ISB SALES CO V DAVE'S CAKES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ISB SALES COMPANY,
FOR PUBLICATION
September 23, 2003
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 238921
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 00-010806-CK
DAVE'S CAKES,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MEURER BAKERIES,
Updated Copy
November 21, 2003
Defendant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Fort Hood and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Dave's Cakes1 appeals as of right from the trial court's order granting a default
judgment in favor of plaintiff. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 27, 2000, plaintiff filed an action against Meurer Bakeries and defendant.
The complaint alleged that plaintiff acted as a "manufacturers representative-broker" for Meurer
Bakeries pursuant to a contractual agreement. In accordance with the terms of the contract,
plaintiff was paid commissions based on the sale of Meurer Bakeries' products. The complaint
acknowledged that the business relationship terminated on September 11, 2000, and further
alleged that defendant "acquired" Meurer Bakeries, although the date of acquisition was not
1
The singular defendant refers to Dave's Cakes only. The liability of defendant Meurer Bakeries
is not at issue on appeal.
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identified. Commissions in the amount of $21,262.81 were allegedly owed to plaintiff pursuant
to the Michigan sales representative commission act (SRCA), MCL 600.2961. Plaintiff sought
the amount of commissions that were due and outstanding, double damages in accordance with
the SRCA, and reasonable costs and attorney fees. In the prayer for relief portion of the
complaint, plaintiff sought a judgment in excess of $25,000, and did not request a sum certain.
The complaint referenced the attachment of three documents: the contract between plaintiff and
Meurer Bakeries, evidence of the termination of the contractual relationship, and documents
showing the outstanding commissions. Despite this reference, there were no documents attached
to the complaint2 filed with the trial court.
Although defendant was based in Georgia, it was represented by counsel in Milwaukee.
On November 15, 2000, Milwaukee counsel sent a letter with documentation purportedly
demonstrating that defendant was not the real party in interest and requesting dismissal. In this
communication, it was alleged that defendant had purchased the assets of Meurer Bakeries, not
the liabilities, through an intermediary. It was further alleged that Meurer Bakeries did not have
authority to represent that there had been an assumption of liabilities by defendant. It was
requested that plaintiff 's counsel contact Milwaukee counsel immediately if voluntary dismissal
would not occur to alert Milwaukee counsel of the need to file the appropriate answer to the
complaint.
Milwaukee counsel did not receive any communication in response from plaintiff 's
counsel. Consequently, Milwaukee counsel sent a second letter dated January 26, 2001, seeking
voluntary dismissal. The letter was sent after several telephone calls to plaintiff 's counsel were
not returned. To prompt action on the part of plaintiff 's counsel, the letter stated that it would be
presumed that defendant would be dismissed from the litigation if contact did not occur within
the next ten days.
There is no evidence that plaintiff 's counsel acted within ten days as requested. Rather,
on April 17, 2001, plaintiff 's counsel wrote a letter to defendant, stating that the documentation
submitted was insufficient to absolve defendant of the liabilities of Meurer Bakeries. The letter
warned that responsive pleadings should be filed by May 15, 2001, or a request for entry of a
default would be filed.
On May 2, 2001, Milwaukee counsel sent another letter to plaintiff 's counsel in an
attempt to resolve the matter before proceeding with the litigation. This letter offered additional
information regarding the succession of the purchase of the assets of Meurer Bakeries. In closing
the letter, Milwaukee counsel requested communication by telephone or in writing regarding
2
Although two defendants were listed in the complaint, the complaint utilized the singular
"defendant" and did not distinguish the conduct of the two named defendants. The complaint
also alleged that Meurer Bakeries was established in Wisconsin, while defendant was established
in Georgia. It further alleged that jurisdiction was acquired through Michigan's long arm statute,
MCL 600.715. A determination regarding jurisdiction did not occur in this case.
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whether the litigation would proceed so as to allow defendant time to retain local counsel in
Michigan. The letter stated that it was presumed that defendant would be given two weeks'
notice so that it could retain local counsel. Although plaintiff 's counsel had represented that a
request for a default would be sought if responsive pleadings were not filed by May 15, 2001, the
deadline passed without action by plaintiff and the case became dormant.
Correspondence between the attorneys effectively ceased in May 2001, and activity was
eventually prompted by the circuit court. On September 12, 2001, the case flow division of the
circuit court sent a notice to plaintiff 's counsel and defendant's corporate headquarters in Georgia
that the litigation would be dismissed for lack of progress unless activity occurred within the next
twenty-eight days. Prompted by the notice from the circuit court, plaintiff 's counsel sent a letter
to Milwaukee counsel indicating that an application for entry of default and an entry of default
had been filed with the trial court. The letter, dated October 3, 2002, was silent regarding any
time frame to allow defendant to retain local counsel. Rather, the letter advised Milwaukee
counsel to contact plaintiff 's counsel upon receipt to discuss the matter further.
Although the last communication sent by plaintiff 's counsel indicated that further
discussions would occur,3 plaintiff 's counsel took action to obtain the default judgment. On
October 8, 2001, an application for entry of default was filed in the trial court. The document
provided that defendant had failed to appear, plead, or otherwise defend the litigation as required
by law. The entry of default was signed by the deputy court clerk.
On October 30, 2001, plaintiff 's counsel filed an affidavit to support the entry of a default
judgment. This affidavit, contrary to the allegations contained in the complaint,4 alleged that the
claim was "not based on a note or other written evidence." A total judgment amount of
$90,154.57 was requested.5 On October 31, 2001, the trial court signed the order of default
judgment.
On November 5, 2001, defendant, through local counsel, moved to set aside the default
judgment. The motion disputed the acquisition of jurisdiction over defendant and the propriety
of service of the complaint. The motion also alleged a meritorious defense based on the purchase
of the assets alone of Meurer Bakeries through an intermediary, and good cause for failing to
answer the complaint based on the parties' informal communications to resolve the litigation.
Affidavits delineating the meritorious defense and good cause requirements were submitted by
Milwaukee counsel and David Stenglein, defendant's president.
3
The briefs on appeal do not address whether telephone communications occurred between the
parties' counsel, and there is no record evidence of any communications.
4
The complaint identified a contractual relationship and documentation to show the outstanding
commissions, although the documents were not submitted with the complaint.
5
The affidavit divided the $90,154.57 judgment as follows. Damages: $63,788.43; Interest:
$3,718.56; Costs: $108.94; Other: $22,538.64 (attorney fees).
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Plaintiff opposed the motion to set aside the default judgment. It was alleged that the
motion was untimely filed beyond the twenty-one day period provided by the court rules.
Plaintiff further alleged that correspondence and payments by defendant showed defendant's
assumption of the liabilities of Meurer Bakeries in order to dispute the allegations of good cause
and a meritorious defense. The trial court held that the motion was untimely filed and that good
cause had not been established. Defendant moved for reconsideration of the decision, alleging
procedural deficiencies regarding the entry of the default judgment and citing the informal
relationship and agreement developed between the parties' counsel to allow time to retain local
counsel. The trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and, on reconsideration, affirmed
its prior determination.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's decision to enter a default is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Barclay
v Crown Bldg & Dev, Inc, 241 Mich App 639, 642; 617 NW2d 373 (2000). Although the law
favors a determination of a claim on the basis of its merits, the policy of this state is generally
against setting aside defaults and default judgments that have been properly entered. AlkenZiegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers Corp, 461 Mich 219, 229; 600 NW2d 638 (1999). The
construction and interpretation of court rules present a question of law that this Court reviews de
novo. Barclay, supra. When construction of a court rule is required, the legal principles that
govern the construction and application of statutes are utilized. Grievance Administrator v
Underwood, 462 Mich 188, 193; 612 NW2d 116 (2000). Issues of statutory construction present
questions of law that are reviewed de novo. Cruz v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 466
Mich 588, 594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give
effect to the intent of the Legislature. In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596
NW2d 164 (1999). This determination is accomplished by examining the plain language of the
statute. Id. Although a statute may contain separate provisions, it should be read as a consistent
whole, if possible, with effect given to each provision. Gebhardt v O'Rourke, 444 Mich 535,
542; 510 NW2d 900 (1994). If the statutory language is unambiguous, appellate courts presume
that the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed and further judicial construction is
neither permitted nor required. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d
300 (2000). Statutory language should be reasonably construed, keeping in mind the purpose of
the statute. Draprop Corp v Ann Arbor, 247 Mich App 410, 415; 636 NW2d 787 (2001). If
reasonable minds could differ regarding the meaning of a statute, judicial construction is
appropriate. Adrian School Dist v Michigan Pub School Employees' Retirement Sys, 458 Mich
326, 332; 582 NW2d 767 (1998). When construing a statute, a court must look at the object of
the statute in light of the harm it is designed to remedy and apply a reasonable construction that
will best accomplish the purpose of the Legislature. Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity
(After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 NW2d 799 (1994).
III. MCR 2.603(D)(2)
MCR 2.603(D) governs setting aside defaults and provides:
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(1) A motion to set aside a default or a default judgment, except when
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, shall be granted only if good
cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed.
(2) Except as provided in MCR 2.612, if personal service was made on the
party against whom the default was taken, the default, and default judgment if one
has been entered, may only be set aside if the motion is filed
(a) before entry of judgment, or
(b) if judgment has been entered, within 21 days after the default entered.
(3) In addition, the court may set aside an entry of default and a judgment
by default in accordance with MCR 2.612.
In the present case, the deputy court clerk entered the default on October 8, 2001.
However, the default judgment itself, setting forth the monetary amount, was not entered until
October 31, 2001. Defendant filed the motion to set aside the default judgment on November 5,
2001. Thus, if the twenty-one-day period begins to run upon entry of the default alone, the
motion to set aside the default judgment was filed thirty-three days after entry of the default and
outside the twenty-one-day period. If the filing of the default judgment starts the running of the
twenty-one day period, the motion was timely filed a mere five days after the entry of the default
judgment. Plaintiff alleged that the motion was untimely filed outside the twenty-one-day period
provided in MCR 2.603(D)(2)(b), and the trial court agreed.
Applying the rules of statutory construction to the court rules, Underwood, supra, we
conclude that the trial court erred in holding that the motion to set aside the default judgment was
untimely. Review de novo of a trial court's interpretation of the court rules must occur, Cruz,
supra, with the primary goal to give effect to the intent of the Supreme Court6 by examining the
plain language of the court rule. In re Telecom Complaint, supra. Review of the plain language
of MCR 2.603(D)(2)(a) reveals that there is no time frame placed on the filing of a motion to set
aside where the default only, and not a judgment, has been filed in the trial court. Id.
However, the court rule further provides that the filing of a motion to set aside must occur
"if judgment has been entered, within 21 days after the default entered." (Emphasis added.)
MCR 2.603(D)(2)(b). Plaintiff asserts that the second reference to default only requires that the
motion be filed within twenty-one days of entry of the default alone. The plain language of the
court rule must be examined as a whole to give effect to each subsection. Gebhardt, supra.
Subsection D(2)(a) of the court rule clearly addresses the default only, before entry of the default
6
The Michigan Court Rules govern practice and procedure in the courts established by the
Constitution and laws of the state of Michigan, and the Supreme Court has the authority to create
and amend the rules. See MCR 1.103 and MCR 1.201.
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judgment. MCR 2.603(D)(2)(a). Subsection D(2)(b) of the court rule restricts its application to a
default judgment because it begins with the qualification or caveat: "if judgment has been entered
. . . ." Thus, MCR 2.603(D)(2)(b) restricts the scope of the application of subsection D(2)(b) the
court rule to the circumstance where a judgment has been entered, unlike subsection D(2)(a). A
proviso restricts the operative effect of statutory language to less than what its scope of operation
would be otherwise. 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (6th ed), § 47:08, pp 235236. Provisos are interpreted in accordance with the general rules of statutory construction. Id.
Thus, once a default judgment has been entered, a twenty-one-day period for setting aside the
default judgment is permitted, MCR 2.603(D)(2)(b), but there is no time restriction where the
default only has been entered. MCR 2.603(D)(2)(a). Applying the court rule to the facts of this
case, the motion to set aside the default judgment was timely filed within the twenty-one-day
period.
Although not dispositive, we note that this interpretation is consistent with the
commentary found in 3 Dean & Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice, § 2603.1, p 311,
which sets forth a cautionary note regarding the lack of clarity in the use of the terms "default"
and "default judgment":
The entry of a default provides the basis for the entry of a default
judgment.
Default judgment may be entered by the clerk in limited
circumstances, or by the court, as provided in MCR 2.603(B). Although there is a
distinction between an entry of default and the entry of a default judgment, the
courts, and even the rules, frequently use the terms "default" and "default
judgment" in a less than precise manner. For example, MCR 2.603(D)(2)(b) uses
the term "default" rather than "default judgment" when it states that a default
judgment may be set aside "within 21 days after the default was entered." As
there is no requirement that a default judgment must enter within 21 days after
entry of default, the subrule, to be given effect, must be read to refer to entry of
the default judgment. Counsel should be aware of this lax use of terms when
reviewing cases on point. [Emphasis in original.]
Following review de novo and applying the plain language of the court rule in context, Cruz,
supra, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining the motion to set
aside the default judgment was untimely. It was filed within five days of entry of the default
judgment, well within the twenty-one days set forth in the court rule. MCR 2.603(D)(2)(b).
IV. MCR 2.603(D)(1)
MCR 2.603(D)(1) sets forth the requirements for setting aside a default judgment:
A motion to set aside a default or a default judgment, except when
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, shall be granted only if good
cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed.
In Alken-Ziegler, supra at 233, the Supreme Court held that, to set aside a default judgment, a
party must both file an affidavit of meritorious defense and show good cause. The good cause
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inquiry is satisfied if there is a substantial irregularity or defect in the proceeding on which the
default is based or a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the requirements that created
the default. The Supreme Court disavowed prior appellate decisions that had imposed a manifest
injustice requirement, noting that manifest injustice was not a discrete event, but a factor to be
considered in the good cause and meritorious defense requirements:
"[M]anifest injustice" is not a discrete occurrence such as a procedural
defect or a tardy filing that can be assessed independently. Rather, manifest
injustice is the result that would occur if a default were to be allowed to stand
where a party has satisfied the "meritorious defense" and "good cause"
requirements of the court rule. When a party puts forth a meritorious defense and
then attempts to satisfy "good cause" by showing (1) a procedural irregularity or
defect, or (2) a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the requirements that
created the default, the strength of the defense obviously will affect the "good
cause" showing that is necessary. In other words, if a party states a meritorious
defense that would be absolute if proven, a lesser showing of "good cause" will be
required than if the defense were weaker, in order to prevent a manifest injustice.
[Id.]
A. MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
Following a review of the record in this case, it is clear that defendant set forth a
meritorious defense. Defendant, a corporation based in Georgia, disputed that long arm
jurisdiction could be acquired, and this dispute was supported by the affidavits of its president
and Milwaukee counsel. Defendant also presented documentation to indicate that plaintiff 's
contract with Meurer Bakeries was cancelled effective September 11, 2000. Although defendant
sent a letter to plaintiff indicating that it "hope[d] and pray[ed]" that the relationship would
continue, this correspondence also sought to alter the prior contractual relationship by increasing
the price structure. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that plaintiff accepted the terms
set forth by defendant in this letter. While a representative of Meurer Bakeries indicated that the
company had become "part" of defendant, any reliance on this letter as a contract between
plaintiff and defendant is questionable in light of the cancellation of the contract in this same
communication.
On appeal, plaintiff alleges that jurisdiction was established over defendant as shown by a
writ of garnishment obtained from Gordon Foods because of its contractual relationship with
defendant. This issue of jurisdiction was not raised, addressed, or decided in the trial court.
Therefore, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. Miller v Inglis, 223 Mich App 159,
168; 567 NW2d 253 (1997).7 Furthermore, plaintiff failed to file a cross-appeal regarding this
7
We note that an issue of law may be addressed, although unpreserved, where all the necessary
facts are before the appellate court. Miller, supra. However, the factual circumstances
surrounding defendant's contacts in this state are not contained in the lower court record. Thus,
(continued…)
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unpreserved issue and failed to cite authority for the proposition that the contacts required for
obtaining long arm jurisdiction may be satisfied by the requirements necessary for obtaining a
writ of garnishment. Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 57; 649 NW2d 783
(2002). Given the information available from defendant, a meritorious defense was set forth in
the documentation.
B. GOOD CAUSE
The good cause requirement of MCR 2.603(D)(1) may be satisfied by demonstrating a
procedural irregularity or defect or a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the
requirements that led to the default judgment. Alken-Ziegler, supra. We conclude that defendant
has demonstrated both a procedural irregularity and a reasonable excuse for failing to answer the
complaint. MCR 2.603(A) governs entry, notice, and the effect of a default:
(1) If a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules, and that fact is
made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the default of that
party.
(2) Notice of the entry must be sent to all parties who have appeared and to
the defaulted party. If the defaulted party has not appeared, the notice to the
defaulted party may be served by personal service, by ordinary first-class mail at
his or her last known address or the place of service, or as otherwise directed by
the court.
(a) In the district court, the court clerk shall send the notice.
(b) In all other courts, the notice must be sent by the party who sought
entry of the default. Proof of service and a copy of the notice must be filed with
the court.
The present record shows that plaintiff did not comply with the provisions of MCR
2.603(A)(2)(b). That rule requires that proof of service and a copy of the notice of entry must be
filed with the trial court. Here, there is no proof of service in the lower court file as required by
the court rule.
(…continued)
this challenge cannot be addressed on appeal. Furthermore, plaintiff 's narrative challenge to the
veracity of the Stenglein affidavit also cannot be addressed because of the lack of a factual
record. Plaintiff further contends that a meritorious defense cannot be established because
defendant made partial payments to it. Even if record evidence of payments by defendant, not
merely allegations, had been submitted by plaintiff, it does not follow that defendant may be held
liable under successor liability or as a guarantor. There is no documentation in the record
available to establish successor liability or that defendant acted as a guarantor for Meurer
Bakeries.
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Additionally, MCR 2.603(B)(2) and (3) address whether the default judgment may be
entered by the clerk or must be approved by the trial court:
(2) Default Judgment Entered by Clerk. On request of the plaintiff
supported by an affidavit as to the amount due, the clerk may sign and enter
judgment for that amount and costs against the defendant, if
(a) the plaintiff 's claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum that can by computation be made certain,
(b) the default was entered because the defendant failed to appear, and
(c) the defaulted defendant is not an infant or incompetent person.
The clerk may not enter or record a judgment based on a note or other written
evidence of indebtedness until the note or writing is filed with the clerk for
cancellation, except by special order of the court.
(3) Default Judgment Entered by Court. In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default must apply to the court for the judgment.
(a) A judgment by default may not be entered against a minor or an
incompetent person unless the person is represented in the action by a conservator,
guardian ad litem, or other representative.
(b) If, in order for the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to
(i) take an account,
(ii) determine the amount of damages,
(iii) establish the truth of an allegation by evidence, or
(iv) investigate any other matter,
the court may conduct hearings or order references it deems necessary and proper,
and shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties to the extent required by the
constitution.
Plaintiff 's counsel presented an affidavit to comply with the provisions of MCR
2.603(B)(2) in order to obtain entry of the default by the clerk. This affidavit alleged that: the
judgment was for a sum certain or a sum that could be readily calculated to a sum certain,
defendant failed to appear, defendant was not an infant or incompetent person, and the judgment
was not based on a note or other written evidence. However, the assertion in the affidavit that
the judgment was not based on a note or other written evidence was directly contrary to
allegations contained in the complaint. The complaint alleged that plaintiff 's contractual
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relationship with Meurer Bakeries was essentially assumed by defendant through successor
liability. The complaint filed in this matter identified the dispute as premised on the breach of a
written contract. The complaint further alleged that the failure to pay the commissions in
accordance with the contract was shown by submitted documentation. While the contract
referenced the documentation as attached to the contract, no documentation was filed with the
complaint.8 On the basis of the procedural irregularities that occurred in obtaining entry of the
default and the default judgment, defendant demonstrated good cause for setting aside the default
judgment.9
Additionally, good cause to set aside a default judgment may be established by a
reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the requirements that created the default. In this
case, the attorneys' course of conduct, albeit unwise, provided a reasonable excuse for failing to
file an answer to the complaint. When the litigation was filed, the attorneys began a process of
informal communications in an attempt to resolve the litigation. The attorneys' correspondence
set forth pledges to continue the informal communications and deadlines for action. However,
the attorneys did not follow through with these pledges and deadlines until the filing of the
request for a default. In view of the nature of the relationship that occurred as a result of the
attorneys' informal communications instead of stipulations filed with the trial court, Milwaukee
counsel had good cause to believe that an answer was unnecessary in light of the representation
that the informal communications would continue.10 Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter
of law in concluding that the motion to set aside the judgment was untimely. Furthermore, it was
8
Indeed, MCR 2.113(F)(1) provides that where a claim or defense is premised on a written
instrument, a copy of the instrument or relevant parts must be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit. There is an exception to this rule if the written instrument is in the possession of the
adverse party and the pleading acknowledges the adverse party's possession.
MCR
2.113(F)(1)(b). There was no allegation in the complaint that the documentation was in the
possession of defendant. Consequently, although the allegations in the complaint indicated that
MCR 2.113(F)(1) was being complied with as a result of the purported attached submission of
the documents, there was no documentation attached to the complaint.
9
The question whether the judgment was for a sum certain or subject to calculation is also
debatable. If the provisions of MCR 2.113(F)(1) had been complied with so that the alleged
outstanding commission invoices had been submitted, one could argue that judgment was for a
sum certain or subject to calculation. There was no documentation contained in the lower court
record to show outstanding commissions in the amount of $21,262.81. The only documentation
offered as evidence of liability was an invoice that contained two entries: "10/28/2000, Bill
$257.02" and "11/10/2000 Bill $171.26." Furthermore, while the complaint may have requested
reasonable costs and attorney fees, it did not set forth whether the action was being pursued by in
house counsel or on a contingency fee basis. To state that defendant was on notice of being held
accountable for a 1/3 contingency fee agreement is specious at best.
10
Even in the letter advising Milwaukee counsel of the filing of the default, plaintiff 's counsel
indicated that telephone communication should occur between the two.
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an abuse of discretion to refuse to set aside the default judgment when a meritorious defense and
good cause were presented by defendant. Barclay, supra.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Bill Schuette
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