WILLIAM E MAXWELL V CITIZENS INSUR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM E. MAXWELL, JR.,
FOR PUBLICATION
April 27, 2001
9:15 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 216792
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-607698-NF
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Updated Copy
June 8, 2001
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Talbot and Meter, JJ.
METER, J.
In this case involving the Michigan no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., plaintiff William
E. Maxwell, Jr., appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition to defendant
Citizens Insurance Company of America under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm. The sole
question before the court was whether plaintiff, a trial lawyer, could receive compensation for
job-related clerical services and transportation provided by his wife as allowable expenses for
care, recovery, or rehabilitation under the no-fault act. Before his injury in an automobile
accident, plaintiff had been able to perform these services himself; after the injury, he was no
longer able to do so.
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I. Factual Background
The facts are fully stipulated.
Plaintiff sustained serious injuries in an automobile
accident on February 1, 1994. At the time, he was a lawyer in sole practice and did all of his own
office work, such as filing and typing; he did not receive assistance from employees. In the
accident, he suffered a detached retina and head injuries, among other injuries. Because of these
injuries, he suffered some impairments in his abilities. Specifically, he "had positive findings of
abnormality on an MRI of his brain, . . . a possible seizure disorder, and . . . possible brain injury
with mild cognitive deficits in the areas of memory processes and relational concepts." Plaintiff
is not, however, mentally incapacitated, and "[w]hile he has a left-hand neuropathy and bilateral
thoracic outlet syndrome, he does not suffer from any paralysis of any limbs."
Because of his impairments, plaintiff 's treating neurologist prescribed, and his treating
neuropsychologist recommended, that plaintiff "receive[] assistance in performing tasks
necessary to returning to his law practice, including such tasks as opening files, reviewing the
mail, scheduling client appointments, typing correspondence and other legal documents, filing,
paying bills, bookkeeping and computer record functions, and reviewing file status for upcoming
deadlines and dates."
Plaintiff also experiences limitations, due to the accident injuries, in his ability to drive.
As part of his law practice, he travels by automobile for depositions and court appearances, not
only in the Metro Detroit area where he practices, but also throughout Michigan and even as far
away as Florida. He is still able to do the Metro Detroit driving himself, but because of the
impairments, he needs to be driven on longer trips. For two periods totaling about a year and a
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half, plaintiff 's neurologist restricted plaintiff 's driving on an involuntary basis and prescribed
transportation services for him; now, plaintiff "has been placed on a voluntary driving restriction
for occasions when he feels dizzy or fatigued." Plaintiff "voluntarily restricts his long-distance
driving activities because of occasional 'black outs' [sic] in attention and the onset of numbness
in his arms."
Plaintiff received help with the office assistance and transportation services from
professional agencies and from his wife; both the agencies and his wife charged him for these
services. The parties stipulated "that the need for the services arose from [plaintiff 's] February 1,
1994 motor vehicle accident, that timely claims for reimbursement for the services were made,
that appropriate documentation was submitted, and that the services are presumed medically
necessary." They further stipulated that because of time bars for filing claims, plaintiff could not
recover these expenses as wage loss under MCL 500.3107(1)(b) or as replacement services under
MCL 500.3107(1)(c). They further stipulated that plaintiff could not recover the expenses as
wage loss for 1995 or 1996 for the alternative reason that plaintiff had over $100,000 in taxable
income for each of these years.
The parties agreed that the "value of the claims submitted through May 29, 1998 for
attendant care/transportation services related to [plaintiff 's] work . . . [was] $70,984."
The fact that plaintiff could not, as the parties stipulated, recover his expenses as wage
loss led to the legal dispute between them.
The issue was whether the expenses were
reimbursable as care, recovery, or rehabilitation under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). The trial court ruled
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that because the services in dispute "were not preparing him for future employment, "but, rather, .
. . furthering his present employment," they were not compensable as "rehabilitation" expenses
under [the statute]."
II. Standard of Review
The parties stipulated the facts in this case, and the trial court ruled solely on an issue of
law. This Court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law de novo. Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich
App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000).
Moreover, this Court reviews issues of statutory
construction, as well as a trial court's grant of summary disposition, de novo. Stevenson v Reese,
239 Mich App 513, 516; 609 NW2d 195 (2000); Stanton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366,
368; 603 NW2d 285 (1999).
III. Expenses Recoverable for "Rehabilitation"
MCL 500.3107(1)(a) states, in relevant part, as follows:
[P]ersonal protection insurance benefits are payable for the following:
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for
reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured
person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.
Plaintiff contends that the expenses at issue here were recoverable as services relating to
"rehabilitation" under this statutory provision.
He contends that this Court should regard
"rehabilitation" as a technical term with a specialized legal meaning and rely on the Michigan
and federal rehabilitation service statutes, specifically, MCL 395.82 and 29 USC 723(a), when
determining the meaning of the word.
He argues that under these statutes, "vocational
rehabilitation" encompasses expenses incurred in transporting a person to work and assisting the
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person during his work. Defendant, by contrast, contends that the term "rehabilitation" should be
given its ordinary dictionary meaning without reference to MCL 395.82 or 29 USC 723(a) and
that this meaning encompasses only training or assistance in preparing a person for employment
and excludes assistance given during actual employment.
This presents an issue of first
impression in Michigan.
A. The Term "Rehabilitation" Should Be Given Its Ordinary Meaning
We agree with defendant that the term "rehabilitation" should be given its ordinary
dictionary definition.
Indeed, our courts consistently use ordinary dictionary definitions in
construing the no-fault act.
In Bailey v DAIIE, 143 Mich App 223, 225-226; 371 NW2d 917 (1985), this Court, in the
context of deciding whether the no-fault act encompassed expenses for vocational rehabilitation
in addition to physical rehabilitation, held that the scope of recoverable benefits under MCL
500.3107(1)(a) is to be determined by reference to the ordinary dictionary meaning of
"rehabilitation." This Court stated:
It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that the reviewing court is to
give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Words should generally be given their
ordinary meanings. If the language of the statute is clear, it is assumed that the
Legislature intended the plainly expressed meaning, and the statute must be
enforced as written.
The American Heritage Dictionary (New College Ed, 1985) defines
rehabilitate as "1. To restore (a handicapped or delinquent person) to useful life
through education and therapy." 1983 OAG No. 6129, p 50 (February 24, 1983)
holds that the term "rehabilitation," given its ordinary meaning, should be
interpreted to include vocational rehabilitation. [Bailey, supra at 225-226
(citations omitted).]
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In Bailey, the vocational rehabilitation allowed was training for a new job for a steelworker who
had injured his shoulder. Id. at 224.
As mentioned in Bailey, id. at 226, the Attorney General of Michigan has authored an
opinion regarding the meaning of the term "rehabilitation" in the no-fault act. The Attorney
General noted that "[i]t is a well-established rule of statutory construction that words of a statute
are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning in the absence of contrary legislative intent" and
opined that this was how "rehabilitation" should be construed in the no-fault act. See OAG,
1983-1984, No 6129, p 50, 52 (February 24, 1983).
In answering a legislator's question
concerning "[w]hat materials and services are included in the scope of rehabilitation benefits,"
the Attorney General stated that
the statutory term "rehabilitation" under . . . ยง 3107(a), in accordance with its plain
and ordinary meaning, must be interpreted in a broad sense to embrace
comprehensive care and services reasonably necessary to restore the injured
person not only to a condition of physical health, in keeping with the limitation of
his or her physical disability, but also to restore that person to useful and
constructive activity through occupational retraining if necessary. [OAG No
6129, supra at 53.]
Other cases also suggest that ordinary dictionary definitions should be used in construing
the no-fault act. In Royal Globe Ins Cos v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co, 419 Mich 565, 575; 357
NW2d 652 (1984), the Supreme Court used a literal approach to defining an "occupant" of a
motor vehicle for purposes of the no-fault act. In doing so, the Court said that "the goal of the
no-fault act which seeks to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents with prompt reparation for
their losses . . . is better served . . . by the certainty and predictability that a literal construction of
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the word "occupant" will yield, when it is assigned its primary and generally understood
meaning." Id. at 575 (emphasis in original).
In Transport Ins Co v Home Ins Co, 134 Mich App 645, 651; 352 NW2d 701 (1984), this
Court construed the meaning of a "motor vehicle owned, operated, maintained, or used by [a]
nonresident" in the no-fault act: "Under general principles of statutory construction, we must
construe a statute according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its words. . . . Only if the
language is ambiguous do we look to other factors in attempting to ascertain the purpose behind
the legislation."
In light of these authorities, defendant is correct that "rehabilitation" should be interpreted
according to its ordinary dictionary meaning. As noted by defendant, there is simply no authority
for plaintiff 's proposition that the term should be interpreted under the no-fault act in the
identical way that it is interpreted under the Michigan and federal rehabilitation service statutes.
See MCL 395.82 and 29 USC 723(a). Plaintiff contends that the term must be interpreted
identically under both the no-fault act and the rehabilitation service statutes because of the
following provision:
If an insurer or self-insurer is responsible under applicable state or federal
auto insurance law for the provision of vocational rehabilitation services to an
injured person, and the services are provided by the state board, the state board
shall collect fees from the responsible insurer or self-insurer in an amount equal to
the full costs of providing the vocational rehabilitation services. [MCL
395.84(3).]
Plaintiff contends that "[g]iven this reimbursement provision, it would be bizarre to conclude that
the [L]egislature intended the term 'rehabilitation' in the [no-fault act] to have narrower scope
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than the sub-term "vocational rehabilitation" as used [throughout] the Rehabilitation Act"
(emphasis in original). We do not find plaintiff 's argument persuasive. Indeed, the terms are
employed in two separate statutes that have different overall purposes. MCL 395.84(3) merely
indicates that the state is entitled to reimbursement from an insurer for the amount the insurer
was required to pay. The statute certainly does not prohibit the state from providing a greater
amount of services than that for which an insurer was required to pay, regardless of whether the
expenses for the services are called "vocational rehabilitation expenses" or merely "rehabilitation
expenses" in the applicable statutes. We reject plaintiff 's argument that the term "rehabilitate"
should be construed under the no-fault act in the exact manner that it is construed under the state
and federal rehabilitation services statutes.
B. The Ordinary Meaning of "Rehabilitate"
Both parties assume that if "rehabilitation" receives its ordinary dictionary meaning, it
will encompass only services needed to get plaintiff back into condition to work, and the services
he seeks to have paid here will be disallowed. For this reason, plaintiff goes to some length to
assert that a definition of "rehabilitation" other than the ordinary dictionary definition is
appropriate.
We note, however, that dictionaries also define rehabilitate as "4. To restore
formally to former capacity. . . ." See Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997), p
1096. This definition would arguably encompass the disputed expenses here, because plaintiff 's
"capacity" before the automobile accident was being able to operate a law practice without
having to pay for support services. However, the Supreme Court in Royal Globe Ins, supra at
573, 575, citing AT&T v Employment Security Comm, 376 Mich 271, 279; 136 NW2d 889
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(1965) (O'Hara, J.), indicated that a word in a statute should be assigned its primary and generally
understood meaning that is consistent with the purpose of the statute. Here, the primary and
generally understood meaning of "rehabilitate" is "1. To restore or bring to a condition of good
health, ability to work, or productive activity." See Random House Webster's College Dictionary
(1997), p 1096. Significantly, the Court in Bailey, supra at 225-226, and the Attorney General in
OAG No 6129, supra at 52 referred to this primary and generally understood meaning.
Accordingly, we conclude that this meaning is indeed the appropriate meaning to be assigned to
the term "rehabilitate" under the no-fault act.
C. The Applicability of the Definition to Plaintiff 's Situation
The stipulated facts show that plaintiff is able to work as an attorney and that for the two
years before the litigation was filed, he earned over $100,000 each year. He returned to work on
a part-time basis two weeks after the accident and has continued working since that time. He has
a driver's license and is able to drive himself to job tasks in the metropolitan area in which he
lives. He does, however, require help with transportation to parts of Michigan outside this
metropolitan area and to other parts of the country; he also requires help with detailed clerical
work in his office. This need for assistance does not render plaintiff disabled or require that he
have the services performed in order to be "rehabilitated" in the ordinary sense of the word.
Indeed, as discussed above, "rehabilitation" does not require that one is able to do exactly what
one did before an accident, but merely that one is able to perform useful and meaningful work
and earn a living by it. In Kondratek v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 163 Mich App 634, 636-637; 414
NW2d 903 (1987), for example, this Court held that an insured whose vocal cords were
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permanently damaged in an accident and who would never be able to talk normally again could
receive vocational rehabilitation benefits to become a sign language interpreter. This Court did
not note what the plaintiff in that case had done before the accident, but she was obviously
training for a position different from the one she had held before the accident. In the instant case,
the nature of plaintiff 's practice is somewhat different from its nature before the accident.
However, he has been able to return to work, and to do so successfully, earning over $100,000 a
year. Given plaintiff 's ability to perform remunerative work, we hold that under the specific
circumstances of this case, the claimed expenses are not compensable under the no-fault act as
vocational rehabilitation services.1
Given our resolution of this issue, plaintiff is not entitled to statutory interest. Nor is he
entitled to attorney fees, because defendant's denial of benefits was reasonable.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
We express no opinion regarding whether the claimed expenses are compensable as wage loss
under MCL 500.3107(1)(b). We further note that plaintiff makes a cursory statement on appeal
that the disputed expenses in this case were recoverable as "care" or "recovery" expenses under
MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Plaintiff does not sufficiently develop this argument for our review.
Nonetheless, we disagree that the expenses were recoverable as "care" or "recovery" expenses.
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