See Empire Iron Mining Partnership
v Orhanen, 455 Mich 410, 428; 565 NW2d 844 (1997); Crowley, Milner & Co v
Macomb Circuit Judge, 239 Mich 605, 615; 215 NW 29 (1927). Thus, the
phrases "a criminal offense," or "the criminal offense," can be construed to mean
"criminal offenses."
Furthermore, if the Legislature had meant to exclude individuals with
more than one conviction from participation in the YTA, it could easily have done
so. Where the Legislature has intended to limit similar measures to individuals
who are charged or plead guilty of only one offense, it has expressly said so. The
general expunction statute applies to "a person who is convicted of not more than
1 offense . . . ." MCL 780.621; MSA 28.1274(101)(1). Likewise, the expunction
statute in the Public Health Code states: "There may be only 1 discharge and
dismissal under this section as to an individual." MCL 333.7411; MSA
14.15(7411)(1). The omission of similar language from the YTA indicates that
the Legislature did not intend to exclude youthful offenders with more than one
conviction from participation.2
2
We note in passing that there are a number of reported cases in which a
defendant who was charged with more than one offense was assigned to, or found
to be eligible for, YTA status. See, e.g., People v Mahler, 156 Mich App 799;
402 NW2d 93 (1986); People v Cochran, 155 Mich App 191; 399 NW2d 44
(1986); People v Bracey, 124 Mich App 401; 335 NW2d 49 (1983); People v
Wilson, 97 Mich App 579; 296 NW2d 110 (1980); People v Bandy, 35 Mich App
53; 192 NW2d 115 (1971). We recognize that this precise issue was not
addressed in these cases. Nevertheless, the fact that the Legislature remained
silent after the release of these cases suggests that it did not object to an
interpretation of the YTA that permitted youthful trainee status to be granted to
individuals that were convicted of more than one offense. See Craig v Larson,
432 Mich 346, 353; 439 NW2d 899 (1989).
We find the reasoning in Harns I a sound basis for declining to read a substantive
limitation into the YTA with respect to the references to the phrase "criminal offense." We agree
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that had the Legislature intended the references as a substantive limitation on eligibility under the
YTA, the limitation would have been expressly stated, and not left to conjecture.
Further, we conclude that such a limitation would not be in keeping with the clear
discretion granted a trial court in applying the YTA. A trial court has wide discretion in placing
a youthful offender under the YTA, subject to review by the appellate courts. People v Teske,
147 Mich App 105, 107-109; 383 NW2d 139 (1985); see also Bobek, supra at 531 (a court has
discretion to amend a term of probation imposed under the YTA). The case law clearly reflects
the trial courts' exercise of that discretion, and further reflects that the appellate courts have
upheld decisions denying placement in appropriate cases in which YTA status was unwarranted
because of the nature and severity of the offense and the circumstances of the offender. See, e.g.,
Teske, supra at 106-107 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying YTA status to armed
robbery defendant with no prior convictions or criminal justice history and instead imposing a
sentence of two to ten years' imprisonment); Fitchett, supra at 252, 254 (no abuse of discretion
in denial of YTA status to defendant who pleaded guilty to breaking and entering an occupied
dwelling with the intent to commit larceny, in exchange for dismissal of arson of a dwelling
house charge, and in sentencing him to one to 15 years' imprisonment). This Court has also
reversed the decision of the trial court if the exercise of its discretion was deemed to have been
improper. See, e.g., Bobek, supra at 526, 531-532 (the trial court abused its discretion in
terminating probation and YTA status of the defendant after 28 days of her two-year
probationary term absent proof of rehabilitation). Interpreting MCL 762.11 to permit placement
under the YTA only in cases involving a single offense would work contrary to the discretion
invested in the trial court and to the overall purpose of the act. "The YTA is a remedial statute
and should be construed liberally for the advancement of the remedy." Bobek, supra at 529.
IV. Disposition
Plaintiff argues that the trial court's denial of YTA status in this case should nonetheless
be affirmed because defendant does not merit placement under the YTA given the nature of the
crimes he has committed. Although the trial court indicated that it would grant YTA status to
defendant if permitted by law, the trial court erroneously concluded that it was not permitted to
do so. Because a court "by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law," Koon
v United States, 518 US 81, 100; 116 S Ct 2035; 135 L Ed 2d 392 (1996), we remand this case to
the trial court for a ruling on defendant's request for placement under the YTA.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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