JACQUELINE RINAS V DIANE MERCER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JACQUELINE RINAS, Personal Representative of
the Estate of JOHN B. RINAS IV, Deceased,
FOR PUBLICATION
October 7, 2003
9:15 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
DIANE MERCER, Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF DAVID QUIROZ, JR,; EARL
HARGROVE JR.; CELADON TRUCKING
SERVICE; JG'S LOUNGE,
Defendants/Cross-DefendantsAppellees,
No. 232686
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-001182-NI
Updated Copy
December 5, 2003
and
SOUTHERN DREAMS,
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff Appellee.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Zahra and Schuette, JJ.
SAAD, P.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While I appreciate the difficulty of interpreting this inartfully
drafted court rule, I believe the plain language of the rule compels the trial court's ruling. That
is, though I respect the majority's interpretation as an effort to apply the plain language of the
rule, I believe the "plain language" analysis results in dismissal of the third suit after two
voluntary dismissals. I read the permissive "may" in MCR 2.504(A)(1) to allow a plaintiff to
dismiss, voluntarily, a suit either with or without an order or with or without an assessment of
costs depending on the circumstances of the case. The rule gives a plaintiff discretion to
voluntarily dismiss one action but says if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a second action (and
again gives the plaintiff discretion to do so without an order), then the second dismissal will be
treated as a final adjudication. This reading gives meaning to all the words of the court rule
while the majority's reading renders the court rule meaningless.
For example, regarding costs, plaintiff argues and the majority reasons that, because
subrule (A)(1)(a) states that a plaintiff may dismiss an action "without an order of the court and
on the payment of costs," and because, in the second suit, the trial court failed to impose costs,
-1-
the second dismissal did not trigger the "adjudication on the merits" provision. The language
regarding the potentiality of the imposition of costs does not change the nature of plaintiff 's
voluntary notice of dismissal. Rather, the rule merely affords a defendant the protection of
recovering his expenses incurred, if any, because of a plaintiff 's unilateral decision to file and
then dismiss an action before responsive pleadings are filed. Nothing in MCR 2.504 says or
suggests that a plaintiff 's notice of dismissal depends on the imposition of costs, or that the res
judicata effect of a second dismissal is nullified if no costs are imposed. If a defendant decides
not to pursue his right to reimbursement of costs (for example, if the costs are minimal), and,
therefore, the trial court does not "impose costs," this does not remove the second dismissal from
the consequences of the plain language of the rule. To so hold simply renders the court rule
totally ineffective in cases where a defendant, for whatever reason, chooses not to seek costs.
/s/ Henry William Saad
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
