SILVER CREEK TWP V ARMANDO CORSO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SILVER CREEK TOWNSHIP,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 18, 2001
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 221052
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000263-CZ
ARMANDO CORSO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Updated Copy
July 20, 2001
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Hood and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order granting defendant summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this action involving the Mobile Home Commission Act
(MHCA), in particular MCL 125.2311. We reverse and remand.
Defendant, Armando Corso, is the owner of real property situated in Silver Creek
Township, Cass County. In June 1996, a special land-use permit was issued with regard to the
subject property for the purpose of allowing the development of a mobile home park. In July
1996, the special land-use permit was revoked by plaintiff after determining that it was issued in
violation of a township ordinance.1 On May 7, 1998, defendant applied for a special land-use
permit, pursuant to subsection 7.07(B) of the Silver Creek Township Zoning Ordinance for the
purpose of allowing the development of a mobile home park. On June 24, 1998, a public hearing
was held by plaintiff 's zoning board concerning defendant's application, at which time citizens'
concerns and objections regarding defendant's proposed development were heard. At the
conclusion of the hearing, defendant's application for a special land-use permit was denied.
In October 1998, defendant submitted a preliminary plan of development to plaintiff for
review, allegedly in accordance with the provisions of the MHCA, specifically MCL 125.2311.
Plaintiff did not reply to defendant's preliminary plan within sixty days as required by MCL
125.2311(5). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment requesting the court
to declare that defendant did not have a valid special land-use permit that allowed him to develop
a mobile home park. Subsequently, motions for summary disposition were filed by both parties.
In granting defendant summary disposition, the trial court held that plaintiff 's failure to act
within sixty days of receipt of defendant's preliminary plan caused the plan to be considered
approved by default in accordance with MCL 125.2311(5).
-1-
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's grant of a motion for summary disposition.
Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). When reviewing a
motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court reviews the documentary evidence to
determine whether a party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law or whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in holding that it was required to respond to
defendant's preliminary plan because plaintiff 's zoning board had previously denied defendant's
application for a special land-use permit. We agree.
The Township Zoning Act (TZA), MCL 125.271 et seq., is the enabling statute that vests
a township with the authority to regulate land development and use through the adoption of
zoning ordinances that promote the public health, safety, and general welfare. See MCL
125.272, 125.273; Sun Communities v Leroy Twp, 241 Mich App 665, 669; 617 NW2d 42
(2000). In contrast, the MHCA, MCL 125.2301 et seq., was designed to regulate and provide for
minimum construction and safety standards with regard to mobile home businesses and parks.
See MCL 125.2304; Gackler Land Co, Inc v Yankee Springs Twp, 427 Mich 562, 579-580; 398
NW2d 393 (1986).
In this case, defendant applied for a special land-use permit, pursuant to subsection
7.07(B), of plaintiff 's zoning ordinance,2 and was denied. Thereafter, pursuant to MCL
125.2311, in an apparent attempt to circumvent the application of the zoning ordinance and the
effect of the zoning board's denial of his request for a special land-use permit, defendant
submitted a preliminary plan of his proposed mobile home park. After the statutory sixty days
passed without response from plaintiff, defendant asserted that he had the authority to develop
his mobile home park. The trial court agreed with defendant's assertion, in effect, that the
provisions of the MHCA controlled over the requirements of subsection 7.07(B) of plaintiff 's
zoning ordinance, which had been promulgated by plaintiff pursuant to its authority under the
TZA.
The trial court improperly granted defendant summary disposition for several reasons.
First, as discussed earlier, zoning laws regulate the development and proper use of land; the
MHCA does not. Second, the decision of the township's zoning board or zoning board of
appeals regarding a zoning request is final. See MCL 125.293a; Carleton Sportsman's Club v
Exeter Twp, 217 Mich App 195, 200; 550 NW2d 867 (1996). Consequently, after the zoning
board denied defendant's application for a special land-use permit, defendant was required to
timely appeal the denial to the township's zoning board of appeals or to the circuit court if the
zoning ordinance did not provide for an appeal to the zoning board of appeals. MCL 125.293a;
Carleton Sportsman's Club, supra at 200. Submitting a preliminary plan of the proposed mobile
home park did not constitute an "appeal" within the contemplation of the TZA. Third, the
MHCA, in particular MCL 125.2345(2), provides as follows:
This act shall not be construed to prohibit a municipality from enforcing
its local ordinances or from taking any other appropriate action to protect the
public health, safety, or welfare as authorized by law or its charter.
-2-
Defendant cannot evade the adverse decision of the zoning board merely by submitting a
preliminary plan in accordance with the provisions of the MHCA. Compliance with applicable
and valid local ordinances and, in this case, the grant of a special land-use permit, is a necessary
prerequisite for MCL 125.2311 to become an operative and governing provision. See generally
Gackler Land Co, supra at 580-581; Engineered Housing Concepts, Inc v Wayne Co, 180 Mich
App 465, 467; 447 NW2d 777 (1989). It is axiomatic that one must first be permitted to develop
a mobile home park before plans for the proposed mobile home park can properly be deemed
approved. Accordingly, the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it granted
defendant summary disposition.
Alternatively, defendant argues that, even if plaintiff was not required to respond to his
preliminary plan, he is the holder of a valid special land-use permit for the purpose of developing
a mobile home park because a permit was issued to him in June of 1996 and the subsequent
revocation of the permit was ineffective. We decline to address this argument. First, this issue
has not been properly presented for review because defendant has given cursory treatment to the
issue with little or no citation to relevant supporting authority for his argument. Wilson v Taylor,
457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998); Community Nat'l Bank of Pontiac v Michigan Basic
Property Ins Ass'n, 159 Mich App 510, 520-521; 407 NW2d 31 (1987). Second, defendant's
failure to appeal or otherwise contest the revocation decision in accordance with the provisions
of the TZA, applicable court rules, or other prevailing law renders this issue improperly raised.
See Carleton Sportsman's Club, supra at 200; Krohn v Saginaw, 175 Mich App 193, 196-197;
437 NW2d 260 (1988).
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of
plaintiff. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
1
The ordinance that established a minimum twenty-acre size requirement, Mobile Home Park
Ordinance 85-1, was revoked in April 1998.
2
There is no dispute that subsection 7.07(B) of the Silver Creek Township Zoning Ordinance
conforms with the requirements of MCL 125.286b and 125.286d.
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