CHARLES LEE HELTZEL V CRYSTAL S HELTZEL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHARLES LEE HELTZEL,
FOR PUBLICATION
October 23, 2001
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff,
No. 232736
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 97-000316-DM
v
CRYSTAL S. HELTZEL, a/k/a CRYSTAL S.
TAPIA,
Updated Copy
January 4, 2002
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JOHN YONKERS and ROBIN YONKERS,
Intervenors-Appellees
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Gage and Meter, JJ.
GAGE, J.
In this child custody dispute, defendant appeals as of right a trial court order awarding
John and Robin Yonkers physical custody of the minor child and granting defendant and the
Yonkerses joint legal custody of the minor. The trial court concluded that defendant, the
biological mother of the minor, failed to make the showing necessary to overcome the statutory
presumption favoring the minor's continued placement in the established custody of the
Yonkerses, who are defendant's parents and the minor's maternal grandparents. We reverse and
remand.
I
Plaintiff and defendant married on July 1, 1995, and resided in Cass County. On May 2,
1996, defendant gave birth to a daughter, the minor involved in this case. The marriage did not
endure, however. By the time plaintiff filed for divorce on April 30, 1997, defendant had left the
marital home and moved with the child to the grandparents' Elkhart, Indiana, home. Defendant's
mother cared for the child while defendant worked full time. Both plaintiff and defendant sought
physical custody of the child.
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On August 29, 1997, the trial court entered a stipulated order for the child's temporary
custody and support. With respect to custody, the order provided that the parties would share
legal custody of the child, but that defendant "shall have temporary physical custody of the
minor . . . until they [sic] reach the age of eighteen years, or graduates from high school,
whichever occurs last." Plaintiff would enjoy "reasonable and liberal" parenting time and had to
make $60 weekly child support payments.1
A divorce judgment, dated November 21, 1997, was entered on December 1, 1997. The
judgment incorporated the custody, parenting time, and child support provisions contained in the
August 29 order.2
On November 26, 1997, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the trial court entered an
order modifying the divorce judgment.3 Relevant to this appeal, the November 26 order stated as
follows regarding the child's physical custody:
Physical custody of the minor child shall be with the maternal
grandparents, JOHN AND ROBYN [sic] YONKERS, who [sic] the minor child,
along with the Defendant, have been residing with since the commencement of
this action. Mr. and Mrs. Yonkers shall retain physical custody of the minor child
until such time as both Defendant and Mr. and Mrs. Yonkers have notified the
Cass County Friend of the Court, in writing, that Defendant is prepared to assume
the physical custody of the minor child. Upon receipt of said notice by the Cass
County Friend of the Court, physical custody of the minor child shall revert back
to Defendant and said child will remain with Defendant until she reaches the age
of eighteen (18) years or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last, or
until further order of this Court.
The November 26 order granted plaintiff and defendant "reasonable and liberal" parenting time.4
Plaintiff and defendant and their attorneys signed the modification order, but the grandparents
did not, and the order did not denote the grandparents as parties to the action. The grandparents
never formally moved to intervene in the action.
1
The order also divided the parties' property, granting plaintiff the exclusive right to reside in the
marital home and permitting defendant to "remove all of her and the minor child's belongings
from the marital home."
2
With respect to property, the divorce judgment likewise incorporated the provision of the
August 29 order granting plaintiff the exclusive right to inhabit the marital home. The judgment
also ordered that, except for several specific awards of personal property, "each party is to
receive the property in their own possession."
3
While it appears that the court erred to the extent that it "blindly accept[ed] the stipulation of
the parents" without "independently determin[ing] what is in the best interests of the child,"
Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 21; 614 NW2d 183 (2000), the parties do not argue that the
court's action constituted error requiring reversal.
4
The modification order further stated "that the parties, including JOHN AND ROBIN
YONKERS, must promptly notify the Cass County Friend of the Court in writing, when their
address changes."
-2-
On February 28, 2000, defendant moved for entry of an order that the grandparents show
cause why they had thwarted defendant's reasonable visitation with the child. The motion
asserted that defendant's mother permitted defendant only supervised visitations. On March 2,
2000, defendant filed a "petition to reinstate original divorce judgment dated 21 November
1997," thus attempting to eliminate the November 26, 1997, modification order's grant of the
child's temporary physical custody to the grandparents. In an affidavit accompanying her
petition, defendant stated that she had signed the stipulated order modifying the divorce
judgment "[a]t my mother's insistence . . . so that [the child] would be covered under my parents'
insurance policy," and that "[m]y mother made the arrangements directly with my attorney."
According to defendant's affidavit, the grandparents never allowed defendant, who had remarried
and had another child, an unsupervised visit with the child. Defendant averred that she loved her
child and felt prepared to assume the child's physical custody, but that the grandparents refused
to permit the child's removal from their custody.
On March 10, 2000, the grandparents responded to defendant's petition. The
grandparents asserted that for over two years the child had resided with them in an established
custodial environment, and that the child's best interests were served by her current placement.
The grandparents' response also mentioned that defendant had not visited overnight with the
child since September 1997, and that "the present husband of the Defendant . . . is a known child
molester." The grandparents also accused two sons of plaintiff 's girlfriend of molesting the child
while the child visited plaintiff.5 The grandparents suggested that the trial court order
psychological evaluations of plaintiff and defendant and their current significant others, as well
as the grandparents themselves; otherwise investigate the current circumstances relevant to the
issue of the child's custody; and restrict plaintiff and defendant to supervised visitations with the
child.
On March 23, 2000, pursuant to plaintiff 's and defendant's stipulation, the trial court
ordered the restoration of the child's physical custody with defendant, that plaintiff and defendant
share legal custody of the child, and that plaintiff have liberal, reasonable visitation with the
child. On the same day, the trial court entered an "Order reinstating original divorce judgment
dated 21 November 1997."
Shortly thereafter, however, on April 3, 2000, the trial court ordered that the friend of the
court perform a custody investigation and make a recommendation, that a hearing regarding
custody and visitation be scheduled, and that pending the investigation plaintiff and defendant
have only supervised visitation with the child.6 Pursuant to stipulation by plaintiff, defendant,
and the grandparents, the trial court on April 26, 2000, ordered that plaintiff and defendant could
5
At the July 2000 custody hearing, the grandmother testified that in February 2000 she took the
child to the hospital after she had visited plaintiff 's home. Those who examined the child found
that her vagina appeared red. Apparently an investigation into the charges was ongoing at the
time of the custody hearing, and the child was participating in counseling.
6
It appears that the court properly rethought its entry of the March 23 order, concluding that it
needed to determine itself whether a custody modification served the child's best interests.
Phillips, supra.
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visit the child on one day every other weekend, but that the child have no contact with either
plaintiff 's girlfriend's children or defendant's husband.7
At the July 26, 2000, hearing before a referee, defendant testified that during her divorce
proceedings from plaintiff she and the child moved in with the grandparents, intending to remain
there only until defendant located alternate suitable housing. By approximately August or
September 1997, defendant's relationship with Oscar Tapia, her current husband, had become
serious. Defendant obtained employment in Plymouth, Indiana, where Tapia lived, and moved
in with Tapia at his parents' home. Defendant explained that although she had prepared to bring
the child to her new residence for a weekend visitation, the grandparents suggested that the child
should remain with them because defendant had just begun her relationship with Tapia and the
child should not so soon be placed in another new environment. Defendant agreed to leave the
child with the grandparents.
Defendant indicated that she subsequently acceded to the grandparents' repeated
suggestions that she sign the stipulation entered on November 26, 1997, granting the
grandparents temporary physical custody of the child, to make the child eligible for the
grandfather's medical insurance coverage. According to defendant, the grandparents and her
divorce attorney, whom the grandparents had retained for defendant, prepared the stipulation.
Defendant estimated that within the next two to three months, she had obtained insurance
through her employer and informed the grandparents that she felt prepared to assume physical
custody of the child. The grandparents informed defendant, however, that they would not permit
her to have custody of the child because the grandmother had spoken with Tapia's former spouse
regarding allegations of child sexual abuse against Tapia, and the grandparents viewed Tapia as a
child molester. Documentation from an Indiana court reflected that Tapia had been charged with
two counts of child molestation and one count of battery involving a child of his former wife.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Tapia had pleaded guilty of battery, and the child molestation charges
were dismissed. Tapia denied that he had ever engaged in sexual contact with a child, but
admitted that he had spanked his former wife's unruly daughter, in the former wife's presence
and as the former wife herself had done. Tapia averred that his former wife fabricated the
molestation charges during their divorce proceedings, and explained that on his counsel's advice
he opted to avoid a trial on the charges because he already owed his attorney approximately
$7,000 and had no money with which to go to trial. Tapia opined that to some extent the
grandparents' disapproval of him was race related, but indicated his understanding of the
grandparents' concern owing to the molestation allegations. Other than the court documentation
of the charges against him, the record contained no specific evidence of any sexual abuse by
Tapia.
Because of their concerns regarding Tapia, the grandparents, contrary to the court order
providing for liberal and reasonable parenting time, advised defendant that she could visit the
child only in the grandparents' home and under their supervision. The next court order
addressing visitation, filed April 26, 2000, stated that defendant would have visitation from 9:00
7
As a further condition of plaintiff 's visits with the minor, plaintiff 's mother had to supervise
them.
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a.m. until 7:00 p.m. every other Sunday, but that the child could have no contact with Tapia.
Although the April 26 order contained no further restrictions, the grandparents acknowledged
that beginning in May 2000 they nonetheless refused to permit defendant to visit the child
outside their home because they suspected that defendant had allowed Tapia to have contact with
the child and they were informed that a warrant existed for defendant's arrest and did not want
the child in defendant's presence outside their home because they feared that the child might
witness defendant's arrest.8 For the same reasons, the grandparents subsequently advised
defendant when she arrived for a scheduled 9:00 a.m. visitation to leave and return at
approximately 1:00 p.m., after the grandparents and the child would have returned from church.
Although the grandparents criticized defendant's visitation with the minor as inconsistent,
the record does not specifically reflect more than a few missed appointments. Defendant
testified that during the first year the child resided with the grandparents she visited the child on
at least three occasions each month at the grandparents' home, that during the second year she
visited the child at least two to three times each month,9 and that during the third year she had
missed only three Sunday visits since March 2000. Defendant and the grandparents agreed that
one visit did not occur because defendant encountered vehicle problems, another failed to happen
because Jaylund, defendant's son with Tapia, had been hospitalized, and another was missed
when defendant took Tapia's parents on a trip to a Texas church. The fourth time no visit
happened had occurred when defendant arrived timely at 9:00 a.m., but the grandfather
suggested that defendant leave and return at 1:00 p.m., when the grandparents and the child
would have returned home from church.
Defendant proclaimed that, although she had not provided the grandparents money or
clothes for the child while the child resided with the grandparents, she loved the child, and her
parents, and wanted to provide the child a home.10 Tapia and two friends of defendant and Tapia
all characterized defendant as a loving mother. The grandparents denied witnessing defendant
engage in any abusive or neglectful treatment of the child, and none of the other witnesses had
reason to believe that defendant lacked the ability to provide the child proper care. The
grandparents explained, however, that they did not wish to place the child in defendant's care
because of the following concerns: defendant's irregular visitation; defendant had not
maintained a stable lifestyle, as reflected by the facts that defendant moved several times since
her divorce and did not maintain steady employment; and defendant's relationship with Tapia,
which the grandparents viewed as their primary source of concern. The grandparents hoped the
court would award them permanent physical custody of the child.
8
Defendant explained that the warrant for her arrest stemmed from an unpaid vehicle loan that
she and plaintiff had taken to purchase a vehicle, which plaintiff received pursuant to the
judgment of divorce. Defendant testified that she was arrested because of the warrant, but that
the charges subsequently were dismissed.
9
Although the testimony varied concerning the extent to which the grandparents permitted
defendant to visit with the child outside the grandparents' home, undisputed testimony reflected
that on at least one occasion defendant was permitted to take the child to a shopping mall.
10
Defendant's and the grandparents' testimony also diverged with respect to the frequency with
which defendant requested custody of the child. Defendant alleged that she inquired monthly
whether the grandparents would return the child to defendant's custody.
-5-
A psychotherapist testified concerning her investigation of the parties and
recommendation regarding the child's custody. The therapist interviewed defendant, the child,
and the grandparents. The therapist did not, however, speak with Tapia, his former spouse, or
the alleged victim. Although the therapist uncovered no indication that defendant ever harmed
or threatened to harm the child, she recommended that the child remain in her established
custodial environment with the grandparents in light of the charges against Tapia, defendant's
frequent relocations, defendant's inconsistent visitation, and unspecified "additional concerns that
were initiated through an interview with the minor child."
On August 11, 2000, the referee issued his report and recommendation. The referee
initially noted that because defendant challenged the propriety of the child's custody in her
established custodial environment with the grandparents, defendant had the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that a change of custody would serve the child's best interests.
After reviewing the statutory factors, the referee recommended that custody of the child remain
with the grandparents, and that defendant have the right to reasonable parenting time.11 The
referee noted that he did not believe that Tapia posed a threat to the child.
Pursuant to MCR 3.215(E)(3), defendant filed objections to the referee's
recommendation. Defendant argued that the referee incorrectly, and in violation of her
constitutional due process rights, placed on her the burden of proving that she should have
custody of her child. Defendant sought a circuit court review hearing de novo, which occurred
on October 25, 2000, although no transcript appears in the record. Plaintiff, defendant, and the
grandparents stipulated that a transcript of the July 26, 2000, hearing before the referee would
constitute the evidentiary record, and were permitted to file briefs stating their positions.
Plaintiff agreed with defendant that she should have physical custody of their child. In addition
to raising their constitutional argument, plaintiff and defendant claimed that absent any
indication of defendant's parental unfitness the referee should have placed significant weight in
both their original intent that the child remain with the grandparents temporarily and their desire
as the child's parents that she return to defendant's custody. Plaintiff and defendant also
challenged the grandparents' standing to claim custody. The grandparents countered that the
referee's recommendation served the child's best interests.
11
In applying the statutory factors to determine the child's best interests, MCL 722.23, the
referee found that stronger love and emotional ties existed between the grandparents and the
child than between defendant and the child, subsection a; because defendant "has made some bad
decisions in her life and still shows a level of immaturity" the grandparents prevailed with
respect to capacity to provide the child love and guidance, subsection b; the grandparents showed
greater capacity to provide for the child's basic needs because defendant had only part-time
employment, subsection c; the child had resided in a stable and satisfactory environment with the
grandparents for most of her life, subsection d. The referee found that defendant prevailed
regarding willingness and ability to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship,
subsection j, because while the grandparents' concerns regarding Tapia "to a certain extent were
justified . . . there is no reason why there should not be parenting time . . . with [defendant] under
normal situations." The referee found that the remaining statutory factors either did not apply or
that neither party prevailed with regard to these factors. The referee concluded that defendant
"has failed to meet the burden of persuasion that a change in custody would be in the best
interests of the child."
-6-
On December 29, 2000, the trial court issued its opinion. The court agreed with the
referee that because an established custodial environment existed with the grandparents,
defendant had to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the child's placement with her was in
the child's best interests. The court further agreed with the referee that the grandparents
prevailed with regard to best interests elements a, b, c, and d, and that neither the grandparents
nor defendant prevailed with respect to elements e, f, g, i, and k. Unlike the referee, the court
opined that element h, the child's home, school, and community record, favored neither party
because the child had not entered school. The court also disagreed with the referee that element
j, willingness of the parties to facilitate a continuing relationship with the child, favored
defendant, instead finding that no one prevailed because the grandparents justifiably restricted
defendant's visitation with the child when they discovered the child molestation charges against
Tapia. While the referee had noted no other relevant factors pursuant to element l, the court
noted several weighing against defendant: defendant's "sporadic history of visitation . . .
indicat[ing] a lack of . . . emotional commitment on the part of the mother"; the grandmother's
hearing testimony that in December 1999 defendant left Tapia and Jaylund reflected some
instability in defendant's marriage; and that defendant "allowed her parents to handle the
responsibility of support." The court concluded that defendant failed to satisfy her burden of
proof that the child should be removed from the grandparents' custody. On January 29, 2001, the
court entered an order denying defendant's motion for change of custody and providing
defendant reasonable visitation as long as Tapia had no contact with the child.12
II
Defendant first contends that the trial court's placement on her of the burden of proving
that a change of the child's custody would serve the child's best interests infringed on defendant's
fundamental liberty interest in raising her child. When faced with a legal challenge to a trial
court's decision regarding a child custody dispute, we must determine whether the trial court
committed "clear legal error on a major issue." MCL 722.28. Although the trial court did not
address the constitutional issue, we nonetheless consider defendant's argument because it was
raised below and involves a significant constitutional issue for which all necessary facts are
before this Court. In re PAP, 247 Mich App 148; ___ NW2d ___ (2001).
A
The trial court required that defendant show that a change in custody would be in the
child's best interests, citing Rummelt v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491; 493 NW2d 434 (1992). In
Rummelt, the petitioner sought custody of his daughter, who was being raised by the respondent,
a maternal aunt. Id. at 493. This Court affirmed the trial court's order that the child remain in
the maternal aunt's custody. After finding that the trial court correctly determined that the aunt
had provided the child an established custodial environment, id. at 495-496, this Court
considered the father's claim that the trial court erroneously required that he prove that the child's
removal from the established custodial environment served the child's best interests. This Court
observed that prior panels of the Court had reached different results in cases involving
noncustodial parents who sought to obtain custody of their children from established custodial
12
The referee denied defendant's subsequent motion to permit visitation in Tapia's presence.
-7-
environments with third parties. The Court noted that one line of cases decided that the
presumption favoring the child's natural parent, MCL 722.25(1),13 weighed more heavily than
the established custodial environment presumption favoring the third party, MCL 722.27(1)(c),14
and therefore required that the third party bore the burden of rebutting by clear and convincing
evidence the statutory presumption favoring the child's natural parents. Rummelt, supra at 496.
This Court in Rummelt, however, declined to follow this line of cases, instead opting to endorse a
different resolution to the apparent tension between subsections 5(1) and 7(1)(c). The Court
explained that "[f]or the reasons stated []in" Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich App 130, 144-148;
406 NW2d 246 (1987), "the existence of the two presumptions reduces the burden of persuasion
from clear and convincing to a preponderance of the evidence, and that the burden of persuasion
rests with the parent challenging an established custodial environment in the home of a third
party." Rummelt, supra at 496.
This Court in Glover had reasoned that the clear and convincing evidence standards
within subsections 5(1) and 7(1)(c) could not literally apply against each other because "[s]uch a
conclusion would only lead trial courts into a logical paradox." Glover, supra at 146. The Court
therefore believed that "it is obvious that each party bears the burden of proof vis-à-vis his own
presumption" by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 147. The Court opined, however, that
the ultimate burden of persuasion rested with the parent challenging an established custodial
environment with a third party because "placing the burden of persuasion on the parent . . . is
better calculated to elicit the quality of testimony and evidence required by a trial court in its
13
The statutory parental presumption states as follows:
If a child custody dispute is between the parents, between agencies, or
between third persons, the best interests of the child control. If the child custody
dispute is between the parent or parents and an agency or a third person, the court
shall presume that the best interests of the child are served by awarding custody to
the parent or parents, unless the contrary is established by clear and convincing
evidence. [MCL 722.25(1).]
14
The relevant statutory language concerning an established custodial environment states as
follows:
(1) If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an
original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the
circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of
the child the court may do 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(c) Modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause
shown or because of change of circumstances until the child reaches 18 years of
age . . . . The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or
issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child
unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best
interest of the child. [MCL 722.27(1)(c).]
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determination of the best interest of the child," and because "as indicated by the expert testimony
in this and other cases, the importance of residence with a biological parent pales beside the
importance of stability and continuity in the life of a child." Id. at 147. The Court qualified that
the trial court remained free to accord the parental relationship more weight if the court found
"more than a mere biological relationship." Id. This Court has continued to apply the Rummelt
panel's solution, premised on the Glover panel's logic, to cases involving noncustodial natural
parents seeking custody from a third party who has provided an established custodial
environment. See LaFleche v Ybarra, 242 Mich App 692, 696-698; 619 NW2d 738 (2000).
B
The United States Supreme Court recently decided a visitation dispute between a child's
natural mother and the paternal grandparents that we find significantly diminishes the prevailing
line of Michigan cases resolving custody disputes between noncustodial natural parents and third
parties who have provided established custodial environments. In Troxel v Granville, 530 US
57; 120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000), the petitioners, paternal grandparents, sought to
obtain more frequent visitation with the involved child than the respondent, the child's mother,
wished to offer the grandparents. Id. at 60-61 (opinion by O'Connor, J.). The Washington
Superior Court that initially entertained the grandparents' request concluded that, pursuant to the
governing Washington statute permitting "'[a]ny person' to petition a superior court for visitation
rights 'at any time,' and authoriz[ing] that court to grant such visitation rights whenever
'visitation may serve the best interest of the child,'" id. at 60, the grandparents' visitation with the
child at least one weekend a month served the child's best interests. Id. at 61-62. When the case
progressed to the Washington Supreme Court, that court declared the visitation statute at issue
unconstitutional because it permitted the state to infringe the parents' right to raise their children
without any threshold showing of harm and permitted judicial overriding of parental decisions
regarding visitation merely on a court's finding that a different decision better would serve the
child's best interests. Id. at 63.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Washington Supreme Court's reversal of
the trial court's order granting the grandparents visitation that exceeded what the child's mother
had offered. The Supreme Court initially stated that "[i]n light of [its] extensive precedent, it
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children." Id. at 66 (opinion by O'Connor, J.). The Court characterized the Washington
visitation statute as "breathtakingly broad" in that it gave a parent's decision regarding
appropriate visitation for his child no deference, instead permitting "a court [to] disregard and
overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party
affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge's determination of
the child's best interests." Id. at 67. The Court concluded that the Washington visitation statute,
as applied in that case, violated the mother's fundamental right to make decisions regarding her
child's upbringing, explaining as follows:
First, the [grandparents] did not allege, and no court has found, that [the
mother] was an unfit parent. That aspect of the case is important, for there is a
presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. As this
Court explained in Parham [ v J R, 442 US 584; 99 S Ct 2493; 61 L Ed 2d 101
(1979)]:
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"[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is
the mere creature of the State and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their
children] for additional obligations. . . . The law's concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children." 442 US at 602; 99 S Ct 2493
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children
(i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make
the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children. . . .
The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened,
but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to [the mother's]
determination of her daughters' best interests. . . .
The judge's comments suggest that he presumed the grandparents' request
should be granted unless the children would be "impact[ed] adversely." In effect,
the judge placed on [the mother], the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving
that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters. . . .
The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly
contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best
interest of his or her child. . . . In that respect, the court's presumption failed to
provide any protection for [the mother's] fundamental constitutional right to make
decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters. . . . In an ideal world,
parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their
grandchildren. Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it
the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in
any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit
parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the
court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination.
[Troxel, supra at 68-70 (opinion by O'Connor, J.) (emphasis in original).]
Accordingly, because the trial court announced few findings supporting its decision, presumed
that the grandparents' visitation would serve the child's best interests, and accorded little weight
to the fact that before the suit the mother voluntarily provided the grandparents meaningful
visitation with the child, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's order improperly infringed
the mother's fundamental due process right as a parent to make childrearing decisions. Id. at 72
73.15
15
Four justices joined the lead opinion in Troxel, while two more justices concurred. Concurring
Justice Souter agreed that a parent possessed a fundamental right to raise his children, but opined
(continued…)
-10-
C
In light of the recent Supreme Court decision emphasizing the fundamental constitutional
right of parents to raise their children and make decisions regarding visitation, and necessarily
custody, we find the instant trial court's determination of the child's custody, premised on
Rummelt, supra, constitutionally infirm. Even though the trial court did not view defendant as an
abusive or neglectful parent or a threat to the child, the court nonetheless in its analysis failed to
accord defendant's fundamental interest in raising the child any special weight. According to the
Rummelt panel's analysis of the interplay between the natural parent presumption, subsection
5(1), and the established custodial environment factor, subsection 7(1)(c), and as the Supreme
Court in Troxel found constitutionally offensive, id. at 68-70, the trial court placed on defendant
the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the child belonged in the custody of her natural
mother. Furthermore, the trial court's application of the simple preponderance of the evidence
standard set forth in Rummelt for reaching a decision regarding the child's best interests plainly
and unconstitutionally invited the court to enforce its own judicial opinion regarding what
custody situation best would serve the child's interests, irrespective of the natural mother's
wishes. The Supreme Court in Troxel explicitly found unacceptable such enabling of a court, in
a case involving "nothing more than a simple disagreement between the . . . Court and [the
parent] concerning [t]he[] children's best interests," to "make childrearing decisions simply
because [the] state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made." Troxel, supra at 72, 73.
"[I]f a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review,
the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination." Troxel,
supra at 70. We reject the Rummelt solution in this case because that Court's analysis of the
interplay between subsections 5(1) and 7(1)(c) accords the fit parent's custody determination
absolutely no deference whatsoever. To the contrary, the Rummelt solution unconstitutionally
places on the natural parent the ultimate burden of persuasion that an award of custody to the
parent would serve the child's best interests. Rummelt, LaFleche, and Glover, the case on which
the Rummelt Court premised its analysis, did not acknowledge or address any constitutional
implications when applying both subsection 5(1) and 7(1)(c). Because Rummelt did not consider
(…continued)
that "because the state statute authorizes any person at any time to request (and a judge to award)
visitation rights, subject only to the State's particular best-interests standard, the statute sweeps
too broadly and is unconstitutional on its face," and "there is no need to decide whether harm is
required or to consider the precise scope of the parent's right or its necessary protections." Id. at
76, 77. Justice Thomas also concurred, agreeing "with the plurality that this Court's recognition
of a fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children resolves this case." Id.
at 80. Justice Thomas expressed his opinion that strict scrutiny review applied to the state's
interference with this fundamental right, and that in this case the state "lacks even a legitimate
governmental interest—to say nothing of a compelling one—in second-guessing a fit parent's
decision regarding visitation with third parties." Id.
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the United States Supreme Court's recent reminder of the importance of the fundamental parental
liberty interest, we note that we are not bound to follow Rummelt. MCR 7.215(I)(1).16
We therefore conclude that in this case involving a fit natural mother seeking a change of
her child's custody from an established custodial environment with third persons, the trial court's
application of the test set forth in Rummelt, for resolving cases involving tension between the
natural parent and established custodial environment presumptions, constituted clear legal error
because it violated defendant's fundamental liberty interest in raising her children. Troxel, supra
at 72-73. In light of the fact that the evidence presented at the hearing did not weigh strongly
against an award of custody to defendant, the trial court's unconstitutional application of an
incorrect burden of proof cannot be considered harmless. Consequently, we must remand this
case for the trial court's reconsideration. The trial court on remand must give defendant's
fundamental liberty interest in childrearing appropriate consideration and should consider up-to
date information. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 889 (Brickley, J), 900 (Griffin, J.); 526
NW2d 889 (1994).
D
Because we must reverse the trial court's unconstitutional custody determination, we also
must provide some guidance for the court on remand when attempting to reapply subsections
5(1) and 7(1)(c). We note that several panels of this Court, although not speaking in
constitutional terms, addressed the concurrent application of subsections 5(1) and 7(1)(c) in a
manner that we find more properly deferential to the fundamental nature of the parent's interest
in childrearing when determining whether to grant the natural parent custody, thus changing the
child's established custodial environment with a third party.
This Court has struggled with the interaction between these two
presumptions on many occasions, most recently in Glover v McRipley, 159 Mich
App 130; 406 NW2d 246 (1987). But see also Deel v Deel [113 Mich App 556;
16
While this Court has long recognized a parent's fundamental constitutional liberty interest in
childrearing, Terry v Affum, 233 Mich App 498, 504; 592 NW2d 791 (1999), aff 'd in part and
vacated in part on other grounds 460 Mich 856 (1999); In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 385;
210 NW2d 482 (1973), the constitutional issue was not addressed in Rummelt, supra. We note
that our Supreme Court recently has directed a trial court to reconsider Rummelt in light of
Troxel:
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the June 24, 1999 order of the Macomb
Circuit Court is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Macomb Circuit Court
for a hearing by the circuit judge on the defendant's petition for custody of her
child. . . . In deciding whether to grant the petition, the circuit court is to address
the interplay of the presumptions stated in MCL 722.27(1)(c) . . . and MCL
722.25(1) . . . and whether the construction supplied in LaFleche v Ybarra, 242
Mich App 692 (2000), Rummelt v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491, 496 (1992), and
Straub v Straub, 209 Mich App 77, 79-80 (1995), gives to fit parents the degree of
deference required by the U.S. Constitution. See Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57
(2000). [Zulkowski v Zulkowski, 463 Mich 933 (2000) (emphasis in original).]
-12-
317 NW2d 685 (1982)]; Stevens v Stevens, 86 Mich App 258; 273 NW2d 490
(1978); Siwik v Siwik, 89 Mich App 603; 280 NW2d 610 (1979); Bahr v Bahr, 60
Mich App 354; 230 NW2d 430 (1975). Having examined these cases, we agree
with the Deel panel's recognition that the two presumptions are not to be
considered equally.
"[T]he language used in the statutes suggest[s] that the presumptions are
not, in fact, of equal weight. While the established custodial environment is to be
favored unless there is clear and convincing evidence that a change is in the best
interests of the child, it is presumed that the best interests of the child are served
by granting custody to the natural parent." [Deel, supra, p 561.]
We also agree with the following language cited favorably in both Deel
and Bahr, supra:
"[The presumption that the best interests of the child would be served by
granting custody to the natural parent] remains a presumption of the strongest
order and it must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the
parent. Nevertheless, if the 'clear and convincing' evidence establishes that the
best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party, the
presumption is rebutted." [Deel, supra, pp 561-562.]
* * *
While it is true that in any child custody dispute the overriding concern is
for the best interests of the child, it is also presumed that the best interests of a
child are served by placing custody with the natural parent, unless otherwise
shown by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 722.25 . . . . We agree that a
showing that a parent is unfit is not required to overcome this presumption.
Stevens v Stevens, supra, and Bahr v Bahr, supra. Nonetheless, we construe the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard to be a substantive standard rather than
just an evidentiary standard. . . . Consequently, in order to overcome the natural
parent presumption, the trial judge was required to find that, when all of the
factors in MCL 722.23 . . . were collectively considered, defendant [the third
party providing an established custodial environment] clearly and convincingly
established that the best interests of the children required maintaining custody
with defendant. It is not sufficient that defendant may have established by clear
and convincing evidence that a marginal, though distinct, benefit would be gained
if the children were maintained with him. [Henrikson v Gable, 162 Mich App
248, 252-253; 412 NW2d 702 (1987) (emphasis added).]
See also Deel, supra at 562 (explaining that "[r]ecognition of both presumptions does not . . .
remove the third party's burden to show that custody in his or her favor is in the child's best
interests"); Stevens, supra at 267 ("The presumption in favor of the natural parent is rebutted if
clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interests of the child are served by
awarding custody to the third party."); Bahr, supra at 359 (recognizing that the Child Custody
Act required that the natural parent presumption "must be seriously considered and heavily
weighted in favor of the parent," but that the presumption is rebutted "if the 'clear and convincing
-13-
evidence' establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third
party").
We agree with the foregoing analysis of the appropriate interplay between subsections
5(1) and 7(1)(c). In enacting the Child Custody Act, the Legislature plainly recognized the
fundamental constitutional nature of a parent's interest in childrearing when it enacted the
presumption that in all custody disputes involving natural parents and third persons, absent clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, parental custody served the child's best interests.
Subsection 5(1). The Legislature also clearly recognized the importance of an established
custodial environment to the development of children. Subsection 7(1)(c). We do not believe,
however, that the Legislature intended that in every custody dispute between a noncustodial
natural parent and a third-person custodian, the third-person custodian could eliminate the
fundamental constitutional presumption favoring custody with the natural parent, and thus arrive
on equal footing with the parent with respect to their claim of custody to the parent's child,
merely by showing that the child had an established custodial environment in the third person's
custody. This interpretation, employed in Rummelt, fails to take into proper account the parents'
fundamental due process liberty interest in childrearing.
The Legislature has decreed that in any custodial dispute the child's best interests,
described within MCL 722.23, must prevail. Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d
748 (2001). In every custody dispute involving the natural parent of a child and a third-person
custodian, the strong presumption exists, however, that parental custody serves the child's best
interests. We hold that, to properly recognize the fundamental constitutional nature of the
parental liberty interest while at the same time maintaining the statutory focus on the decisive
nature of an involved child's best interests, custody of a child should be awarded to a third-party
custodian instead of the child's natural parent only when the third person proves that all relevant
factors, including the existence of an established custodial environment and all legislatively
mandated best interest concerns within § 3, taken together clearly and convincingly demonstrate
that the child's best interests require placement with the third person.17 Only when such a clear
and convincing showing is made should a trial court infringe the parent's fundamental
constitutional rights by awarding custody of the parent's child to a third person.18 We reiterate
the Supreme Court's warning that "the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on
the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge
believes a 'better' decision could be made," Troxel, supra at 72-73, and remind trial courts
17
The existence of an established custodial environment should be considered, subsection
7(1)(c), but should not itself eliminate the third person's burden to overcome the parental
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. We note, however, that when a child custody
dispute involves the child's fit natural parents, who possess equal constitutional liberty interests
in raising their children, and agencies, or third persons, the simple best interests of the child
analysis applies, subsection 5(1), and the party seeking a change in the child's custody from an
established custodial environment must demonstrate clearly and convincingly that the change
will serve the child's best interests. Subsection 7(1)(c).
18
We note for clarification that the provisions of the Child Custody Act clearly are not
themselves facially unconstitutional, Council of Organizations & Others for Ed About
Parochiaid, Inc v Governor, 455 Mich 557, 568; 566 NW2d 208 (1997), but that the trial court's
application of subsections 5(1) and 7(1)(c) violated defendant's constitutional rights.
-14-
considering competing custody claims of a noncustodial natural parent and a third-person
custodian that it is not sufficient that the third person may have established by clear and
convincing evidence that a marginal, though distinct, benefit would be gained if the children
were maintained with him. Henrikson, supra at 253.
III
Defendant also argues that the grandparents lacked standing to participate in a custody
dispute over the minor. Whether a party has legal standing to assert a claim constitutes a
question of law that we review de novo. Terry v Affum, 233 Mich App 498, 501; 592 NW2d 791
(1999) (hereinafter Terry I), aff 'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds 460 Mich 856
(1999).
We initially note that defendant correctly cites Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 48-49; 490
NW2d 568 (1992), for the proposition that a third party, including a grandparent, generally
"cannot create a custody dispute by simply filing a complaint in circuit court alleging that giving
legal custody to the third party is in the best interests of the child."19 Defendant also correctly
states that a third party does not attain a legal right to a child's custody merely on the basis of the
fact that the child has resided with the third party. Bowie, supra at 45; Sirovey v Campbell, 223
Mich App 59, 69; 565 NW2d 857 (1997).
As defendant seems to acknowledge, however, the instant case is distinguishable from the
consolidated cases the Supreme Court addressed in Bowie, supra. While Bowie involved a
grandparent who initiated an original custody proceeding against the minor's father, Bowie,
supra at 28-29, and an attempted voluntary transfer of legal custody from a child's parents to
third parties outside the context of a custody dispute, id. at 29-30, 55, the instant custody dispute
stemmed from a circuit court order during a divorce proceeding. Our Supreme Court specifically
has recognized that while generally no authority permits "a nonparent to create a child custody
'dispute' by simply filing a complaint in the circuit court alleging that giving custody to the third
party is in the 'best interests of the child,'" custody may be awarded to grandparents or other third
parties according to the best interests of the child in an appropriate case (typically involving
divorce)." Ruppel v Lesner, 421 Mich 559, 565-566; 364 NW2d 665 (1984). The Supreme
Court in Bowie later explained that a circuit court award of custody to a third party during a
divorce proceeding "is based not on the third party's legal right to custody of the child, but on the
court's determination of the child's best interests." Bowie, supra at 49, n 22.
The circuit court had jurisdiction of the custody dispute between defendant and the
grandparents pursuant to MCL 722.27(1), which explains that "[i]f a child custody dispute . . .
has arisen incidentally from another action in the circuit court or an order or judgment of the
circuit court," the circuit court may take various specific actions affecting the child's custody.
19
Certain limited standing exceptions, inapplicable in this case, do exist within the Child
Custody Act. See subsection 6b, MCL 722.26b, involving guardianships, and 6c(1), MCL
722.26c(1), describing limited circumstances under which third persons may bring a custody
action. Section 7b, MCL 722.27b, also inapplicable here, authorizes grandparents to seek orders
for grandparenting time under certain circumstances.
-15-
Subsection 7(1) contains the threshold requirement that an existing custody dispute is properly
before the circuit court. Terry v Affum (On Remand), 237 Mich App 522, 533; 603 NW2d 788
(1999) (Terry II). "The term 'child custody dispute' is generally used broadly throughout the
Child Custody Act 'to mean any action or situation involving the placement of a child.'" Sirovey,
supra at 68, quoting Frame v Nehls, 452 Mich 171, 179; 550 NW2d 739 (1996). Defendant's
March 2000 petition to change the child's custody from the grandparents clearly created an
"action or situation involving the placement of a child." Sirovey, supra at 68. Once obtained
pursuant to divorce proceedings, circuit court jurisdiction over child custody issues continues
until the child turns eighteen years of age. MCL 552.17a(1).
The grandparents' standing is not at issue in this case, however, because the grandparents
at no time during the instant litigation ever filed a pleading requesting permanent custody of the
child or otherwise sought to originate a custody proceeding. Terry II, supra at 533. To the
extent that the grandparents obtained custody of the child during the divorce proceedings, the
trial court properly granted the grandparents custody pursuant to the parties' stipulated order
modifying the judgment of divorce. "[U]nder § 17(1) of the divorce act, the circuit court may
enter postjudgment custody orders only 'on the petition of either of the parents.' MCL 552.17(1)
. . . . In making such order, the circuit court has jurisdiction under § 17a(1) of the divorce act to
award custody to a third person."20 Sirovey, supra at 77. "Viewing plaintiff 's and defendant's
custody stipulation as analogous to a postjudgment petition to modify custody, the court . . . had
jurisdiction under the divorce act to award custody of [the child] to [the grandparents] if it then
determined such award to be in [the child]'s best interests." Id. at 83.
Accordingly, while the grandparents had no substantive right to custody of the minor,
Bowie, supra, we find that as proper third-party custodians under the modified judgment of
divorce the grandparents properly responded to defendant's request to change custody, on behalf
of the child in their custody, that the child's best interests would be served by continuing to
reside in the established custodial environment with the grandparents. An observation of this
Court in Terry II, supra, relates to a similar situation that illustrates this point. In Terry I, a
natural father obtained a court order establishing his paternity and sole legal and physical
custody of his child, while also reflecting the father's and the deceased mother's family's
stipulation that the mother's family would have parenting time with the child. Terry I, supra at
499-500. The father shortly thereafter moved to amend the court order to terminate the mother's
family's right to parenting time, but the trial court denied the motion and revised the mother's
family's parenting time schedule. Id. at 500-501. This Court in Terry I found that the mother's
family lacked standing to initiate a proceeding seeking parenting time pursuant to MCL 722.26c.
Terry I, supra at 502. On remand from the Supreme Court, this Court in Terry II considered
whether pursuant to MCL 722.27(1)(b) parenting time with the mother's family was appropriate
on the basis that it would serve the children's best interests. Terry II, supra at 525-526, n 2. This
Court found that "while without standing to initiate a proceeding seeking parenting time, by
virtue of [the father's] various actions [the mother's family members] are parties to a child
custody dispute properly before the circuit court." Terry II, supra at 534 (emphasis added). The
Court concluded that as long as visitation with the mother's family served the children's best
20
The Child Custody Act defines a "third person" as "any individual other than a parent." MCL
722.22(g).
-16-
interests, the mother's family would be entitled to visitation incidental to the child custody
dispute. Id. at 533-537.21
Consequently, we reject defendant's standing argument. We further note that because we
do not detect within the trial court record, nor within defendant's brief on appeal, any specific
argument that the grandparents could not participate in the action because they never filed a
motion to intervene in the proceedings, we need not consider this issue. Tucker v Clare Bros
Ltd, 196 Mich App 513, 517; 493 NW2d 918 (1992).
IV
Lastly, defendant asserts that the trial court improperly failed to weigh in its analysis of
the custody situation the fact that she, plaintiff, and the grandparents all contemplated that the
grandparents would maintain custody of the child only temporarily until defendant found a new
home and job. This Court many times has recognized the "good public policy to encourage
parents to transfer custody of their children to others temporarily when they are in difficulty by
returning custody when they have solved their difficulty." Straub v Straub, 209 Mich App 77,
81; 530 NW2d 125 (1995). Our review of the trial court's opinion reflects that the court did
indeed consider the voluntary and temporary initial nature of defendant's placement of the child
in the grandparents' custody.22 To the extent that defendant suggests that the trial court should
have granted her custody solely on the basis that the child's placement with the grandparents was
intended to be a temporary arrangement, we do not agree. See Straub, supra (applying this
public policy as a factor that "here tips an otherwise equal scale" in the mother's favor).
21
See also Terry II, supra at 529-533, describing the following similarities between that third
person case and Deel, supra, Siwik, supra, Stevens, supra, and Bahr, supra:
Notwithstanding the fact that custody did not ultimately remain with the
third parties in all these cases, at some stage of the proceedings in each case the
circuit court determined that at least for that time awarding custody to third
parties was in the children's best interests. Though the four decisions are not
equally clear concerning how the third parties became involved, two common
threads can be gleaned. Critically, none of the third parties had initiated the
action that resulted in the circuit court's award of custody to them. This fact
comports with what is clearly the threshold requirement of MCL 722.27(1) . . .
that an existing custody dispute is properly before the circuit court. The second
element common to the four examined cases is the fact that the circuit court's
decisions regarding the award of custody were made after hearings to determine
the child's best interests. [Terry II, supra at 533 (emphasis in original).]
22
We note that the trial court correctly observed that a finding of an established custodial
environment does not depend on the manner in which such an environment became established.
See Hayes v Hayes, 209 Mich App 385, 388; 532 NW2d 190 (1995) ("In determining whether an
established custodial environment exists, it makes no difference whether the environment was
created by a court order, without a court order, in violation of a court order, or by a court order
that was subsequently reversed."); Treutle v Treutle, 197 Mich App 690, 693; 495 NW2d 836
(1992) ("In determining whether a custodial environment exists, the court's concern is not with
the reasons behind the custodial environment, but with the existence of such an environment.").
-17-
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-18-
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