State v. Luckett

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State of Maryland v. Terris Terrell Luckett, No. 122, September Term, 2009 Constitutional Criminal Procedure Fifth Amendment Miranda Warnin gs: A suspect under cu stodial interrogation by the polic e is not prop erly informed of the rights afforded by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U .S. 436 , 86 S. C t. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), when the warnings, however consistent they might be with the language of Miranda, are accompanied by overt misstatements concerning those rights. In that event, the warnings are constitutiona lly infirm and any purported waiver of the rights afforded by Miranda is defective, requiring su ppression in the State s case-in-chief of any statement the suspect makes follow ing the purported w aiver. In the Circuit C ourt for Prin ce Geo rge s Coun ty Case No.07-2178X IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 122 September Term, 2009 STATE OF MARYLAND v. TERRIS TERRELL LUCKETT Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Adkins Barbera, JJ. Opinion by Barbera, J. Filed: April 14, 2010 We decide in this case whether a confessio n that Resp ondent T erris Terrell L uckett gave to the police complied with the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S . 436, 86 S . Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 69 4 (1966). The Circuit Court for Prince George s County ruled that the police did not comply with the requirement of Miranda that a suspect be properly advised of the right to counsel that attends custodial interrogation. The Circuit Court granted Responden t s motion to suppress the statement he gave to the police following w hat the court ruled w as a con stitutiona lly defectiv e advis emen t. The State challe nged the Circuit Court s ruling by filing an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Maryland Code (2006 Rep l. Vol.), § 12-302(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Upon its independent review of the suppression ruling, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Circuit Court that the police had violated Miranda and affirm ed the s uppres sion ord er. State v. Luc kett, 188 Md. App. 399, 981 A.2d 835 (20 09). We granted the State s petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Special A ppeals. W e now a ffirm that jud gment. I. Respondent stands charged by indictment with two counts each of first-degree murder and use of a handgun in the comm ission of a c rime of vio lence. He filed a mo tion to suppress three statements he had made to the police, only the last of which is the subject of this appea l. The four-day hearing o n the supp ression mo tion was f ollowed b y the Circuit Court s issuance of a written opinion d enying the m otion as to the first and s econd state ments and granting the motion w ith respect to the third statement. We adopt portions of the Court of Special Appeals recitation of the facts underlying the crimes, the suppression motion, and the Circuit Court s decision:1 On Augus t 2, 2007, T unja Luckett, Respondent's wife, was found dead of a gunshot wou nd at the c ouple's Fort Was hing ton h ome . On that s ame day, John Scales w as shot to de ath at his barbershop in Clinton. On August 3, charges were filed against Respondent, charging him with both murders. Respondent himself, however, was not yet apprehended. On August 4, Prince Geo rge's County Po lice Office r Stephen Fox responded to th e Southern Avenue Metro S tation, whe re Respo ndent had reportedly leaped backward from th e Met ro platf orm dir ectly into th e path o f an on comin g train. Respondent was pulled from the tracks and rushed by helicopter to the Prince G eorge's Co unty Hosp ital. Both legs were crushed and, in the course of two operations over the next two da ys, both of Responde nt's legs were amputated. In his meticulously thorough 14-page Opinion of the Court, [the suppression hearing judge] began with a summary that made this bizarre string of events comprehensible. The state esse ntial ly alleges that Mr. L uckett believ ed that his wife was having an affair w ith his son's football coach. M r. Luckett is alleged to have killed his wife and after doing so, gone to the footb all coach's place of business, a barber shop, and proceeded to kill the footba ll coach on Au gust 2, 2 007. On August 4, 20 07 havin g wh at ca n best be desc ribed as shoo ter's remors e, Mr. Luckett attempted to take his life in two ways. First, he slit his wrists. Failing in that attempt, Mr. Luckett went to a Metro station a little after two in the afternoon and threw himself in front of a moving Metro train. The First Statement to Officer Fox When he first arrived at the hospita l, Respondent spontaneously spoke to Officer Fox, who had accompanied him to the hospital from th e Metro station. Respon dent volun teered to O fficer Fox that he had not mean t to kill his wife but that he had meant to kill Scales, because he believed that Scales was having an affair with his (R esponde nt's) wife. Re sponden t referred to 1 We have modified the recitation to substitute the term Respo ndent for the Co urt of Specia l Appeals use of the term the ap pellee, wh en referring to Mr. Lu ckett. -2- Scales as his enemy and said that he had wanted to kill Scales for eight and a half months. Respondent further stated that after he shot Scales, he threw the gun out of the c ar windo w. He als o stated that af ter the shoo tings, he tried to slit his wrists bec ause he d id not wan t to go to jail. [The Circuit Co urt] ruled tha t Res pondent's statements to Officer Fox were totally spontaneous and were not in response to any interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, ther efor e, did not a pply. Smith v. Sta te, 186 Md. App. 498, 520-22, 974 A.2d 991 (2009). The judge ruled: There is no evidence that either officer interrogated or came close to interrogating Mr. Luckett in any way. These statements were volunteered by Mr. Luckett. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U .S. 436 , 478. The corre ctness of th at ruling is not b efore us o n this appea l. The Second Series of Statements to Detective Selway On the next day, August 5, Detective Brian Selway, of the Homicide Division, took over the duty of being posted as guard at Respondent's hospital room. He came on duty at 7 A.M. Respondent awoke between 10:15 and 10:20 A.M. and immediately started talking. [The] Opinion of Court aga in well summarized Detective Selwa y's initial concern and his ob servations w ith respect there to[:] Det. Selw ay wa s con cern ed w ith M r. Lu cket t's level of alertness and asked him questions such as who the President of the United States was and what the Detective's first name was. Answering correctly, Det. Se lway ob served Mr. L uckett to be alert and responsive. Mr. Luckett also answered questions of hospital personnel and was aware of his surroundings. Selway watched as Mr. Luc kett joked w ith the hospita l staff whe n they came in to the room to monitor his medicines. Through the conversation Mr. Luckett rev ealed that he was aw are an arrest warrant had been is sued f or him. At 10:33 A.M. Detective Selway read Respondent his Miranda warnings from the sma ll busine ss card h e carried in his w allet. . . . You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have him with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before a statement is taken, if you wish. If you decide to give a -3- statement, you still have the right to stop at any time so you may talk to a lawyer. Respondent waive d those rights by sa ying, I un derstan d. From then until 2:20 P.M., Detective Selway simply listened as Respondent talked. Respondent reaffirmed that he believed that his wife had been having an affair with their son's football coach. He repeated his earlier statements to Officer Fox that he did not mean to k ill his wife and that he threw the gun away after shooting Scales at the barbershop. He also told Detective Selway that he kept a journal under the m attress in his be droom, an d he aske d Detectiv e Selway to retrieve it. At appro ximately 2:15 P.M. a District Court Commissioner arrived at Respondent's intensive care room. Respondent, in D etec tive S elway's presence, told the Comm issioner, I kn ow wh at I did was wrong. Respondent then asked, Is there any way I can get off the death penalty? The Commissioner responded that she could not give legal advice. [The Circuit Court s] primary concern with respect to those statem ents was whether Respon dent was in a sufficie ntly lucid state 1) to make a free and voluntary confession and 2) to make a free and voluntary w aiver of his Miranda rights. [The court] found that Respondent was lucid and rational and ruled that the motion to suppress those statements would, therefore, be denied[:] [T]he Court finds Detective Selway to be believable and places great weight o n his testim ony. A lthough Det. Selw ay was initially concerned about Mr. Luckett's state of mind, he concluded [that] Mr. Luckett w as lucid after asking him noninterrogational questio ns. The Court f inds tha t Mr. L uckett understood what he was sa ying and w as not impr operly coerced by Detective Selw ay into giving these statements. The C ourt concludes that the statem ents made to Detective Selway and the statement made in the presence of the Commissioner, Detective Selway and Detectiv e Co dero was mad e fre ely an d voluntarily. The Third Statement to Detective Barba This appeal by the State is taken only from [the Circuit Court s] decision to suppress a third statement, given by Respondent to Detective Matthew Barba on August 13, 2007. Detective Barba briefly visited Respondent in his hospital room on August 8, identified himself as the lead investigator in the two homicides with which Respondent was charged, dropped off a business card, an d said tha t he w ould be back o n anothe r day. Detective Barba returned on August 13 with audio/video equipment and a -4- technician with the hope of conduc ting a video taped interv iew with Respo ndent. Luckett, 188 M d. App . at 405- 09, 981 A.2d a t 838-4 1. The Circ uit Court rec ited in its written opinion w hat happe ned next: On August 13, 2007, at 12:35 p .m. Detective Barba along with Michael Coa tley, an audio te chnician, arriv ed at M r. Luckett s hospital room. After identifying himself Detective Barba stated that Mr. Luckett immediate ly engaged in conversati on with him asking him if he had found the tapes. Detective Barba was unsure as to what Mr. Luckett was asking. Barba indicated that he wo uld help h im out bu t that he need ed to get a w aiver first. Barba advised Luckett that he had certain r ights. Mr. Luc kett asked a bout his kids, his mother and gran dmother. With equipment set up, at approximately 12:52 p.m. Detective Barba began reading M r. Luckett his rights under Miranda v. Arizona[:] DETECTIVE BARBA: Like, like I said, I'm not here, I'm here to help. MR. LUCKE TT: Whatever you need. DETECTIVE BAR BA: O kay. I'm going to explain everything to you okay, um, I m Detective B arba, okay, I introd uced myself last week. I'm Detective Barba of the Prince Geo rge's Coun ty Police D epar tmen t, oka y. MR. LUC KETT: Yes. DETECTIVE BARBA: I'm going to read you your rights for this particular interview MR . LU CK ETT : Okay. DETEC TIV E BA RBA: that w e're g oing to ha ve, o kay. MR. LUC KETT: Yes. DETECTIVE BARBA: You do have rights. I'll also exp lain -5- that we have audio and video on right now, you do understand that? MR. LUC KETT: Yes. DETECTIVE BAR BA: Right? O kay. Now I'll read everything just like were, just call [sic] like Miranda rights. O kay. MR . LU CK ETT : Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA: If you don't understand anything that I'm saying to you, stop me. MR . LU CK ETT : Okay. DETE CTIV E BA RBA : Okay, I have no problem with that all right. No w I'm goin g to read e verything verb atim , oka y. MR. LUC KETT: Yes. DETECTIVE BARBA: And we'll go from there . All right, this is an advice o f rights and w aive rs fo rm, right here okay. MR. L UCK ETT: DETE CTIV E BA RBA : I'm going to show it to you afterward. You w ant to mov e your thing up a little bit? MR. L UCK ETT: Y eah, let me se e that. DETECTIVE BARB A: Okay. This is rights and waivers form. MR . LUC KET T: I und erstand [.] DETECTIVE BARBA: For our Prin ce G eorg e's County Police Departm ent. Today's date is Augus t 13, 2007 a nd the time is 12:52, okay. Um, I am now going to read you your rights under the law. If you do not understand something that I say to you, plea se sto p me and I'll ex plain them to you , oka y? -6- MR. LUC KETT: Yes. DETECTIVE BARBA: You have the right to remain sile nt, if you choose to give up this right, anything that you say can be used aga inst you in cour t. MR. LUC KETT: Yes. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you a re asked an y questions to have a lawyer present with you while you're being questioned , that's about this case spec ifica lly. MR . LU CK ETT : Okay. DETECTIVE BAR BA: Lik e I said, if we wa nt to talk about the Redskins, you don't need a lawyer for th at because it does not concern okay. Uh , if you want a lawyer and cannot afford, uh, a lawyer will be provided with you at not [sic] cos t, in a public defender, things [sic] or you can g et a p rivate attorne y. If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer, you still have the right to stop answering questions at any given time. MR . LU CK ETT : Okay. DETECTIVE BARBA: Now, you understand that? Do you understand these rights? MR. LUC KETT: Yes. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay that's you understand just check yes and then initial if you understand those rights. MR. LUC KETT: Just check yes? DETECTIVE BARBA: If you understan d the rights tha t I'm giving you. MR. LUCKE TT: Yeah. -7- DETECTIVE BARBA: And then initial. Okay. Have you been, uh, do you want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer present? And that could be the verbal one. We're not [background noise] written, normally I would take a written one, part of it will be a v erbal that w ould be us discussing the incident back and forth, do you want to do that[?] [Crosstalk] MR. LUC KETT : I'm sorry, if I say yes, we're going to discuss the inciden t right? DETECTIVE BARBA: Mm-hmm. MR. LUCKE TT: Would I be setting myself up? MALE V OICE: Huh? MR. LUCKE TT: Would I set, would I be setting myself up? MALE V OICE: You MR. LUCKETT: I mean I'm, I'm looking toward you for answer you know what I'm saying? MALE V OICE: Now which is would he be asking you.[2] DETE CTIV E BA RBA : MR. LUCKE TT: we're, we're going to discuss the case DETECTIVE B ARBA: You 2 The record on appeal includes the videotape recording of the exchange between Detective Barba and Respondent. It is apparent from the videotape that the Male Voice is that of a person who was positioned out of range of the camera. It is also apparent that Responden t s statements, Would I set, would I be settin g mys elf u p? and I mean I 'm, I'm looking toward you for answ er you know what I'm sa ying? are dire cted to that off-camera male v oice. -8- MR. LU CKET T: - -without my lawyer. DETECTIVE BA RBA: O kay, if we discuss any matters outside of the case, you don't need a lawyer pres ent at all period, o kay. MR. LUCKE TT: So DETECTIVE BARBA: We can talk about anything but the case MR. LUCKE TT: So I won't be hurting myself. DETECTIVE BARBA: If we talk about anything but the case, okay. MR. LUCKETT: Mm hmm. DETECTIVE BAR BA: I'm ju st letting yo u know that you do have rights o kay. MR . LU CK ETT : Ok ay. DETECTIVE BARBA: When w e are discussing matters of the case , when I a sk you som ethin g spe cific ally MR. LUCKETT: Mm hmm. DETECTIVE BARBA: or if you tell me something spec ifica lly, you have a right to have a lawyer present here, okay? MR . LU CK ETT : Okay. DETECTIVE BAR BA: What you're doing here is that you are giving up a right to having a lawyer present to tell me your side, okay. MR . LU CK ETT : Ok ay. -9- DETEC TIV E BA RBA: Y ou don't h ave t o do that, Oka y. MR. L UCK ETT: R ight. DETECTIVE BARBA: But for me to be able to present your side MR . LU CK ETT : Okay. DETECTIVE BAR BA: along with everything else that I'll be presenting MR. LUCKETT: Mm hmm. DETEC TIV E BA RBA: O kay, th en th at go es on my integrity. MR. LUCKE TT: All right, I know what you're saying. DETECTIVE BARBA: I'm going to give the full version of what's going on. MR . LU CK ETT : Okay. DETE CTIV E BA RBA : Okay. Do you understa nd that? MR. L UCK ETT: C orrect. DETECTIVE B ARBA: Okay. So you understand that you do have rights. MR. L UCK ETT: R ight. DETECTIVE B ARBA: You don't have to talk to me. MR. L UCK ETT: C orrect. DETECTIVE BARBA: Okay. Do you want to make a statement at th is time witho ut a lawyer pre sent? MR. LUC KETT: Yes. -10- At the end of that discuss ion, Respo ndent gav e a lengthy statem ent describin g his belief that his wife had been having an affair with M r. Scales, his activities during the months leading up to the murd ers, and the m urders them selves. Res ponden t repeated h is earlier statements to the police tha t he did not m ean to kill his w ife but he d id intend to kill Mr. Scales. Respondent said that he knew what he had done was wrong, and he was willing to accept my punishment and be accounta ble for my actions. He stated that he hoped Detec tive Ba rba wo uld not throw the boo k at me . In its written opinion, the Circuit Court set forth Respondent s arguments for why the videotape d statemen t to Detective Barba sh ould be su ppressed: Mr. Luckett s counsel argu es that Detective Barba s advice is defective in two respects: 1. The five-word statement of you don t need a lawyer is false and not a correct statement of the law . 2. The off er to help in presenting the case, the promise to help and the promise to investigate are violation[s] of Hillard v. State, 141 M d. App . 199, 78 4 A.2d 1134 ( 2001) . The Circ uit Court ad dressed the you don t n eed a law yer argume nt first: Detective Barba's statement you don't need a lawyer is not a correct recitation of the law and should never be spoken by any law enforcement officer to a person in custody unde r any circumstances. These w ords were related to Mr. Luckett two times in the videotape and according to Detective Barba, stated at least tw o other times. It appears fro m D etec tive B arba 's statement that he may have stated the same words b efore the tape was turned on as well. Any stateme nt that could possibly lead the defenda nt to misconstrue his rights under Miranda is contrary to the law requiring a knowing an d voluntary waiver. The Circuit Co urt also noted that Detectiv e Barba s hould hav e know n that anything Respondent might say during interrogation could compromise his defense: -11- By the ninth da y of investigatin g this matter, Detective Barba, a seasoned Prince George's County Officer, either knew or should have known that the defense would allege that Mr. Luckett was not criminally responsible for his actions, or that his sanity would be questioned. Any statement shedding light on his mental capacity or understanding, regardless of whether it was about this case or not, could b e relevant an d Mr. Lu ckett wou ld have gre atly benefitted from a counse l. Mr. Luckett's entire life was mo re or less in question at this time. This was not simply a domestic case as the State believes. Much more w as riding on the question ing of M r. Luckett at th is stage o f the inv estigatio n of th e case. The Circuit Court ruled that the exchange between Detective Barba and Res ponden t, considered in its entirety, failed to c onvey to Re sponden t his right to have a lawyer present during the interrogation: The De tective s off er to help w as not harm ful by itself, but his statement, you don t need a lawyer, combined with the Detective s other statement, without further explanatory statements from the Detective to Mr. Luckett make this advice o f rights invalid. Consequently, the court granted the motion to suppress the statement that Respondent gave to Detective Barba on Augu st 13, 2007 , on the basis th at it was give n in violation of Miranda. The Circuit Co urt did not decide Resp ondent s allegation that De tective Barba s offer to help in presenting the case, the promise to help and the promise to investigate was the product of one or more improper promises a nd thereby involuntary under M aryland s common law. The court explained that there was no need to do so because [t]he State has not ask ed that th e Cou rt make a determ ination o f whe ther the s tateme nt was volunt ary. The State noted an appeal from the grant of Respondent s motion to suppress the statement he gave to Detective Barba. The Court of Specia l Appeals affirmed the Circuit -12- Court, holding: [U]nder the totality of the circumstances, the unnecessarily lengthy and rambling discussion about the nature of the Miranda rights not on ly included spe cifically questionab le statements of the law bu t utterly failed effe ctively to communicate the message man date d by Miranda. Luckett, 188 Md. App. at 410, 981 A.2d at 841. We granted the State s petition for a w rit of certiorari to consider the following question: Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that Luckett s August 13, 2007 statement must be suppressed where that holding: 1) expands the concept of improper inducem ent to include situations where the interrogator makes no offers or promise s in exchan ge for a state ment; 2) is ba sed upon a flatly incorrect interpretation of the record; and 3) erroneously concludes that Luckett did not kno wingly waive his right to cou nsel[?] Upon our independent review of the facts developed at the suppression hearing,3 we affirm the judgm ent of the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals that Respondent s statemen t to Detective Barba was obtained in violation of Miranda s requirement that a suspect be properly advised of the right to counsel. We the refore need not address the State s assertion 3 In reviewing the Circuit Court s ruling on the motion, we consider o nly the facts and information contained in the record of the suppression hearing. Longsh ore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129, 1135 (2007). [W]e view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonab ly drawn there from in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion, here, Resp ondent. Owen s v. State, 399 Md. 388, 403, 924 A.2d 1072, 1080 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1144, 128 S. Ct. 1064, 169 L. Ed. 2d 813 (2008) (quoting State v. Rucker, 374 M d. 199, 2 07, 821 A.2d 4 39, 444 (2003 )). We defer t o the motions court s factual finding s and u phold t hem u nless the y are show n to be c learly erron eous. W e, however, make our own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the facts and circumstances of this case. Longshore, 399 Md. at 499, 924 A.2d at 1136 (quoting Jones v. Sta te, 343 M d. 448, 4 57, 682 A.2d 2 48, 253 (1996 )). -13- that the Court of Special Appeals wrongly interpreted the record. We also need not address the State s claim that the Court of Special Appeals wrongly expand[ed] the concept of improper inducement to include situations where the interrogator makes no offers or promises in exchange for a statemen t. To the ex tent that the inter mediate appellate court s opinion can be construed as add ressing the comm on law voluntariness o f Responden t s statement, it is dicta not necessary to the judgment affirming the Circuit Court s order suppressing Respon dent s statem ent solely because it was obtained in violation of Miranda.4 4 Our holding in this case affirming suppression of the confession on the basis of the Miranda violation means that the State may not use the confession in its case-in-chief. Should Respondent testify on his own behalf at trial in a manner that contradicts that confession, the State m ay want to im peach R esponde nt with that c onfession . The State would be permitted to employ the statement for impeachment purposes if, and only if, the Circuit Court first rules the confession was voluntary as a matter of federal and state constitutional law an d Ma ryland co mmo n law. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 22426, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645-46, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 3-5 (1971) (declaring th at statements inadmissib le under Miranda in the prosecution s case-in-chief are not barred for all purposes, provided that the trustw orthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards, and holding that the prosecution properly impeached the defendant on cross-examination with use of a Mirandaviolative statement, not challenged as involuntary, that contradicted the defendant s direct testimony); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1220, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 577 (1975) (applying the rule of Harris to permit the prosecution to use a Miranda-violative statement during its rebuttal case to impeach the defendant s direct testimony that contradicted the statemen t); State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 40-43, 50-51, 375 A.2d 1105, 111012, 1115-16 (1977) (recognizing the rule of Harris and Hass, but holding that the rule did not apply in that case because the Miranda-violative statement did not contradict the defendant s direct testimon y); State v. Fra nklin, 281 Md. 51, 60-61, 375 A.2d 1116, 1121-22 (1977) (applying Harris and Hass to hold that the State properly impeached the defendant with what this Court assumed was a Miranda-violative statement, not challenged as invo luntary, that contradicted the def endan t s direct t estimon y), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018, 98 S. Ct. 739, 5 4 L. Ed. 2d 764 (197 8); Hall v. State , 292 Md. 683, 688-89, 441 A.2d 708, 711 (1982) (applying Harris and Hass to uphold the prosecution s use of the defendant s (contin ued...) -14- II. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution , which ap plies to the States through the Fou rteenth A mend ment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L. Ed. 2d 6 53, 659 (1 964), prov ides in relevant part that [n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. C ONST. amend. V. To give force to the Constitution s protection against compe lled self-incrimination, the Court established in Miranda certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation. Florida v. P owell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1009, 1018 (2010) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2880, 106 L. Ed. 2d 166, 17 7 (198 9)). Accord Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218, 230, 849 A.2d 410, 417 (2004), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 546 U.S. 72, 126 S. Ct. 602, 163 L. Ed. 2d 4 (...continued) Miranda-violative statement to impeach the defendant s direct testimony that contradicted the state ment). We have mentioned that the Circuit Court did not rule on Respondent s voluntariness claim because th e State did not press for a ruling on the issue. Presumably the court was of the view that, unless and until the State sought to use the state ment for impeachment purposes, there was no need to decide the matter. Ordinarily, however, when a motion to suppress a statement raises both Miranda and voluntariness con cerns, the court should rule at the suppression stage on the voluntariness of the statement, even if the court also rules that the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. A voluntariness ruling at that time has obvious benefits. Th e evidenc e that was d eveloped on the issue is fresh in the minds of counsel and the co urt, the issue is fully ripe for decision, and a ruling at that time makes clear to both partie s before tria l the extent to which, if at all, the State may use the d efendant s stateme nt at trial. -15- 406 (2 005). The Supreme Court, intent on giv[ing] concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies a nd courts to follow, Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1018 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42, 86 S. Ct. at 1611, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 705), adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect s Fifth Amendment right from the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation, Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045, 1052 (2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S. Ct. at 1624, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 719). The measures adopted in Miranda stemmed from the Court s recognition that incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere, involves psychological pressures that work to undermine the individual s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he wou ld not otherwise do so freely. 384 U.S. at 445, 467, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 1624, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 707, 719. The prophylactic m easures de veloped in Miranda took the form of the now-familiar warnings that law enforcem ent personnel must d eliver to a suspect before undertaking any custodial interrogation: [A] suspect must be warned prior to any questioning [1] that he has the right to remain silen t, [2] that anything he says can be used aga inst him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the pre sence of a n attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questio ning if h e so des ires. Miranda, 384 U .S. at 479 , 86 S. C t. at 1630 , 16 L. E d. 2d at 7 26. The third of thos e warnin gs, at issue in the present case, addresses the particular -16- concern that [t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege [to remain silent] by his interrogators. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1018 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S. Ct. at 1625, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 721). [T]he need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any [custodial] questioning[.] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470 , 86 S. Ct. at 1626, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 721. And, [a]s with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, th is warning is an absolu te prerequisite to interrogation. . . . O nly through su ch a warn ing is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right. 384 U.S. at 471-72, 86 S. C t. at 1626 , 16 L. E d. 2d at 7 22. Although the warnings are invariable, the Supreme Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. Powell,130 S. Ct. at 1204, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1018 . See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 2809, 69 L. Ed. 2d 696, 701 (1981) (per curiam) ( This Court has never indicated that the rigidity of Miranda extends to the pr ecise fo rmulatio n of the warnin gs give n a crim inal def endan t. (internal quotation m arks omitted )); Rhode Is land v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 297 , 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1688, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 305 (1980) (safeguards against compelled self-incrimination include Miranda warnings or their equ ivalent ); Rush v. Sta te, 403 Md. 68, 84-89, 939 A.2d 689, 698-701(2008) (discussing sam e). Neverth eless, the wa rnings mu st reasona bly -17- con ve[y] to [a suspe ct] his rights as requ ired by Miranda. Powell,130 S. Ct. at 1204, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1019 (quoting Duckw orth, 492 U.S. at 203, 109 S. Ct. at 2880, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 177). Of course, the rights acco rded by Miranda can be waived. See 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628, 16 L. Ed . 2d at 724; Blake, 381 M d. at 236, 84 9 A.2d a t 421 ( Th e law is clear that a suspect may validly waive Miranda rights[.] ). Th e State has a h eavy bur den, however, to establish that a suspect has waive d those rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628, L. Ed. 2d at 724. The State must show that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the high standar[d] of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights [set forth in] Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed . 1461 (1938). Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219, 175 L. E d. 2d at 105 2 (citation om itted); White v. Sta te, 374 Md. 232, 251, 821 A.2d 459, 470 (2003 ), cert. denied, 540 U.S . 904, 124 S . Ct. 262, 157 L. Ed. 2d 189 (2 003). By this is m eant that: First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequ ences of th e decision to abandon it. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 421 (1986) (citation omitted ). Accord North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S . 369, 373, 9 9 S. Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L. Ed. 2d 2 86, 292 (1 979); McIntyr e v. State, 309 Md. 607, 614-15, 526 A.2d 30, 33-34 (1987). -18- In determining the constitutional adequacy of a suspect s waiver of the Miranda rights, the totalit y of the w arning s must b e exam ined. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 1141, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 421 ( O nly if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoe rced choic e and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been w aived. (citation omitted)); Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1019-20 (concluding that, [i]n combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell s right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of the interrogation, but at all times ); Duckw orth, 492 U.S . at 205, 109 S. Ct. at 2881, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 178 (holding that the warnings, in their totality, satisfied Miranda ); Rush, 403 Md. at 89-90, 939 A.2d at 701-02 (concluding that the totality of the advisem ents, both oral and written, com mun icate d all r ights aff orde d by Miranda). But if the warnings, viewed in the tota lity, in any way misstate the suspect s rights to silence and counsel, or mislead or confuse the suspect with respect to those rights, then the w arnings are constitutiona lly infirm, rendering any purported waiver of those rights c onstitutionally defective and requ iring suppre ssion of an y subsequen t statement. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486, 86 S. Ct. at 1629, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 725 (stating that the warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisite to the adm issibility of any statement by a defendant ). We bear these principles in mind as we consider the Miranda warnings given to Respo ndent. -19- III. Respondent successfully argued before the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appea ls that the Miranda warnings were incorrect and misleading, rendering his Miranda waiver unkn owing and th erefore invalid. T he State disagre es. The State points out that Detective Barba co rrectly informed Respondent of all of his Miranda rights at the outset of the exchange between the two. The State directs us to the following advisements by Detective Barba. He advised Respondent: You have the right to remain silent, if you choose to give up this right, anything that you say can be used ag ainst you in court. Detective Barba added: You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are asked any questions[,] to have a lawyer present with you while you're being questioned . . . . He further advised: [I]f you want a lawyer and cannot af ford [on e], a lawyer w ill be provided with [sic] you at no cost[,] and, If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer, you still have the rig ht to stop answering questions at any given time. Detective Barbara also asked Respondent if he understood those rights, and Respondent replied that he did. We agree with the State that those advisements comport with Miranda. The problem, however, does not lie in Detective Barba s recitation of the Miranda warnings we have just quoted. The problem in stead lies in the detective s further clarifications and explanations of the rights covered by those warnings. As we shall see, it is those comme nts that nullified what otherwise were proper warn ings, and rendered the Miranda advisement constitutionally defective. -20- When advising Respondent that he had the right to talk to a lawyer before you are asked any questions [and] to have a law yer present w ith you wh ile you're be ing que stioned , Detective Barba added, that s about this case, specifically. Detective Barba followed that statement with an example of the type of exchange that would not be considered interrogation accorded protection under Miranda: Like I said, if we want to talk about the Redskins, you don't need a lawyer for that because it does not concern okay. Following that, Responden t asked whether, in discussing the incident without a lawyer, he would be setting [himself] up in discuss[ing] the case without my lawyer. Respondent sought an answer to that concern from either Detective Barba or the unknow n male in the room . In answer to Respondent s concern, Detective Barba simply repeated the words that conveyed, in effect, that not all that he and Respondent might discuss during the interrogation was covered by the right to counsel: Okay, if we discuss any matters outside of the case, you don't need a lawyer present at all period. Okay. Then, when Respondent sought confirmation that he w ould no t be hu rting h imself, D etective Barba again repeated that Respondent did have rights but only [w]hen we are disc ussing matters of the c ase. Detective Barba re-emphasized, moreover, that not everything Respondent might say during interrogation was covered by the right to counsel: When or if you tell me something spec ifica lly, you have a right to have a lawyer present here. The detective ended these advisements with the following: What you're doing here is that you are giving up a right to having a lawyer present to tell me your side, okay. Shortly thereafter, Respondent -21- purported to waive h is Miranda rights by signing the form declaring that he understood the rights he was waiving. Detective Barba did not inform Respondent, as the detective should have done in answer to Respo ndent s qu ery about incrim inating him self, that anything Respon dent said during interrogation could incrim inate him. To the co ntrary, Detective Barba rep eatedly advised Respondent that any of his statements that were not directly related to the case (whatever the detective meant by the case ) were outside the purview of the right to counsel and, impliedly at least, no t subject to being used against Respondent at trial. Detective Barba s repeated explanatio ns of w hat Miranda does and does not protect during interrog ation w ere inco rrect as a matter o f law. Miranda covers any custodial exchange that occurs between interrogator and suspe ct, other than routine booking questions and the like.5 In other words, the protections afforded by Miranda extend to the entirety of the interrogation, from beginning to end, w ithout limitation on the m atters dis cussed . See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S . 675, 684, 1 08 S. Ct. 2093, 2099, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704, 715 (1988) (stating that [a] suspect's request for counsel 5 See Pen nsylvania v . Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528, 552 (1990). Note also the exceptions to Miranda that the Supreme Court announced in Illinois v. P erkins, 496 U .S. 292 , 296, 11 0 S. Ct. 2 394, 23 97, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 251 (1990) (conversations between suspects and undercover agents admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings) and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2631, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 557 (1984) (recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warning s be given in order to use a suspect s statement as evidence against him at trial). -22- should apply to any questions the po lice wish to pose ). Therefore, no police officer adv ising a suspect of his rights und er Miranda should intimate, much less declare affirmatively, a limitation upon the right to counsel. Detective Barba s statements that the right to counsel applied only to discussion of the specifics of the case, being wrong as a matter of law, rendered the advisements constitutionally infirm.6 The constitutional infirmity of the warnings rendered similarly infirm Respondent s subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights, because his purported waiver was not made with a f ull awareness of both the nature of th e right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Mora n, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 1141 , 89 L. Ed. 2 d at 421; see 6 Detective B arba s legally inco rrect advisem ents conce rning the sc ope of the right to counsel were enough to render the advisements constitutionally defective, and our conclusion in that regard provides the basis for our disposition in this case. We therefore need not consider the effect of other comments that Detective Barba made during the Miranda advisements, and which caugh t the attention of the Court of Special App eals. We refer here to Detective Barba s comment at the beginning of the recorded colloquy, Like, like I said, I m not here, I m here to help [,] and to h is comme nt much la ter during the colloquy that But for me to be able to present your side along with everything else that I ll be presenting, . . . then that goes on my integrity. The Cou rt of Specia l Appeals noted: T he inevitab ly seductive effect of repeated assurances tha t the interrogator is there to help the defendant is that the officer is presented as an alternative source of help. Such a choice is an unspoken inducement to waive the right to counsel. Luckett, 188 M d. App . at 419, 981 A.2d a t 846. Any statement o n the part of a police of ficer that attem pts to mislead, or has the effect of misleading , a suspect as to the scope of t he rights affo rded by Miranda renders the advisement defec tive. See 2 W AYNE R. L AF AVE, C RIMINAL P ROCEDURE § 6.9(c) (3d ed. 2000) ("[T]here is an absolute prohibition upon any trickery which misleads the suspect as to the . . . dimensions of any of the applicable rights."). We caution the police, and those advising them, that this C ourt will not to lerate any attemp t to mislead a su spect abou t the full scop e of t he rights affo rded by Miranda. -23- also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2611, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643, 656 (2004) (commenting that [b]ewilderment [is] an unpromising frame of mind for know ledgea ble dec ision ). Acc ordingly, we reject the State s central theme of the present appeal, which is essentially that, so long a s correct Miranda warnings are given, the inclusion of other misleading or, as in this cas e, flatly incorrect ad visements concerning those warnings has no adverse effect on the adequacy of the warnings. The State s thesis defies common sense, runs directly afoul of the requirem ent that Miranda adviseme nts be an alyze d in their total ity, and is contrary to the dictates of Miranda and its pr ogeny. We hold that a suspect is not properly informed of his or her Miranda rights when a statement of those rights, however correct the statement may be, is nullified by other incorrect statements concerning those rights. In that event, the Miranda advisements are constitutiona lly infirm, a purported waiver of those rights is constitutionally invalid, and any statement the police obtain from the suspect during the ensuing interrogation violates Miranda. Here, Detective Barba misadvised Respondent of his right to counsel under Miranda, rendering invalid his purported Miranda waiver and requiring suppression of Respondent s post- waiver statement to the detective. The Circuit Court s suppression ruling was correct, as was the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming that order. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF S P E C IA L A P P E A L S W I T H DIRECTION TO REMAND THE -24- CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE S COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT IN C O N S I S T E N T W I T H T H IS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY. -25-

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