FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY V ST CLAIR FAMILY COURT JUDGE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
FOR PUBLICATION
December 7, 2001
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff,
v
ST. CLAIR FAMILY COURT JUDGE and
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendants.
No. 219442
St. Clair Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-004871
ON REHEARING
Updated Copy
February 15, 2002
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and Hood and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This action seeking an order for superintending control comes to us on rehearing. We
affirm this Court's prior order denying plaintiff Family Independence Agency relief.
I. Procedural History
In August 1998, fourteen-year-old MJK was charged with second-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC II), accosting a child for immoral purposes, and indecent exposure. In January
1999, MJK pleaded guilty to the CSC II charge, and the other two charges were dismissed. In its
order of disposition, the court made MJK a temporary ward of the court.
On February 19, 1999, following a dispositional hearing, the family court referee issued a
supplemental order of disposition recommending, in pertinent part, as follows:
The juvenile's placement shall be changed to WJ MAXEY - SUMMIT.
That [MJK] be continued as a temporary ward of this Court.
That [MJK] be committed to the State of Michigan Family Independence
Agency under Public Act for future care and planning.
That [MJK] be immediately placed at Maxey Boys Training School to
receive treatment as a sex offender.
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That the Director of Boys Training School is ordered to accept [MJK]
upon presentation of said minor and this Court Order.
* * *
That [MJK] shall be transferred from the caseload of . . . Juvenile
Probation Officer, to the caseload of . . . delinquency worker at the Family
Independence Agency.[1]
On March 8, 1999, the FIA appealed the family court's dispositional order to this Court,
arguing that the order violated MCL 712A.18(1)(e), as amended by 1998 PA 478,2 because it
usurped the FIA's authority to determine the appropriate placement for the juvenile, particularly
in light of the newly added language of the statute. This Court issued an order dismissing the
appeal pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(10) because the FIA was not a party to the proceedings
involving the juvenile. This Court's order, however, stated that dismissal was without prejudice
to the FIA's filing a complaint for superintending control. In re MJK, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered April 26, 1999 (Docket No. 218041).
1
On February 25, 1999, St. Clair Circuit Judge Robert R. Spillard entered an amended order,
indicating that the applicable public act number was inadvertently omitted from the previous
order. The court listed the public act number (Public Act 150), and ordered that the remainder of
the February 19, 1999, order remain in full force and effect.
2
MCL 712A.18, as amended, provides, in pertinent part:
(1) If the court finds that a juvenile concerning whom a petition is filed is
not within this chapter, the court shall enter an order dismissing the petition.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (10), if the court finds that a juvenile
is within this chapter, the court may enter any of the following orders of
disposition that are appropriate for the welfare of the juvenile and society in view
of the facts proven and ascertained:
* * *
(e) Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, commit the juvenile
to a public institution, county facility, institution operated as an agency of the
court or county, or agency authorized by law to receive juveniles of similar age,
sex, and characteristics. If the juvenile is not a ward of the court, the court shall
commit the juvenile to the family independence agency or, if the county is a
county juvenile agency, to that county juvenile agency for placement in or
commitment to such an institution or facility as the family independence agency
or county juvenile agency determines is most appropriate, subject to any initial
level of placement the court designates . . . . [Amended language italicized.]
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On May 12, 1999, the FIA filed a complaint for superintending control in this Court.
Again, the FIA maintained that the supplemental and amended orders violated subsection
18(1)(e) because they usurped the FIA's authority to determine the placement of the juvenile. On
February 8, 2000, this Court peremptorily dismissed the FIA's complaint for superintending
control. A panel of this Court concluded that the amended language of subsection 18(1)(e)
deprived the FIA of statutory authority to directly place juvenile offenders who are wards of the
court, even though the court had also committed the juvenile to the care of the FIA.3 On April
27, 2000, this Court granted plaintiff 's motion for rehearing and directed the parties to proceed in
the same manner as in an appeal of right. FIA v St Clair Family Court Judge, unpublished order
of the Court of Appeals, entered April 27, 2000 (Docket No. 219442).
II. Analysis
On this appeal, the issue presented is whether, under MCL 712A.18(1)(e), the family
court has authority to determine the specific placement of a juvenile when it commits the juvenile
to the FIA, but continues the juvenile as a court ward. This is an original action in this Court,
presenting issues of statutory interpretation.
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515;
573 NW2d 611 (1998). If the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute is clear, judicial
3
This Court's order provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Pursuant to the plain language of MCL 712A.18(1)(e); MSA
27.3178(598.18)(1)(e), as amended by 1998 PA 478, the authority to direct
placement of a juvenile offender is generally dependent in the first instance on
whether the juvenile is a ward of the court. Pursuant to § 18(1) and the first
sentence of subsection 18(1)(e), "the court" may "commit the juvenile to a public
institution, county facility, institution operated as an agency of the court or county,
or agency authorized by law to receive juveniles of similar age, sex, and
characteristics." However, [i]f the juvenile is not a ward of the court, the court
shall commit the juvenile to the family independence agency . . . for placement in
or commitment to such an institution or facility as the family independence
agency . . . determines is most appropriate, subject to any initial level of
placement the court designates" (emphasis added). In the present matter, the
family court's February 19, 1999, supplemental dispositional order expressly
stated "That [MJK] be continued as a temporary ward of this Court."
Accordingly, while the Family Independence Agency may have statutory authority
to direct placement of certain juvenile offenders who are not wards of the court, it
has no such authority over juveniles who are wards of the court, such as juvenile
[MJK]. [FIA v St Clair Family Court Judge, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered February 8, 2000 (Docket No. 219442) (emphasis in original).]
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construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Cherry Growers, Inc v Agricultural Marketing
& Bargaining Bd, 240 Mich App 153, 166; 610 NW2d 613 (2000). We may not speculate
regarding the probable intent of the Legislature beyond the words expressed in the statute. In re
Schnell, 214 Mich App 304, 310; 543 NW2d 11 (1995). When reasonable minds may differ with
respect to the meaning of a statute, the courts must look to the object of the statute, the harm it is
designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose of
the statute. Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 644; 513
NW2d 799 (1994).
With those well-settled principles of statutory interpretation in mind, we agree with the
prior panel of this Court that an order for superintending control is not warranted under these
circumstances given the plain language of MCL 712A.18(1)(e). Section 18 provides, in pertinent
part:
(1) If the court finds that a juvenile concerning whom a petition is filed is
not within this chapter, the court shall enter an order dismissing the petition.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (10), if the court finds that a juvenile
is within this chapter, the court may enter any of the following orders of
disposition that are appropriate for the welfare of the juvenile and society in view
of the facts proven and ascertained:
* * *
(e) Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, commit the juvenile
to a public institution, county facility, institution operated as an agency of the
court or county, or agency authorized by law to receive juveniles of similar age,
sex, and characteristics. If the juvenile is not a ward of the court, the court shall
commit the juvenile to the family independence agency or, if the county is a
county juvenile agency, to that county juvenile agency for placement in or
commitment to such an institution or facility as the family independence agency
or county juvenile agency determines is most appropriate, subject to any initial
level of placement the court designates. . . .
The FIA argues that because subdivision e allows the FIA authority to place juveniles
committed to the agency, the court's conduct in the present case unduly usurped that authority.
We disagree with the FIA's interpretation of § 18. Significantly, subdivision e begins with the
plain statement: "Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision," then goes on to provide that
a court may enter an order committing a juvenile to the specific institutions or facilities it sees fit.
Thus, the juvenile courts have been given general authority with respect to committing juveniles
to the designated facilities and institutions. The only limitation on that authority is provided in
the second part of subdivision e, stating "If the juvenile is not a ward of the court . . . ." In such a
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case, the Legislature has required that the court commit the juvenile to the FIA or, in limited
instances, to the appropriate county juvenile agency.4
In this case, the trial court's dispositional order provides that MJK was to be continued as
a court ward. Thus, under the plain language of subsection 18(1)(e), the limitation on the court's
general authority to place MJK in a specific institution or facility does not apply. Accordingly,
the court had authority to "commit [MJK] to a public institution, county facility, institution
operated as an agency of the court or county, or agency authorized by law to receive juveniles of
similar age, sex, and characteristics." We recognize that subdivision e does not specifically
delineate a procedure to be followed in situations such as the present, where the court has
continued the juvenile as a court ward and committed the juvenile to the FIA. However, without
a more specific directive from our Legislature,5 we cannot conclude that placement of the
juvenile in this case is not within the sole discretion of the court as provided in the first sentence
of subdivision e. To conclude otherwise would require us to look outside the plain, unambiguous
language of the subsection 18(1)(e), which we are prohibited from doing in light of the doctrine
of separation of powers and well-settled principles of statutory interpretation.
For the reasons discussed, this Court again orders the dismissal of the FIA's complaint for
an order of superintending control.
Complaint dismissed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
4
Subsection 18(1)(d) provides a court specific authority to commit a juvenile to the FIA. That
subdivision states, in part, that a court may issue an order to "place the juvenile in or commit the
juvenile to a private institution or agency approved or licensed by the department of consumer
and industry services for the care of juveniles of similar age, sex, and characteristics." MCL
712A.18(1)(d).
5
Given that the text of subsection 18(1)(e) appears not to contemplate the present situation, we
urge the Legislature to consider whether it intends for the court or the FIA to have ultimate
authority in placing a juvenile when the court continues wardship and commits the juvenile to the
FIA. We note that the FIA contends the present situation is prevalent and the absence of a
specific directive in these circumstances has led to significant practical problems. According to
the FIA, court-ordered placements have the problematic effect of "leapfrogging" other juveniles
currently on waiting lists to enter certain placement programs.
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