MARTHA L THOMAS V CITY OF DETROIT RETIREMENT SYSTEM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARTHA THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 22, 2001
9:05 a.m.
CITY OF DETROIT RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
No. 217729
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-738619-NZ
V
Defendant-Appellee,
and
ESTATE OF CHARLES EDWARD THOMAS,
Deceased,
Updated Copy
August 3, 2001
Intervening-Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
METER, J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court's grant of summary disposition to
defendants under MCR 2.116(I)(2). We affirm.
Charles Edward Thomas, the decedent, was a former employee of the city of Detroit who
died in 1997. While employed by the city, he participated in an "annuity savings fund" (the fund)
under the direction of defendant City of Detroit Retirement System. Plaintiff, the decedent's
former wife, whom he divorced in 1992, was the decedent's designated beneficiary for the fund at
the time of his death. After the retirement system refused to pay plaintiff the benefits accrued in
the fund, she filed suit against the retirement system. The decedent's estate was allowed to
intervene in the matter as a defendant. The trial court subsequently granted summary disposition
to defendants, finding that plaintiff was precluded from receiving the fund's proceeds under the
following provision from the 1992 divorce judgment:
PENSION
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that each party shall
keep and retain, as their exclusive property, free and clear of any claim by the
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other, any pension benefits to which they are now entitled or may be in the
future.[1]
Plaintiff contends that the fund at issue here was not covered by the divorce judgment as
a "pension" and that because she was the named beneficiary of the fund at the time of the
decedent's death, she is entitled to the proceeds from the fund. We disagree. We review a trial
court's grant of summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331,
337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1999), p 1155, defines "pension" as "[a] fixed sum paid
regularly to a person (or to the person's beneficiaries), esp. by an employer as a retirement
benefit." The same dictionary defines "annuity" as "[a]n obligation to pay a stated sum, [usually]
monthly or annually, to a stated recipient." Id. at 88. These definitions indicate a substantial
similarity between a pension and an annuity fund. Moreover, the dictionary lists "definedcontribution plan" (similar to the annuity fund at issue here) as a type of "pension plan." Id. at
1155. Further, the change of beneficiary form in which the decedent designated plaintiff as the
beneficiary of the fund stated "I . . . direct . . . the Retirement System . . . to pay the accumulated
contributions standing to my credit in event of my death before my retirement to [plaintiff]"
(emphasis added). This is evidence that the annuity fund at issue here operated as a type of
pension.
In addition, MCL 552.101(4) states in relevant part:
Each judgment of divorce . . . shall determine all rights of the husband and
wife in and to all of the following:
(a) Any pension, annuity, or retirement benefits.
1
At a later hearing, the court stated that the fund at issue was also covered under the following
provision of the divorce judgment:
STATUTORY INSURANCE PROVISION
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that any rights of either
party in any policy or contract of life, endowment or annuity insurance of the
other as beneficiary are hereby extinguished, unless specifically preserved by this
Judgment.
In light of our disposition of this case, we need not decide whether the fund ultimately fell within
this additional provision. However, it appears to us that the fund was not in fact covered by this
provision, because this provision dealt solely with insurance. We emphasize that no parties to
this appeal argue that this provision was applicable.
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(b) Any accumulated contributions in any pension, annuity, or retirement
system.
(c) Any right or contingent right in and to unvested pension, annuity, or
retirement benefits.
This language mandates that a divorce judgment address any annuities. In spite of this mandate,
the divorce judgment at issue here did not separately address the instant annuity fund but instead
stated that "each party shall keep and retain, as their exclusive property, free and clear of any
claim by the other, any pension benefits to which they are . . . entitled . . . ." The failure to
specifically address annuities (other than annuity insurance, see n 1, supra) in the divorce
judgment despite the existence of the instant annuity fund is further evidence that the divorce
judgment, in referring to a "pension," was intended to encompass the annuity fund at issue.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in determining that the fund at issue here was
covered by the "pension" provision of the divorce judgment.2
Plaintiff suggests that even if the fund is considered a "pension" under the divorce
judgment, she nonetheless is entitled to the proceeds of the fund under Daugherty v Wickes Corp,
9 Mich App 305; 156 NW2d 581 (1967). In Daugherty, the decedent's former wife, whom he
had divorced, was the named beneficiary of his profit-sharing plan at the time of his death. Id. at
310. The Court held that the profit-sharing plan was covered by a divorce decree stating that
neither party "shall hereafter have any right, title or interest to the proceeds of any . . . contract of
. . . retirement" held by the other. Id. at 310, 312. The Court held that the former wife was
nevertheless entitled to the proceeds of the plan because the decree simply vested complete
ownership of the plan in the decedent and left him free to dispose of those proceeds in any
manner he saw fit. Id. at 313. The Court concluded that the decedent was free to leave his
former wife as the beneficiary of the plan after the divorce and that she was therefore entitled to
the proceeds upon his death. Id.
While we agree that Daugherty supports plaintiff 's argument in the instant case, we are
not strictly bound to follow Daugherty, a 1967 case, under MCR 7.215(I)(1). We do not believe
that Daugherty was correctly decided. The Daugherty Court stated the following in reaching its
decision:
[Under the divorce decree,] the profit-sharing plan became Emil
Hildebrandt's property to do with as he pleased. He could have changed
beneficiaries free and clear of any claim by his former spouse. However, the
decree left him free to give his profit-sharing benefits to Mary Ann if he so
desired. The point is that he took no step to give his profit-sharing benefits to
anyone else. We agree that pursuant to the divorce decree, the profit-sharing plan
2
We emphasize that this particular holding is strictly limited to the facts of this case.
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became Hildebrandt's sole property.
property after the divorce.
The issue is what did he do with this
Notice for a moment the effect of the appellee's . . . argument upon a man
who wants his divorced wife to have the benefits of his profit-sharing plan.
Should a divorce decree like the one before us have the effect of frustrating such
an intention? Of course not. How, then, would he accomplish such an objective
after divorce? Should our judge-made law require that the divorced man execute
a new beneficiary provision keeping his former wife as the named beneficiary?
One can hardly think of anything more offensive to common sense than a
requirement that he must execute another beneficiary provision in order to retain
the same beneficiary. [Daugherty, supra at 313.]
This reasoning is unpersuasive. We believe that language in a divorce decree awarding one party
the proceeds of a fund "free and clear" of any claim by that party's spouse—such as the language
in the instant divorce judgment—operates to void a designation listing the spouse as the
beneficiary. To hold otherwise would be to contravene the clear language of the decree and
thereby frustrate the expressed intent of the parties who signed it.
The divorce decree at issue in Daugherty stated that "neither the plaintiff . . . nor the
defendant . . . shall hereafter have any right, title or interest to the proceeds of any . . . contract of
. . . retirement . . . [held by the other] in which either was heretofore named or designated as
beneficiary . . . ." Id. at 310. Similarly, the divorce judgment at issue in the instant case stated
that "each party shall keep and retain, as their exclusive property, free and clear of any claim by
the other, any pension benefits to which they are now entitled or may be in the future." These
phrases clearly divested the surviving, divorced spouse of any interest in their deceased former
spouse's retirement or pension benefits. Should the parties in a particular case decide to keep
each other as beneficiaries in spite of their divorce, they need merely specify as much in the
divorce decree. The concerns of the Daugherty Court as expressed in the above excerpt are
simply unfounded.3
This holding finds support in Mohamed v Kerr, 53 F3d 911, 912-913, 915-916 (CA 8,
1995) (divorce decree awarding each party "'full right, title, interest and equity [in various
retirement and insurance policies] free and clear of any claim by the other party'" operated to
terminate any beneficiary interests or rights, "notwithstanding that they [were] not expressly
mentioned"), and Clift v Clift, 210 F3d 268, 272 (CA 5, 2000) (divorce decree stating that the
wife was "'divested of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to'" a life insurance policy
prevented her from claiming proceeds after the husband's death, even though she remained the
designated beneficiary). As stated in Clift, "[h]ad [the wife claiming the benefits] intended to
3
Indeed, we note that requiring the decedent in this case to have executed a new beneficiary
provision divesting plaintiff of the fund’s proceeds, notwithstanding the clear and unequivocal
language of the divorce judgment, would be imposing an unnecessary burden.
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retain her beneficiary interest, she should have demanded that the divorce decree so provide." Id.
We acknowledge that Mohamed and Clift do not constitute binding authority on this Court and
that other federal cases reach somewhat contradictory conclusions. See, e.g., Lyman Lumber Co
v Hill, 877 F2d 692, 693-694 (CA 8, 1989). Nonetheless, we view Mohamed and Clift as
persuasive authority for our decision.
Because the divorce decree at issue in this case awarded the decedent his pension benefits
"as [his] exclusive property, free and clear of any claim by [plaintiff]," plaintiff was not entitled
to the proceeds of the fund after his death, even though she remained the named beneficiary of
the fund.
Plaintiff additionally argues that the trial court erred in allowing the estate of Charles
Edward Thomas, deceased, to intervene. We decline to review this argument because it is
inadequately briefed. See Palo Group Foster Care, Inc v Dep't of Social Services, 228 Mich App
140, 152; 577 NW2d 200 (1998).
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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