Attorney Grievance v. Levin

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Attorney Grievance Commission v. Robert Norman Levin, Misc. Docket AG No. 10, September Term 2012. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SANCTIO NS REPRIM AND The Respo ndent, Robert Norman Levin, violated Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional C onduct 1.15(e), 3.4(c), and 8.4(d). The violations stem med from Levin s d isregard of a Writ of Garnishment issued against him. The appropriate sanction fo r such misc onduct, in lig ht of his unblemished 47year career, lack of selfish motive, full cooperation with Bar Counsel, and significant remedial action, was a reprimand. Circuit Court for Montgomery County County Case No. 27349M IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 10 September Term, 2012 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ROBE RT NO RMA N LEV IN Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Adkins Barbera McD onald, JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Adkins, J., dissents. Filed: July 2, 2013 Robert Norman Levin, Respondent, was admitted to the Bar of this Court on December 17, 1965. On April 2, 2012, the Attorney Grievance Commission ( Bar Counsel ), acting pursuant to M aryland Rule 16-751(a), 1 filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Rem edial A ction a gainst L evin. The complain t arose from Levin s rep resentation of Sean Shahparast and Royal Investment Group, LLC, as plaintiffs in a legal malpractice action filed in the C ircuit Court for Mo ntgo mery Cou nty. 2 Years earlier, in an unrelated case in the Circuit Court for Montgom ery County, Creative Concrete Corporation, represe nted by M ichael T . Nalls, E sq., sued Shahparast and Royal for the balance of a debt they owed to Creative for a driveway installed by Creative. Creative obtained judgment in November of 2005, in the amount of $24,355, plus $5,000 in attorneys fees, against Shahparast for the balance of the amount owe d for the drivewa y. In October of 2010, prior to reaching a settlement in the legal malpractice litigation, Levin was served with a Charging Order in Aid of Enforcement and a Writ of Garnishment by Creative. The Writ named Shahparast as the judgment debtor, Creative as the judgment creditor , and L evin as the garn ishee. 1 Rule 16-751(a) provides: (a) Commencement of disciplinary or rem edial a ction. (1) Upon approval or direction of Commission. Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals. 2 A similar case was filed in the District of Columbia in which an attorney licensed in D .C. represen ted Shahp arast and R oyal. In November of 2010, Levin filed an Answer to the Writ of Garnishment in which he denied holding an y property of the ju dgment d ebtor. Upo n receiving the Answ er, Nalls wrote to Levin and expressed his belief that the Writ applied to the unmatured debt arising from Shahparast s ongoing legal malpractice claim. Levin responded in writing that he was not in possessio n of any of th e judgme nt debtor s p roperty, but that he would honor the court s order should he come into possession of any such property. Nalls th en filed a R eply to Levin s A nswer, statin g that the de bt owed by Levin to Shahparast was unmatured and, therefore, garnishable. At this point, pursuant to Rule 2-6 45(g), 3 the garnishment proceedings beca me contested. The reafter, Levin filed a Response to Nalls Reply. At no point in the garnishment proceedings did Levin argue that the Writ of Garnishment was invalid. In February of 2011, a settlement in the legal malpractice litigation was reac hed with Levin receiving tw o settlement checks with a total value of $107,500. The checks named 3 Rule 2-645(g) provides: (g) When answer filed. If the garnishee files a timely answe r, the matters set fo rth in the answer shall be treated as established for the purpose of the garnishment proceeding unless the judgment creditor files a reply contesting the answer within 30 days after its service. If a tim ely reply is not filed, the court may enter judgment upon request of the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor, or the garnishee. If a timely reply is filed to the answer o f the garnish ee, the matter shall proceed as if it were an original action between the judgment creditor as plaintiff and the garnishee as defendant and shall be governed by the rules applicable to civil actions. 2 Levin, Shahparast, and an attorney from a D.C. firm as payees. Levin did not contact Creative or Nalls to inform them of his receipt of the checks. Instead, Levin endorsed the checks and handed them over to his client to be endorsed by the client and the attorney from the D.C . firm. In March of 2011, upon learning of the legal malpractice settlement, Nalls contacted Levin to inquire about the proceeds, to request an accounting, and to notify Levin that he intended to seek legal relief. Levin responded that he was never in receipt of any funds in connection with the settlement and that tho se funds had be en deposited into the D .C. s firm s trust account. In March of 2011, Nalls filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief and served a Request for Production of Documents on Levin seeking docu ments related to his representation of Shahparast in the legal malpractice action. After a hearing on the Motion for Appropriate Relief, the Court ordered Levin to produce documents relevant to the garnishment action. Levin f ailed to prod uce all of the requested d ocumen ts by the courtimpos ed dea dline, bu t produ ced the m at a la ter date. In April of 2 011, Na lls filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Petition for Contempt on behalf of Creative against Le vin for failin g to comply with the court s orde rs relating to the production of documents and for disobeying the Writ of Garnishment. After a hearing, the Motion for Sum mary Judgm ent was g ranted, the P etition for Contempt regarding the willful violation of the Writ of Garnishment was taken under advisement, and the Petition for C ontempt f or failing to comply with the Court s Order regarding the production of docum ents was d enied. Thereaf ter, Levin an d Nalls ne gotiated a se ttlement. 3 Pursuant to that settlement, Levin agreed to pay $40,000 of his own money to Creative in exchange for the a ssignm ent of S hahpa rast s de bt to Cr eative. T he grant of summa ry judgment was then stricken and the Petition for Contempt was withdrawn. Prior to the hearin g on Cre ative s M otion for S ummary Ju dgment, N alls filed a complaint with B ar Counsel regarding Levin s handling of the legal malpractice proceeds. Bar Counsel charged Levin with violations of the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15(a), (d), and (e) (Safekeep ing Property), 4 3.4(c) and (d) (Fairness to Opposing 4 Rule 1.15 provides in pertinent pa rt: (a) A law yer shall hold pro perty of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyers own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account m aintained p ursuant to T itle 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other property shall be identified specifically as such and appropriate ly safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records of the account fund s and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years after the date the record was created. *** (d) Upon receiving funds or property in wh ich a client or third person has an intere st, a lawyer shall p romptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by ag reement w ith the client, a law yer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall render p romptly a ful l acc oun ting rega rding suc h pro perty. (continued...) 4 Party and Counsel), 5 4.1(a) (Truthfulness in Statem ents to Others), 6 and 8.4(c) and (d) (Misconduct). 7 4 (...continued) (e) When a lawyer in the c ourse of re presenting a client is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept sepa rate b y the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall distribute promp tly all portions of the property as which the interests are not in dispute. 5 Rule 3.4 provides in p ertinent part that a lawyer: A lawyer sh all not: *** (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligati on exis ts[.] The hearing judge made no findings of f act or conc lusions of la w regard ing Rule 3.4(d), and Bar Counsel filed no exception to the lack of findings regarding that Rule. Acc ordingly, we do not address the Bar Counsel s allegations regardin g Rule 3.4(d). Attorney Grievance v. Zdravkovich, 381 Md. 680 , 684 n.2, 852 A.2d 82, 84 n.2 (2004). 6 Rule 4.1 p rovides in p ertinent part: (a) In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not kno win gly: (1) make a false statem ent of material fact or law to a third person [.] 7 Rule 8.4 in pertinent part provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: *** (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or (continued...) 5 In an Order dated April 9, 2012, we referred the Petition to the Honorable Sharon V. Burrell of th e Cir cuit C ourt for M ontg ome ry County. A hearing was held on September 14, 2012. Nalls and Levin testified and various documents were introduced into evidence including the Charging Order, the Writ of Garnishment, correspondence between Nalls and Levin, and transcripts of the relevant p roceedings. Judge B urrell issued the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which she determined that Levin violated Rules 1.15(d) and (e) and 3 .4(c), but did not violate Rules 1.15 (a), 4.1(a), and 8.4(c) and (d): Findings of Fa cts Robert Norman Levin (hereinafter Respondent ) graduated from Harvard Law School in 1965. He was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in December 1965 and admitted to the Bar of the Dis trict of Colu mbia in January 1966. Respondent is also admitted to the U.S. District Court for the D istrict of Colu mbia, the U .S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the U.S. Court of A ppeals for the Federa l Circuit, the U.S. Court of App eals for the D istrict of Colu mbia Circuit, the U.S. Tax Court, the U.S. Supreme Court, and has been admitted pro hac vice to numero us other state and federal courts. He has never been the subject of any disciplinary actions by any court. Respondent is 72 years of age and has practiced law continuou sly in Maryland for 47 years. During all times relevant to this matter, Respondent maintained an office for the practice of law in Montgomery County, Maryland. As of October 2010, Respondent represented Sean 7 (...continued) misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduc t that is prejudicia l to the administration of justice[ .] 6 Shahparast ( Shahparast ) and Royal Investment Group, LLC ( Royal ), who were Plaintiffs in a legal malpractice action filed in this Court against John C. Moffett and his law firm. M r. Moff ett had represented Shahparast and R oyal in a real estate matter that led to the malpractice action. The case was styled Sean Shahparast and Royal Investment Group, LLC vs. John C. Moffett and John C. Moffe tt Char tered, Case No. 320660V, and the amount c laimed w as $700,0 00. (The D efendan ts in that action will be referred to as Moffett. ) Leo Roth, Esq. represented Moffett. Mr. Moffett then filed in this Court a separate suit against Shahparast, Royal, and Shahparast s wife (Homa Ravanbakhsh) for unpaid legal fees. Respondent represented the three defendants. The case was styled John Moffett Chartered v. Sean Shahpa rast, Homa Ravanbakhsh and Royal Investment Grou p, LLC , Case No. 335738V. The legal malpractice case and the collection case were consolidated by this Court. Shahparast filed a second and unrelated legal malpractice case in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against Moff ett. Respondent was not counsel in the D.C. litigation. Plaintiffs were r eprese nted in D .C. by the firm of Gordon & Simmons. In a prior and u nrelated co nstruction ca se in this Co urt, Creative Concrete Corporation ( Creative ) had sued Shahparast and Royal, formerly known as Foreclosure Real Estate Services, LLC, to collect payment for a driveway (the Creative litigation ). Creative was represented by Michael T. Nalls, Esq. ( Mr. Nalls ), an attorney with an office in M ontgomery Cou nty, Maryland whose practice includes representing construction companies, including debt collection on their behalf. These collection matters included the issuance of Writs of Garnishment and Charging Orders. Respondent was not counsel of record, or otherwise involved in the Creative litigation. In the Creative litigation, a judgment was entered on November 7, 2005, against Shahparast. No judgment was entered against Royal. The principal amount of the judgment claimed by Mr. Nalls to be owed by Shahparast was $24,355, plus a $5,0 00 attorney s fe e, and interes t. Mr. Nalls engaged in extensive post-judgm ent efforts to collect the judgment, including the issuance of Writs of Garnishm ent and ef forts to attach real property. As of October 7 2010, Nalls collec tion efforts had not been successful. At some point Nalls became aware of the legal malpractice action brought by Shahpa rast and R oyal. On O ctober 4, 20 10, Nalls filed a Request for Writ of Garnishment on behalf of Creative against Shahparast as the Judgment Debtor and Respondent as the Garnishee, because Respondent was counsel for Shahparast in the Moffett case. At the same time Nalls requested the issuance of a Charging Order against any interest [Sha hparast] may have in [Royal] and Foreclosure Real Estate Services, LLC, for the amount of the judgment and interest . . . and that said Order be served on Robert N. Levin, Esquire, as Counsel of record in Civil 320660. By this time Creative was owed over $43,000. The Court granted both requests. The Writ of Garnishment was issued on October 8, 2010. The Order for Charging Order in Aid of Enforcement of Judgment was entered on October 15, 2010. The Court directed in the Charging Order that it be served on Respondent as counsel for Shahparast. The Court authorized service in this manner because service on Shahparast in previous matters w as difficult an d he had f ailed to abide by previous charging orders. Respondent was served with both the Writ of Garnishment and the Order For Charging Order in Aid of Enforcement of Judgment. On November 1, 2010, Respondent filed a Garnishee s A nswer to Garn ishment. In the Answ er, Respondent denied being indebted to Shahparast and denied that he was holding any property belo nging to S hahparas t except: to the extent that [S hahparas t] might be sa id to have a property interest in the related files and papers Respondent was holding in connection with his representation of Shahparast in several cases. Upon re ceipt of the A nswer, N alls sent Respondent a letter dated November 1, 2010, expressing his disagreement with the contents of the Answer. Nalls pointed out in the letter that the Garnishment would apply to an un-matu red debt and the Chose in Action, or claim of Mr. Shahpa rast and Foreclosure Real Estate Services, Inc./Royal Investment Group, LLC versus John M offett. On Novem ber 19, 201 0, Respo ndent wrote to Nalls. Of relevance to this case is R esponde nt s represen tation that: At the moment I do not hold any funds or other p rope rty of the judgment debtors. . . . Should any 8 funds come into my possession that are subject to the garn ishment I will, of course, honor the C ourt s Order. I am handling the Moff ett case on a c ontingent b asis and w ill assume that all an attaching creditor is entitled to are those fun ds that I would be distributing to my clients. On November 22, 2010, Nalls filed a Plaintiff s R eply to Garnishee s Answer. At that point the proceedings became contested pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-645. On November 24, 2010, Responden t filed a Garnishee s Re sponse to Plaintiff s Reply to Garnishee s Answer. Du e to the repre sentation in Responden t s letter of November 19, 2010, Nalls did not request a trial date since he believed the matter to be unc ontested if Respondent received f unds in C ivil 320660 . It was his understanding that the W rit of Garnishment and Charging Order remained in effect. On February 23, 2011, a written Settlement Agreement and Release was entered into between the Shahparast parties and Mr. M offett, wh ich resulted in dismissal of: (a) the Maryland legal malpractice case against Mr. Moffett, (b) the legal fee claim bro ught by M r. Moffe tt against Sha hparast, his wife, and Royal, (c) the D.C. legal malpractice case against M r. Moff ett, and all currently known or unknown claims, causes of action, and/or grievances. . . and all claims of any kind known to law, whether or not they are in the contemplation of the parties at the present time and whether or not they may arise following the execution of this release. . . for the sum of $107,500. The written Settlement Agreement and Release identified as Releasors Shahparast and Royal. Although Homa Ravanbakhsh was me ntioned in th e docum ent as agree ing to certain conditions, she was not identified as a Releasor, nor was there a signature line for her to sign. There is only one signa ture on the Settlement Agreement that of Shahparast. Above the signature line is the following: Releasors Sean Shahparast and Royal Investment Group, L.L.C. The Settlement Agreement was drafted by Mr. Roth. Respondent described the document as a mess, but, for reasons covered by privilege, the document was not corrected. 9 On Feb ruar y 24, 2011, Respondent received from counsel for the malpra ctice insuran ce carrier fo r Moff ett two checks totaling $107,500 in payment of the settlement addressed in the Settlement Agreement and Release. One check, in the amount of $95,000, was made payable to Sean Shahparast and Robert N. Levin, Esq. & Roger Simmons, Esq., his attorneys, and included an attachment that stated: Full and complete release and settlement o f the Shah parast M aryland matter re lative to John Moffett. The other check, in the amount of $12,500, was made payable to Sean Shahparast and R obert N . Levin , Esq. & Roger C. Simmons, Esq. and included an attachment that stated: In full and final release of John Moffett in DC matter. There had never been any discussion amongst the parties regarding two checks. Respondent proposed returning the checks, and having the Settlement Agreement redrafted to correct errors in the document, but was unable to do so, for reasons protecte d by attorn ey/client privilege. Instead, Respondent endorsed both checks and gave the check s to Shahpa rast, who delivered them to the Simmons law firm for the necessary further endorsements and deposit of the checks in the Simmons firm trust acco unt. S hortly thereafter, Respondent received a check written on the Simm ons firm s tru st account in the amount of $25,000, which represented Responden t s fee and an amount owed to an expert witness. Respondent did not inform Nalls that he received the checks and did not contact the Court or take any legal action. Nalls continued to monitor the docket entries for the case and contacted defense counsel. N alls was relatively sure that settlement would be reached in Februa ry 2011 or the matter would go to trial on M arch 7, 201 1. Nalls was also assured that the settlement proceeds would bear Responden t s name as well as Shahparast s name. In early March 2011, N alls observe d that lines of dismissal had been entered in Civil 320660 and the other ca se in which Respondent represented Shahpa rast and his w ife. He then wrote to Respondent on March 2, 3 and 4, 2011. As of March 4, 2011, Nalls knew that the case was settled and he wanted Respondent to provide information concerning the settlement. Nalls notified Respondent that he intended to seek legal relief. When he received no resp onse f rom R espon dent, Nalls wrote on March 7, 2011, once again requesting a full accounting, and informed Respondent that he planned to take legal a ction to obta in 10 information related to the settlement from Respondent and Roth. On March 7, 2011, Respo ndent wrote back to Nalls. In this letter Respondent stated: All of the funds from the settlement of all of the cases were paid into the escrow account of the firm handling th e action in the Super ior Court, Gordon & Simmons, and so I never was the recipient of thos e fund s. Thus, your assumption that I was or would be the recipient of the settlement p roceeds is in correct. On March 9, 2011, Nalls filed a Motion for App ropriate Relief (Disclosure of Confidential Documents) and a Motion to Shorten Time for the production of documents pursuant to a Notice of Records Deposition served on Leo Roth and a Request for Production of Documents served on Respondent. After a hearing attended b y Respond ent, Roth a nd Nalls, on March 9, 2011, the Court ordered the production of the documents relating to the settleme nt of the Sh ahparast litigation by 3:00 p.m. on March 16, 2011. The documents were to be disclosed only to Nalls and Bar Counsel. Respondent was served with the Request for Production and Orders in the Courthouse on March 9, 2011. During the hearing before the Honorable R obert Greenberg, Respondent acknowledged that the case had settled and that he and Shahparast had received the checks. On March 10, 2011, Nalls sent a letter to Respondent demanding payment of the judgment. On March 16, 2011, Nalls sent Respondent another letter requesting that Respondent comply with the C ourt orde r prio r to 3 p.m. that d ay. Respondent wrote b ack on Marc h 16, 20 11, and questioned Nalls basis for requesting the documents be produced in less than 30 days and indicated that Shahp arast had the right to review what he intended to produce and assert his privilege. Respondent further indicated that he was gathering the requested docume nts and w ill provide the m once th ey are all assembled and approved by Mr. Shahpa rast which I hope w ill be in the ne xt wee k or so. On March 17, 2011 , Nalls sent R esponde nt a letter confirming that Respondent would provide the requested docume nts by March 21, 2011. Respondent provided some of the requested documentation on March 21, 2011. He did not, however, provide a copy of the Retainer Agreement for the 11 representation of Shahparast. On March 23, 2011, Nalls sent Respondent another letter, requesting this document be provided. On April 8, 20 11, Nalls file d a Mo tion for Summa ry Judgment and Petition for Contem pt on behalf of C reative. In the Petition for Contempt, Nalls asserted that Respondent had failed to obey the Garnishment and Charging Order and had failed to respon d to d iscovery. On April 18, 2011, a Show Cause Order was issued and, on May 5, 2011, Respondent filed Garnishee s Verified Opposition to Motion for Summ ary Judgme nt. On May 19, 2011, a hearing was held before the Honorable Joseph M. Quirk. Judge Quirk found that the funds came into the hands of Respondent on a temporary basis and that Respondent had an obligation to, at least, make [Creative] aware that he had come into this chose, which is in the form of a check, an d that he w as certainly not free to then ma ke simply a transfer with an en dors eme nt to a thir d party . . . Judge Quirk entered judgment against Respondent in the amount owed by the judgment debtor. Although the Court found that Respondent had violated the Orders to produce the documents requested by Nalls, noting that Respondent had not filed for a Protective Order, Judge Quirk did not find Respondent in contempt for failing to produce the docum ents in compliance with the Orders. Judge Quirk took the issue of contempt for not honoring the garnishm ent under a dvisemen t. Subsequently Respondent and Nalls discussed settling the matter. Respondent asked N alls if there w as someth ing he cou ld do to resolve the A ttorney Grieva nce com plaint. Nalls indicated that there w as nothing he could d o about the complain t. Respondent and N alls ente red into a settlem ent, under which Respondent paid (out of his own funds) $40,000 to satisfy the obligati on to C reative. T he debt owed by Shahparast was then assigned to Respondent by Creative. Creative withdrew the motions for contempt and summ ary judgment and, on June 3, 2011, the Court struck the oral grant of summary judgment and allowed N alls to withdra w the mo tion for con tempt. Conclusions of Law Based upon the preceding findings of fact, this Cou rt concludes that Respondent engaged in professional misconduct 12 in violation of the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct ( MRPC ) as discussed below. 1. MRPC Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property). Subsectio n (a) of this rule requires a lawyer to hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer s possession in connec tion with a representation separate from the lawyer s own property and to maintain funds in a separate trust account. Subsection (d) requires a lawyer upon receiving funds or othe r property to which a third person has an interest to pro mptly notify the third person and to pro mptly deliver to th at person any funds or property to which the person is entitled to receive. Subsection (e) requires that if a lawyer is in possession of property in which two or more p ersons claim interests the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. There is clear and convincin g evidenc e that, on or about February 24, 2011, Respondent came into possession of funds or other property in which Shahparast, Roger Simmons, Respondent and Creative had interests: the two checks representing the settlement proceeds from the malpractice cases. The Court finds that Respondent knew that Creative had an interest in the proce eds of the s ettlement. Respondent recognized this interest in his Answer to the Writ of Garnishment and Garnishee s Response to Plaintiff s Rep ly to Garnishee s Answer an d in his letters to Nalls dated November 19, 2010, and March 7, 2011. The Court finds that Respondent knew that Shahparast had an interest in the funds or other prop erty. Shahparast was one of the payees on the checks and Respondent acknowledged during the hearing before Judge Quirk that he knew that Shahparast had an interest in the proceeds of the settlement. The Settlement Agreement was signed by Shahparast on behalf of Sean Shahparast and Royal Investment Group, LLC. Shahparast was a plaintiff, alon g with Royal, in the malpractice case tha t resulted in the settlement. Respondent acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that Royal was the alter ego of Shahparast. Respondent also knew that the Court had charged Shahparast with Royal s interest in the settlement. Instead of holding the funds or other property in trust, Respondent endorsed the checks and turned them over to Shahparast, the judgm ent debtor. This Court find s that Resp ondent vio lated MRPC 1.15(d) because he fa iled t o pro mptly notify Creative of the receipt of 13 the funds and/or property, failed to promptly deliver the funds or other prop erty to Creative a nd did no t promptly render an accounting regarding such property. He did not inform Nalls or the Court that he had received the settlement checks and took no legal action until af ter Nalls filed the Petition for Contempt and Motion for Sum mary Judgm ent. The evidence demons trated that Nalls requested an accounting in his letters to Respondent of March 2 and 3, 2011. Respondent did not provide an accounting for the settlement funds until the Court ordered him to do so. The fact that other parties may have had an interest in the settlement checks an d that the ex act dollar am ount ow ed to Creative may have been in question or dispute did not relieve Respondent of his obligation to Creative. U nder MR PC 1.15(e), Respondent was required to keep the funds or othe r property separate until any dispute was resolved. Respon dent failed to honor this obligation, in violation of M RPC 1.15(e). Respondent testified that he had expected to receive one check in the amount of $107,000 representing the proceeds of both the M aryland and District of Columbia legal malpractice cases. He received two checks instead, one of which was in the amount of $95,000 and the receipt attached to this check indicated that it was for: Full and complete release and settlement of the Shahparast Maryland matter relative to John Mof fett. But whether one or two checks were received is of no importance in determining whether Respondent violated MRPC 1.15 since, even if one check had been received, Respondent would have had the same obligation to hold the funds or other property of the judgment debtor in trust for Creative until the amounts of the various interests were determined. Respondent also testified that he did not want to do anything that would have held up the distribution of the funds representing the settlement in the malpra ctice case an d that it could be reasonably assumed that, had he informed Nalls of the receipt of the settlement checks, Nalls would have taken legal action and that would have delayed the distribution of the settlement proceeds . In his letter to Assistant Bar Counsel dated May 13, 2011 , Respon dent wro te: It is not denied that had I refused to endorse the checks that Payment w ould have been stopped but it would have been stop ped as to parties not subject to the garnishment order as well as Shahparast. Resp ondent s 14 desire to avo id delay in the distribution of the settlement funds does not provide a defense or justification for Respondent s failure to honor his professional and ethical obligations. For the foregoing reasons, there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(d) and (e). The Court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(a) because that rule requires a lawyer to hold pro perty of clients o r third person s separate from the lawyer s own property and to maintain funds in a separate trust account and Respondent did not deposit the settlement p roceeds into any accoun t. In his def ense, Respondent set forth in his Answer and testified at the hearing that he now believes that the Writ of Garnishment served on him in October 2010 was invalid even though there was no Cou rt ruling to that effect. He also testified that he never considered himself su bject to the Charging O rder. Respondent characterized his failure to notify Nalls of the receipt of the settlement checks as a legal mistake. The clear and convincin g evidence demonstrated that Respondent believed the Writ of Garnishment and the Charging Order were valid throughout the times relevant to this matter. Respondent s letters to Nalls and Court filings did not challenge the validity of the Writ of Garnishment. Respondent did not question the validity of the garnishment during the proceedings before Judge Quirk on May 19, 2011, or in his letter of May 13, 2011, to Assistant Bar Counsel. He testified at trial that in 2010 and 2011 he believed h e was ob ligated to ho nor the W rit of Garn ishment. But even if he had believed that the Writ of Garnishment and Charging Order were invalid, Respondent was not free to disregard them. All orders of the Court must be complied with prom ptly. If a person to whom a Court directs an order believes that the order is inc orrect the remedy is to ap peal . Absent a stay, however, he or she must comply promptly with the order pending appea l. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 398-99, 692 A.2d 465, 472 (1997) (an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings). But even conside ring the me rits of Resp ondent s defense, this Court does not find that Respondent has met his burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. 15 Responden t s defense is based on Consolidated Construction Services, Inc. v. Simps on, 372 M d. 434, 4 45, 813 A.2d 260 (2002), which in valid ated garn ishm ents base d on a con tingency. In Consolidated Cons truction , the Court o f Appe als found that under M d. Cod e Ann . Cts. & Jud. Pro c. § 3-305 and Maryland Rule 2-645, the addition of the term contingent in the Rule was a substantive change not in the Statute, and was thus improper. Respondent argued that since he handled the Moff ett litigation based on a con tingent fee, the Writ of Garnishment served on him was invalid. Responden t s reliance on Consolidated Construction appears to be misplaced. First, the problem with Md. Rule 2-645 addressed by the Court of Appeals in Consolidated was corrected in 2003, w hen the offending word contingent was removed. See, list of amendments following M d. Rule 2-645, Vol. 1, 2012 Repl. Vol. By 2010, when the Writ of Garnishment was issued in the underlying case, the rule only referred to any debt owed to the judgment debtor, whether immedia tely payable or unmature d. There is no evidence that the judgment creditor argued that he was entitled to attach a contingent debt or that the Court believed that such a requ est would be prop er. In the Request for Charging Order, Nalls referenced any claims, choses in action, interests in property, funds, settlement proceeds, recoveries, judgments, money, claims, debts owed to Royal Investment Group, LLC whether immedia tely payable or unmatured, or other property of the Defendant, Sean Shahparast and as to Royal Investment Group, LLC. Respondent s fee arrangement with the ju dgment debtor would not make the debtor s interest contingent as described b y the Court of Appea ls in Consolidated. Second, the facts in this case are very different from those in Cons olidated , where the judgment debtor did not contribute to or receive any funds under the terms of the settlement agreeme nt. It was for this reason th at the Court of Appea ls found that the writ of garnishment that was served on the parties to the settlement agreement other than the judgment debtor, the garnishees, were not valid. 372 Md. at 442, 444. Respondent also appea rs to contend th at Nalls was trying to garnish a contingent debt rather than a matured/unmatured debt. A matured d ebt is one in w hich the sum is certain and is due, i.e., matured. An unmatured debt is one in which the sum 16 is certain and the time for payment of the debt has not yet occurred. Generally, a contingent sum is no more than a possibility that a presently unas certainable sum mig ht possibly be owed to the debtor from the person sought to be garnished at some future t ime. 3 72 M d. at 448 -449. T he co ntingen cy, therefore, must relate to the garnishee s liability to the debtor. There is no question that Respondent wou ld be liable to Shahparast in some amount that could be determined and that that liability existed at the time Respondent received the checks representing the settle ment p roceed s. See, e.g., Belcher v. Government Employees Insurance Com pany, 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978); Fico v. Ghing her, 287 Md. 150, 411 A.2d 430 (1980) (an interest w as unma tured, not co ntingent, even though the amount of the liability could not presently be determined, if the amount could be d efinitely ascertained in the future after all disputed claims had b een settled). Maryland Rule 16-757 provides that [a] respondent who asserts an affirmative defense . . . has the burden of proving the defense . . . by a preponderance of the evidence. Respondent has not met his burden in this case with respect to the Writ of Garnishm ent. Respondent has met his burden with respect to the Charging Order, but, for the reasons set forth below, it does not change the Court s conclusions of law. Respondent contends that Mr. Nalls improperly served the Charging Order on him by using M aryland Rule 2-649(a) to recover Shahparast s interest in Royal, LLC. Rule 2-649(a) provides that a Charging Order is requested by a judgment creditor of a partner . . . , and the Court may issue an order charging the partnership interest of the judgment debtor . . . . Since Royal was an LLC, and not a partnership, the Charging Order was invalid, as a matter of law. Further Maryland Rule 2649(b) requires that the Charging Order be served on a general partner. Because Royal was an LLC, and not a partnership, there was no partner to be served. The Ch arging O rder should have been serv ed on the c ompany s re sident agent, which Respondent was not. Lastly, in R&D 2001, LLC v. Rice, 402 Md. 648, 655 (2008), the Court of Appeals held that a Charging Order cannot ap ply to a member s interest in an LLC. T he Court found that t he prope r pro cedu re fo r garnish ing p rope rty of an LLC w as by garnishm ent. While Respondent may be correct that the Charging 17 Order did not apply to Royal, the crux of Petitioner s charges pertain to the Writ of Garnishment and not the Charging O rder. Even if Responden t or Shahparast had raised objections to the Charging Order, it would not have d ischarged Respo ndent s obligations u nder the W rit of Garn ishment. 2. MRPC Rule 3.4(c). This rule provides that a lawyer shall not disobey the rules of a tribunal. Respondent was obligated under the rules of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to honor th e Writ of Garnishment and Charging Order to hold the pro perty of the judgment creditor, subject to further proceedings. As indicated above, he failed to honor these Orders, thereby violating MRP C 3.4(c). R esponde nt clearly knew about the obligation and represented to the Court and judgment creditor s counsel that he would honor the Writ of Garnishment and Charging Order. He did not raise objections with the Court to either the Writ of Garnishment or Charging Order or otherwise assert that no valid obligations existed. In response to the Attorney Grievance Commission complain t, Respondent asserted that he never had the actual settlement funds in h is possession and contro l because h e did not deposit the checks. But the fact that Respondent did not deposit the check s does not m ean that the f unds w ere not in his possession. The Writ of Garnishment provided that Respondent was to hold the property of the judgment debtor s ubject to further proceedings of the Court. The fact that Respondent endorsed the checks, and turned the check s over to Shahpa rast, demonstrates that he considered the checks and the settlement proceeds represented by the checks to be Shahparast s prop erty. Although Respondent failed to comply with the Order of the Court to produce the settlement d ocumen ts to Nalls prio r to 3:00 p.m. on March 16, 2011, this Court does not find that to be a violation of Rule 3.4(c) because Respondent informed Nalls that he could not produce the documents in that time frame and asked for addition al time. Nalls a greed to ad ditional time and Respondent supplied what he had at a later date. 3. MRP C Rule 4.1. Subsection (a) of this rule provides that a lawyer shall not knowin gly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third perso n or fail to disclose a material fact when d isclosure is ne cessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client. Petitioner argues that Respondent made false statements in v iolation of R ule 4.1(a) w hen he did 18 not keep his promise to Nalls to honor the Writ of Garnishment and when he wrote in a letter to Nalls that he was not the recipient of settlement proceeds. This Court does not find by clear and conv incing evid ence that the se acts cons titute false statements of material fact or law p ursuant to Rule 4.1(a). In order for the letter that Respondent wrote to Nalls stating that he would honor the Writ of G arnishment to be a f alse stateme nt, there would h ave to be e vidence th at when R esponde nt wrote the letter he had no intention of honoring the Writ. That fact has not been established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Respondent changed his mind or somehow believed that he was not obligated to honor the Writ at the time that he received the settlement checks does n ot mak e the lette r, when written , a knowin gly false stateme nt. With respect to the letter to Nalls indicating that Respondent was not th e recipient of settlement proceeds, the Court finds that Respondent interpreted the garnishment order in a way such that because he endorsed the checks and did not deposit them into his trust account, then the funds did not come into his possession. Although this interpretation may have been erroneous, this Court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that Respo ndent made a false statem ent by this assertion. 4. MRPC Rule 8.4 (Miscondu ct). This rule makes it professional misconduct to engage in conduct involving dish onesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [subsection (c)] or to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice [subsection (d)]. In Maryland, a finding of deceit an d misrepre sentation in violation of MR PC 8.4(c ) must be found to be intention al. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Clem ents, 319 Md. 289, 298, 572 A.2d 1 74, 179 (1990). A misrepresentation is made when the attorney knows the statement is false and cannot be the product of mistake, misunde rstandin g or ina dverten ce. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Siskin d, 401 Md. 41, 68-69, 930 A.2d 328 (2007). As stated in section 3 above, there is no clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly made false statements, thereby acting dishonestly. There is also no clear and convincing evidence that Respondent intentionally made misrepresentations. Accordingly, the Court does not find that Responden t violated Rule 8.4(c). 19 Moreover, although th is Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rules 1.15(d) and (e) and 3.4(c), it does not automatically follow that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) as well. In Attorney Grievance v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 842 A.2d 42 (2004), the Court of A ppeals held that the attorney s failure to notify a bank, which was the thirdparty assignee/creditor of his client, of the receipt of settlement funds and to timely pay the assignment, violated Rule 1 .15(b). The attorney in Stolarz contended that his failure to pay off the bank loan at the time of settlement was an innocent error. The Court of Appea ls rejected this a rgumen t, noting that: We do not accept the implication of Stolarz s argument that Rule 1.15 contains an innocent error safe harbor exception. This Court has explained on numerous occasions that with regard to Rule 1.15 an unintentional violation of this rule . . . is still a violation of the attorney s affirm ative du ties imp osed b y the rule. 379 Md. at 399 (citations omitted). Accord ingly, while inten t is not a factor in determining whether there has been a violation of Rule 1.15 or Rule 3.4, it is a factor in determining whether an attorney kno win gly en gaged in conduct involving disho nesty, fraud, deceit or m isrepresenta tion. Such in tent is not pres ent in this case. The Court also does not f ind clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d). Every mistake that a lawyer makes, broken promise or wrong interpretation of the law does not rise to con duct that refle cts negatively on the legal profes sion. Cf. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Rose, 391 Md. 1 01, 892 A.2d 469 (2 006) (attorn ey found to v iolate Rule 8.4(d) where he failed to promptly, completely and truthfully respond to Bar C ounsel an d failed to d iligently represent client); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 920 A.2d 458 (2007) (atto rney violated R ule 8.4(d) where h e left courtro om wh ile judge was announcing his opinion); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hall, 408 Md. 306, 969 A.2d 953 (2009) (attorney violated Rule 8.4(d) whe re he had a sexual relationsh ip with his client). Mitigating Factors 20 Respondent has proven the follow ing mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence: 1. Absence of a prior disciplinary record. In the 47 years Respondent has been in practice, he has never been sanctioned by any Court. 2. Absence of dishonest or selfish motive. Respondent did not stand to benefit in any wa y from the error he has acknow ledged. Nalls testified that Respo ndent s claim for his contingent fee took priority over the judgment lien. Respondent would have received his legal fee without regard to the garnishment issue. He did not act to obtain any benefit for which he was not entitled. 3. Cooperation with B ar Coun sel and this C ourt. Respondent has been fully responsive and cooperative in a timely manner. Remedial Action It is undisputed that Respondent used $40,000 of his own funds to make th e judgme nt creditor w hole, well before Bar Counsel took any action. Conclusion For the fore going r easons , the Circuit Court for Montgom ery County, Maryland, on this 31st day of October, 2012, finds that Respondent Robert Norman Levin has violated the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Profes sional Conduct 1.15 (d), 1.15(e), and 3.4 (c). The Court further finds that Respondent has established mitigating factors and that he took remedial action. (Internal footnotes omitted). This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings in Maryland. Attorney Grievance v. Seltzer, 424 Md. 94, 112, 34 A.3d 498, 509 (2011), quoting Attorney Grievance v. Stern, 419 Md. 525, 556, 19 A.3d 904, 925 (2011). We review de novo the circuit court judge s conclusions of law. Rule 1621 759(b)(1). In our independent review of the record, we accept the hearing judge s findings of fact as prima facie correct unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance v. Chapman, 430 Md. 238, 273, 60 A.3d 25, 46 (2013), quoting Attorney Grievance v. Lara, 418 Md. 35 5, 364, 14 A.3d 6 50, 656 (2011). Both Levin and Bar Counsel filed exceptions that require an introductory discussion of the nature and validity of Creative s garnishment interest in the legal malpractice settlement proceeds. Section 3-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.)8 and Rule 2-6459 govern the garnishm ent o f pro perty. Consolidated Construction Services, Inc. v. Simpson, 372 Md. 434, 447, 813 A.2d 260, 268 (2002). Section 3-305 and Rule 2-645(a) permit attachment on unmatured interests. Contingent interests, however, are not garnishable under Maryland law. Consolidated Construction, 372 M d. at 448 , 813 A .2d at 26 8. 8 At the time the Writ of Garnishment was issued in 2010, Section 3-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.) provided: An attachment may be issued against any property or credit, matured or unmatured, which belong to a deb tor. The language of Section 3-305 remains unchanged. Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.) § 3-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 9 Rule 2-645(a) (2010) provided: (a) Availability. This Rule governs the garnishment of any property of the judg ment debtor, other than wages su bject to Rule 2-646 and a partnership interest subject to a charging order, in the hands of a th ird person for the purpose of satisfying a money judgmen t. Property includ es any debt ow ed by the judgment debtor, whether immediately payable or unmatured. The lan guage pertinen t to this op inion re mains u nchan ged. 22 An unmature d interest, in this regard, is an interest in which the amount of the garnishee s liability may be uncertain, but there is no question about liability. Belcher v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 282 M d. 718, 7 24 n.3, 3 87 A.2 d 770, 7 74 n.3 (1978). A con tingent interes t, on the other hand, is on e in which liability is not certain and absolute, but depends on some independent event, such as a finding of liability in a pending lawsu it. Id. The Writ of Garnishment in this case wa s issued on October 8, 2010. Levin was served w ith the Writ late r that month before a finding of liability or settlement of the legal malpractice case, whic h did not o ccur until February 23, 2011. Thus, at the time Levin was served with the Writ of Garnish ment, liability under the Writ to the judgme nt debtor was contingent on the outcome of the legal malpractice case. At the time the Writ was issued, then, the legal malpractice claim was n ot garn ishable under M aryland la w. Consolidated Construction, 372 M d. at 447 -48, 81 3 A.2d at 268. In his exceptions, Levin initially asse rts that Nalls sh ould have reported to the court from the inception of the garnishment action that the interest was contingent because, he asserts, the court may not have issued the Writ of Garnishment. In the alternative, he asserts, if Nalls was unaware that the debt was contingent when he requested the garnishment, upon reading the Consolidated decision in M arch of 20 11, Nalls sh ould have reported to the court that the W rit of G arnishm ent wa s invalid or shou ld have withdr awn th e Writ. According to Judge B urrell s Findin gs of Fac t, howeve r, Nalls argued that interest was subject to garnishm ent as an un matured d ebt. Nalls testifie d, in fact, that even after 23 reviewing the Consolidated Construction decision, his position regarding the debt at issue being unmatured, rather than contingent, had not changed. Albeit incorrect, Nalls belief went unchallenged throughout the garnishment proceeding. More im portantly, wha t Nalls believed or did is not relevant to our task of determining whether Levin violated the Rules of Profe ssional C onduc t. See Attorney Grievance v. Ellison, 384 Md. 688, 705, 867 A.2d 259, 269 (2005 ). Levin also argues that Bar Counsel should not have proceeded against Levin upon receipt of a detailed letter in March of 2012 from Levin s counsel addressing the Consolidated Construction decision and the invalidity of the Writ. Bar C ounsel s position, however, with which we agree, is that the validity of the Writ of Garnishment does not control our consideration of whether Levin violated the Rules of Professional Cond uct. Cf. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garland, 345 M d. 383, 398-99, 692 A.2d 465, 472-73 (1997 ). Levin excepts also to the Findings because, he asserts, they failed to refer to the fact that on June 10, 2011, Judge Quirk wrote to Bar Counsel to inform him that the grant of Summary Judgment was stricken and the Petition for C ontempt w as withdra wn, presu mably indicating that Judge Quirk found Levin had not acted in bad faith or violated any Rules of Professional Conduct. Levin s exception, however, misstates what the documents introduced at the hearing reveal. Judge Quirk s letter to Bar Counsel did state that the Motion for Summary Judgment and Petition for Contempt were withdrawn in the garnishment case, but the purpose of this letter was to report potential disciplinary rule violations by Levin. 24 Levin next exce pts to the hearing judge s omission of some of his proposed findings of fact submitted after the disciplinary proceeding. We have, however, noted that proposed findings are just that, proposed, and a hearing judge is under no obligation to accept proposed findings. See Attorney Grievance v. Joseph, 422 M d. 670, 6 96, 31 A .3d 137, 153 (2011 ); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Keister, 327 M d. 56, 60 n.9, 607 A.2d 9 09, 911 n.9 (1992). Levin finally excepts to the Findings by arguing that Bar Counsel failed to meet his burden of pro of. See Rule 16-757(b ).10 We deny this exception because the hearing judge found that Levin was served with the Writ; that Levin believed it to be valid throughout the garnishment proceedings; that Levin d id not open ly challenge the Writ through the regular channels of motions and appeal; that, thereafter, upon settlement of Shahparast s legal malpractice claim, Levin received two checks; that when Levin received these checks, he knew that two or more persons claimed an interest in them, but did not keep those funds separate until the dispute between those parties was resolved; and that Levin, in violation of the Writ of Garnishment that had gone unchallenged, endorsed those checks and handed them over to his clien t. These fin dings we re not clearly erro neous an d were su fficient to 10 Rule 16-757 in pertinent part provides: (b) Burdens of proof. The petitioner has the burden of proving the averments by clear and co nvincin g evide nce. A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence. 25 support the Rules violations discussed herein. Levin excepts to the conclusion that he violated Rule 1.15(d), which states: (d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person ha s an interest, a law yer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreem ent with the clien t, a lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds or other property the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, sha ll render prom ptly a full acco unting re gard ing s uch prop erty. According to Levin, [s]ince the W rit of Garnishment w as invalid under Consolidated, the third party (Creative ) had no in terest in the funds, so there was no obligation to notify and deliver the fun ds, or provide an accountin g. Rule 1 .15 does n ot define w hat interest in property is sufficient to trigger Lev in s duty to turn o ver wha t otherwise would b e his client s proper ty to Crea tive. An inter est in prop erty, albeit in diffe rent contex ts, is generally defin ed as a legitim ate claim of entitle ment to that pro perty. See Board of Regents o f State Colleg es v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S. Ct. 27 01, 2709 , 33 L. Ed. 2 d 548, 56 1 (1972); Reese v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 177 Md. App. 102, 155 , 934 A.2d 1009, 10 40 (2007 ). Rule 1.15(d), although silent as to the definition of interest, suggests in its terms that a third party s entitlement to funds is a mandato ry prerequisite to disbursement by explaining that the lawyer shall deliver promptly to the . . . third person any funds or other property that the . . . third person is entitled to receive. (em phasis add ed). Entitlem ent, then, is the dispositive concern. Attorney Grievance v. Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 157, 879 A.2d 58, 78 (2005) 26 (attorney violated former Rule 1.15(b), now 1.15(d), by failing pay creditors the monies they were entitled to receive . . . . (emphasis added)); Ellison, 384 Md. at 709-10, 867 A.2d at 271-72 (former Rule 1.15 (b), current Rule 1.15(d), implicated where attorney subject to a valid assignment); Attorney Grievance v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 400, 842 A.2d 42, 49 (2004) ( As the assignment between the client and creditor gave the creditor an enforceab le interest in the procee ds of the se ttlement, [attorney s] know ledge of th e agreem ent is sufficie nt to raise ethical duties to the creditor. (emphasis add ed)). At the time the Writ of Garnishment was issued, Cre ative was n ot entitled to a portion of the malpractice claim, because, as a contingent interest, it was n ot garn ishable . Consolidated Construction, 372 Md. at 447-48, 813 A.2d at 268. Receipt of the funds by Levin pursuant to the settlement, months after the Writ of Garnishment was served, did not render enf orceable a Writ that w as unenf orceable when issued. Cf. United States v. Williams, 279 Md. 673 , 679, 370 A.2d 1 134, 1137 (197 7). Levin s agreement to turn over the malpractice funds after the Writ was issued also did not alter the W rit s u nenforc eabi lity. As a result, we sustain L evin s exception to the conclusion that he violated Rule 1.15 (d). Levin also argues, however, that his conduct did not violate Rule 1.15(e), which provides: (e) When a lawyer in the c ourse of re presenting a client is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the law yer) claim interests , the property sha ll be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall distribute promptly all portions of the property as to which interests are not in dispute. 27 Property that is disputed under Rule 1.15(e) is substantially different than property to which a third party is entitled u nder Ru le 1.15(d). L evin clearly violated Rule 1.15(e) because he knew of the c laim file d by Cre ative. When Levin received the checks for $107,500 in settlement of the legal malpractice claim, he acknowledged that Creative had filed a claim as an attaching creditor : Should any funds co me into m y possession th at are subjec t to the garnish ment I w ill, of cou rse, hon or the C ourt s O rder. I am handling the [legal malpractice] case on a contingent basis and will assume that all an attaching creditor is entitled to are those funds that I would be distributing to my client. (Empha sis added). Although acknowledging the dispute between Creative and his client regarding the legal malpractice funds, Levin did not sep arate those f unds pen ding its resolution, but instead endorsed the checks and forward ed them to his client in violation of Rule 1.15(e). Levin further excepts to the conclusion that he violated Rule 3.4(c) because, according to him, he ha d no duty to res pond to th e Writ, exce pt by his disavowal of its validity by the transmission to his client of the disputed funds. Rule 3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not know ingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists. Open refusal is not defined in the Rule, but commentators have suggested that such a refusal is good faith and open noncompliance in order to test an order s validity. 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 30.9, at 30 -21 (3d ed . 2001, 201 1 Supp.); see also In the Disciplinary Matter Involving Ford, 128 P.3d 178, 180-82 (Alaska 2006). The breadth of 28 open refusa l need not be e xplore d in the in stant cas e, because Levin never op enly challenged the Writ be cause of th e continge nt interest claim , in any context other than in the instant grievance proceeding. In this regard, L evin s oblig ation was to be open in his refusal to honor the Writ which may have been manifested in a Motio n to Qu ash the Garnis hmen t, see Cole v. Randall Park Holding Co., 201 Md. 616, 625, 95 A.2d 273, 278 (1953) ( A mo tion to quash is a proceeding in the nature of a petition to the Court, without an appearance on the merits of the case, to dismiss the attachment on the ground that the proceedings are defective. The defects, upon which the motion is based, ma y either be apparent upon, or dehors to the procee ding. (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); an Answ er to the W rit challenging the contingent nature of Creative s claim being attache d, see Rule 2-645(e); or an approp riate mo tion, on ce the p roceed ings be came c onteste d, see Rule 2-645(g) (providing that contested garnishment actions shall be governed by the rules applicable to civil actions ). Therefore, we o verrule Levin s exception to the determination that he violated Rule 3.4(c). We turn now to Ba r Counsel s exception. Bar Counsel, citing Attorney Grievance v. Usiak, 418 Md. 667, 18 A.3d 1 (2011) and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 692 A.2 d 465 (19 97), excep ts to the conc lusion that L evin did no t violate Rule 8.4(d) when he knowingly forwarded the procee ds of the leg al malpractic e settlement to his client. Rule 8.4(d) provides tha t [i]t is profe ssional m iscond uct for a lawyer to . . . engage 29 in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.] We have determined that Levin violated R ule 3.4(c) because he did not appropriately challenge the Writ of Garnishment by an open refusal an d did not es crow the funds in dispute in violation of Rule 1.15(e), all of w hich unde rmined fa ith in the adm inistratio n of jus tice. See Usiak, 418 Md. at 688, 18 A.2d at 13; Byrd, 408 Md. at 482, 970 A.2d at 889; Attorney Grievance v. Hermina, 379 Md. 503, 521, 842 A.2d 762, 772 (2004); Garland, 345 Md. at 398, 692 A.2d at 473. Accordingly, Bar Counsel s exception is sustained. Having determined various Rule violations we must now determine the approp riate sanction for Levin. Bar Counsel recommends a 30-day suspension. Levin argues that no sanction should be imposed, or, in the alternative, that a reprimand would be appropriate. The goal of impo sing sanctio ns in attorney grie vance ca ses is to protec t the public. Chapman, 430 Md. at 277, 60 A.3d at 49. The g oal is not to punish an offend ing a ttorn ey. Id. We have also noted that [t]he public is protected when sanctions are imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed. Attorney Grievance v. Stinson, 428 Md. 147, 196, 50 A.3d 1222, 1251 (2012), quoting Attorney Grievance Commission v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997 ). In imposin g sanctions , we will consider the nature of the ethical duties violated in light of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Attorney Grievance v. Paul, 423 Md. 2 68, 284 , 31 A.3 d 512, 5 22 (20 11). As mitigation, Judge Burrell found that Levin, in 47 years of practice, has never been sanctioned by any court, that Levin did not act with a selfish or dishonest motive, and that 30 Levin had fully coo perated w ith Bar C ounse l during the disc iplinary pr oceed ing. Moreover, Judge Burrell fou nd that Le vin took remedial action by paying Creative $40,000 of his own money, well before Bar Counsel took any action against him. In arguing that a 30-day suspension is appropriate, Bar Counsel points to Usiak, 418 Md. 667, 18 A.3d 1, and Garla nd, 345 Md. 383, 692 A.2d 465, where we imposed suspensions on attorneys for violating court orders, and distinguishes Attorney Grievance v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 920 A.2d 458 (2007) and Attorney Grievance v. Hermina, 379 Md. 503, 842 A.2d 762 (2004), in which we imposed reprimands for violating court orders or direct command s of the court. In Usiak, 418 Md. at 691, 18 A.3d at 15, we imposed a 60-day suspension for a flagrant violation of a court order to remain in the courtroom when Usiak showed no remorse and was adamant that if presented with the same situation again, his actions would be the same. Garland, 345 Md. at 399, 692 A.2d at 473, effected an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in six months because Garland showed an utter disregard for the laws of this State, had multiple alcohol related driving convictions, and, despite a serious alcohol problem, he continuously disregarded rehabilitation attempts. By contrast, in Mahone, 398 Md. at 271, 920 A.2d at 466, we reprimanded Mahone for conduct that was disruptive in court, but took into consideration that his client was not prejudiced as a result of his conduct and Mah one had no prior d isciplinary record. In Hermina, 379 M d. at 522, 842 A.2d at 773, we reprimanded an attorney for, among other violations, refusing to honor a court s discovery order and considered, in imposing a reprimand, that he had no prior disciplinary history and a reco rd of engaging in pro bono 31 activities. Levin s conduct, sa nctionable as we have discussed, is mitigated by his unblemished 47-year record as an attorney, his recomp ense of $40,000 to Creative, and his coop eration with Bar Counsel. A public reprimand is the appropriate sanction. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COST S AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING C O S T S O F A L L T R A N SC R IP T S, PURSUANT TO MARYLA ND RUL E 16 761, F O R WHICH SU M JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMM ISSION AGAINST ROB ERT NOR MA N LE VIN . 32 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 10 September Term, 2012 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ROBE RT NO RMA N LEV IN Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Adkins Barbera McD onald JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J. Filed: July 2, 2013 This is an odd situation. Respondent s alleged misconduct occurred in connection with his failu re to distribute proceeds of a settlem ent to his client s judgment creditor who filed a writ of garnishment. Under the Maryland law, howeve r, the settlement proceeds w ere not garnishable. Nevertheless, the Majority holds Respondent responsible for violating Rules 1.15 (e) and Rule 3.4(c). B ecause, as th e Majority ack nowled ges, there w as nothing in Responden t s hands that was subject to garnishment, I w ould not fin d Respo ndent in violatio n of tho se two rules. The Writ of Garnishment in this case required Respondent to hold the property of the judgment Debtor named above subject to further proceedings in this Court. Under Consolidated Construction Services, Inc. v. Simpson, 372 Md. 434 , 813 A.2d 260 (2002), however, the settlement proceeds that came to Responden t s possession were not garnishable. The M ajority concede s as much : At the time the W rit of Garn ishment w as issued, C reative was not entitled to a portion of the malpractice claim, because, as a contingent interest, it w as not g arnisha ble. Receipt of the funds by Levin pu rsuant to the settlement months after the Writ of Garnishment was served did not render enforceable a Writ that was unenfor ceable when issu ed. Levin s agreeme nt to turn over the malpractice funds after the Writ was issued also did not alter the W rit s u nenforc eabl ility. Maj. S lip Op. a t 27 (cita tions om itted). Since the settlement proceeds were not the judgment creditor s property, were not subject to garnishment, and were not covered by the Writ of Garnishment, I do not see how Respondent could have violated Rules 1.15(e) or 3(4)(c). Rule 1.15(e) provides: When a lawyer in the course of representing a c lient is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The Majority ma intains that L evin clearly viola ted Rule 1.15(e) because he knew of the claim filed by C reative. Maj. S lip Op. a t 28. I disa gree. Comment 5 to Rule 1.15 provides th at [a] law yer may have a duty under ap plicable law to protect . . . third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, but that duty arises when there is a lawful claim against the funds and when the third-party claim is not frivolous under applicable law . If that is so, the la wyer indeed must refu se to surrender the funds or property to the client until the claims are resolved. Id. But when there is clear law that renders the writ of garnishment invalid, the lawyer has no such o bligation. Ev en if Levin was under the m is-impression that Creative had a valid interest in settlement funds, but that he could evade his obligations under Rule 1.15 so long as he never deposited or cashed the checks, the fact remain s C reative had no valid cla im to the funds. With no valid claim, we should not hold the lawyer responsible for a violation of Ru le 1.15( e). Neither did Levin violate R ule 3.4 (c). That rule p rovides tha t A lawyer s hall not: . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists. We all agree that Creative was not entitled to a portion o f the malp ractice claim, b ecause, as a contingen t interest, it was not 2 garnish able. Maj. Slip Op. at 27. Thus, the Writ of Garnishment was inva lid, and Lev in did not disob ey an obligation by forwa rding the se ttlement che cks to the D.C. firm. See In re Conduct of Tamblyn, 695 P.2d 902, 906 (Or. 1985) (finding no violation of a disciplinary rule because the preliminary injunction without a bond only seemed to be an order and was in truth no order at all. When Tamblyn advised his clients to disobey th e order . . . th ere wa s no or der to d isobey. ). To be sure, Respondent may not have had an altogether pure heart, in that his goal was to keep the settlement funds away from his clients creditors, and to do so secretly. But the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings is clear and convincing evidence . Md. R ule 16-757(b). I cannot find my way to a conclusion that a lawyer commits misconduct just because he had b ad intent to v iolate a rule in a situation, when examination of clear precedent reveals that the rule does not apply in the first place. See C onsol. C onstr. S ervs., Inc., 372 M d. at 434, 813 A.2d at 260. We should always keep in mind the serious consequences for an individual lawyer as we impose even the lowest form o f discip line. A reprimand imposed on a good lawyer can have a profound im pact on his repu tation, a commo dity that is irreplaceable. As the old saying goes, It takes a lifetime to build a good reputation, but you can lose it in a minute. In conclusion, I would not find Res ponden t violated any of the Rules w ith which he was charged, and accordingly would dismiss the Petition. 3

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