DARREN K GREER V THOMAS PAUL ALEXANDER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DARREN K. GREER,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
FOR PUBLICATION
November 9, 2001
9:05 a.m.
No. 231430
Roscommon Circuit Court
LC No. 99-720945-DC
THOMAS PAUL ALEXANDER,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
and
RICHARD VINCENT and ALICE VINCENT,
Updated Copy
January 18, 2002
Intervening-Appellees.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the December 1, 2000, order granting defendant's petition to
change custody of the two minor children from plaintiff, the children's stepfather, to defendant,
the children's natural father. Defendant cross appeals by leave granted. We reverse and remand.
Defendant and Debra V. Alexander, the mother of the children, were married in 1988.
Two daughters were born of the marriage, Cassaundra in 1991 and Katherine in 1994. At some
point during the marriage, the parties moved to Kentucky because defendant was unable to
maintain steady work in Michigan. In 1994 or 1995, Debra and the children moved back to
Michigan. Defendant was convicted of cocaine possession in Kentucky in 1994 and spent ninety
days in jail and was sentenced to a three-year term of probation.
Debra obtained a divorce in October 1995. The judgment of divorce awarded Debra sole
legal and physical custody of the children, and defendant was awarded supervised parenting time.
The relevant provision of the judgment provided that "[d]ue to the tender age of the children and
Defendant's [Thomas Alexander's] absence from the children, Defendant shall have supervised
visitation" and that supervised visits were "to continue until such time as a bonding relationship
between Defendant and minor children is shown to exist."
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In April 1998, Debra married plaintiff. One son was born of the marriage in January
1999. In late March 1999 Debra died. Between the time of the divorce and Debra's death,
defendant visited the children only "two or three times" and was $15,000 in arrears in child
support.
On April 1, 1999, plaintiff sought and was granted temporary guardianship over the
children. After a hearing at which defendant was represented by counsel, the guardianship
became permanent. Defendant did not appeal the order.
Thereafter, both plaintiff and defendant filed petitions for custody of the children. On
November 29, 1999, a bench trial was conducted. The trial court found that an established
custodial environment existed with plaintiff and that defendant had failed to meet his burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a change in custody was in the children's best
interests. On December 22, 1999, the court entered an order modifying the judgment of divorce
to award joint legal custody of the children to plaintiff and defendant, with physical custody
awarded to plaintiff. Defendant was awarded parenting time, and the children's maternal
grandparents, Richard and Alice Vincent, were awarded visitation. Defendant did not appeal this
decision.
Six months later, in June 2000, defendant filed a petition to change custody, and filed an
amended petition in August 2000. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the petitions on the ground that no
proper cause or changed circumstances were alleged to justify reopening the custody decision.
The court denied the motion, and a hearing on the petition to change custody was held on
October 30, 2000. In an oral ruling, the trial court found that the children's established custodial
environment was with plaintiff, but found that a presumption in favor of a natural parent existed
and that plaintiff failed to show by even a preponderance of the evidence that it would not be in
the best interests of the children to award custody to defendant. Despite expressing doubt
whether the best interest factors were applicable in light of the statutory presumption in favor of
the natural parent, the judge analyzed the factors anyway, finding that four factors favored
plaintiff, that one factor favored defendant,1 and that the parties were equal on the remaining
factors. The judge ordered physical custody to be changed to defendant, with provisions to
ensure a continuing relationship between the children and plaintiff, their half-brother, and their
maternal grandparents.2
I
Initially, we note that defendant argues on cross appeal that the trial court's decision in the
first custody trial was wrongly based on the court's finding that an established custodial
environment existed with plaintiff and that plaintiff should have been required to overcome the
statutory presumption in favor of defendant's custody of the children, as their biological father,
1
The court found that the catchall factor favored defendant because of the presumption in favor
of the natural parent.
2
This Court granted plaintiff 's motion for stay pending appeal.
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by clear and convincing evidence. However, the December 22, 1999, order was not appealed
and, therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to review the trial court's decision.
II
Plaintiff argues that the trial court applied an inappropriate legal standard in ruling on
defendant's petition for change of custody. Plaintiff relies on LaFleche v Ybarra, 242 Mich App
692; 619 NW2d 738 (2000), in arguing that the appropriate legal standards for this type of
custody matter are as follows:
MCL 722.25(1); MSA 25.312(1) provides that when the dispute is
between the parent or parents and an agency or a third person, it is presumed that
the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the parent or
parents, unless the contrary is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Rummelt [v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491, 494; 493 NW2d 434 (1992)].
However, as above indicated, the established custodial environment presumption
contained in MCL 722.27(1)(c); MSA 25.312(7)(1)(c) provides that courts are not
to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is
presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.
There is a conflict in these two presumptions in cases involving a natural parent
seeking custody from a third party who has provided an established custodial
environment. Rummelt, supra at 494. This Court has previously concluded that,
"in instances in which both the parental presumption of § 5 and the established
custodial environment presumption of § 7 are applicable, the burden of proof
evolves into a preponderance of the evidence." Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich
App 130, 146; 406 NW2d 246 (1987). Each party bears the burden of proof vis-avis his own presumption but "the burden of persuasion rests with the parent
challenging an established custodial environment in the home of a third party."
Id. at 147, see also Rummelt, supra at 496. [LaFleche v Ybarra, supra at 696698.]
Thus, plaintiff contends that the trial court gave too much weight to the statutory
presumption in favor of defendant as the natural parent, failed to place the burden of persuasion
on defendant to challenge the established custodial environment existing with plaintiff, and failed
to recognize the importance of determining whether a change of custody was ultimately in the
best interests of the children.
However, defendant argues that the LaFleche standard's placement on him of the burden
of proving that a change of the children's custody would serve the children's best interests would
infringe on defendant's fundamental liberty interest in raising his children. In support of this
argument, defendant cites Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57; 120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000),
in which the Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental constitutional right of parents to raise
their children and make decisions regarding visitation and, necessarily, custody.
Recently, in Heltzel v Heltzel, 248 Mich App 1; ___ NW2d ___ (2001), this Court, faced
with a custody dispute between a natural parent and a third party, examined Troxel and
concluded:
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In light of the recent Supreme Court decision emphasizing the
fundamental constitutional right of parents to raise their children and make
decisions regarding visitation, and necessarily custody, we find the instant trial
court's determination of the child's custody, premised on Rummelt, supra,
constitutionally infirm. Even though the trial court did not view defendant as an
abusive or neglectful parent or a threat to the child, the court nonetheless in its
analysis failed to accord defendant's fundamental interest in raising the child any
special weight. According to the Rummelt panel's analysis of the interplay
between the natural parent presumption, subsection 5(1), and the established
custodial environment factor, subsection 7(1)(c), and as the Supreme Court in
Troxel found constitutionally offensive, id. at 68-70, the trial court placed on
defendant the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the child belonged in
the custody of her natural mother. Furthermore, the trial court's application of the
simple preponderance of the evidence standard set forth in Rummelt for reaching a
decision regarding the child's best interests plainly and unconstitutionally invited
the court to enforce its own judicial opinion regarding what custody situation best
would serve the child's interests, irrespective of the natural mother's wishes. The
Supreme Court in Troxel explicitly found unacceptable such enabling of a court,
in a case involving "nothing more than a simple disagreement between the . . .
Court and [the parent] concerning [t]he[] children's best interests," to "make
childrearing decisions simply because [the] state judge believes a 'better' decision
could be made." Troxel, supra at 72, 73.
"[I]f a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to
judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's
own determination." Troxel, supra at 70. We reject the Rummelt solution in this
case because that Court's analysis of the interplay between subsections 5(1) and
7(1)(c) accords the fit parent's custody determination absolutely no deference
whatsoever. To the contrary, the Rummelt solution unconstitutionally places on
the natural parent the ultimate burden of persuasion that an award of custody to
the parent would serve the child's best interests. Rummelt, LaFleche, and Glover,
the case on which the Rummelt Court premised its analysis, did not acknowledge
or address any constitutional implications of their decisions when applying both
subsection 5(1) and 7(1)(c). Because Rummelt did not consider the United States
Supreme Court's recent reminder of the importance of the fundamental parental
liberty interest, we note that we are not bound to follow Rummelt. MCR
7.215(I)(1).
We therefore conclude that in this case involving a fit natural mother
seeking a change of her child's custody from an established custodial environment
with third persons, the trial court's application of the test set forth in Rummelt, for
resolving cases involving tension between the natural parent and established
custodial environment presumptions, constituted clear legal error because it
violated defendant's fundamental liberty interest in raising her children. Troxel,
supra at 72-73. In light of the fact that the evidence presented at the hearing did
not weigh strongly against an award of custody to defendant, the trial court's
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unconstitutional application of an incorrect burden of proof cannot be considered
harmless. Consequently, we must remand this case for the trial court's
reconsideration. The trial court on remand must give defendant's fundamental
liberty interest in childrearing appropriate consideration, and should consider upto-date information. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 889 (Brickley, J), 900
(Griffin, J.); 526 NW2d 889 (1994).
In providing some guidance for the court on remand when attempting to reapply
subsections 5(1) and 7(1)(c), the Court stated:
We note that several panels of this Court, although not speaking in
constitutional terms, addressed the concurrent application of subsections 5(1) and
7(1)(c) in a manner that we find more properly deferential to the fundamental
nature of the parent's interest in childrearing when determining whether to grant
the natural parent custody, thus changing the child's established custodial
environment with a third party.
"This Court has struggled with the interaction between these two
presumptions on many occasions, most recently in Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich
App 130; 406 NW2d 246 (1987). But see also Deel v Deel, [113 Mich App 556;
317 NW2d 685 (1982)]; Stevens v Stevens, 86 Mich App 258; 273 NW2d 490
(1978); Siwik v Siwik, 89 Mich App 603; 280 NW2d 610 (1979); Bahr v Bahr, 60
Mich App 354; 230 NW2d 430 (1975). Having examined these cases, we agree
with the Deel panel's recognition that the two presumptions are not to be
considered equally.
"'[T]he language used in the statutes suggest[s] that the presumptions are
not, in fact, of equal weight. While the established custodial environment is to be
favored unless there is clear and convincing evidence that a change is in the best
interests of the child, it is presumed that the best interests of the child are served
by granting custody to the natural parent.'" Deel, supra, p 561.
"We also agree with the following language cited favorably in both Deel
and Bahr, supra:
'[The presumption that the best interests of the child would be served by
granting custody to the natural parent] remains a presumption of the strongest
order and it must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the
parent. Nevertheless, if the "clear and convincing" evidence establishes that the
best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party, the
presumption is rebutted. [Deel, supra, pp 561-562.]
* * *
"While it is true that in any child custody dispute the overriding concern is
for the best interests of the child, it is also presumed that the best interests of a
child are served by placing custody with the natural parent, unless otherwise
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shown by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 722.25 . . . . We agree that a
showing that a parent is unfit is not required to overcome this presumption.
Stevens v Stevens, supra, and Bahr v Bahr, supra. Nonetheless, we construe the
'clear and convincing evidence' standard to be a substantive standard rather than
just an evidentiary standard. . . . Consequently, in order to overcome the natural
parent presumption, the trial judge was required to find that, when all of the
factors in MCL 722.23 . . . were collectively considered, defendant [the third
party providing an established custodial environment] clearly and convincingly
established that the best interests of the children required maintaining custody
with defendant. It is not sufficient that defendant may have established by clear
and convincing evidence that a marginal, though distinct, benefit would be gained
if the children were maintained with him. [Henrikson v Gable, 162 Mich App
248, 252-253; 412 NW2d 702 (1987) (emphasis added).]"
See also Deel, supra at 562 (explaining that "[r]ecognition of both
presumptions does not . . . remove the third party's burden to show that custody in
his or her favor is in the child's best interests"); Stevens, supra at 267 ("The
presumption in favor of the natural parent is rebutted if clear and convincing
evidence establishes that the best interests of the child are served by awarding
custody to the third party."); Bahr, supra at 359 (recognizing that the Child
Custody Act required that the natural parent presumption "must be seriously
considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent," but that the presumption
is rebutted "if the 'clear and convincing evidence' establishes that the best interest
of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party").
We agree with the foregoing analysis of the appropriate interplay between
subsections 5(1) and 7(1)(c). In enacting the Child Custody Act, the Legislature
plainly recognized the fundamental constitutional nature of a parent's interest in
childrearing when it enacted the presumption that in all custody disputes
involving natural parents and third persons, absent clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary, parental custody served the child's best interests. Subsection 5(1).
The Legislature also clearly recognized the importance of an established custodial
environment to the development of children. Subsection 7(1)(c). We do not
believe, however, that the Legislature intended that in every custody dispute
between a noncustodial natural parent and a third-person custodian, the thirdperson custodian could eliminate the fundamental constitutional presumption
favoring custody with the natural parent, and thus arrive on equal footing with the
parent with respect to their claim of custody to the parent's child, merely by
showing that the child had an established custodial environment in the third
person's custody. This interpretation, employed in Rummelt, fails to take into
proper account the parents' fundamental due process liberty interest in
childrearing.
The Legislature has decreed that in any custodial dispute the child's best
interests, described within MCL 722.23, must prevail. Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich
App 142, 150; 631 NW2d 748 (2001). [Heltzel v Heltzel, supra at ___.]
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The Heltzel Court then concluded:
In every custody dispute involving the natural parent of a child and a thirdperson custodian, the strong presumption exists, however, that parental custody
serves the child's best interests. We hold that, to properly recognize the
fundamental constitutional nature of the parental liberty interest while at the same
time maintaining the statutory focus on the decisive nature of an involved child's
best interests, custody of a child should be awarded to a third-party custodian
instead of the child's natural parent only when the third person proves that all
relevant factors, including the existence of an established custodial environment
and all legislatively mandated best interest concerns within § 3, taken together
clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the child's best interests require
placement with the third person. Only when such a clear and convincing showing
is made should a trial court infringe the parent's fundamental constitutional rights
by awarding custody of the parent's child to a third person. We reiterate the
Supreme Court's warning that "the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply
because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made," Troxel, supra at
72-73, and remind trial courts considering competing custody claims of a
noncustodial natural parent and a third-person custodian that it is not sufficient
that the third person may have established by clear and convincing evidence that a
marginal, though distinct, benefit would be gained if the children were maintained
with him. Henrikson, supra at 253. [Heltzel, supra at ___.]
Here, the trial court expressed doubts regarding the proper standard to be applied in
deciding defendant's petition for change of custody. In light of the pronouncement in Heltzel
regarding the appropriate standard to be applied in custody disputes between a natural parent and
a third-party custodian, we conclude that a remand for an evidentiary hearing wherein the trial
court can apply the standard announced in Heltzel is warranted. On remand, the trial court
should consider up-to-date information. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 889; 526 NW2d 889
(1994).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction
is not retained.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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