SANDERS S MAGEE V CITY OF DETROIT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MAE A. BOOKER, personal representative of the
estate of SANDERS S. MAGEE, deceased,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 3, 2002
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219554
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 89-906937-CH
CITY OF DETROIT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
August 16, 2002
Before: Saad, P.J., and Bandstra and Smolenski, JJ.
SMOLENSKI, J.
Defendant appeals as of right from the circuit court's final order entering judgment in
favor of plaintiff after a bench trial. The circuit court awarded plaintiff damages of $30,977.12 in
this real property case on the basis of plaintiff 's claims of promissory estoppel and unjust
enrichment. Because we conclude that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in entering
judgment in favor of plaintiff on those claims, we reverse.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The decedent, Sanders S. Magee, acquired the subject real property in 1979. Although he
collected rental income from the property, the decedent failed to pay over the course of several
years either city of Detroit or Wayne County real property taxes owing on the property. On
March 20, 1984, the city filed a foreclosure action in the Wayne Circuit Court regarding the
delinquent real property taxes the city had assessed against the property for 1979, 1980, and
1981. Although the city personally served the decedent with the summons and complaint, he
failed to appear and defend the suit. Accordingly, the city obtained a default foreclosure
judgment on May 10, 1985. That judgment provided that absolute title to the real property would
vest in the city unless the decedent paid the delinquent city taxes, along with interest and
penalties, within sixty days from the date of the judgment.1 When the sixty-day redemption
1
However, the judgment provided that it
shall not affect any state or county taxes or assessments that have been bid to the
State of Michigan or remain unpaid in the office of the Auditor General of the
(continued…)
-1-
period expired on July 10, 1985, the decedent had not come forward to pay the amount of the
judgment. Therefore, the city obtained title to the property on July 10, 1985, subject only to any
outstanding state or county tax liens. On September 30, 1985, the decedent tendered and the city
accepted a payment of the delinquent city taxes. (Matters regarding this payment will be
discussed in §§ II and III and in note 10 of this opinion.)
Simultaneously, Wayne County was also proceeding against the decedent for his failure
to pay real property taxes assessed by the county. On the first Tuesday of May 1985, the county
tax lien against the property was placed up for bid at the annual county tax sale. Because no
individual bids were received, the tax lien was acquired by the state of Michigan. MCL 211.70.
At that time, taxpayers enjoyed a lengthy redemption period during which they could pay
delinquent county taxes, along with certain penalties and fees, and thereby redeem the tax lien
acquired by the state.2 On October 10, 1985, the decedent redeemed the state tax lien by paying
the delinquent county taxes at the Wayne County Treasurer's Office. Because he redeemed the
lien within the one-year period provided in MCL 211.74, the state issued a quitclaim deed to the
decedent, releasing any and all interest the state had acquired in the property.
The decedent later argued that he obtained fee simple absolute title to the property by way
of the state quitclaim deed. However, that was clearly not the case. MCL 211.131c governs the
procedure by which a taxpayer can redeem a state tax lien. That statute provides, in pertinent
part:
A redemption deed issued under this section does not vest in the grantee
named in the deed any title or interest in the property beyond that which he or she
would have owned, if title to the property had not vested in this state. . . . The
deed, except if there is redemption as owner by judgment for foreclosure by a
municipality collecting its own delinquent taxes and assessments for tax and
assessment liens of the municipality as provided in subsection (3), revives all
titles, liens, and encumbrances, with their respective priorities, as would have
existed if title to the property had not vested in this state . . . . [MCL 211.131c(4)
(emphasis added).]
(…continued)
State of Michigan or Wayne County Treasurer whether the lien for such taxes or
assessments became a lien prior to or subsequent to the tax and assessment lien
hereby foreclosed . . . .
Therefore, the title acquired by the city through the default foreclosure judgment was
subject to only (1) the decedent's right to redeem within sixty days and (2) any
outstanding state or county tax liens.
2
MCL 211.74 provided for an initial one-year redemption period, and MCL 211.131c extended
that redemption period by another six months. Both MCL 211.74 and MCL 211.131c are
repealed effective December 31, 2006, under the provisions of 1999 PA 123, enacting § 5.
-2-
Thus, the quitclaim deed conveyed by the state to the decedent merely released the state
tax lien and returned all parties with legal interest in the real property to the positions they would
have been in had the state never acquired a tax lien. Because the city of Detroit had already
obtained its default foreclosure judgment for delinquent city taxes, and because the redemption
period on the city foreclosure had already expired, the decedent's payment of his delinquent
Wayne County taxes extinguished the state tax lien and vested absolute title to the property in the
city. MCL 211.131c(4).
In 1989, the decedent collaterally attacked the city's default foreclosure judgment by filing
a civil suit alleging claims to quiet title and for inverse condemnation. The circuit court granted
the city's motion for summary disposition on the ground that the decedent had failed to redeem
the property by paying his delinquent city taxes within the sixty-day period following entry of the
default foreclosure judgment. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. Magee v Detroit, 203 Mich App 228, 233-234; 511 NW2d 717 (1994). In that
opinion, the Magee Court concluded that "a city's sale of tax-forfeitable property [must] be
carried out by means that conform as nearly as possible to the provisions set forth" in the General
Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq. Magee, supra at 233. Further, the Magee Court
concluded that Detroit charter provisions regarding the collection and foreclosure of delinquent
real property taxes could not be enforced if those provisions were in "direct conflict" with the
provisions of the GPTA. Id. On the basis of that premise, the Magee Court concluded that the
circuit court had prematurely granted the city's motion for summary disposition, and remanded
for further proceedings to determine whether the Detroit charter provisions adequately complied
with the provisions of the GPTA.
On remand, the circuit court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing and concluded
that the Detroit charter provisions were inconsistent with the provisions of the GPTA.
Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the city did not utilize a "petition for sale" and did
not pursue a "judicial sale" procedure when attempting to regain title to tax forfeitable properties.
Therefore, under this Court's holding in Magee, supra, the circuit court held that the city had
acted contrary to state law when it acquired title to the real property. Accordingly, the court
permitted plaintiff 's claims to proceed to a bench trial.3
The circuit court permitted plaintiff to amend her complaint several times, and the case
finally reached trial on claims of inverse condemnation, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel,
and violation of 42 USC 1983, among other claims.4 After a lengthy bench trial, the circuit court
found in plaintiff 's favor on only two claims: promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. The
circuit court awarded plaintiff $27,800 in damages on the claim of promissory estoppel and
3
While the case was pending on remand, Sanders Magee died and the circuit court substituted
the personal representative of the decedent's estate, Mae A. Booker, as plaintiff.
4
Plaintiff originally based her § 1983 claim on the theory that the city had wrongfully deprived
the decedent of his interest in the subject property, in violation of the city's own procedures.
After the close of proofs, the circuit court allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege a
separate § 1983 claim for arbitrary and capricious government action.
-3-
$3,177.12 in damages on the claim of unjust enrichment, for a total judgment of $30,977.12.
Defendant appeals as of right from entry of that judgment.
II. Promissory Estoppel
First, we address defendant's contention that the circuit court erroneously entered
judgment for plaintiff on her claim of promissory estoppel. Defendant argues that plaintiff 's
proofs were insufficient to support a finding of liability on a theory of promissory estoppel
because (1) the alleged statements of city employee Virginia Belser were insufficient to
constitute a definite and clear promise, (2) the decedent did not reasonably rely on Belser's
alleged statements, and (3) Belser's unauthorized statements could not bind the city. We agree.
In Marrero v McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp, 200 Mich App 438, 442; 505 NW2d 275
(1993), this Court set forth the elements of a claim of promissory estoppel:
"(1) a promise; (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to
induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee;
(3) which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature; and (4) in
circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be
avoided." [Quoting Schipani v Ford Motor Co, 102 Mich App 606, 612-613; 302
NW2d 307 (1981).]
In determining whether the requisite promise existed, this Court must objectively
examine the words and actions surrounding the transaction in question as well as the nature of
the relationship between the parties and the circumstances surrounding their actions. Novak v
Nationwide Mut Ins Co, 235 Mich App 675, 687; 599 NW2d 546 (1999). "The sine qua non of
promissory estoppel is a promise that is definite and clear." Marrero, supra at 442. Further, a
"promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified manner, made
in a way that would justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment had been made."
Schmidt v Bretzlaff, 208 Mich App 376, 379; 528 NW2d 760 (1995). The doctrine of promissory
estoppel must be cautiously applied, and only "where the facts are unquestionable and the wrong
to be prevented undoubted." Novak, supra at 687; Marrero, supra at 443.
At trial, Phillip Magee, the decedent's son, testified that he accompanied the decedent on
a visit to the city of Detroit offices in July or August 1985, and that he witnessed a conversation
between the decedent and Belser, a sales representative in the city's Community & Economic
Development Department. According to Magee, Belser told the decedent that if he paid his
delinquent real property taxes, "he wouldn't have any problem with the City." Magee also
testified that Belser stated: "Pay your taxes. City loves money. Pay your taxes." Finally, Magee
testified that Belser told the decedent that if he paid his delinquent taxes, he "wouldn't have to
worry about [his] property being taken" by the city.5 Plaintiff based her claim of promissory
estoppel on Belser's alleged statements.
5
Although Belser was called to testify at trial, she invoked her rights under the Fifth Amendment
and refused to either confirm or deny Magee's testimony regarding her alleged representations.
-4-
We agree with defendant's argument that Belser's alleged statements do not rise to the
level of a definite and clear promise for purposes of the promissory estoppel doctrine. The
evidence presented at trial demonstrated that defendant obtained a Wayne Circuit Court default
foreclosure judgment regarding the subject property on May 10, 1985. Pursuant to Detroit City
Charter, § 8-403, the decedent had sixty days after entry of the default judgment to redeem the
property through payment of the delinquent city taxes. The evidence revealed that the decedent
did not attempt to pay those delinquent taxes until September 30, 1985, over two months after
the city redemption period expired. Examining Belser's alleged statements in context, we do not
believe that they constitute a clear and definite promise that the city would not enforce its default
foreclosure judgment. Plaintiff failed to present evidence that either Phillip Magee or the
decedent ever informed Belser that the city had already obtained a foreclosure judgment or that
the redemption period had already expired. Further, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that
Belser reviewed documentation regarding the real property, which might have allowed her to
gain that knowledge independently. Therefore, Belser's statements cannot reasonably be
interpreted as a promise that the decedent could retain his interest in the property, despite entry of
the city's foreclosure judgment and the expiration of the sixty-day redemption period.
Even if Belser's alleged statements qualified as a clear and definite promise under the
promissory estoppel doctrine, we would conclude that plaintiff did not prove that the decedent
reasonably relied on those statements when he paid the delinquent city taxes. Plaintiff claimed
that the decedent acted in reliance on Belser's statements when he obtained a loan from his
church and used a portion of those loan funds to pay the delinquent city taxes. However, Phillip
Magee testified that Belser made the alleged promises in July or August 1985. The decedent did
not attempt to pay the delinquent taxes until September 30, 1985. We conclude that it was not
reasonable, given the facts of this case, for the decedent to believe that Belser's alleged
statements remained accurate on that date. The decedent obviously knew how to obtain a copy of
his city tax bill and how to use that bill to verify his status as legal owner of the real property.
This is the procedure the decedent followed in April or May 1985, when he wanted to convince
his tenant that he still owned the real property. However, Phillip Magee testified that neither he
nor the decedent obtained a new copy of the city tax bill in late September 1985, when they
visited city offices to pay the delinquent city taxes. Rather, Magee testified that the decedent
utilized the April 1985 tax statement in order to make the September 1985 payment.
It is undisputed that the decedent was on notice of the foreclosure action in the Wayne
Circuit Court, because he received personal service of the summons and complaint in May 1984.
Further, one year after commencement of the foreclosure action, in May 1985, the decedent was
on notice that his ownership interest in the property was in question, given his tenant's refusal to
pay rent. Therefore, even if Belser's alleged statements had been accurate in July or August
1985, and even if those statements did constitute a clear and definite promise, we conclude that it
was unreasonable for the decedent to pay the delinquent taxes on September 30, 1985, without at
least obtaining a current copy of the tax bill to verify his continued ownership interest in the real
property.
Defendant next contends that Belser's alleged statements could not bind the city because
those statements were outside Belser's authority as a city employee. To support its argument,
-5-
defendant relies on Johnson v Menominee, 173 Mich App 690, 693-694; 434 NW2d 211 (1988),
where this Court held:
It is fundamental that those dealing with public officials must take notice
of the powers of the officials. Persons dealing with a municipal corporation
through one of its officers must at their peril take notice of the authority of the
particular officer to bind the corporation. If the officer's act is beyond the limits of
his or her authority, the municipality is not bound. [Citations omitted.]
According to the testimony of Belser's former supervisor, Belser lacked authority to
approve a taxpayer's payment of delinquent city taxes after the redemption period had expired on
a real property foreclosure judgment. Furthermore, according to the testimony offered by the
operational manager of the City of Detroit Treasurer's Department, the city cashiers lacked
authority to accept payment of delinquent real property taxes after the redemption period had
expired on a foreclosure judgment. Plaintiff failed to present proof that Belser was authorized to
make the alleged representations that the city would accept the decedent's payment of delinquent
city taxes after expiration of the redemption period on the foreclosure judgment. Under Johnson,
we conclude that Belser's unauthorized representations could not bind the city under the
promissory estoppel doctrine.
For all the above reasons, we conclude that the circuit court erroneously entered judgment
in favor of plaintiff on her claim of promissory estoppel.
III. Unjust Enrichment
Next, we address defendant's contention that the circuit court erroneously entered
judgment for plaintiff on her claim of unjust enrichment. Defendant argues that plaintiff could
not recover damages on the theory of unjust enrichment because the decedent voluntarily, albeit
mistakenly, paid the delinquent city taxes. Defendant argues that a taxpayer cannot recover a
voluntary payment of taxes, even if it turns out that the payment was in excess of the amount
owed or if the taxes were void. Hertzog v Detroit, 378 Mich 1, 17; 142 NW2d 672 (1966); Nat'l
Bank of Detroit v Detroit, 272 Mich 610; 262 NW 422 (1935); Bateson v Detroit, 143 Mich 582,
583-584; 106 NW 1104 (1906). We agree. Although the city mistakenly accepted the decedent's
untimely payment, the decedent was also partially at fault, because he failed to verify that he still
held an ownership interest in the property before he tendered payment. "The rule that a tax
voluntarily paid cannot be recovered back, and that the taxpayer cannot aver a mistake of fact
which results from his own neglect to consult the record, is too well settled to require extended
citation of authorities." Id. at 584. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court erroneously
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on her claim of unjust enrichment.
IV. General Property Tax Act
Next, we address defendant's contention that home rule cities may adopt and implement
real property tax collection and foreclosure procedures that are inconsistent with the provisions
contained in the GPTA. In essence, defendant argues that this Court's opinion in Magee, supra,
was wrongly decided. Given our conclusion that the circuit court erroneously entered judgment
-6-
in favor of plaintiff on her claims of promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment, we need not
address this issue in order to resolve the present case. Nevertheless, because we are concerned
regarding the state of the law in this area, we briefly turn our attention to the proper relationship
between the powers of home rule cities and the provisions of the GPTA.
In our view, the GPTA clearly states that its provisions do not apply to a city that has
adopted inconsistent charter or ordinance provisions. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
The requirements of this act relating to the amount and imposition of
interest, penalties, collection or administration fees, the procedures for collection
of taxes, and the enforcement of tax liens are applicable to all cities and villages if
not inconsistent with their respective charters or an ordinance enacted pursuant
to their respective charters. In addition to the methods authorized under section
108, a city or village, which by its charter does not return its delinquent taxes to
the county for collection, may enforce the tax liens for delinquent taxes,
assessments, and charges by foreclosure proceedings or any other method
authorized under statute, charter, or ordinance enacted pursuant to law or charter.
[MCL 211.107(1) (emphasis added).]
This statutory section plainly and unambiguously provides that if a conflict exists
between the GPTA and the provisions of a city charter, the charter governs. After all, "[i]t is
difficult to see how the Detroit charter provisions can be inconsistent with an act which provides
that charter provisions override the provisions of the act." Fink v Detroit, 124 Mich App 44, 53;
333 NW2d 376 (1983).6 Therefore, we agree with defendant's argument that home rule cities are
free to adopt and implement real property tax collection and foreclosure procedures that are
inconsistent with the provisions contained in the GPTA.
However, on the first appeal in this case, the Magee Court concluded that "a city's sale of
tax-forfeitable property [must] be carried out by means that conform as nearly as possible to the
provisions set forth in the GPTA." Magee, supra at 233. Further, the Magee Court concluded
that the Detroit charter provisions regarding the collection and foreclosure of delinquent real
property taxes could not be enforced if they were in "direct conflict" with the provisions of the
GPTA, because "[n]o provision of a city charter may conflict with or contravene the provisions
of any general law of the state." Id., citing MCL 117.36, and Joy Management Co v Detroit, 176
Mich App 722, 733; 440 NW2d 654 (1989). Because the Magee decision did not consider the
language of MCL 211.107, which states that the GPTA does not apply to a city that has adopted
inconsistent city charter or city ordinance provisions, we conclude that it was wrongly decided.7
6
In addition, several Michigan Supreme Court opinions have upheld Detroit charter provisions
regarding the collection of its real estate taxes, despite the differences between those charter
provisions and the GPTA. See Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682, 689-690; 520 NW2d 135
(1994); Detroit v Collateral Liquidation, Inc, 295 Mich 440, 441; 295 NW 218 (1940); Detroit v
Safety Investment Corp, 288 Mich 511, 515-517; 285 NW 42 (1939).
7
Furthermore, while the Magee holding relied on Joy, supra at 733, for the proposition that a
city charter cannot conflict with a state statute, it ignored Joy's holding that "[t]he General
(continued…)
-7-
V. Law of the Case Doctrine
Despite our disagreement with the holding in Magee, the law of the case doctrine would
normally require us to follow that holding, because that opinion was issued in an earlier appeal in
the same case. However, defendant persuasively argues that the law of the case doctrine does not
require this Court to follow the erroneous Magee decision.8
This Court explained the law of the case doctrine in South Macomb Disposal Authority v
American Ins Co, 243 Mich App 647, 654-655; 625 NW2d 40 (2000):
The law of the case doctrine dispenses with the need for this Court to
again consider legal questions determined by our prior decision and necessary to
it. As generally stated, the doctrine is that if an appellate court has passed on a
legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal question
thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same.
Additionally, under the doctrine, if an appellate court decides a legal question, the
lower court is also bound by that legal decision on remand. The rationale behind
the doctrine is the need for finality of judgments and the lack of jurisdiction of an
appellate court to modify its judgments except on rehearing. [Internal quotations
and citations omitted.]
The law of the case doctrine applies "without regard to the correctness of the prior
determination." Driver v Hanley (After Remand), 226 Mich App 558, 565; 575 NW2d 31
(1997). Therefore, a conclusion that a prior appellate decision was erroneous is not sufficient, by
itself, to justify ignoring the law of the case doctrine. Bennett v Bennett, 197 Mich App 497,
500; 496 NW2d 353 (1992).
To do so would vitiate that doctrine because it would allow this Court to
ignore a prior decision in a case merely because one panel concluded that the
earlier panel had wrongly decided the matter. It would, therefore, reopen every
case to relitigation of every issue previously decided in hopes that a subsequent
panel of the Court would decide the issue differently than did the prior panel.
Clearly, the law-of-the-case doctrine has no usefulness if it is only applied when a
panel of this Court agrees with the decision reached by a prior panel. [Id.]
(…continued)
Property Tax Act does not apply to cities whose charters provide inconsistent provisions. MCL
211.107." Joy, supra at 734.
8
The Magee opinion did not address the adequacy of plaintiff's proofs on her claims of
promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. Given our conclusion that the circuit court
erroneously entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on those two claims, we need not address the
binding nature of the Magee opinion under the law of the case doctrine in order to resolve the
present case. However, because analysis of that doctrine is relevant to our conclusion that Magee
was wrongly decided, we address it here.
-8-
Nevertheless, the law of the case doctrine is "discretionary and merely expresses the
practice of courts generally; it is not a limit on their power." Freeman v DEC Int'l, Inc, 212 Mich
App 34, 37; 536 NW2d 815 (1995). Furthermore, the law of the case doctrine applies only if the
facts remain substantially or materially the same. People v Phillips (After Second Remand), 227
Mich App 28, 31-32; 575 NW2d 784 (1997); Driver, supra at 565; Bennett, supra at 499. In the
present case, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine does not require us to follow the
Magee holding regarding the GPTA because the facts did not remain substantially or materially
the same after the trial court conducted its remand proceedings.
When the Magee Court issued its decision, it did not have the benefit of examining the
Detroit charter provisions at issue. See Magee, supra at 232, n 5. Therefore, the Magee Court
did not clearly understand what provisions the Detroit Charter actually contained regarding the
collection of delinquent real property taxes. This can be seen in the Magee Court's statement
that, "unless a petition for the sale of the property to Mr. Sachs [the purchaser from the city] was
filed before October 5, 1985 . . . any sale of the property should have been obviated under § 106
(or similar section of the Detroit charter)." Id. at 232 (emphasis added). On remand, it became
clear that the Detroit charter had no provision similar to MCL 211.106 regarding a petition for
sale and a judicial sale proceeding.
In addition, when the Magee Court issued its decision, it seems to have assumed that the
state of Michigan obtained fee simple absolute title to the real property after the 1984 annual
county tax sale and that the state conveyed fee simple absolute title to the decedent in the March
1986 quitclaim deed. Magee, supra at 229-230. However, the testimony developed on remand
demonstrated that this was not true. According to the city's taxation expert, the state did not
obtain fee simple absolute title after the 1984 annual county tax sale, but acquired only a tax lien
against the property, which could not have matured into fee simple absolute title until after the
expiration of all redemption periods.9 The testimony on remand clarified that the decedent
redeemed the state tax lien before the expiration of the first one-year redemption period.
Therefore, the state never acquired fee simple absolute title, and it could not have conveyed such
title to the decedent.
Further, when the Magee Court issued its decision, it seems to have assumed that the city
allowed Wayne County to collect real property taxes on its behalf. Id. at 230.10 Testimony from
both city and county officials, developed on remand, revealed that Wayne County is not
authorized to accept payment of taxes on behalf of the city of Detroit. This confusion may have
led the Magee Court to further conflate the distinction between the parallel city and county
processes for the collection of delinquent real property taxes.
9
This conclusion is also supported by the language of MCL 211.131c(4).
10
The opinion states that the decedent "paid the balance of his delinquent property taxes" on
October 5, 1985. Magee, supra at 232. Proceedings on remand made clear that the decedent
paid his delinquent county taxes in October 1985, redeeming the state tax lien. In contrast, the
decedent paid the delinquent city taxes in September 1985.
-9-
In sum, because the city developed a factual record on remand that was not available to
the Magee Court, and because key facts did not remain substantially or materially the same, we
conclude that the law of the case doctrine does not require us to follow the first holding issued in
this case.
Nevertheless, because Magee was a published opinion, we are bound to follow it under
MCR 7.215(I)(1). We decline to request a conflict panel under MCR 7.215(I) because we
conclude that the issue is not outcome determinative.
VI. 42 USC 1983
Defendant next contends that plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to prove a claim under 42
USC 1983. Our review of the record indicates that plaintiff asserted two separate claims under §
1983: (1) that the city engaged in arbitrary and capricious action and (2) that the city violated its
own procedures when it obtained title to the subject real property. However, the circuit court
ruled that plaintiff had failed to prove arbitrary and capricious action. Further, the circuit court
dismissed plaintiff 's claim for violation of city procedures, on the basis of a ruling that plaintiff
abandoned that claim. Although plaintiff objected to these rulings below, plaintiff failed to
properly file a timely appeal from the circuit court judgment. Because there was no adverse
ruling against defendant regarding this issue, we decline to address it.
VII. Attorney Fees
Defendant next contends that plaintiff was not entitled to an award of attorney fees, under
either federal or state law. However, our review of the lower court record indicates that the
circuit court denied plaintiff 's motion for attorney fees and costs. Although plaintiff objected to
this ruling below, she failed to properly file a timely appeal from the circuit court judgment.
Because there was no adverse ruling against defendant regarding this issue, we decline to address
it.
VIII. Conclusion
We conclude that the circuit court erroneously entered judgment on behalf of plaintiff on
her claims of promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. Because these were the only two
claims on which plaintiff prevailed, we must vacate the circuit court's award of damages in
plaintiff 's favor. In light of this ruling, we need not address defendant's arguments regarding the
circuit court's denial of its motions for a new trial or remittitur.
Reversed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.