Rosemann v. Salsbury, Clements,

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Curtis O. Rosemann v. Salsbury, Clements, Bekman, Marder & Adkins, LLC, No. 39, Septem ber Te rm 200 9. JUDGMENTS MONEY PAYABLE IN THE EVENT OF PERSONAL INJURY EXEMPTION FROM EXECU TION MONEY R ECEIVED AS PART OF A SETTLEMENT IN A PERSO NAL IN JURY C ASE IS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION ON A JU DGM ENT FOR CHIL D SU PPO RT A RRE ARA GES . Circuit Co urt for How ard Cou nty Case No. 13-C-08-072739 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 39 September Term, 2009 CURTIS O. ROSEMANN v. SALSBURY, CLEMENTS, BEKMAN, MARDER & ADKINS, LLC Bell, C.J. Harrell Greene Murphy Barbera Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially Assigned) Rodowsky, Lawrence F. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: January 13, 2010 Curtis O. Rosemann ( Mr. Rosemann or the Judgment Creditor ), the custodial parent of two m inor children , filed writs of garnishm ent in the Circuit Court for H oward County seeking to execute on two judgments against his former wife, Rosalind Rosemann ( Ms. Rosemann or the Judgment Debtor ), for unpaid child support obligations. The writs sought to garnish funds that a law firm held for the benefit of Ms. Ro semann in connection with the settle ment of a civil claim ag ainst a third party for alleged personal injuries she suffered. The Circuit Court held that the money was exempt because it was compensation for a personal injury, and therefore protected by § 11-504(b)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Md. Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vo l. & Supp . 2009), a statu te providing that certain pr operty is exem pt from ex ecution on a judgme nt. 1 On ap peal, the Court of Special A ppeals aff irmed. W e granted M r. Rosem ann s petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whethe r money received as part of a settlement in a personal injury case is exempt from execution on a judgment for child support arrearages. 408 Md. 4 87, 970 1 Section 11 -504 prov ides, in pertine nt part: (b) The following items are exempt from execution on a judgmen t: * * * (2) Money payab le in t he ev ent o f sickness, ac cide nt, in jury, or death of any person, including compensation for loss of future earnings. This exemption includes but is not limited to money payable on account of judgments, arbitrations, compromises, insurance, benefits, co mpensa tion, and relief. Disability income benefits are not exempt if the judgment is for necessities contracted for after the disability is incurred. § 11-5 04(b)(2 ). A.2d 892 (2009). We shall affirm the judgment of the intermed iate appellate court and, for the reasons set forth below, hold that apparently the Legislature intended for the funds to be exem pt from execu tion on a judgm ent, eve n one re presen ting chil d supp ort arrea rages. I. FACTS The Rosemanns were married on 16 February 1985. The marriage yielded two children. On 16 Feb ruary 1995, the Circuit Court for Howard County granted the Rosemanns an absolute divorce. At that time the court made no provisio n for ch ild supp ort. On 4 June 1999, the court ordered M s. Rosem ann to pay ch ild support to Mr. Rosemann in the amount of $554.92 per month. On Ms. Rosemann s appeal, the Court of Special Appeals directed entry of a revised amou nt of $5 33.61 p er mon th. Over the ensuing years, Ms. Rosemann did not pay the child support as ordered. As a consequence , Mr. Ros emann o btained tw o judgm ents agains t his ex-wif e for the ch ild support arrearages one in the amount of $3,851.70, plus interest, entered in 2001 by the Circuit Court and one in the amount of $30,709.38, plus interest, entered by the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona,2 and en rolled in the Circ uit Cou rt. On 6 May 2005, Ms. Rosemann was injured while a passenger on board an America West ( the airline ) flight. She hired Salsbury, Clements, Bekman, Marder & Adkins, LLC (the law firm ) of Baltimore City to represent her regarding her personal injury claim 2 The Circuit Court approv ed Mr. Rose mann s relocation to Arizona with the children in 2002. He enrolled the Maryland child support decree in A rizona and enforce d it there throug h a con tempt p etition fo r non-p ayment o f child s uppor t. -2- against America West. The law firm filed suit on her behalf against the airline in the U.S. District Court fo r the District of Maryland.3 The airline and Ms. Rosemann reached a settlement in the amount of $30,000.00. The check representing the settlement proceeds was made payable to Rosali nd Ro seman n and th e law f irm as h er attorn ey. Discovering this, Mr. Rosemann filed in the Circuit Court two writs of garnishment against Ms. Ro semann and the law firm, in wh ose trust acco unt the latter kept Ms. Rosemann s share of the settlement proceeds. The first writ sought to execute on the enrolled Arizona judgment. The second writ sought to execute on the judgment entered originally by the Circuit Court. The law firm filed answers claiming that the funds are exempt from execution on a judgment pursuant to Section 11-504(b)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article . . . . The trial court consolidated the garnishment proceedings. Cross-motions for summary judgment ensued. After a hearing, the trial court granted the law firm s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in its favor. 4 Mr. Rosemann filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in an unreported opinion. Mr. Rosemann filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, 408 Md. 487, 970 A.2d 89 2 (2009), to consider th e followin g question : 3 According to the law firm s brief here, the personal injury lawsuit was captioned as: Rosalind Rosemann vs. U.S. Airways, Civil No. RDB-1:07-cv-2105. 4 According to the parties briefs, no transcript of the proceedings before the trial court was prepared because the parties agreed to proceed before the Court of Special Appeals as an Expedite d Appe al, as allowe d by Maryland Rule 8-20 7(b), with an agreed sta tement o f facts. -3- Did the trial court err in granting the garnishee s motion for summary judgment and denying the judgment creditor s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Courts Article, Section 11-504(b)(2) provides an exemption from execution for money payable in the event of sickness, accident or injury, even though Maryland and federal public policy favor excepting a judgment for child support from the exemption statutes? II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The facts ar e agree d to by the parties. W e are asked to inte rpret a statute, a p urely legal questio n. Harvey v. Marsh all, 389 Md. 243, 257, 884 A.2d 1171, 1179 (2005) (citing Mohan v. Norris, 386 Md. 63, 66 -67, 871 A.2d 5 75, 577 (2005)); see also Pub. Service Comm n v. Wilson, 389 M d. 27, 45, 88 2 A.2d 8 49, 860 (2 005); Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Roads Comm n of the State Highway Admin., 388 Md. 500, 516, 880 A.2d 307, 316 (2005); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 80-81 (2004). Therefore, our review is non-deferential to the judgments of the intermediate appellate court and the trial court. Harvey, 389 Md. at 257, 884 A.2d at 1179 (citing Mohan, at 66-67, 871 A.2d at 577); Wilson, 389 Md. at 45, 882 A.2 d at 860; Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture, 388 Md. at 516, 880 A.2d a t 316. III. THE RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION The cardinal rule of statutory interp retation is to asc ertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dept. of the Env t, 410 Md. 326, 338, 978 A.2d 702, 709 (2009) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 212, 973 A.2d 23 3, 241 (2009)). Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the -4- statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language. United States v. Ambrose, 403 Md. 425, 438, 942 A.2d 755, 763 (2008) (quoting Kushell v. Dep t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 56 3, 576-77, 870 A .2d 186, 193-94 (2 005)). [W]e neither a dd nor delete language so as to reflec t an intent no t evidenced in the plain language of the statute; nor [do we] construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. Lonaconing, 410 Md. at 339, 978 A.2d at 709 (quoting Ambrose, 403 Md. at 439, 942 A.2 d at 763). This C ourt reads th e statute as a w hole to ensu re that none of its provisions are rendered meaningless. Id. We will not construe a statute to reach a result that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. Id. (quoting ZimmerRubert, 409 M d. at 215, 97 3 A.2d a t 242). If the la nguage o f the statute is cle ar and unambiguous, we need look no further than the language of the statute to ascertain the Legislature s intent. Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condominium, 404 Md. 560, 572, 948 A.2d 11, 19 (2008). When the language of the statute is subject to m ore than on e interpretation, it is ambiguous and we usually look beyond the statutory language to the statute s legislative history, prior case law, the statutory purpose, and the statu tory structu re as aid s in asce rtaining the Leg islature s intent. Id.; see also Kortobi v. Kass, 410 M d. 168, 177 , 978 A.2d 247, 252 (2009); Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 135, 747 A.2d 625, 628 (2000). Where a statute is ambiguous, we also consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, an d adopt tha t construction which av oids an illogic al or unreasonable re sult, -5- or one which is inconsis tent with common sense. Chesapeake Charter, Inc., 358 Md. at 135, 747 A.2d at 628 (quoting Tucker v. Fireman s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 73 2 (198 6)). With regard to the specific type of statute that we consider in the present case, an exemption from execution of a judgmen t law ought to be liberally construed. In re Taylor, 312 Md. 58, 71 n.5, 537 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1988) (quoting Muhr v. Pinover, 67 Md. 480, 487, 10 A. 289, 28 9 (1887)); see also Fowler v. Gray, 99 Md. 594, 599, 58 A. 444, 446 (1904); Darby v. Rouse, 75 Md. 26, 28, 22 A. 1110, 1110 (1891). When construing an exemption from execution statute, this Court gives due consideration . . . to the purpose of granting the exem ptions and the objective s to be fulfille d by the granting of them. In re Taylor, 312 M d. at 71, 5 37 A.2 d at 118 5. IV. ANAL YSIS The Maryland Constitution directs the General Assembly to pass laws to protect from execution a reasonable amount of the property of the debtor. Md. Const. art. III, § 44. Section 11-504 of the Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Pro ceedings A rticle (1974, R epl. Vol. 2006 & S upp. 2009), for its part, purports to carry out this mandate. See In re Taylor, 312 Md. 58, 60, 537 A.2d 1179, 1180 (1988) (observing that, in compliance w ith the comm andmen t in Article III, § 44, the General Assembly enacted § 11-50 4). Section 11504(b) provides certain property to be exempt from execution on a judgment. Section 11504(b)(2), the exemption to which the Judgment Debtor looks for protection in the present -6- case, exempts from execution: Money payable in t he eve nt of sic kness, a cciden t, injury, or death of any person, including compensation for loss of future earnings. This exemption includes but is not limited to money payable on account of judgments, arbitrations, compromises, insurance, benefits, compensation, and relief. Disability income benefits are not exempt if the judgment is for necessities contracted for after the disability is incurred.[5] 5 In addition to th e persona l injury proceed s exemp tion enum erated in § 11-504(b)(2), the statute also exempts the following: (1) Wearing apparel, bo oks, tools, instru ments or a ppliances, in an amount not to exceed $5,000 in value necessary for the practice of any trade or profession except those kept for sale, lease, or barter. * * * (3) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or any depen dent of the deb tor. (4) The debtor s interest, not to exceed $1,000 in value, in househo ld furnishing s, househo ld goods, w earing app arel, appliances, books, animals kept as pets, and other items that are held primarily for the pers onal, family, or household use of the debtor or any depende nt of the debtor. (5) Cash or property of any kind equivalent in value to $6,000 is exem pt, if with in 30 days from the date of the attachment or the levy by the sheriff, the debtor elects to exempt cash or selected items of propert y in an amount not to exceed a cumu lative va lue of $ 6,000. (6) Mone y payable or paid in accorda nce with an agreement or court o rder fo r child su pport. (7) Money payable or paid in accordance with an agreement or court order for alimony to the same ex tent that wages are exempt from attachment under § 15-601 .1(b)(1)(ii) or (2)( i) of the Commercial Law Article. § 11-5 04(b). (contin ued...) -7- We conclude here that the langu age of § 1 1-504(b)(2 ) is unambiguous, and, thus, we need look no further than the language of the statute to ascertain the Legislature s apparent intent. The statute exempts from execution on a judgment [m]oney payable in the event of sickness, accident, injury, or death of any person, including com pensation for loss of fu ture earnings. § 11-504 (b)(2). This exemption is broad. It contemplates a variety of payment sources, including money payable on account of judgments, arbitrations, compromises, insurance, benefits, compensation and relief. Id. In In re Taylor, we considered the tools exemption fo und in § 11-504 (b)(1). 312 Md. at 60-61, 537 A.2d at 1180. At the time that case was decided, § 11-504(b)(1) exempted from execution on a judgment [w]earing apparel, books, tools, instruments, or appliances necessary for the practice of any trade or profession excep t for those kept for sale or ba rter. 312 Md. at 59, 537 A.2d at 1180 (quoting Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1974, 1984 Repl. Vol.) § 11-504(b)(1) ). There we observed the legislative intent in enacting § 11-504(b)(1) emanating bright and clear from the plain language of the subsection. The subsection is a reflection of the constitutiona l dictate and glows in the light of the past actions of the legislature concerning the exemption statutes. The leg islative intent is tha t any and all wearing apparel, books, tools, instruments, or appliance s are 5 (...continued) Section 11-504 also provides that, in any proceeding under Title 11 of the United States Code, entitled Bankruptcy , any individual debtor domiciled in this State may exempt the debtor s aggregate interest, not to exceed $5,000 in value, in real pro pert y or personal proper ty. § 11-504(f). Subsection (h) provides that an interest in certain retirement plans also sha ll be exe mpt. Id. § 11-5 04(h). -8- exempt from execution on a judgment if they are reasonably necessary for the practice of the debtor s trade or profession. Id. at 70-7 1, 537 A .2d at 11 85. With regard to § 11-504(b)(2) in the present case, we also see the legislative intent . . . emanating bright and clear from the plain language of the subsection. Id. at 70, 537 A.2d at 1185. T he federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit opined that the purpose behind the personal injury exemption found in § 11-504(b)(2) is to w ithhold[] from creditors funds necessary to recompense the debtor for injuries to his physical person, to make the debtor whole in the eyes of the law, and to restore human capital to the extent monetarily possible. In re Butcher, 125 F.3d 238, 241 (4th Cir. 1997). In Niedermayer v. Adelman, 90 B.R. 146 (Bankr. D.Md. 1988), the bankruptcy court also considered the underlying purpose o f the perso nal injury exem ption: A fundam ental civility of our jurisprudence subordinates financial obligations to claims of life and liberty. Thus, without the citation of authority, our system does not p ermit incarceration to satisfy a debt. N or does it permit the sale of human beings as chattels. We would never require, for example, the extraction of a pint of blood from a person for sale in satisfac tion of a mone y judgm ent. Likewise an exemptio n law that p ermits a deb tor to retain his claim to recompense himself for personal injury avoids a creditor s stripping him of his means of possibly becoming whole when in jured in tort. The law will, within limits, allow for attachm ent of his pr operty for the satisfaction of debts, and for that matter lawsuits that go with that property, but it will not allow for attachment of his person for such purpose. Under these principles we can expect that a car which is burned in an electrical fire will be subject to attachment, as would be any claim against the insurance company for the fire loss. On the -9- other hand, a person is not a chattel subject to attachm ent in satisfaction of a debt, and so, too, a lawsuit seeking to recompense him for da mage to h is person is likewise protected from a ttachm ent. 90 B.R . at 148. The money that Ms. Rosemann received from the airline was to compensate her for an alleged injury. It thus was, [m]oney payable in the event of . . . injury . . . . § 11504(b)(2). The airline agreed to pay the money as part of a compromise in which Ms. Rosemann agreed not to p ursue f urther h er laws uit again st the airlin e. The settlement funds held by th e law f irm, thus , fall squ arely with in the pe rsonal in jury exem ption. In the face of the plain language of the statute and its clear applica bility to the facts of the present case, Mr. Rosemann nonetheless urges us to hold that the money received by Ms. Rosemann in compensation for her injury is not exempt because the underlying judgmen ts on which he seeks to execute represent child support arrearages. He bluntly asks us to carve-out an excep tion to the exem ption statute so lely on the grou nd of gen eral public policy, based largely on a demonstrable track record in recent years of the Legislature cracking down o n dead-b eat parents through sta tutory change s (unrelated to the statute in this case) making it easier to collect such arrearages or put press ure on the d ebtor to pay up. The law firm retorts that, notwithstanding the Legislature s apparent policy of enhancing the enforcea bility of child sup port awa rds, the langu age of the particular statu te here is plain and does not include an exception for child support obligations. As the argument goes, had the Legislature intended to bring § 11-504(b)(2) within the initiative to enhance collection of -10- child support arrearages, it knew how to do so and chose not to. It is well establish ed that, in M aryland, a paren t has a duty to support h is or her children. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Miller, 371 Md. 591, 603 , 810 A.2d 947, 954 (2002) ( T his Court has long recognized the parents obligation to support their m inor children . This obligation imposes a duty on the parent to provide su pport and confers a r ight on child ren to receive it. ) (intern al citation s omitte d). This duty is con firmed in the co mmo n law, see id., and in our statutes. See Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 2009) § 5-203 (Pa rents are join tly and severally resp onsible for the children s support, care, nurture, welfare, and education . . . . ). The duty is so important that a parent may not bargain away or waive his/her minor child s right to receive suppo rt. See Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 111-12, 591 A.2d 501, 503-504 (1991) (holding that an agreement between a mother and father to waive payment of child support and arrearages in exchange for father s consent to the adoption of the minor children by the mother s husband was invalid becau se it violated public policy). Indeed, the Citizens of Maryland and the General Assembly have taken several steps to ensure that non-supp orting parents honor their ob ligations. For example, the State Constitution provides that a person may be imprisoned for non-payment of child or spousal support obligation s. See Md. C onst. art. III, § 38 (s tating that [n ]o person s hall be imprisoned for a debt, b ut a valid decree of a court of competent jurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court for the support of a spouse or dependent children, or for -11- alimony . . . shall not cons titute a debt w ithin the meaning of this section. ); Md. Rule 15207(e) (providing procedures for imprisonment upon non-payment of child or spousal support obligation); Middleton v. Middleton, 329 Md. 627, 639, 620 A.2d 1363, 1369 (1993) (holding that since a parent s child support obligation is not a debt within the prohibition of § 38, the ob ligation of the defaulting parent may be enforced b y means of the court s contempt power, including imprisonment, pending the purging of the default. ). The General Assemb ly authorized the Child Support Enforcement Administration (the Administration ),6 subject to procedu ral requirem ents, to reque st the Mo tor Vehicle Admin istration (the 6 The Ge neral Asse mbly mand ated that the A dministration shall: (1) coordin ate a statew ide program for suppo rt enforcem ent; (2) maintain a central registry of records on absent parents as required under § 12-105 of this article; (3) locate ab sent parents ; (4) determine the ability of an abs ent parent to pay child supp ort; (5) accept assignment of right, title, or interest in ch ild support made under § 5-312(b)(2) of the Human Services Article; (6) in any case in which an assignment is made under §5312(b)(2) of the Human Services Article, prosecute and maintain any legal or eq uitable action available to establish each absent pare nt s obligation to pay child sup port; (7) cooperate with other states in establishing and enforcing child supp ort obligation s; (8) collect and d isburse sup port paymen ts through th e State disbursement unit established under § 10-108.7 of this subtitle; and (9) use established legal processe s to enforce court orders to pay support. Fam. L aw § 1 0-108 (a). -12- MVA ) to suspend th e driver s licen se of any ob ligor who has failed to make child supp ort payments. Fam. Law § 10-119(b); see also Md. Code Ann. Transp. (1977, 2009 Repl. V ol.) § 16-203 (providing that if the Administration notifies the MVA that an obligor is 60 days or more out of compliance with the most recent order of the court in making child su pport payments, the [MVA] shall (1) susp end an ob ligor s license o f privilege to drive in this S tate . . . . ). The Administration also may request a licensing author ity to suspend the occupational license of an obligor who is in arrears with respect to child support payments. Fam. Law § 10-119.3. In addition, §§ 10-120 through 10-138 authorize the Administration, under certain circumstances, to require an employer to deduct support payments from the earnings of an obligor. § 10-120(b). These statutes effectuate a federal mandate to create procedures to withho ld, suspend , or restrict the use of driver s lice nses, profe ssional and occupatio nal licenses, an d recreation al and spo rting licenses o f individua ls owing overdue suppo rt . . . . 42 U .S.C.S. § 666(a) (16) (L exisN exis 20 09). Mr. Rosemann argues that these various statutory m ethods fo r enforcing a child support obligation d emonstra te generally that an obligee s right to receive support trumps an obligor s right to receive any fund s in com pensat ion for a perso nal injur y. We are compelled to disagree. Although the many statutes enacted by the Legislature indeed demonstrate a strong public polic y in favor of enforcing child support awards, that does not authorize th is Court, when the clear applica tion of the p resently conside red statute supplies a re sult that is adverse to that policy, to fashion from whole judicial cloth an exception to the statute. We -13- are not a super-le gislature . We acknowledge, as we mu st, that we ha ve held, un der the fac ts and circumstances of other cases and statutes, th at statutes exempting certain p roperty from execution w ere found inapplicable where the underlying debt was for spousal support arrearages. In United States v. Williams, 279 Md. 673, 370 A.2d 1134 (1 977), a former wife o f a retired military officer filed a writ of attachment with the United States to effect a collection of arrearages of alimony. The exemption at issue provided that the following amount of wages w ere exempt f rom attach ment: (1) [T]he g reater of: (i) The product of $1 20 multiplied by the numb er of weeks in wh ich the wages du e are earned; or (ii) 75 pe rcent of the wa ges du e; . . . . Id. at 676 n.3, 370 A.2d at 1136 (quoting Md. Code (1975) Commercial Law Article § 16602). The United States argued that the retirement pay did not constitute wages and, even if it did, the amount that Mrs. Williams sought was in excess of the amount allowed under the exemption. We held first that federal military retirement pay constituted wages for the purposes of the statute.7 Id. at 678, 370 A.2d at 1137. We held further that the exemptions from attachment provided by § 15-602(b)(1)(i) and (ii) are inapplicable, because the underlying obligation is for intra-familial support and the very purpose of the statutory 7 Section 15-601 provided, at the time we decided Williams, that wage s means all monetary remuneration paid to any employee for his employment. 279 Md. at 676 n.3, 370 A.2d at 1137. -14- exemptions is to p rotect a f amil y from bein g deprived of all s upport by attachment proceedings brought by an outsider. Id. In Williams, we drew an analogy to Safe Dep osit & Trust Co. of Balt. v. Robertson, 192 Md. 653, 65 A.2d 292 (1949), where we permitted the attachment of income from a spendthrift trust to satisfy alimony arrearages, notwithstanding that a typical creditor w ould not b e permitted to reach th e fund s. Williams, 279 Md. at 67879, 370 A.2d at 1137 (citing Safe Dep osit, 192 Md. at 662 -63, 65 A.2d at 296). In Safe Deposit, our decision rest[ed] . . . upon grounds of public policy . . . . 192 Md. at 663, 65 A.2d at 296. We explained the rationale for that as, [t]he reason for the rejection of the common law rule , that a condition restraining alienation by the beneficiary is repugnant to the nature of the estate granted, was simply that persons extending credit to the beneficiary on a voluntary basis are chargeab le with notice of the conditions set forth in the instrument. This reasoning is inapplicable to a claim for alimony which , in Ma ryland at le ast, is an award made by the court for food, clothing, habitation and other necessaries for the maintenance of the wife. The obligation continues during the joint lives of the parti es, and i s a duty, no t a debt. . . . We think the rule that gives legal effect to spendthrift provisions as against contract creditors should not be extended to claims for support or alimony. In such situations the wife is a favored suitor, and her claim is based upon the strongest grounds of public p olicy. Id. at 662- 63, 65 A .2d at 29 6 (intern al citation s and q uotation marks omitted ). In Blum v. Blum, 295 Md. 135, 141-42, 453 A.2d 824, 828 (1983), we extended the holding of Williams to an obligation to pay contractual spousal support. We drew no distinction between a contractual obligation to pay spou sal su pport and alim ony, holding that -15- the obligation to pay contractual spousal support, like the obligation to pay alimony, is not a debt, but rather a duty to provide intra-familial support . . . Id. Thus, the same statute we interpreted in Williams did not apply to a wage lien for contractual spousal suppo rt . . . . Id. at 142, 4 53 A.2 d at 828 . In Pope v. Pope, 283 Md. 531, 390 A.2d 1128 (1978), we interpreted a provision of the Unemployment Insurance Law that exempted unemployment benefits from execution. The statute at issue in Pope provided that rights to [unemployment] benefits shall be exempt from levy, execution, attachment, or any other remedy whatsoever provided for the collection of debt . . . . Id. at 534, 390 A.2d at 11 30 (quotin g Md. C ode (195 7, 1969 R epl. Vol.), Art. 16 , § 16(c)). In Pope, the forme r wife of a recipient of u nemploym ent benef its sought to enforce the provisions of a decree under which her husband was to pay her permanent alimony of $20 per week. Id. at 532-33, 390 A .2d at 1129. The C ircuit Court ordered a lien on the former husband s unem ploymen t benef its. Id. The Employment Security Administration opposed imposition of the lien, arguing that a lien on the benefits would violate th e Une mploym ent Insu rance L aw. Id. at 533, 390 A.2d at 1129-30. Applying the holding in William s, we held that the benefits were not exempt a nd that the sta tute did not proh ibit a lien f or alimony . . . . Id. at 535, 3 90 A.2 d at 112 9-30. We acknowledged that our holding, as in Williams, fail[ed] to adhere to the literal language of the statute, id. at 536, 390 A.2d at 1131, but determined nonetheless that the purpose of the unemployment statute mandated our conclusion because the very purpose of invalidating assignments of -16- unemployment benefits and of exempting them from attachment . . . is to lighten [the] burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. Id. (quoting Md. C ode (1957, 1969 Repl. Vo l.), Art. 95 A, § 16(c)) (em phasis in original). In reaching this conclusion, we explained why contravention of the plain language of the statute was nec essary to effec tuate the legisla tive intent: The courts which accept the principle we adopted in Williams are simply recognizing that the legislative purpose underlying such statutes is the protection of the various types of benef its involved from the claims of creditors not from the claim of a former wife for alimony, which often, as in Maryland, is not considered a debt. Id. at 537, 3 90 A.2 d at 113 2. Mr. Rosemann argues that these cases establish that statutes and constitutional provisions exempting specific property from legal process have been construed judicially to be inapplicable against a claim for child support or alimony. We disagree. The cases establish that statutes exempting wages and unemploym ent benefits from execution on a judgment have been construed to be ina pplicab le as aga inst a cla im for f amilial su pport. As the intermediate appellate court, in its unreported opinion in the present case, summarized aptly our prior decisions, although some portion of the family s support should be protected from creditors, no part of the wages that provide support sh ould be pr otected fro m the fam ily itself. The rationale underlying that construction is that the purpo se of the w age and b enefit exemptions is to protect a family from being dep rived of all support by attachment proceedings brought by an outsider. Williams, 279 Md. at 678, 370 A.2d at 1137. The -17- exemption at issue in the p resent case, th e persona l injury exemp tion, by contrast, is to make the injured person whole. Unlike wages, a personal injury award is not meant to support directly the injured p arty s family; it is mean t primarily to pay medical b ills and com pensate for loss of future earnings and pain and suffering. Furthermore, our holding in Safe Dep osit is inapplicable here because the trust funds were intended to provide income to the benefic iary, not, as is the case underlying the personal injury exemption, to make the person whole when injured in tort. The Legislature has considered and amended the exemption statute many times since it was codified as § 11-504 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. See Laws of M d., 1977, Ch. 356; Laws of Md., 1980, Ch. 546; Laws of M d., 1981 , Ch. 76 5; Law s of M d., 1982, Ch. 703; Laws of Md., 1983, Chs. 175 and 554; Laws of Md., 1984, Ch. 255; Laws of Md., 1988, Ch. 613; Laws of Md., 1989, Ch. 549; Laws of Md., 1998, Ch. 375; Laws of Md., 2003, C h. 21, § 1; Laws of Md., 2004, Ch. 463; Laws of Md., 2007, Ch. 238. Pertinent to the present c ase, in 2007 , the Legislatu re consider ed § 11-5 04 in conn ection with child support and alimony and amended the statute to exempt f rom execution money paid or payable for child support or alimony. S.B. 712, Laws of Md., 2007, Ch. 238. amendment is codified at § 11-504(b )(6) and (7). The In enacting that amendment, the Legislature recognized the impact this section may have on domestic support matters, yet did not create an exception to the person al injury monies exemption w ith regard to execution on a judgment for child support arearrages. We may not create judicially an exemption to the -18- statute that the Legislature has not seen fit to impose. As demonstrated b y the multiple amendm ents to § 11-504, the Legislature had ample opportunities to enact an exception permitting a judgment creditor to execute on exempted property where the judgment is for dome stic supp ort arrea rages, b ut it has n ot done so. Mr. Rosemann asserts that federal policy in favor of enforcing child su pport obligations also mandates that we conclude that the funds are not exe mpt from execution in the present case. Pointing to the mandate established in 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16) requiring States to establish procedures to suspend or restrict licenses, he argues that federal law requires states to give support collection prio rity over any other leg al process u nder state law. He relies on § 666 (b)(7) in sup port of this proposition, which inde ed provides that [s]upp ort collection under this subsection must be given priority over any other legal process under State law against the same income. This does not con vince us that his argume nt must carry the day, however, because income is defined as any period ic form of payment due to an individual, regardless of source, including wages, salaries, comm issions, bonuses, worke r s compensation, disability, payments p ursuant to a pension o r retirement p rogram, and interest. Id. § 666(b)(8). The pers onal injury settlem ent funds are not a fo rm of per iodic payment due to Ms. Rosemann and do not fit within any of the enumerated types of payments. Thus, we conclude that federal law does not require that supp ort collection have a higher priority than Ms. Rosemann s right to exempt her personal injury settlement procee ds from execu tion. -19- IV. Conclusion Although anyone (with the possible exception of the non-supporting parent) can sympathize with Mr. Ro semann s and his ch ildren s situation , in accordan ce with the wellsettled rules of statu tory construction, we cannot judicially place in the statute language which is not there in order to avoid a harsh result. Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 225, 592 A.2d 1090, 1094 (1991) (quoting Cotham v. Bd. of County Comm rs, 260 Md. 556, 565, 273 A.2d 115, 120 (1971)). Even where we have determined that an omissio n from a s tatute was inadve rtent, w e have decline d to sup ply word s to reac h a desi red resu lt. See Birmingham v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 239 Md. 443, 449, 239 A.2d 923, 926 (1968) ( Nor have we the power to correct an omission in the language of a statute, even []though the omission was the obvious result of inadvertence. ); Rogan v. B&O R.R. Co., 188 Md. 44, 54, 52 A.2d 261, 266 (1947) ( Even though a c ertain provisio n, which h as been o mitted from a statute, appe ars to be within the o bvious pu rpose or pla n of the statu te, and to have been omitted merely by inadverten ce, neverthe less, the court is not at liberty to add to the language of the law; and the court mus t hold that the L egislature inten ded to om it the provisio n, howe ver impro bable that may appea r in connec tion with the general po licy of the statute. ). A s Justice Bra ndeis noted in Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926), [t]o supply omissions transcends the judicial function. If the situation brought to light by this case is an oversight, it is a matter for the Le gislature to correct . Thus, we hold that the money received by the Judgment Debto r is exem pt from execu tion her e pursu ant to § 1 1-504 (b)(2). -20- JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. C O S T S T O B E P A I D BY PETITIONER. -21-

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