Friedman v. Hannan

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HEADNOTE: Lydia Friedman, et al. v. Jerome B. Hannan, No. 3, September Term, 2009 ESTATES A ND TRU STS - ESTATES AND TR USTS ART ICLE SECTIO N 4105(4) - REVOCATION OF WILL PROVISIONS FOLLOWING DIVORCE PROVISIONS RELA TING TO THE SPO USE Decede nt s will prov ided for se veral nam ed family me mbers of his ex-wif e to inherit a portion of his estate. Decedent was married when he drafted the will, and did not revise it, even after his subsequent divorce. The language of Section 4-105(4) of the Estates & Trusts Ar ticle, howev er, automa tically revokes, up on divorc e, any provision of a will relating to the spouse[.] Use of the broad term relate allows for a flexible application of the statute , and thus rev ocation of bequests is n ot always limited to the ex-sp ouse. It is the duty of the trial court, as trier of fact, to effectuate the testator s intent. Based on the terms of the will and the circumstances surrounding its execution, the trial court must ascertain whether the testator in creating the provision was primarily motivated by the marriage or whether the testator had independent reasons for the bequest. Here, the trial court s find ing that De cedent did not have a relationship w ith the family m embers o f his ex-wife outside of the marriage, and w ould not have includ ed them in his will if it were not for his union w ith their relative was supported by the ev idence. The court did n ot err in declaring the bequest to the wife s family members void. Circuit Co urt for Baltim ore City Case No. 24-C-07-004235 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 3 September Term, 2009 LYDIA FRIEDMAN, ET AL. v. JEROME B. HANNAN Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Adkins Barbera, JJ. Opinion by Adkins, J. Filed: January 14, 2010 In this case we interpret Section 4-105(4) of Md. Code (1974, 2001 R epl. Vo l.) Estates & Trusts Article ( ET ), which directs that provisions in a will relating to the spouse be revoked upon divorce from that person. We hold that the automatic revocation provision of ET Section 4-105(4) is not limited to bequ ests to a former spouse, and may include bequests to a former spouse s family members. A court should utilize the terms of the will and circumstances surrounding its execution to determine whether a bequest relat[es] to the spouse w ithin the meaning of S ection 4-105(4). On appeal de novo from the Orphans Court for Baltimore City, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City was called upon to construe the will of James Patrick Ha nnan ( Dece dent ). The Decedent was married at the time he executed the will, but was divorced before his death. There is no dispute that a fter the divorce, all testa mentary beq uests mad e to Decedent s former spouse were revoked by operation of ET Section 4-105(4). The question at issue involv es the status o f Deced ent s bequ ests to those surv [iv]ing imm ediate fam ily members of my Wife[.] The former spouse s immediate family members, (Lydia Friedman, Patricia Tolley, B arbara G raves, G enia C overt, K elley G allagher and Kimberly Shike [col lectively, Friedman ]) appealed from the trial court s decision that the marital dissolution revoked their legacies. Th e Court of Specia ls ( CSA ) affirmed, and we, in turn, affirm the intermediate appellate co urt. FACTS & LEGAL PROCEEDINGS The facts in this case are simple and uncontested. On June 5, 1981, James Hannan married Anna Z elinski. 1 No children w ere born to them during the marriag e. At som e point, the two separated, and later d ivorced on February 6, 2 001. As p art of the sep aration, both parties entered into a pr operty set tlemen t agreem ent. Zelinski testifie d that Dec edent me t all of his obligations unde r that agreem ent. 2 Decedent subsequently died on September 10, 2006. He had never remarried. This action involves a will that Decedent executed during his marriage to Zelinski ( the Will ), 3 the relevant provisions of which state: ITEM TWO: I appoint as Executor of this, my Last Will and Testame nt, provided she shall survive me, my Wife, ANNA MAR IE COVE RT HA NNA N. In the event my Wife preceedes [sic] me in death, I appoint m y Brother, KEVIN HANNAN as Executo r of this W ill. ITEM THREE: I give and bequeath to m y Wife, ANN A MA RIE COVERT HANNA N, provided she survives me, all of my posses sions.... ITEM FOUR: Should my Wife, ANNA MARIE COVERT HANNAN, and myself die together by accident or otherwise, the estate is to be handled by LYDIA ELIZABETH COVERT FRIEDMAN and KEVIN HANNAN. All real and personal prop erty, exce pt jew elry belonging to my Wife and myself, be liquidated and proceeds there of [sic] be divide d equally 1 During her ma rriage to Decedent, Ze linski s name was A nna Marie C overt Hannan. 2 Zelinski has willingly relinquished any possible claim against the estate. 3 Decedent executed the Will on April 18, 1986. After signing it in front of two witnes ses, De ceden t hande d it over to Zelin ski s mo ther, Joa n Cov ert, for sa fekee ping. The Will remained in her possession during the remainder of Decedent s life, and it was not located until after his death. 2 between my surviving immediate family members and those surving [sic] immediate family members of my Wife: JEROME B. HANNAN, KEVIN HANNAN, MICHAEL HANNAN, KATHLEEN HAN NAN and DAN IEL HA NNA N, LYD IA ELIZABETH COVERT FRIEDMAN, PATRICIA JO COVERT TOLLEY, BARBARA JANE COVERT, GENIA LOUISE COVERT, and KELLEY ANN FRIEDMAN (said KELLEY is to share her part with her sister KIMBERLY BETH FRIEDM AN). ITEM FIVE: Jewelry belonging to myself shall be given to my Wife if she survives me. If she has preceeded [sic] me in death, it shall go to my brother DANIEL HANNAN, to do with as he wishes. Jewelry belonging to my Wife, is addressed in her own Will. Both parties assume that the Decedent drafted the Will himself, without the aid of legal counsel, although no evidence was presented to confirm that conclusion. Decedent s brother, Jerome B. Hannan ( Hannan ) filed the Will with the Register of Wills, and he was appointed personal representative of the estate.4 On May 16, 2007, the Orphans Court fo r Baltimore City concluded that [t]he rem aining clause [in Item Fo ur] pertaining to distribution provides that certain family members, including [Friedman], are entitled to distribution o nly if the Dec edent died in a comm on disaster w ith his wife[ .] Acc ordingly, the Orph ans Cou rt ordered tha t the Will not be adm itted to proba te, effectively leaving Decedent intestate. Both parties appealed to the Circuit Court, seeking an interpretation of Item Four as 4 Jerome B . Hannan was app ointed as pe rsonal repre sentative of his brother s e state before the discovery of the Will. He remained in that capacity after the Will was found, despite Item Two s provision appointing Kevin Hannan to that position. 3 a residuary clause and a determination as to whether Zelinksi s named fa mily members would inherit under that clause. At trial, Zelinski testified that her named fam ily members were her sisters and two of her nieces. She admitted that Decedent did not know her named family membe rs prior to their m arriage, and that those fa mily members did not live with them during the marriage. Decedent s divorce attorney, Susan Huesman-Mitchell, testified that Decedent was a merchan t marine, an a vocation th at required h im to live away from his wife on a boat for several weeks at a time. The Circuit Court agreed with the parties interpretation of Item Four as a residuary clause, and therefore found that Decedent died testate. T he court the n conside red the W ill as a whole and determined that its provisions relating to the immediate fam ily of Decedent s wife could not be fulfilled because of the divorce. The court issued a written order, ordering that only the immediate family members of the deceased ¦receive the proceeds from the estate[,] and that Friedman be excluded from receiving any proceeds of the estate. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion, and Friedman filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari t o this Court. We granted certiorari to consider the following three questions: 1. Did the trial court err in deciding that the bequ ests to Friedman w ere conditioned on Decedent being married to Zelinski at the time of Decedent s death? 2. Did the trial court err in de ciding that the bequests to Friedman were class gifts and not individual gifts even though the beneficiaries were individually named in the will? 4 3. Did the trial court err in deciding that ET Section 4-105(4) acts to revoke a person s testamentary gifts to his form er spouse s specifically iden tified family members when h is will was executed during his marriage and unchanged after his divorce? We ho ld there w as no er ror, and affirm the Circ uit Cou rt. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(c), where, as here, an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate c ourt will review the case on b oth the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous[.] Md. Rule 8-131(c). The appellate court must consider evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party[.] Ryan v. Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 392, 347 A.2d 834, 835 (1975). If there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings below, those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous. Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 202, 857 A.2d 1109, 1123 (2004) (citation omitted). The trial court s conclusions of law, however, are not entit led to the defere nce of the clea rly errone ous stan dard. See Clancy v. King, 405 Md. 541 , 554, 954 A.2d 1 092, 1099 (200 8). DISCUSSION Neither party argues tha t the Will is invalid or should not be admitted to probate. Moreover, the parties agree that Item Four of the Will fun ctions both a s a simultane ous death clause and a residuary clause in the event that De cedent s wife pred eceased h im. The d ispute is whether the bequest to F riedman in Item Fou r of the W ill survived the divorce of Decedent and Zelin ski. 5 Friedman contends that in Item Four Decedent crafted individual bequests with the intent that those gifts survive any divorce between Decedent and Zelinski. Hannan responds that the bequest to Friedman was contingent upon Decedent being married to Zelinski at the time of his death. Hannan views the bequest as one intended to be a gift to a class, which fails because of the divorce. They also differ on the meaning of ET S ection 4-10 5, with Friedman arguing for a narrow interpretation, and Hannon urging the opposite. The starting point of our analysis will be ET Section 4-105, which sets forth the methods or circumstances under w hich a will may be revoked. Subsection (4) thereof includes div orce as a ca use of disso lution to this ex tent: Divorce or annulment. -- By an absolute divorce of a testator and his spouse or the annulment of the marriage, either of which occurs subseque nt to the execution of the testato r s will; and all provisions in the will relating to the spouse, and only those provisions, shall be revoked unless otherwise provided in the will or decree. (Empha sis added). 5 Both parties agree that the statute applies, and that the case turns on the meaning of relating to the spouse[.] Although neither party co ntends that th is provision is ambiguous, they divide on its meaning. Hannan argues that the phrase provision s in the will 5 When first codified in 1957 as Section 351 of Article 93, the statute did not include div orce and a nnulmen t as part of its en umerated list of accepta ble metho ds to revoke a will. See Md. Cod e (1957), Article 93, § 351 . Effective June 1, 196 4, however, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 106 of the Acts of 1964, which added a new Section 35 1(d), expan ding that list to inc lude abso lute divorce . Although revised sligh tly since that time and recod ified as ET § 4-105(4 ), the subsec tion has rem ained sub stantially uncha nged (o ther than the add ition of a nnulm ent as a c atalyst for r evoca tion) sin ce 196 4. Compare ET § 4 -105(4 ) with M d. Cod e (1957 ), Article 93, § 35 1(d). 6 relating to the spouse mandates revocation when, in the mind of the testator, the connection between the legatees and the ex-spouse is substantial and logica l and that the re is no other basis for a connection[.] Friedman, on the other hand, advances a narrow interpretation, which would apply on ly to bequ ests to or for the d irect ben efit of th e spou se. Maryland has consistently recognized these g uiding principles of statutory interpretation: In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is a lways to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomp lished, or the e vils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statu tory, constitutiona l, or part of the Rules. We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugato ry. If the languag e of the statu te is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute s provisions, and our a nalysis ends. If, ho wever, the language is subject to more tha n one interp retation, or w hen the lan guage is not clear whe n it is part of a larger statutory sch eme, it is ambiguous, and we endeavor to resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute s legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose, as well as the structure of the statute. People s Ins. Coun sel Div. v. Allsta te Ins. Co., 408 Md. 336, 351-52, 969 A.2d 971, 979-80 (2009 ) (quota tion ma rks and citations omitted ). Following these p rinciple s, we sta rt by cons idering the plain mean ing of relate, which is [t]o stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into associatio n with or c onnection with; with to. BLACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 1288 (6th ed. 1990); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 7 2037 (1983) (us ing the Bla ck s Law definition o f relate to in terpret the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 which preempted States from enforcing any law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier). Thus, the ordinary meaning of relate is the existence of a connection between two subjects, not that the two subjects need be the same. See State v. H arrell, 348 M d. 69, 81-82 , 702 A.2d 723, 729 (1997) (statin g that in orde r to qualify under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, the declarant s statement must have some connection with the startling event in order to relate to the startling event.... ) (emphasis added); Trimble v. BNSF Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 916, 922 (D. Neb. 2009) (stating that the definition of relating to was not so narrow as to require that two subjects be identical); Contractors Ass'n v. West Va. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Div. of Pub. Sa fety, et. al., 434 S.E.2 d 357, 36 9 (W. V a. 1993) (se rvices prov ided by Dep artment of Public Sa fety for road patrol, traffic control, etc. were relating to the duties of the Division of Motor Vehicles because the activities of one [agency] ha[d] a bearing on the activities of the other. ). Courts have g enerally tre ated this langua ge as br oadly inc lusive. See Se. Ala. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 572 F.3d 912, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that fringe be nefits -- which are part of the compensation an employee receives for his or her services -- fit comfo rtably within the bro ad me aning o f the term wage -related . ). Like the courts in the cases cited above, we read relating to as a broad term, and hold that the trier of fact, when app lying the statutory language of section 4-105(4) to decide whether a particular bequest is one relating to the spouse, is not limited to bequests to or 8 for the benef it of the spou se. In other w ords, the trier of fact may dete rmine that b equests to other persons n onetheless relate to the spouse. We draw this conclusion b ecause the term relating to means that there is a connection between two subjects, not that the subjects have to be the same. Trimble , 636 F. Supp. 2d at 922 . Fundamental princip les of statutory construction require that we must take care to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage by our inte rpretatio n. People s Ins. Coun sel Div., 408 Md. at 351-52. If the General Assembly had intended Section 4-105(4) to ap ply more n arro wly, it had no reason to use the term relating to. It could have simply said that upon divorce, all provisions in the will for the former spouse are revoked. Its choice not to do this, but instead to use the br oader rela ting to lang uage, mu st be respec ted and en forced by this Court. We are not persuaded by Friedman s argument that [t]he deliberate inclusion of and only those provisions is clear evidence that the legislature intended to limit the scope of [ET Section 4-105(4)] to revoke only those pro visions relating to the form er spouse. This language simply clarifies that the balance of the will remains intact. It adds nothing that would further define or limit th e mean ing of th e phras e relatin g to the s pouse . With such a broadly worded statute, the task of determining, on a case by case basis, whether a particular b equest in a w ill was relate d to the de cedent s fo rmer spou se, falls to the courts. This d ecision is ma de largely by the trial court because it involves a fact-based inqu iry, i.e., determination of the deceden t s intent. When construing a will, the paramount 9 concern of the court is to ascertain and effectuate the testator s expressed intent. Pfeufer v. Cyphers, 397 Md. 643, 649, 919 A.2d 641, 645 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted ). Gen erall y, that intent is gathered from the four corners of the will, with the words of the will give n their plain meaning and import. Id. Where, as here, a will is drawn by a layman, the language used may be given the meaning it would commonly have to a person in his situation[.] Shriner s Hosps. v. Maryland Nat l Bank, 270 Md. 564, 570, 312 A.2d 546, 550 (197 3) (citations om itted). Ordina rily, extrinsic eviden ce is not adm issible to prove the testator s intent unless there is a laten t ambig uity. See Monmonier v. Monmonier, 258 Md. 387, 390, 26 6 A.2d 1 7, 19 (197 0). Yet, wh en ascertain ing that intent, th e court m ay consider the situation of the testator and his relations with the parties to whom he has devised or bequeathed his property[.] Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 180 Md. 336, 339, 24 A.2d 299, 300 (1942). In that regard, the will must be read in the light of the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of its execution. Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. 45, 48, 75 A .2d 126, 128 (195 0). As the trial court in this case pronounced, the duty to ascertain and effectuate a testator s intention is virtu ally ironclad. Adhering to that rule, the Circuit Court determined that Decede nt intended to create tw o classes of legatees: (1) Decedent s surviving immedia te family memb ers, and (2) thos e surviv ing imm ediate f amily me mbers of his w ife. It concluded that because the bequest to his spouse s relatives was conditioned on him being 10 married at his death, the bequest to the second class failed. Our task is to decide whether the Circuit Court s fact findings were clearly erroneous, or it made an error of law. The Circuit Court s decision and Friedman s criticism of it can best be understoo d if we set fo rth the key portio ns in the lang uage of th e Court: Looking at the will itself, taking the decedent s wife out of the will, it is clear that the testator intend ed to create tw o classes of person s to share equally in the proceeds of the estate. The first class of individuals was the decedent s immedia te family members, comprising of five persons. The second class, or grou p, consisted o f six person s, namely his wife s immediate fam ily members. P ersons 5 an d 6; name ly Kelly Ann Friedman, as well as Kelly Beth Friedman, Kelly was to share her p art of the pro ceeds w ith her sister, Kimb erly Beth Friedman. The division her e, looking a t the four co rners of this w ill, indicates an intent to create the two classes of persons as opposed to individual bequests. At the time of his death, the decedent was unmarried. He did not have a wife. Since he did not have a wife, there were no immediate family members of a wife at the time of his death. Absent any evidence to the contrary, this was a condition that the decedent - - that decedent did not contemplate at the time that he s igned the w ill. The condition, namely passing of proceeds to his wife and/or her immediate family members, cannot be fulfilled. I find that the case of Herman v. Ortego, 39 Califo rnia App. 4th, 1529 to be particularly instructive in this case. In that case, which is extremely similar to the case at hand, the cou rt indicated the decisive inquiry is whether or n ot the testator in making the particular gift in question did so with group 11 mindiness. Whether, in other words, he was looking at the body of persons in question a s a whole or a unit, rather than individual members of the group as individuals, if the former they take as a class. According to the holding in that case, the court found that we think it more logical construction to hold that when a testator provides for his spouses children, he normally intends to exclude children of an ex-spo use after diss olution unle ss a contrary intention is indicated else where in the will. We clearly do not have a contrary indication ind icated elsew here in the will. And I also find that - - that consistent with the out of state opinion, this testator clearly made a gift in terms of group mindiness. And I find that as evidence of six individuals on the immedia te - - six immediate family members on the wife s side have to share in half the estate, but only five members of the decedent s immediate family have to share in this - - the estate. Friedman argues that the Circuit Court made an error of law in classifying the Item Four bequest as conditioned on Decedent remaining married to Zelinski at his death. In a related argument, Zelinski contends that the court placed the burden on Petitioners to prove that Decedent actually intended what he unambiguously stated in his will rather than on Respondent to prove that he did not. As these two arguments are intertwined, we address them together. The criteria for a class gift were stated in Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 190 Md. 332, 338, 58 A .2d 649, 652 (194 8): a gift of an aggregate sum (1) to a body of p ersons un certain in number at the time of the gift, (2) to be ascertained at a future time, and (3) who a re all to take in equal or s ome othe r definite 12 proportions; the share of each being dependent for its amount upon the ultimate num ber of persons[.](citations om itted). See also Ma dden v. M ercantile-Sa fe Depos it & Trust Co., 262 Md. 406 , 278 A. 2d 55 (1 971). Friedman argues that the bequest necessarily fails the first criterion for a class gift because (1) there is no way to determine membership for this group without including the names, (2) the number of persons was not uncertain when th e will was drafted[,] and (3) the number of persons could not increase or decrease after the will was drafted. T he legacy also fails the second element, she maintains, because Decedent s gifts were to eleven people[,] a numb er whic h was know n whe n the w ill was d rafted a nd [w as] not g oing to chang e. We do not consider the traditional criteria for class gifts to be disp ositive in this case. These criteria are no more than an interpretive tool often used by courts when analyzing a will. As Maryland courts have held for m ore than a c entury, interpretive tools are ultim ately subordina te to a cou rt s p aram ount inquiry the inten tion of th e testato r. See, e.g., Evans, 190 Md. at 341, 58 A.2d at 653 (canons of construction, including those ab out class gifts, are subordina te to the general rule that the obvious intent of the testator must prevail ); Judik v. Travers, 184 Md. 215, 221, 40 A.2d. 306, 309 (1944) ( It is only when the verbal expressions are of doubtful meaning that the rules or canons of construction may be invoked, and even these rules have no bin ding force, being m ere guides to aid in the discov ery of this all important element of intention. ).6 Mo re im portantly, we must bear in m ind that we are 6 See also, e.g., Johnson v. Swann, 211 Md. 207, 212, 126 A.2d 603, 605 (1956) (continued...) 13 dealing with a statute, ET Section 4-10 5(4), which au tomatically ope rates to revok e certain bequests upon divorce, and the rules of will construction, such as class gifts, must be viewed in that contex t. The trial court did not confin e itself to the trad itional class g ift criteria to construe Decedent s intent. It focused on the divorce context, and found persuasive the rationale of a California case in which the court had to determine whether the testator inten ded to crea te two classes of devisees when he bequeathed his property to my children and my spouse s children who survive me and my issue and my spouse s issue who survive me[, ] and whether those beq uests rema ined valid following a divorc e. See Hermon v. Urteago, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577, 57 9 (Ct. A pp. 199 5). (...continued) ( The answer depends upon the intention of the testator, as gathered from the will and surround ing circum stances, aide d by recogn ized cano ns of con struction. ); Grace v. Thompson, 169 Md. 653, 658, 182 A. 573, 575 (1936)( These rules, naturally, have no binding or exclusive force, but are mere guides to aid in the discovery of what is, wherever the construction of a will is in issue, the supreme law of the case, the intention of the testato r. ); Payne v. Payne, 136 Md. 551, 555, 111 A. 81, 82 (1920) ( [O]f all the cardinal rules governing the interpretation of wills, ... the one to which all othe rs are subordinate, is the rule that the intention of the testator, where that can be ascertained from the language of the will and from the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of the e xecution, m ust control); Martin v. Cook, 129 Md. 195, 199, 98 A. 489, 490 (1916) ( All rules...are but aids for arriving a t the intention of the testator.... ); Branson v. Hill, 31 Md. 181, 188-89 (1869) ( It is then to the instrument itself to which we must at last resort in order to ascertain its true meaning, and if this can be done, reference to rules often arbitra ry...will be altogethe r unneces sary. ); Tayloe v. Mosher, 29 Md. 443, 450 (1868) ( T he intention is certainly, in every cas e, the object o f ascertainm ent; but, wherever there is doubt and difficulty, the Courts must resort for aid to settled rules of construction. ). 14 The California court held that the testator intended to create two groups of legatees because the words my spouse s children and my spouse s issue were used without naming any individuals, signaling the testator s paramount intent to describe the beneficiaries as members of a group identified by familial ties. Id. at 581. In so holding, the co urt stated: The decisive inquiry is whether or not the testato r, in making the particular gift in question, did so with gro upmind edness , whether, in other words, he was looking to the body of persons in question as a whole or unit rather than to the individual members of the group as individua ls; if the former, they take as a class. Id. at 580.7 This approach to ascertaining intent of the decedent is consistent with Maryland common law, and we do not agree with Friedman s contention that the Circuit Court erred when it utilized the approa ch in determ ining wh ether the be quest in Item Four was related to the D ecede nt s for mer sp ouse f or purp oses of ET Se ction 4- 105(4 ). As we indica ted above , a court may consider the relationships between the testator and his beneficiaries when investig ating int ent. See Robinson, 180 Md. at 339, 24 A.2d at 300. 7 Other jurisdictions have also utilized the groupmindedness doctrine or similar rules. See Ran d v. Thwe att, 261 S.W.2d 77 8, 779 (Ark. 1953 ); Krog v. Hafka, 109 N.E.2d 213, 21 8 (Ill. 1952); Hardin v. Crow, 222 S.W .2d 842, 84 4 (Ky. 1949 ); Sutherlan d v. Flaher ty, 298 N.E.2d 869, 871 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973) ( In the construction of wills the te st of the existe nce of a c lass is not wh ether the pe rsons nam ed form, in fact, a class by objective definition, but whether, subjectively, the testator considered them as such. ); In re Brow n s Estate, 36 N.W .2d 912, 91 3 (Mich . 1949); Estate of Frailey, 625 S.W.2d 241, 24 3-44 (Mo. C t. App. 1981); Jones v. Le wis, 44 N.E.2 d 735, 74 1 (Ohio C t. App. 1941) ( When there is a gift to a number of persons who are united or connected by some c omm on tie, an d it is clea r that the testator w as look ing to th e body as a who le ... the gift may be construed as o ne given to them as a class. ). 15 Thus, the trial court did no t err in conside ring the tenu ous nature of Dece dent s relation ship to his spouse s family in concluding that Decedent would not have inten ded that be quest to survive a divorce. In this vein, there was testimony before the court that indicated that Decedent did not know Z elinski s family members prior to marrying her, and that during a large po rtion of the ma rriage h e was e mployed at sea. We are not persuaded by Fried man s arg ument tha t the Circuit C ourt errone ously reversed the burden of proving that the gift to his wife s relatives was conditioned on the continuance of the marriage. We interpret ET Section 4-105(4) to be similar to a burdenshifting law. We conclude that in creating the automatic revocation of will provisions relating to a former spouse, the General Assembly recognized two pertinent features of divorce. First, divorce usually results in a separation of assets that were jointly owned, thus reducing each spo use s assets a vailable to be queath to h is or her ow n family. Second, divorce is often acrimonious, with the acrimony spilling o ver to the form er sp ouse s fa mily. Also, it is common in w riting wills during a marriage that two sp ouses divid e their assets between their respective family members because they have agreed that is fair. Even without acrim ony, this viewp oint is likely to change upon divorce. In enacting Section 4-105(4), the Legislature created a rem edy to avoid u nintended consequ ences for p eople wh o neglect to change their wills upon divorce. For these reasons it is permissible for an Orphans Court or circuit court to find that a will provision is relating to the form er spouse w ithin the meaning of Section 4-105(4) 16 if it considers that the provision w as primarily motivated by the marriage or given at the request of the spouse. As we mentioned above, a testator may provide for the children of a spouse simply because each spouse agrees to benefit the other s family, without any indepe ndent d esire to d evise p roperty to those c hildren . 8 On the o ther hand, a court could find that a b equest did n ot relate to the spouse when the evidence shows that the testator formed a close personal relationship with the le gatee and likely desired to p rovide for him or her regardless of whether the marriage continued.9 Decedent s naming of the individu als included in the bequ est to his wife s relatives, in addition to referring to them by a group name, does not foreclose a finding that Decedent viewed them as a g roup of p ersons w ho wou ld only inherit if he remained married. See Cryder v. Garrison, 128 A.2d 76 1, 764 (Pa . 1957) (ho lding that a court may find a class gift where class members are individually named in the will when the testator intended to create a class gift). Th e Circuit Court in this case observed: The division here, looking at the four corners of this will, ind icates an intent to create the two cla sses of per sons as op posed to individual bequests. Much of the evidence that the Circuit Court relied on to support the conclusion that Decedent made a bequest with group-mindedness is found in the text of Item Four itself. A lthough D ecedent ind ividually name d each fa mily memb er who w ould 8 This principle might apply as well when a court is considering a bequest to nonrelatives , such as a spou se s car etaker or spo use s ch urch. 9 Friedman cites Bloom v. Selfon, 555 A .2d 75 ( Pa. 198 9), In re Estate of Kerr, 520 N.W. 2d 512 (Minn. App. 1994), and McGuire v. McG uire, 631 S .W. 2d 12 (A rk. 198 2). We hav e reviewe d these case s, but they do no t persuade u s to reach a d ifferent resu lt. 17 take pursuant to Item Four, he first identified those people according to their respective groups before listing their names. Additionally, Decedent placed the conjunction and before the last person comprising each group, thus suggesting an intent to create two lists, rather than one.10 Finally, instead of specifically referring to Zelinski when classifying the Friedman group, Decedent described them as the immediate family members of my Wife [.] (emph asis add ed). Petitioner advances an argument based on a comparison of the Uniform Probate Code ( UPC ) and ET S ectio n 4-1 05(4 ) and purp orted leg islati ve histor y. UPC S ection 2-50 8, in effect in 1969, called for revocation of will provisions to the spouse. At the same time, the precursor to Maryland s ET Section 4-105 contained largely the same language as the statute does today, in that it called for revocation of provisions relating to the spouse. See Md. Code (1957), Article 93, § 351 . In 1990, the UPC was amended to add a provision that the automatic revocation upon div orce also ap plied to any bequests to a relative of the divorced individual s former spouse[.] UPC §2-804(b)(1) (1990) Petitioner posits that the UPC did in its revision exactly wha t [Hanna n] asks this C ourt to do - - expand the concept of revocation beyond the former spouse to also include the forme r spouse s relatives. But Maryland has not ad opted this portion of the UPC nor in any 10 The names in Item Four are listed as follows: JE ROM E B. HA NNA N, KEV IN HANNAN, MICHAEL HANNAN, KATHLEEN HANNAN and DANIEL HANNAN, LYDIA ELIZABETH COVERT FRIEDMAN, PATRICIA JO COVERT TOLLEY, BAR BAR A JA NE C OVE RT, G ENIA LOU ISE C OVE RT, and KELLEY ANN FRIEDMAN (said KELLEY is to share her part with her sister KIMBERLY BETH FRIEDM AN). (emp hasis added). 18 way indicated that it wished to expand this statute in such a manner. In an effort to support her contention that the failure of the Maryland General Assemb ly to adopt the revised U PC Sec tion 2-804(b)(1) demonstrates it had no intent that Section 4105(4) would o perate to revoke bequests to a former spouse s relatives, she invokes the Second Report of the Go vernor s C ommissio n to Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of Maryland ( the Hen derson C ommissio n ) whic h was issu ed in 1968.11 She relies on the Commission s Comm ent to what was then Section 351 (now Section 4-105) which reads as follows: This section adopts, without ch ange or substance, § 3 51 (Md) which was recently reconsidered and amended by the General Assemb ly. See the Comment to Section 3-301. The Commission therefore f elt that the approach to the subject of 2506 and 2-507 (UPC), which is somewhat more restricted than the pres ent M aryland la w, sho uld not be follo wed. Friedman maintains, This comment is not only evidence of an awareness of the UPC, but a willingne ss to vary from its proposed language. We have no doubt that the Henderson Commission was aw are of the UPC , or that it consid ered itself fre e of any duty to recommend the UPC provisions to the Gene ral Assem bly. But we do not agree that the Comment sheds light on the question at hand. In using the ph rase somewh at more restricted , the Comment refers to UPC Sections 2-506 and 2-507, neither of which addresses 11 The Henderson Commission was chaired by Hon. William L. Henderson and was created to Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of Maryland. 19 revocation by divorce.12 Moreover, we see nothing in that Report that reveals a legislative intent that the words relating to the spou se in Section 4-10 5 sho uld b e con strue d narrow ly. CONCLUSION In sum, we hold that ET Sec tion 4-105 (4) is not limited in its effect to provisions for the direct benefit of the spouse. The decision as to whether a particular provision is one relating to a form er spouse is a factual on e to be ma de by the trial court. In doin g so, a court should decide whether the testator in creating the provision was primarily motivated by the marriage or whether the testator had independent reasons for the bequest. In making that decision, the court may infer that bequests made to a former spouse s family were made primarily because of the marriage unless there is evidence of some independent reason in the will itself or the circu mstances existing at the time of ex ecution. Fo r the reason s set forth above, we conclude that the Circuit Court did not err in finding that Decedent was groupminded in the Item Four residuary bequest, and that the bequest to Friedman failed as a result of the divorce. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE P AID BY PETITIONERS. 12 UPC Section 2-506 is titled Choice of Law as to Execution, and Section 2-507 is titled Revocation by Writing or by Act. These titles aptly describe the subject addressed in these sections. 20

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