PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL E BELL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
October 7, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209269
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-004885
MICHAEL E. BELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON SECOND REMAND
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 209270
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 97-001258
MICHAEL E. BELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Saad and Meter, JJ.
METER, J. (concurring).
I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and remand because this result is compelled
by Crawford v Washington, ___ US ___; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). I write
separately, however, to express my disapproval of Crawford.
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the main purpose of the
Confrontation Clause was to prohibit the “use of ex parte examinations as evidence against [an]
accused.” Id., 124 S Ct 1363. The Court stated that the text of the clause itself (“[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him,” see US Const, Am VI) evidences that the clause applies to “witnesses,” or to those who
“bear testimony.” Crawford, supra, 124 S Ct 1364. It then stated that a person giving a
statement to the police is giving “testimony” because “[p]olice interrogations bear a striking
resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in England,” and the Confrontation Clause
was designed to guard against the dangers of these examinations. Id. at 1363-1364. The Court
then held that prior testimony – including statements given during a police interrogation – is not
-1-
constitutionally allowable as evidence unless the declarant is unavailable and there has been an
opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the declarant. Id., 124 S Ct 1366-1367, 1374.
I simply cannot agree with Crawford’s conclusions that statements given during a police
interrogation are “testimonial” and that the Confrontation Clause automatically requires the
exclusion of these “testimonial” statements if there has been no prior opportunity for crossexamination.
Indeed, I fail to see how an accomplice’s narrative statement that is given to a police
officer and that implicates himself and the defendant is more “testimonial” in nature than a
similar statement given to, for example, a casual acquaintance. See id., 124 S Ct 1364 (where
Crawford draws a distinction between statements given to the police and statements given to
mere acquaintances). In each case, the accomplice is not giving direct testimony against a
defendant but is simply relating facts1 to a third party in an extrajudicial setting.
Even assuming, arguendo, that such a statement by an accomplice to the police is
considered “testimonial” in nature, I agree with Justice Rehnquist’s analysis in Crawford that
there is no reasonable basis for automatically excluding out-of-court testimonial statements
under the Confrontation Clause when there has been no opportunity for cross-examination. See
id., 124 S Ct 1376-1378.
I believe that Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56; 100 S Ct 2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1986), and
People v Poole, 444 Mich 151; 506 NW2d 505 (1993), were correctly decided. I recognize,
however, that I am bound by the Crawford decision, and I therefore concur in the majority’s
opinion.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
1
These facts are likely to be true and often correctly deemed reliable because “the declarant and
the accused are partners in an illegal enterprise.” See id. at 1377 (Rehnquist, J.).
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.