PEOPLE OF MI V KIMBERLY A SCHULTZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
July 20, 2001
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 216299
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-157826-FH
KIMBERLY A. SCHULTZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
September 28, 2001
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Jansen and Gage, JJ.
GAGE, J.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of delivering less than fifty grams of
heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). The trial court sentenced defendant as a third-offense habitual
offender, MCL 769.11, to one year in jail and lifetime probation. Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm.
I
Early on October 2, 1997, defendant Kimberly A. Schultz summoned a neighbor for help.
Defendant's boyfriend, Steven Schultz, was unconscious, lying on his back on the living room
floor. Because the boyfriend had no heartbeat and was not breathing, defendant called 911 and
the neighbor performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation until emergency workers arrived.
Shortly thereafter, several police officers and firefighters arrived at the apartment, but
could not successfully revive defendant's boyfriend (hereinafter the decedent).1 The Oakland
County Deputy Medical Examiner autopsied the decedent and concluded that he died from a
combination of alcohol2 and morphine3 intoxication. The examiner detected on the decedent's
1
The police also searched the apartment and seized some used, bent syringes, an unused syringe,
some bloody gauze, and some spoons with gauze stuck to them.
2
The boyfriend had a 0.36 percent blood alcohol level.
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upper left arm a fresh needle mark, but noticed no further markings indicating past drug use by
the decedent. The Oakland County Medical Examiner's chief toxicologist opined on the basis of
the decedent's blood test results that his death occurred within minutes of the moment the heroin
was injected.
To the police who arrived at the decedent's apartment on the morning of the decedent's
death, defendant claimed that during the previous evening she was at a bar until 1:30 a.m. and
when she returned home she found the decedent unconscious on the floor and his former
girlfriend leaving the apartment. Leslie Brock, who was a friend of defendant and who had
occupied the apartment directly above the decedent's apartment for approximately five months
before his death, testified that she never observed the decedent use heroin, only alcohol, but
witnessed defendant inject heroin every day. According to Brock, the decedent disliked that
defendant used heroin, expressing that her drug use "was a big problem." Brock recalled that she
encountered defendant near the decedent's apartment later on the morning of the decedent's death.
Brock testified that defendant, who appeared hysterical, stated that the decedent was dead, and
that defendant, in response to Brock's question about what had transpired, stated that "she
[defendant] shot him up with a hit." The prosecutor also presented several other witnesses who
testified that the decedent had an alcohol addiction, but disliked and never used drugs.
Detective Sergeant Thomas Cleyman of the Hazel Park Police Department testified
regarding several statements he took from defendant during the afternoon following the
decedent's death. Defendant acknowledged to Cleyman her past use of heroin, and that she had
broken a promise to the decedent to stop using heroin. Cleyman eventually elicited from
defendant four different versions of the events surrounding the decedent's death. Initially,
defendant denied knowing whether the police might find heroin in the decedent's blood because
she did not spend the entire evening with him. She and the decedent began drinking outside an
apartment of some friends of the decedent. She and the decedent then went to Sugarbaker's bar
until 10:30 p.m., when defendant dropped the decedent off at his apartment because of his
advanced state of drunkenness. Defendant then went to another bar. On returning to the
apartment in the early morning hours, defendant observed another woman leaving the apartment
and that the decedent had turned blue. Defendant next claimed that she had dropped off the
decedent, who was very drunk, at the apartment and returned to a bar, and speculated that the
decedent might have ridden his bicycle to Detroit to obtain heroin for himself. Defendant
subsequently indicated that she and the decedent bought some heroin together, and returned to
the apartment where they separately injected it. Cleyman testified that defendant's last version of
events went as follows:
(…continued)
3
The examiner explained that in the body heroin broke down into morphine and six
monoacetylmorphine. The boyfriend's blood contained 115 nanograms per milliliter of
morphine, and fifty-three nanograms per milliliter of six monoacetylmorphine. According to the
examiner, any amount of morphine beyond fifty nanograms per milliliter could be lethal.
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The last one is she stated that she did the works, she admitted that she
mixed the Heroin, she said she was selfish she took most of it. . . . [Defendant]
told [the decedent] that she would do the works, but she wanted the first hit. She
told officer [sic] that is how she knew he did the Heroin and once again I
disagreed with her because she still stated that she went into the bathroom to
shoot up and that she possibly still could not have known if he shot up or not
because she stated she wasn't in the room with him.
In response to Cleyman's inquiry about how the decedent knew how to shoot himself up,
defendant replied that during the 1970s the decedent previously had injected heroin, and that the
decedent injected heroin three times during September 1997. Defendant signed a written
statement matching the last version of her story and including the observation that "God showed
me the dangers of what [heroin] will do and I know that I could be next. I can't bring him back
and the Lord knows I'm only asking for death myself." After the interview, defendant marked on
a truth/lie chart that Cleyman prepared that she had been ninety-seven percent truthful.
More than two months later, Cleyman arrested defendant,4 which precipitated further
statements by defendant the following day. Cleyman read aloud defendant's final written
statement, which described the following:
Steven J. Schultz and I were out October 1, 1997, drinking. The second
bar we approached wouldn't serve us. Steven and I were in the area to buy Heroin
and he suggested we get high. I said no, let's just go home. We went anyhow, got
home, we both did each other . I can't remember much, who went first, but I do
remember fighting over the drug. We seem to fight over alcohol and Heroin as
Steven wanted his way and his way only.
I always and/or in most cases gave it to him. We did each other. I noticed
ten minutes or so later something seemed strange so I try when I fixed the syringe,
the dose, I put in there was just water. I thought I had most of or all of it, still not
knowing if Steven had more of his own. I only meant for us to get our life in
order, his death intentional [sic].
Defendant informed Cleyman that the decedent purchased the heroin with money from the
paycheck he had collected earlier that afternoon. Defendant further explained orally that she
injected heroin into the decedent's left arm, after which the decedent fell unconscious, and that
the decedent's death was not intended. According to Cleyman, defendant also "stated that she
knew it was dangerous, the Heroin" "[b]ecause she had fallen out. She said she had never
witnessed anyone falling out before, but she stated she had fallen out herself, personally."5
4
Cleyman testified that when he arrested defendant, he recovered six hypodermic needles from
her jacket pocket.
5
Cleyman explained that "to fall out" meant to overdose.
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Defendant stood trial on charges of involuntary manslaughter and delivering less than
fifty grams of heroin. At the close of the prosecutor's case, defendant moved for a directed
verdict regarding the delivery count,6 arguing that the delivery charge must fail because the
evidence indicated that the decedent purchased the heroin, and defendant could not transfer to
him something that he already owned. The prosecutor responded that defendant's injection of
heroin into the decedent's arm fell within the clear statutory definition of delivery as a transfer.
The trial court denied defendant's motion on the bases that (a) social sharing of drugs constitutes
delivery under the controlled substance statutes, citing People v Brown, 163 Mich App 273; 413
NW2d 766 (1987); (b) although evidence showed that the decedent purchased the heroin, "[t]he
law does not recognize an ownership concept for illegal substances"; (c) because both defendant
and the decedent had access to the heroin "[y]ou could make the argument . . . that [defendant]
delivered a portion of her share to him"; and (d) "the social policy behind the delivery statute is
to discourage the flow of illegal substances between individuals in our society and the social
policy is better promoted by allowing the charge to go forward in this factual scenario." The jury
found defendant not guilty of involuntary manslaughter, but guilty of delivering heroin.
II
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict
regarding the charge of delivery of heroin because the evidence, which established that she and
the decedent jointly purchased and then shared heroin, was insufficient to establish a delivery of
heroin. In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider in the light most
favorable to the prosecutor the evidence presented by the prosecutor up to the time the motion is
made and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements
of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Vincent, 455 Mich 110, 121; 565
NW2d 629 (1997). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom can
sufficiently establish the elements of a crime. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d
177 (1993). "However, it is not permissible for a trial court to determine the credibility of
witnesses in deciding a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, no matter how inconsistent or
vague that testimony might be." People v Mehall, 454 Mich 1, 6; 557 NW2d 110 (1997). This
Court applies the same standards in reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed
verdict. People v Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 665; 482 NW2d 176 (1992).
Our resolution of the issue whether defendant's conduct, as reflected within the trial court
record, qualifies as a delivery of a controlled substance also involves statutory interpretation.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. People v Webb, 458 Mich
265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998).
The rules of statutory construction are well established. The fundamental
task of statutory construction is to discover and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. The task of discerning our Legislature's intent begins by examining
6
Defendant also moved for a directed verdict with respect to the involuntary manslaughter
charge, which the trial court denied.
-4-
the language of the statute itself. Where the language of the statute is
unambiguous, the plain meaning reflects the Legislature's intent and this Court
applies the statute as written. Judicial construction under such circumstances is
not permitted. [People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284; 597 NW2d 1
(1999) (citation omitted).]
Where a statute supplies its own glossary, courts may not import any other interpretation but
must apply the meaning of the terms as expressly defined. Harder v Harder, 176 Mich App 589,
591; 440 NW2d 53 (1989). This Court may consult dictionaries to discern the meaning of
statutorily undefined terms. People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 563; 621 NW2d 702 (2001).
The jury found defendant guilty of violating MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), which in relevant
part provides that one may not "deliver a controlled substance" "in an amount less than fifty
grams." "Deliver" is further defined as follows:
"Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted
transfer from 1 person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is
an agency relationship. [MCL 333.7105(1).]
"[T]ransfer is the element which distinguishes delivery from possession." People v Steele, 429
Mich 13, 25-26; 412 NW2d 206 (1987) (emphasis in original).
The Legislature did not provide a specific, statutory definition of "transfer." Dictionary
definitions of "transfer," both as a noun and a verb, seem to broadly contemplate any conveyance
of something from one person to another.
n. 1. Any mode of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in
an asset . . . . The term embraces every method—direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary—of disposing of or parting with property or
with an interest in property . . . . 3. A conveyance of property or title from one
person to another.
* * *
vb. 1. To convey or remove from one place or one person to another; to
pass or hand over from one to another, esp. to change over the possession or
control of. 2. To sell or give. [Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed), pp 1503-1504.]
This Court has concluded that the scope of prohibited transfers, as contemplated by MCL
333.7105(1), plainly and unambiguously includes "'sharing' of controlled substances in social
situations." Brown, supra at 275 (Quinnell, J.), 296-297 (Beasley, J., concurring). "The cases
are well settled that the act of transferring a controlled substance is sufficient to sustain a finding
of an actual delivery." People v Maleski, 220 Mich App 518, 522; 560 NW2d 71 (1996).
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Defendant relies on United States v Swiderski, 548 F2d 445 (CA 2, 1977) to support her
contention that the sharing of drugs between two individuals who jointly acquired them does not
qualify as a delivery of controlled substances. In Swiderski, "[a]ccording to the version of facts
most favorable to the government," the two defendants, an engaged couple, together purchased
approximately one-quarter pound of cocaine. Id. at 447-448. Both defendants were present
during the sale, and both sampled the cocaine before the sale. Id. at 448. Defendant Swiderski's
fiancée "remarked that the quality of the cocaine was not good enough for their personal use, but
that they had a buyer who would take it," and Swiderski paid the seller for the cocaine, which
police seized from Swiderski's fiancée shortly after the transaction. Id. After a jury trial, the
defendants were convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Id. at 449.
The defendants on appeal challenged the trial court's supplemental instruction to the jury
concerning the legal meaning of intent to distribute, which instruction "made it clear over defense
objections that distribution could be satisfied solely by a transfer between Swiderski and De Los
Santos [his fiancée]." Id. After noting that under the relevant provisions of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 19707 the term "distribute" signified "to deliver,"
which in turn meant "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance,
whether or not there exists an agency relationship," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals framed
the precise issue before it as "whether a statutory 'transfer' may occur between two individuals in
joint possession of a controlled substance simultaneously acquired for their own use." Id. The
court observed that the act sharply distinguished "between drug offenses of a commercial nature
and illicit personal use of controlled substances," id., reflecting Congress' intent to punish more
severely drug distribution and trafficking activities that "tend[] to have the dangerous, unwanted
effect of drawing additional participants into the web of drug abuse." Id. at 450. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals found the facts before it outside the scope of conduct that Congress
intended to punish more severely:
[W]here two individuals simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of
a drug for their own use, intending only to share it together, their only crime is
personal drug abuse—simple joint possession, without any intent to distribute the
drug further. Since both acquire possession from the outset and neither intends to
distribute the drug to a third person, neither serves as a link in the chain of
distribution.
* * *
. . . Whatever else may be embraced within the term "transfer," a term that
is not defined in the Act, we are persuaded that it was not intended to include the
7
The Michigan Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Federal act was the first major overhaul of drug
laws to occur in 20 years. It provided the impetus for the adoption of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act in some form by 45 jurisdictions including Michigan." People v Alford, 405
Mich 570, 586, n 6; 275 NW2d 484 (1979).
-6-
exchange of physical possession between two persons who jointly acquired and
hold the drug for their own use. [Id.]
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressly limited its holding "to the passing of a drug
between joint possessors who simultaneously acquired possession at the outset for their own
use." Id. at 450-451.
While Swiderski persuasively supports defendant's argument that one joint, simultaneous
purchaser and possessor of heroin cannot be guilty of delivery for giving some quantity of the
heroin to the other joint, simultaneous purchaser and possessor, the facts of this case appear
distinguishable from those underlying Swiderski. Defendant averred in her statements to police
that she and the decedent jointly purchased the lethal quantity of heroin for their own personal
use, but other evidence presented during trial suggested otherwise, specifically that defendant
might have shared with the decedent heroin that she already possessed. Defendant acknowledged
to the police that she was a heroin user, and a witness observed defendant inject herself with
heroin daily. The testimony of several witnesses agreed that the decedent did not take drugs
because of a distaste for them, and decedent's autopsy revealed no physical signs of regular drug
use. Defendant reportedly acknowledged to Cleyman her knowledge that the heroin she injected
into the decedent was dangerous, apparently because it had caused defendant herself to lose
consciousness.
Viewing these facts and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, we find that they support a rational jury's inference that defendant
supplied the decedent with an amount of heroin that she already possessed, and that the decedent
played no role in obtaining the heroin. Vincent, supra; Jolly, supra. It remained for the jury to
determine whether to credit defendant's version of the heroin purchase, or to accept the
prosecution witnesses' statements regarding the decedent's negative view of and abstinence from
drugs and make the further rational inference that defendant supplied heroin to the decedent.
Mehall, supra.
Because the evidence supported the reasonable inference that defendant shared with the
decedent heroin that she previously acquired, Swiderski does not control the outcome of this
case. See People v Lytal, 96 Mich App 140, 163; 292 NW2d 498 (1980) (distinguishing
Swiderski because "[h]ere, defendant [charged with possession with intent to deliver] and his
accomplice . . . did not simultaneously acquire possession of the narcotics at the outset."), rev'd
on other grounds 415 Mich 603; 329 NW2d 738 (1982). We note that most cases considering
whether to apply Swiderski decline because of factual distinctions. See United States v
Washington, 41 F3d 917, 920, n 2 (CA 4, 1994) (distinguishing Swiderski because the defendant
bought cocaine himself planning to share it with friends, and noting that "[n]o other circuit has
followed the Second Circuit in Swiderski"); United States v Speer, 30 F3d 605, 608, 609 (CA 5,
1994) (distinguishing Swiderski because of undisputed facts that the defendants who jointly
acquired cocaine intended to distribute some of it to an individual "who was not at or near the
scene of the transaction," and observing that "[t]his Circuit has never adopted the Swiderski
doctrine nor have we found that any other circuit has done so"); United States v Rush, 738 F2d
497, 514 (CA 1, 1984) ("The Swiderski holding appears fully justified on the facts of that case,
-7-
but we hesitate to approve its casual extension to situations where more than a couple of
defendants and a small quantity of drugs are involved . . . ."). While we find no flaw in
Swiderski's analysis given its facts, we likewise find circumstances distinguishing the instant case
from Swiderski.
We conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict
regarding the delivery charge because the evidence tending to establish defendant's social sharing
of the cocaine with the decedent fell within the plain, broad scope of a "transfer" within MCL
333.7105(1). Brown, supra. The Supreme Court has recognized that "delivery is a significantly
more serious offense than mere possession," as "reflected in the Legislature's enactment of
separate sections governing possession and delivery." People v Fluker, 442 Mich 891, 892
(1993). The Legislature clearly intended to deter drug trafficking by strictly punishing drug
dealers. People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 64-65; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). While according to
defendant's proffered version of events involving her and the decedent's joint, simultaneous
acquisition of heroin and their sharing of the drug solely between themselves, defendant would
appear to fall outside the category of drug traffickers the Legislature aimed to sanction more
severely, the record supports the jury's reasonable finding to the contrary that in injecting the
decedent with her previously acquired heroin defendant fatally drew the unfortunate decedent
"into the web of drug abuse." Swiderski, supra at 450. Had the Legislature wished to authorize
for social sharers of controlled substances, like defendant, lesser punishments than those
applicable to commercial drug traffickers, it could have done so explicitly. To the contrary, it
employed the broad term "transfer" to define the culpable element of delivery. The plain
language of MCL 333.7105(1) would encompass defendant's act of sharing her supply of cocaine
with the decedent. Borchard-Ruhland, supra; Brown, supra.
III
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor made improper closing arguments that denied
her a fair trial. Because defendant did not timely or specifically object to the now challenged
statements by the prosecutor, we will review defendant's allegations of improper conduct by the
prosecutor only for plain error. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370
(2000). To avoid forfeiture of her unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant
must establish that errors occurred, these errors were clear or obvious, and the errors affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings. People v Wyngaard, 462 Mich 659, 668; 614 NW2d 143
(2000).
In reviewing alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we review the pertinent portion of the
record and evaluate the prosecutor's remarks in context. Prosecutors cannot make statements of
fact unsupported by the evidence, but remain free to argue the evidence and all reasonable
inferences arising from it as they relate to the theory of the case. The prosecutor's comments
must be considered as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and the relationship
they bear to the evidence admitted at trial. Schutte, supra at 721.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly (1) argued that defendant could be
guilty of the uncharged crime of murder because she might have wanted to kill the decedent,
-8-
whom the record indicated planned to request that she vacate the apartment she shared with him,
and (2) suggested that the jurors should speculate regarding what transpired if they did not
believe defendant's asserted version of the events surrounding the decedent's death. The record
reflects the following relevant statements by the prosecutor during his closing statement:
The only reason that it's really any kind of an issue at all in this trial
[whether the decedent consented to being injected with heroin] is because it's a
little bit disconcerting that a man who has no evidence on his body of prior of
[sic] old drug use, as you heard from the medical examiner's office, a man who is
known to his friends to be a drinker, heavy drinker, but known to be against drugs.
And you know [sic] only heard that from his buddy, Terry Fletcher, his employer,
you heard from Leslie Brock, this defendant's friend, not [the decedent's] friend,
this defendant's friend when asked about [the decedent's] prior Heroin use, no, he
was dead set against that.
You have a man who has no marks on his body of prior drug use, the man
who's known to be adamant against it. A man, who the very afternoon, prior to
his death told his employer that he was going to kick her out of her house and then
he goes out and does Heroin that night. It's a little bit disconcerting. It doesn't
bear upon the law in this case, but it is a little bit disturbing.
The prosecutor in his rebuttal closing continued as follows:
So, the hypothetical that [defense counsel] presented to you takes
everything out of context in terms of the issues that you have to look at. Counsel
also told you what [sic] [the decedent] chose to participate in Heroin. Well, you
know what we don't know that. Once again I presented it to you earlier, we don't
even know if this man was conscious. I can't tell you he wasn't. I can't tell you he
didn't want Heroin that night. I can tell you it certainly is unusual that a man
who's been drinking that long, that he can build up that kind of tolerance to
alcohol when on this occasion even though he's drunk decides he wanted Heroin
despite the fact that hours earlier he told his employer he was going to kick her
out.
Despite the fact that her own Heroin buddy, Leslie Brock told you, oh no,
he was dead set against that. We don't know that he consented. That is her story.
And you have to understand that, that is the version you are getting from a woman
who you know will lie to suit her own purposes. A woman who lied to the police
multiple times during the course of their investigation giving the police ultimately
five different stories as to what had really happened. That is her version. That is
close to the truth as we're going to get. That doesn't mean it is the truth.
It doesn't mean that [the decedent], that's her version that he purchased the
Heroin. That it was his money. This is the one who purchases Heroin every day.
Like I said they say that's the evidence. That's the evidence from the mouth of the
-9-
woman who will lie to suit her own purposes. A woman who will clean up
evidence of what she just did, evidence of her Heroin use and the needles that she
injected into [the decedent] before she ever seeks help for him.
We detect within these remarks no improper suggestion by the prosecutor that defendant
might be guilty of murder or that the jury should speculate regarding the events surrounding the
decedent's death. Viewing the prosecutor's remarks in context, we find that the prosecutor
simply and properly (1) emphasized the unlikelihood of defendant's assertions that the decedent
consented to using heroin and had a history of heroin use by recounting the evidence tending to
establish the decedent's distaste for drugs and defendant's drug habit, and drawing the reasonable
inference therefrom that the decedent would not have consented to heroin use, People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); Schutte, supra, and (2) argued from the available
facts, which included defendant's many, varied versions of events given to the police, that
defendant was not worthy of belief. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d
460 (1996).
IV
Lastly, we reject defendant's contention that the cumulative effect of trial errors deprived
her of a fair trial because we find that no errors occurred. People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 16;
577 NW2d 179 (1998).
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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