Patterson Park v. Teachers Union

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Patterson Park Public Charter School, Inc., et al. v. The Baltimore Teachers Union, American Federation of Teachers Local 340, AFL-CIO, ET AL., No. 99, September Term, 2006. PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS - SECTION 9-106 (B) WAIVERS The Baltimore Teachers Union (the Union) and the Baltimore City Board of School Commissione rs (City Board) sought review of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City s decision that the Maryland State Board of Education was able to grant waivers of the provisions of Section 9-108 (a) o f the Edu cation Artic le dealing w ith public charter schools, and that the State Board had ori ginal jur isdiction over S ection 9 -106 (b ) waive r applica tions. C onversely, Patterson Park Public Charter School, Inc., and The Midtown Academy, Inc. sought review of the Circuit Court s decision to reverse the grant of Section 9-108 (b) waive rs by the State Board on the grounds that the Unions were denied the opportunity to participate in the waiver application process, and also of the Circuit C ourt s decision that the State Bo ard appropriate ly denied Midtown Academy s application for waivers of Sections 4-103 (a) and 6-201. Before a ny proceedin gs in the interm ediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals, on its own initiative, issued a writ of certiorari. The Court determined that, based upon the clear language of Section 9-106 of the Ed ucation Article, the State Boa rd may only grant waivers of provisions applying to all public schools, and not those specific to just public charter schools, and therefore Title 9's provisions were not subject to waiver under Section 9-10 6 (b). The Court further concluded th at, because lo cal boards o f educatio n have no authority to waive State laws and regulations, they had no jurisdiction over Section 9-106 (b) waiver applications implicating State laws or regulations, over which the State Board has original jurisdiction. The Court also held that the Unions, as the exclusive representative of Baltimore City school em ployees, had a statutory and fiduciary duty to represent the Baltimore City public school employees in the waiver proceedings, and thus the State Board erred by not giving the Unions proper no tice or opportunity to be heard in the waiver proceedings. The Court further concluded that the State Board s decision denying waivers requested by Midtown Academy under Sections 4-103 (a) and 6-201 w as within its au thority and was not inconsistent with law. The Court, therefore, vacated the Circuit Court s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings before the State Board of Education consistent with its holding. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 99 September Term, 2006 PATTERSON PARK PUBLIC CHARTER SCHO OL, IN C., et al. v. THE BALTIMORE TEACHERS UNION, A M E R I C A N F E D ER A T I O N OF TEACHERS LOCAL 340, AFL-CIO, ET AL. Bell, C.J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: May 11, 2007 In 1996, in the wake of a growing national movement toward the development of public charter school programs, the Baltimore City Public School System launched the New Schools Initiative, a pilot program through which private groups w ere reques ted to subm it requests-fo r-proposals to either establish n ew pub licly-funded sc hools with in Baltimo re City or to assume control over existing public schools. Report on the Final Evaluation of the City-State Partnership, Presented to: The New Baltimore City Board of School Commissione rs and the Maryland State Departmen t of Education 93 (December 3 , 2001). By 2001, five scho ols were p articipati ng in th e NSI progra m. Id. at 94. Although these schools were identical in substance and form to pu blic charter sc hools, beca use Ma ryland did not have public cha rter school en abling legisla tion, they were not eligible for grant monies from the Federa l Charter Sc hool Prog ram to aid in their start-up or m aintenance costs. Liz Bowie, Go Slow Policy On Charter Schools City Takes Wary Approach; 18 Groups Weigh Proposals; Sites Can t Open Until Fall 2005, http://www.cityneighbors.org/ press/sun051120 04.html (originally published in the Ba ltimore Sun, May 11, 20 04). The Federal Charter School Program was created in 1994 to provide financial assistance for the planning, program design, and initial implementation of charter schools for the purpose of increasing national understanding of the charter schools model and evaluating the effects of such schools, including the effects o n students, stu dent acad emic achievement, staff, and pare nts. 20 U .S.C. § 722 1 (2003). T he financ ial assistance is available, howev er, only to those States having legislation au thorizing the creation of public charter schools which provides for the review of each public charter school s performance every five years to ensure that the schools are fulfilling the terms of their charters; holds charter schools to the same accountability standards a s are other p ublic schoo ls; permits entities other than a local board of education to grant charters, or if limited to the local boards, permits an a ppeals pro cess; and als o grants the charter scho ols autonomy over their budget and expenditures. In support of the Federal Charter School Grant Program, the United States Department of Education undertook a n ationwide campaig n to presen t its model public charter school and encourage the States to adopt public charter school enabling legislation. In 1996, the United States Department of Education delivered a presentation to the Maryland State Board of Educ ation, prom pting it to assem ble a study gro up to provide the State Board w ith guidelines for implementing a qualifying public charter school program in Maryland. After exploring the public charter school legislation of 3 9 other State s, as well as that of the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and integ rating the State Board guidelines, the General Assembly enacted the Maryland Public Charter School Act in 2003. 2003 M d. Law s, Chap . 358. The Maryland C harter Scho ol Act w as codified as Title 9 of the Education Article, Section 9-101 of which provides: (a) Established. There is a Maryland Public Charter School Program. (b) Purpose. Th e general p urpose of the Progra m is to establish an alternative means within the existing public school 2 system in order to provide innovative learning opportunities and creative educational approaches to improve the education of students. Maryland Code (1978, 2004 Repl. Vol.), Section 9-101 of the Education Article.1 The Act defines a public charter school as a public school that : (1) Is nonsecta rian in all its programs, policies, and operations; (2) Is a school to which parents choose to send their children; (3) Is open to all students o n a space-a vailable basis and a dmits students on a lottery basis if more students apply than can be accommodated; (4) Is a new public scho ol or a conv ersion of a n existing pu blic school; (5) Provides a program of elementary or secondary education or both; (6)Operates in pursuit of a specific set of educational objectives; (7) Is tuition-free; (8) Is subject to federal and State laws prohibiting discrimination; (9) Is in compliance with all applicable health and safety laws; (10) Is in compliance with § 9-107 of this title; (11) Operates under the supervision of the public chartering authority from which its charter is granted and in accordance with its charter and, except as provided in § 9-106 of this title, the provisions of law and regulation governing other public schools; (12) Requires students to be physically present on school premises for a period of time substantially similar to that which other public school students spend on school premises; and (13) Is created in a ccordanc e with this title and the ap propriate county bo ard p olicy. Section 9-102 . 1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Maryland Code are to the 2004 Replacement Volume of the Education Article. 3 Section 9-106 (a) and (b) provide s that the pub lic charter sch ools shall co mply with the provisions of law an d regulation governing other public schools, and that a waiver of those requirements may be sought through an appeal to the S tate Bo ard [of Educ ation]. 2 Section 9-108 (a) provides that all employees of public charter schools [a]re public school emplo yees, with the right to be collectively represented, and the right to all of the benefits deriving from any existing collective bargaining agreements. Sections 4-103 (a) and 6-201 require that the county superintendent shall nominate for appointment all principals, teachers, and clerical p ersonnel o f the public school. In this case, ten Baltimore City public charter sch ools, including the Patterson P ark Public Charter School and The Mid town Ac adem y, Appellants, applied to the S tate Board 2 Section 9-106 provides: (a) In general. S ubject to subsec tion (b) o f this sec tion, a public charter school shall comply with the provisions of law and regulation governing other public schools. (b) Waiver. Subject to subsection (c) of this section, a waiver of the requirements under subsection (a) of this section may be sought through an appeal to the State Board. (c) Same Exceptions. A waiver may not be granted from provisions of law or regulation relating to: (1) Audit requirements; (2) The me asuremen t of student a cademic a chievem ent, including all assessments required for other public schools and other assessments mutually agreed upon by the public chartering authority and the school; or (3) The hea lth, safety, or civil rights of a student or an employee o f the charter school. 4 of Education for waivers of various State and local educational provisions. All requested waivers pertaining to Section 9-108 (a) of the Education Article, stating that public charter school employees a re public school employees and granting them the rig ht to be collec tively represented, were granted. Appellees, the Baltimore Teachers Union, American Federation of Teachers Local 340, AFL-CIO, and Baltimore Municipal Employees Union, American Federation of State, C ounty and M unicipal Em ployees, Cou ncil 67, Local 44 (the U nions ), the exclusive representative agents of Baltimore City public school employees, and the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners, petitioned for judicial review of the State Board s decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, from which both Appellants and Appellees subsequently noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, this Court, on its own initiative, issued a writ of certiorari. The first two issues that we are called upon to determine in this case concern some of the provisions for which Section 9-106 (b) waivers wer e sou ght; spec ifica lly, whether under Section 9-106 (b), th e State Board of Education may waive provisions found in Title 9 of the Education Article, and whether the Board improperly denied Midtown Academy s applica tion for waive rs of Se ctions 4 -103 (a ) and 6- 201. We shall hold that Section 9-106 (b) waivers are limited to provisions outside of Title 9 of the Education Article, and that the State Board of Education correctly denied Midtown Acad emy Ac adem y s reque st for w aivers o f Sectio ns 4-10 3 (a) an d 6-20 1. 5 The next two issues we must determine are procedural and entail whether the Unions had a right to intervene in the waiver application p rocess, and whethe r the applications were correctly submitted d irectly to the State Board of Educatio n withou t first being su bmitted to and reviewed by the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners. 3 3 In their appeals to the Court of Special Appeals, Patterson Park and Midtown Academy Academy presented three questions for review: I. Did the trial co urt err in holdin g that the state b oard lacked authority to grant waivers of Educ. § 9-108, [and § 9-105], Md. Code? II. Did the trial court err in holding that the Unions were necessary parties to any modification of existing collective bargaining agreements? III. Did the trial court err in determining that the State B oard denied the unions due process? In their cross-appeal, the Unions presented the following questions: I. Did the State Board violate Educ. §§ 9-108 and 9-106 and exceed its statutory authority by gra nting waivers from the employee status requirements under Educ. § 9-108? II. Do the Unions have standing to challenge the orders of the State Board g ranting the w aivers from the emplo yee status requirements under Educ. § 9-108? The City B oard prese nted the fo llowing q uestions in its c ross-appea l: I. Did the trial court err by holding that the City Board waived its right to contest the State Board of Education s process for deciding requests from charter school applicants for waivers of State law and regulations? (contin ued...) 6 We shall hold that the Unions had a right to intervene in the waiver application proceedings and that the State Board of Education has original jurisdiction over waiver applications submitted pursu ant to Section 9-106 (b ). I. Background Midtown Academ y was foun ded in 1997 under the Baltimore City Public School System s New Schools Initiative p rogram. T he schoo l serves the B altimore C ity neighborhoods of Bolton Hill and Reservoir Hill and provides education for students in kindergarten through eighth grade. In No vember o f 2004, M idtown A cademy ap plied to convert to a public c harter scho ol in order to q ualify for fed eral grant m onies, and its application was granted in January of 2005. The Patterson P ark Public C harter Scho ol, Inc., serves th e Baltimore City neighborhoods of Patterson Park, Patterson Place, B utchers H ill, Fells Prospe ct, Highlandtown and Canton and provides education for students from kindergarten through eighth grade. Patterson Park applied for its charter in August of 2004, which was granted in November of the same year, with a September, 2005, opening date. Eight othe r Baltimore City public charter schools also submitted applications to the 3 (...continued) II. Did the trial c ourt err by holding that the State Board was authorized to waive the law governing charter schools? III. Did the trial court err by affirming the State Board s decision on waiver requests which created new procedures under the guise of deciding waiver requests? 7 State Boa rd of Edu cation in 20 05 for w aivers of v arious prov isions of bo th local and State educational requirements. The City Neighbors Pu blic Charte r School, In c. ( City Neighbors ) submitted its waiver application on May 18, 2005, which it revised on June 18, 2005, followed by that of Patterson Park and the Southwest Baltimore Charter School s on May 20, 2005; the Crossroads School s on May 23, 2005; Midtown Academy s on May 27, 2005; the KIPP Ujima Village Academy s ( KIPP ) on June 1, 2005; the Empowerment Academy s on June 2, 2005 ; the Inner Harbor East Academy s on June 24, 2005; the Baltimore Curriculum Project, Inc. s o n June 30 , 2005; and the North wood A ppold Comm unity Academy s on July 11, 2005.4 All ten of the schools applications requested 4 In addition to requests for waivers of various local rules and regulations, all ten of the schools sought w aivers of Sections 9-108 (a), 6-401 (d), and 6-501 (f), which state that all certified and non-certified (employees not holding Maryland certifications) public charter school employees a re public sch ool emplo yees and are e ntitled to the same collective bargaining rights. Sections 4-103 (a), 4-311, and 6-501 which provide that employees who are not employed by BCPSS will be employed by the charter school or its operator an d are not subject to existing collective bargaining agreements. All but the Empowerment Academy requested waivers of Sections 4-103 (a) and 6201 which require that the superintendent of the local board of education shall nominate for appointm ent all principa ls, teachers, and clerical perso nnel. City Neighbors, Patterson Park, Southwest Baltimore, KIPP, Inner Harbor East, and Northw ood Ap pold requested waivers of Section 9-101 which provides that public charter schools be open to all students in Baltimore on a space-available basis, and admit stude nts on a lotte ry basis if m ore app ly than the re are sp aces av ailable. City Neighbors, Patterson Park, Southwest Baltimore, KIPP, The Empowerment Aca dem y, Inner Ha rbor East, the Baltimore Curriculum Project, and North wood A ppold applied for waivers of Sections 5-112 and 4-310 which require that the public charter schools procure items over a certain amount through competitive bidding processes. City Neighbors, Southwest Baltimore, Midtown Academy, KIPP, The Empowerment Aca dem y, and the Baltimore Curriculum Project applied for waivers of Section 9-105 which (contin ued...) 8 waivers of Sections 9-108 (a) of the Education Article,5 which p rovides tha t all charter school 4 (...continued) requires that professional staff hold the appropriate Maryland certification. Patterson Park, Inner Harbor East, and Northwood Appold requested waivers of Section 4-316, which places the staffing and personnel nominations, assignments, promotions, transfers, evaluations, and salaries, as well as temporaries employees and reductions or remov als of staff d ecisions in the hands of the Baltimore City School Board, and Sections 4-111 (a)(1), 4-205 (h)(i) and 7-106, which places the superintendent of the Baltimore City School Board in charge of the school curriculum and guidelines. City Neighbors, Patterson Park, Southwest Baltimore, KIPP, Inner Harbor East, the Baltimore Curriculum Project, and Northw ood Ap pold applied for waivers of Sections 7-103 (b), 6-408 and 6-510, which sets the opening and closing days, the holida ys, and the leng th of the school days. Patterson Park and Inner Harbor East ap plied fo r waive rs of Se ction 7- 101.1 which requires that pre-kindergarten programs be offered. City Neighbors, Patterson Park, Southwest Baltimore, Inner Harbor East, and Northwood Appold also requested waivers of COMAR 13A.06.01.02 and 13A.06.01.05 whi ch re quire tha t the B altim ore C ity Bo ard o f Ed ucat ion a ct as the school fo od autho rity. 5 Section 9-108 provides: (a) In general. Employee s of a pub lic charter sch ool: (1) Are public school employees, as defined in §§ 6-401(d) and 6-501(f) of this article; (2) Are em ployees of a p ublic school em ployer, as defin ed in §§ 6-401(e) and 6-501(g) of this article, in the county in which the public charter school is located; and (3) Shall have the rights granted un der Title 6, Subtitles 4 and 5 of this article. (b) Collective bargaining agreement. If a collective bargaining agreement under Title 6, Subtitle 4 or 5 of th is article is already in existence in the county where a public charter scho ol is located, the employee organization and the public charter school may mutually agree to negotiate amendments to the existing agreement to address the needs of the particular public charter school. Public school employee is defined in two contexts, with regard to those employees (contin ued...) 9 employees are public school employees with the right to be collectively represented and the right to all of the benefits deriving from any existing collective bargaining agreements. Each of th e sch ools subm itted reas ons f or re questing the w aive rs; sp ecif ically, Appellant, Patterson Park requested that 5 (...continued) that hold Maryland certificates, and those that do not. Thus, public school employee is defined as a certificated p rofessiona l individual who is employed by a public scho ol employer o r an individu al of equiv alent status in Baltimore City, e xcep t for a cou nty superintendent or an individual designated by the public school employer to act in a negotiating capacity as provided in §§ 6-408(b) of this subtitle. Section 6-401 (d)(1). Public school employee also is defined as: (1) . . . [A] nonc ertificated individual who is employed for at least 9 months a year on a full-time basis by a public school employer. (2) "Public sch ool emplo yee" includes a noncertificated employee in Baltimore City notwithstanding that the noncertificated employee does not work for at least 9 months a year on a full-time basis. (3) "Public school employee" does not include: (i) Mana gement p ersonnel; (ii) A confidential employee; or (iii) Any individual designated by the public school em ployer to act in a negotia ting capacity as p rovided in § 6-510 (b) o f this subtitle. Section 6-501 (f). Title 6, Subtitles 4 and 5, grant all public school employees the right to form, join, and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choice for the purpose of being represented on all matters that relate to salaries, wages, hours, and other working conditions. Sections 6-40 2 (a) and 6-503 (a). 10 all personne l who are not full-time instructional staff be employees of [Patterson Park s] operator, Imagine Schools, Inc. and therefore . . . no t . . . subject to collec tive bargaining agreements. This is especially important for the principal of the school. It allows the Operator to hire non-traditional, but highly qualified, candidates. Most importantly, it enables the O perator to hire and supervise the main p erson wh o will imple ment its mission and who will be the mentor for the rest of the professional staff. In order for [Patterson Park] to be cost effective and innovative in its program and delivery of services, the school must be able to attract and employ administrators, custodial, instructional aides and specialists who are not employees of the school system. [Patterson Park] desires to attract qualified members of the community and parents who would not otherwise be part of the BCPSS system. Appellan t, Midtow n Acad emy, cited the following bases for its Section 9-108 (a) waiver request: 6 While Midtown is prepared to limit its hiring of full-time primary classroom teachers . . ., [and] principal or director to . . . individu al[s] employe d by th e Syst em, n ominate d by the [superinte ndent], and subject to the applicable collective bargaining agreement, it seeks to maintain the ability it has enjoyed for 8 years as a New Initiative School to employ individuals as employees of the [nonprofit] operator ( The Midto wn A cadem y Inc. ), fre e of the se restric tions. *** Many of the positions for which we seek waiver are either non- 6 With regard to its request for waivers of Sections 4-103 (a) and 6-201, Midtown Academy set forth the same reasons as it set forth for its requests of Sections 9108(a) , 6-401 (d) and 6-501 (f), statin g See I above . 11 existing in the System . . . or rare. We have found it far easier to recruit highly qualified individuals in the art, music and language arts areas ou tside of the S ystem than w ithin it. The positions Midtown Academ y cited for needing the waiver were resource teachers, instructional assistants, a Volunteer Coordinator, and other po sitions that do n ot typically exist in the school system, such as a Tae Kwan Do7 instructor.8 On June 20, 2005, D r. Nancy S. G rasmick, Sta te Superinten dent of S chools, w rote to the Baltimore City Public School System ( BCPSS ) requesting comments on the waiver applications. The BC PSS resp onded b y stating that it objec ted to the Sta te Board s review of the waiver applications, which it alleged the State B oard had no author ity to do under T itle 9 of the Education Article. BCPSS asserted that the Baltimore City Board of Education should first be allowed to consider any waiver requests, an d if the requ ests pertain to local rules or regulation s, the City Board has the authority to grant or deny the waivers. If, however, the requests pertain to Sta te regulations, and the City Board agre es that the waivers should be granted , BCPS S contend ed that the C ity Board could then seek a waiver from the State Boa rd on beh alf of the ch arter schoo l applicant. The Unions, as the designated exclusive representative for certified and non-certified 7 Tae Kwan D o is the Korean art of unarmed self-d efense characterized especially by the extensive use of kicks. Merriam-Webster s Collegiate Dictionary 1272 (11th ed. 2005). 8 The majority of the other schools also cited the need to staff positions not provided for in the BCPSS model school system, for example, the Crossroads School stated that it needed to hire a Director of Instruction, a Dean of Students and Families, and a High School Transition C oordinator. 12 education al, service, maintenance, food service, and transportation employees of the Baltimore County Public School System, also notified the State Board of Education that they objected to the waiver applications and requested, to no avail, to intervene in the waiver proceedings.9 Midtown Academy subsequently filed an opposition to both the BCPSS s objections to the waiver process and the Unions motions to intervene in the waiver process. Midtown argued that the Un ions interests were sufficiently represented by the BCPSS s involvement and, therefore, their intervention would be superfluous. Midtown Academy further alleged that the BCPSS was estopped from asserting original jurisdiction over the waiver application process because it a dvised the p ublic charter schools to address all applications to the State Board. Further, Midtown Academy also argued that, because it was not given any notice of the BCPSS s objections to the waiver applications, the objections should be rejected. On July 22, 2005, in a closed, executive session, and without further communication with either the BCPSS or the Unions, the State Board voted on all but Northwood A ppold Community Academy s waiver applications , generally denying all but a limited number of the requests. In its opinions published July 29, 2005, the State Board granted the requested waivers regarding Section 9-1 02 (3), which req uires that all cha rter schools b e open to a ll 9 The record shows that the Unions wrote to both Valerie V. Cloutier, the Principal Counsel for the State Board of Education, and Dr. Edw ard L. Root, President of the State Board of Education, objecting to the w aiver applica tions and se eking to inte rvene in the wa iver pro ceedin gs. 13 students on a space-available basis, under the following conditions: [The public charter school] shall admit on a priority basis children of founders who are listed on the original charter application a nd re side in Baltim ore C ity. And with regard to all ten applications fo r waivers of Section s 9-108 (a), the State Boa rd conclude d that: [w]ith the excep tion of pos itions not curr ently offered b y the Baltimore City Public Sch ool System su ch as that of a karate teacher, all employees of [the pu blic charter sc hool] are pu blic school employees s ubject to applicable collective bargaining provisions unless modifications are negotiated under Educ. § 9108 (b). The State Board issued the same ruling on Augus t 4, 2005, reg arding the N orthwoo d Appo ld Commu nity Academy s requested w aiver of Section 9-10 8 (a). On August 26, 2005, the Unions filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the State Board s rulings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to Section 10-222 of the State Government Article,10 on the grounds that, although they were entitled under Maryland 10 Section 10 -222 of th e State Go vernmen t Article prov ides in pertine nt part: (a) Review o f final decisio n. (1) Exc ept as prov ided in subsection (b) of this section, a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this section. (2) An agency, including an agency that has delegated a contested case to the Office, is entitled to judicial review of a decision as provide d in this section if the agen cy was a par ty before the agency or the Office. (contin ued...) 14 Rule 7-202 (c)11 to participate in the waiver proceedings, they were not given notice of the administrative hearings concerning the waiver requests, and that, as a result, they were not able to perform their statutory and fiduciary duties to the Baltimore City Public School System employees. In support of their petition, the Unions filed a memorandum alleging that waivers are only permitted with regard to regulations governing other pub lic schools, not those pertaining to charter scho ols, and bec ause the co llective bargaining rights f ound in Section 9-108 pertain sp ecifically to public charter schools, they are not subject to w aiver. On August 29, 2006, the Baltimore C ity Board of School C ommissioners (the City Board ) filed ten separate petitions for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, on the grounds that the State s Board improperly exercised original jurisdiction over the applications because Section 9-106 (b) provides that the State Board may only consider waiver requests on appeal, and that the appeal process, governed by COMAR 13A.01.05.01, et seq., envisions appeals to the State Board from waiver decisions first made 10 (...continued) Maryland Code (1 984, 199 4 Repl. V ol.), Section 1 0-222 (a) o f the State Government Article. 11 Maryland Rule 7-202 (c) provides: The petition shall request judicial review, identify the order or action of which review is sought, and state whether the petitioner was a party to the agency proceeding. If the petitioner was not a party, the petition shall state the basis of the petit ione r's standing to seek judicial review. No other allegations are necessary. If judicial review of a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is sought, the petitioner shall attach to the petition a certificate that copies of the petition were served pursuant to subsection (d) (2) of this Rule. 15 by a county board of education or the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners. Midtown Academy also filed a petition for judicial rev iew of the State Board s denial of several of their requested waivers.12 In addition to its arguments supporting the State Board s grant of the Section 9-108 (a) waivers, Midtown also asserted, among other arguments, that the Board erroneously denied its requested waivers of Sections 4-103 (a)13 and 6-201,14 provisions which require the Superintendent of the City Board to nominate for 12 Midtown Academy joined in the petition of KIPP Baltimore, Inc., the charter holder for Midtown Academy, KIPP, City Neighbors, and Southwest Baltimore. 13 Section 4-1 03 (a) prov ides that: On the written recommendation of the county superintendent and subject to the provisions of this article, each cou nty board shall: (1) Appoint all principals, teachers, and other certificated and nonce rtificated person nel; and , (2) Set their salaries. 14 Section 6-2 01 provid es in pertinen t part: (a) Authority of county board to employ personne l. The cou nty board shall employ indiv iduals in the p ositions that the county board considers necessary for the operation of the public sc hools in the cou nty. (b) Appo intmen t of profe ssiona l person nel. (1) The county superintendent shall nomin ate for app ointment by the county board: (i) All profes sional assistan ts of the off ice of cou nty superintendent; and, (ii) All principa ls, teachers, and other certifica ted person nel. *** (contin ued...) 16 appointment all principals, teachers and clerical personnel of the charter school. Midtown Academy contende d that the p ower to hire is the lifeblood of any organization, and that the inability to nominate its own staff and p ersonnel in hibited its ability to eff ectuate its goa ls and desired results. Patterson Park filed motions to intervene in both the Un ions and the City Board s actions for judicial review, alleging that the State Board had the authority under both Section 9-106 of the Education A rticle and COM AR 13A .01.01.02-1 15 to grant w aivers of its 14 15 (...continued) (c) Appointm ent of clerical non professiona l personne l. (1) Except in Worcester County and Baltimore City, the county superintendent shall appoint clerical and other nonprofessional personne l. COMA R 13A.01.01.02-1 provides: A. Authority. Upon a demonstration of good cause, substantial compliance, or comparable effort by an educational institution or program seeking a waiver, the State Board of Education may grant waivers from its regulations. B. Term. (1) The term of a waiver may not exceed 3 years. (2) Requests to renew waivers for additional 3-year terms may be filed with the State Superintendent of Schools. C. Procedure. (1) The head of an educational institution or program, including an institution of higher education, or the local superintendent of schools on behalf of a school or school system, shall file a waiver request with the State Superintendent of Schools. The request shall include a description of the desired outcome and an explanation of why the waiver is necessary and justifiable under the circumstances. (2) The State Superintendent of Schools s hall submit to the State (contin ued...) 17 regulations and any othe r law or reg ulation gov erning pu blic schools , except w ith regard to audit requirements, the measu rement of student aca demic ach ievemen t, and the hea lth, safety or civil rights of a student or employee. F urther, Patterso n Park arg ued that the Unions d id not have standing to contest the State B oard s dec isions beca use the pro ceedings a pplied only to non-Baltimore City public school employees, who are not members of the Unions, and thus the Unions themselves were not affected by the State Board of Education s decisions. The Unions also filed a Motion to Consolidate all of the petitions for judicial review of the State Board s public charter sch ool waive r opinions, w hich the co urt subsequ ently granted. A hearing on the petitions for judicial review was held in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City o n Jan uary 2 4, 20 06, a t which c ounsel for the Un ions , the C ity Board, th e Empowerment Academy, Patterson Park, Midtown Academy, KIPP, City Neighbors, and Southwest Baltimore schools participated in oral arguments and subsequently filed supplemental memo randa m ore full y discussin g the issu es here tofore i dentifie d. On April 6, 2006, the Court issued a written order reversing the State Board s grant of waivers 15 (...continued) Board of Education each waiver request with in 45 calendar days of its receipt with a recommendation for either granting or denying the waiver, specifying its term, and pro viding written justification fo r any recomm ended de nial. (3) The State Board of Education shall render a decision at its next regularly sched uled mee ting. The d ecision of the S tate Board o f Educa tion on a w aiver reque st is final. 18 pertaining to Section 9-108 (a). The court determined that the Unions, as necessary parties to the proceedings, were improperly denied their right to intervene because: The Baltimore City Public School System and the Unions entered into collectiv e bargaining agreemen ts. The Unions w ere thus the barg aining a gents o f said em ployees, s ubject to that agreeme nt. These public charter schools are Baltimore City public schools. And, em ployees of the se public charter scho ols are Baltim ore City p ublic em ployees. The Unions existing contracts were modified without the Unions participation in the proceedings. Section 9-108 (b) s upports the proposition that the Un ions were indispe nsable parties to the actio n. . . . That is, § 9-108 re cognizes th at where collective bargaining agreeme nts already exist, both the unions and the public charter school(s) must participate in any discussion of change to the contract or collec tive barg aining a greem ent. Modifying existing contracts cannot be done without the presence of all parties to the contract neither in court nor in private negotiations. In this case, the charter schools sought waivers f rom the [S tate Board] to modify existing collective bargaining agreements. In granting those waivers, the [State Board] violated Rule 2-214 (a), i.e., the requirement that all public schools recognize negotia ted colle ctive ba rgainin g agree ments. . . . This Court finds that the [State Board] erred as a matter of law in grantin g waiv ers of E duc. § 9 -108, where the Unions we re necessary parties to any modification of existing collective bargaining agreements between them and the BCPSS. The court also determined that public charter school waivers c ould be granted for provisions founds in Title 9 because S ection 9-10 6 (b), whic h govern s public cha rter schools waivers, permits waivers of all provisions of law governing other public schools, and the plain language of Educ. § 9-106 (a) states that a public charter school shall comply with provisions of law governing other public schools, and that other public schools refers to traditional, non-charter, public schools. Regardless of the 19 linguistic gymnastics being used by the parties, Educ. § 9-106 (a) clearly states that public charter schools are not governed solely by Title 9 of the Education Article, but are governed by all of the laws traditional public schools are governed by. Public charter schools are public schools. The court further affirmed all of the State Board s decisions with regard to all other requested waivers, denied the cross-petition of KIPP, Crossroads Aca dem y, Midtown Academy, and Southwest Charter School, and remanded the case to the State Board of Education for further proceedings consistent with its decision. Patterson Park and Midtown noted timely appeals to the Court of Special A ppeals, to which the Unions and the City Board filed cross-app eals. This Court granted a writ of certiorari on its ow n initiativ e, Patterson Park v. Baltimore Teachers, 396 Md. 11, 912 A.2d 647 (200 6), prior to any pro ceedings in the intermed iate appellate c ourt. Before this Court, Patterson Park argues that Section 9-106 (b) of the Education Article requires that waiver applications be submitted to the State Board of Education, not the City Board, because th e waiver re quests implicated S tate educatio n law, and thus, could only be granted by the State Bo ard. It further alleges that the trial court erred in holding that the Unions we re necessary parties to the waiver process be cause the re quested w aivers wo uld not impact any existing collective bargaining agreements and, as such, the Unions had no standing in the waiver proceedings. For this reason, Patterson Park contends that this case is distinguishable from Baltimore Teachers Union v. Maryland State Board of Education, 379 Md. 19 2, 840 A.2d 72 8 (2004). 20 Midtown Academy adopts the arguments of Patterson Park and adds that Section 9106 (c) is the only limitation on the State Board s waiver authority, which by its terms, prohibits waivers of audit requirements, the measu rement of student aca demic achievem ent, and the health, safety and civil rights of students or employees, and therefore any requested waivers not pertaining to these three categories are subject to waiver. Midtown Academy further alleges that the language of Section 9-106 (a), allowing for waivers of all regulations governing other public scho ols, necess arily includes pu blic charter sc hools because they are public schools. Midtown Academy contends therefore, that the State Board should have granted its requested waivers of Sections 4-103 (a) and 6-201 because these reque sts were consistent with the letter a nd spirit of the Public Ch arter Schoo l Act. It mainta ins that, to deny these waivers, which would provide it greater autonomy in implementing its alternative educational programs, is to underm ine the statuto ry purpose fo r the Public C harter Scho ols Act to establish alternative means within the existing public school system . . . to improve the education of the students. The City Board responds that Section 9-106 (b) permits the Sta te Board to hear appeals of waiver applications which, they argue, clearly grants original jurisdiction over such applications to the local boards of education. It contends that this argument is further supported by COM AR 13 A.01.01.0 1.B, whic h outlines the appeal pro cess for de cisions rendered by local school boards, providing that all appeals are handled by the State Board. The City Board also maintain that Section 9-106 (b) does not permit the w aiver of all S tate 21 law requirements which, it asse rts, would u ndermine the very structure creating pu blic charter schoo ls. The Unions adopt the arguments of the City B oard and further po sit that all requireme nts for public charter scho ols found in Title 9 are n ot subject to waiver, including the collectiv e barga ining re quirem ents of Section 9-108 . The Union s therefore maintain that the State Board s grant of Section 9-108 waivers exceeded its statutory authority and, as such, its actions were ultra vires. The Unions further contend that they ha ve standing to challenge the State Board s decisions under this Court s holding in Baltimore Teachers Union because the decisions have the effect of diminishing the size of th eir bargainin g unit. II. Analy sis This case arises out of the S tate Board of Educ ation s decisio ns regardin g certain public charter schools waiver requests. The State Boa rd of Education s authority over the educational system is unique in the annals of administrative agencies. As [t]he head of the Department [of Education], it is vested with the power to determine policies and set forth bylaws, rules and regulations for the administration of public schools, as well as interpret both statutory provisio ns of the E ducation A rticle, and its ow n by-laws, rule s, and regulati ons. Se ctions 2 -101 an d 2-20 5. We noted in Board of Education for Dorchester County v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 506 A .2d 625 (1986 ), that, [w]hile administrative agencies generally may interpret statutes, as well as rule upon other lega l issu es, an d wh ile an agen cy's 22 interpretation of a statute w hich it adm inisters is entitled to weight, the paramount role of the State Boa rd of Edu cation in interpreting the public education law sets it apart from most administrative agencies. Id. at 790-91, 506 A .2d at 633 (footnote om itted). We recently reviewed the authority of the State Board of Education in Board of Education of Talbot County v. Heister, 392 Md. 140, 896 A.2d 342 (2006), stating: Our cases have long made clea r that the State Board has v ery broad statutory authority over the administration of the public school system in this State. *** In Wilson v. B oard of E duc. of M ontgom ery Cou nty, we noted that [t]he totality of the se provision s, quite plainly we think, invests the State Board with the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education. This has be en described as a visitatorial power of the most comprehensive character . We have had occasion to explain the scope and purp ose of this visitatorial power: We think it beyond question that the power of visitation vested in the State Board is one of general control and supervision; it authorizes the State Board to superintend the activities of the local boards of education to keep them within the legitimate sphere of their operations, and whenever a controversy or dispute arises involving the educational policy or proper administration of the public school system of the State, the State Board s visit[atorial] power authorizes it to correct all abuses of authority and to nullify all irregular proceedings. *** 23 The State Board s powers are not without limit or their exercise unreviewable. . . . [T]he State Board may not decide finally purely legal questions, and may not exercise its pow ers arbitrarily or ca pricious ly. Regarding the first listed limitation, however, we have noted, in the context of decision-making by administrative bodies generally, that with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the a dminis trative ag ency. Id. at 152-155, 896 A.2d at 349-51 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted ). See also Halsey v. Bd. of Educ. of G arrett Cou nty, 273 Md. 56 6, 572, 331 A.2d 30 6, 309 (19 75) ( [Th e State Board] canno t be asserted to finally decide purely legal questions. ). Thus, the decisions of the State B oard of Educ ation are en titled to greater deference than those of most other administrative agencies. Heister, 392 Md. at 155, 896 A.2d at 351. A. Whether Title 9 Provisions are Subject to Waiver The Unions and City Board contend that the State Board has contravened the State statute by granting waivers of Section 9-108 (a). Both the City Board and the Unions contend th at any provision found in Title 9 of the Educ ation Article, w hich gove rns public charter schools, cannot be waived because Section 9-106 (b) only permits waivers of provisions governing other public schools. The Circuit Court, however, disagreed with the Unions and the City Board, concluding that public ch arter schoo ls are public sc hools w hich are n ot govern ed solely by Title 9 of the Education Article, but are governed by all of the laws trad itional public schools are governed by. In short, because Section 9-108 (a) provisions are not enumerated among those prov isions exem pt from w aiver in Section 9-106 (c), they are subject to waiver. 24 We disag ree with the conclusion of the Circ uit Court. Whether the provisions of Title 9 of the Education Article are subject to Section 9-106 (c) waiver s is a question of statutory interpretation. In conducting statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always to to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp. v. Yanni, __ Md. __, __, A.2d __ , (2007) (No. 67, September Term, 2006) (filed March 15, 2007); In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 468, 906 A.2d 91 5, 936 (20 06); General Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352, 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. Yanni, __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __ ; In re: Kaela C., 394 Md. at 46 7, 906 A .2d at 936; Kane v. Bd. of Appeals o f Prince G eorges C ounty, 390 Md. 145, 162, 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2005); Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep t of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 356 Md. 180, 194, 738 A.2d 856, 860-6 1, 863 ( 1999) . Further, whenever possible, an interpretation should be given to the statutory provisio ns wh ich doe s not lea d to abs urd con sequen ces. E.g., Roskell v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 53, 912 A.2d 65 8, 673 (20 06); So. Easton Neighborhood Assoc. v. Town of Easton, 387 Md. 468, 495, 876 A.2d 58, 74 (2005 ). See also Smack v. Dep t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305, 835 A.2d 1175, 1 179 (2003) ([T]he statu te must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or inco mpatible w ith 25 common sense. ). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our ana lysis ends. City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427, 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006 ), quoting Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604-05, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004). If h oweve r, the langua ge is subjec t to more tha n one interp retation, it is ambiguous, and we r esolve th at am bigu ity by lo okin g to the statute 's legis lativ e history, case law, and statutory purpo se. Oakland v. Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (20 06); Canaj, Inc. v. Baker a nd Div. Phase III, 391 Md. 374, 403, 893 A.2d 1067, 1084 (2006); Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591, 865 A .2d 590, 594 (200 5). Section 9-1 06 of the M aryland Pub lic Charter S chool A ct provides that: (a) In general. S ubject to subsec tion (b) o f this sec tion, a public charter school shall comply with the provisions of law and regulation governing other public schools. (b) Waiver. Subject to subsection (c) of this section, a waiver of the requirements under subsection (a) of this section may be sought through an appeal to the State Board. (c) Same Exceptions. A waiver may not be granted from provisions of law or regulation relating to: (1) Audit requirements; (2) The me asuremen t of student a cademic a chievem ent, including all assessme nts required fo r other pub lic schools and other assessments mutually agreed upon by the public chartering authority and the school; or (3) The health, safety, or civil rights of a student or an employee o f the charter school. The clear implica tion of this sec tion is that any pro vision app lying to all public schools, and not those specific to just public charter schools, or those listed in subsection (c), may be waived. Title 9 does not govern all public schools, Title 9 governs only public charter 26 schoo ls. Thus , Title 9's p rovision s are no t subjec t to waiv er unde r Sectio n 9-10 6 (b). The language of Section 9-102 of the Education Article,16 Definitions, further supports this interpretation. Section 9-102 provides that a public charter school is a public school tha t [i]s created in accordan ce with [T itle 9], [i]s in compliance with § 9-107 of this title, and [o]perates . . . in accordance with its charter and, except as provided 16 Section 9-1 02 define s a public ch arter schoo ls as a pub lic school th at: (1) Is nonsectarian in all its programs, policies, and operations; (2) Is a school to which parents choose to send their children; (3) Is open to all students on a space-ava ilable basis an d admits students on a lottery basis if more students apply than can be accommodated; (4) Is a new p ublic school or a conv ersion of a n existing pu blic school; (5) Provides a program of elementary or secondary education or both; (6) Operates in pursuit of a specific set of educational objectives; (7) Is tuition-free; (8) Is subject to federal and State laws prohibiting discrimination; (9) Is in compliance with all applicable health and safety laws; (10) Is in compliance with § 9-107 of this title; (11) Operates under the supervision of the public chartering authority from which its charter is granted and in accordance with its charter and , except as p rovided in § 9-106 of this title, the provisions of law and regulation governing other public schools; (12) Requires students to be physically present on school premises for a period of time substantially similar to that which other public school students spend on school premises; and (13) Is created in accordance with this title and the approp riate county bo ard p olicy. 27 in § 9-106 of this title, the provisions of law and regulation governing other pub lic schools. Section 9-102 (10), (11 ), and (1 3) (emp hasis ad ded). Thus, Title 9 contains the defining elements of public charter schools, such as nonsectarian, tuition-free, and open to all students on a space-available basis. Section 9-102 (1), (3), and (7). Fu rther, public charter schools must be created and operated in accordance with the provisions of Title 9. Section 9-102 (13). Section 9-102 does not provide any exception to these requirements; they form the very essence of the public charter school program. By comparison, however, Section 9-102 also requires that public charter scho ols [o]perate[] . . . in accordance with . . . the provisions of law and regulation governing other public schools, except as provided in § 9-106 of this title. Section 9-102 (11 ) (emphas is added). Clearly, therefore, when a defining element or requirement of public c harter scho ols was subject to waiver, Section 9-102 so stated. We, therefore, hold that the provisions of Title 9 of the Education Article are not subject to waiver. To conclude otherwise would lea d to the absu rd result that a ll of T itle 9 's provisions could be w aived, rend ering the en tire Title nuga tory, a result which conflicts w ith the canons of statutory interpretation. See Reier v. State Dep t of Assessments & Taxation, 397 Md. 2, 33-34, 915 A.2d 970, 988-89 (2007) (rejecting a specific statutory interpretation because it would lead to an absu rd result); Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 M d. 53, 89 , 912 A .2d 674, 695 (2006) (adopting the Circuit Court s analysis because to hold otherwise would lead to absurd results); McD ermott v. D ougherty , 385 Md. 320, 326, 869 A.2d 751, 754 (2005) 28 (stating that its holding is based, in part, on the potential for absurd results if the Court were to hold otherwise). B. Original Jurisdiction Over Section 9-106 (b) Waiver Applications The City Board and the Unions contend that, because the word appeal appears in Section 9-106 (b), the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners has original jurisdiction over all Section 9-106 (b) waiver applications; if the application is denied, the City Board s decision may then be appealed to the State Board of Educ ation. The C ity Board argues that th is approach is consistent with the provisions of COMAR 13A.01.05.01, et seq., which govern the appeals process from final decisions of a county board of education or the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners to the State Board.17 Whether the local or State Board of Education has original jurisdiction over waiver applications submitted pursuant to Section 9-106 (b) of the Educatio n Article req uires us to interpret Sections 9-106 and 9-108 (a) of the Education Article. Section 9-106 (a) provides that public charter schools shall comply with the provisions of law and regulation governing other public schools. Public sch ools are subject to reg ulations pro mulgated at both the State 17 The Circuit Cou rt did not reac h this issue be cause it deter mined tha t the City Board gave up its claim of original jurisdiction over the waiver applications when it initially advised the public charter schools to submit their waiver applications to the State Board of Education. We disagree with the Circuit Court as the record demons trates that the C ity Board was only acting pursuant to the proposed regulations of the State B oard, to wh ich it noted its objections. The State Board published a proposed draft regulation governing Section 9-106 (b) waivers in the Maryland Register on April 29, 2005, but withdrew the regulation on August 19, 2005. 29 and the local leve l; Sections 2-205 of the Education Article vests the State Board of Education with the po wer to set forth bylaws, rules and regulations for the administration of public schools, while Sections 4-108 (4) and 4-303 (d)(1) permit local boards of education to [a]dopt, codify, and make available to the public bylaws, rules, and regulations not inconsistent with State la w, for the c onduct an d manag ement of the [local] pu blic schoo ls. Section 9-106 (b) provides that [s]ubject to subsection (c) of this se ction, a waiver of the requirements under subsection (a) of this sec tion may be so ught throu gh an app eal to the State B oard. COMAR 13A.01.01.02-1, Waivers From Regulations, governs waiver applications implicating re gulations pr omulgate d by the State Board of Education pursuant to Section 2 -205 of th e Educa tion Article, an d provide s in pertinent p art: The head of an educational institution or program, including an institution of higher education, or the local superintendent of schools on behalf of a school or school system, shall file a waiver request w ith the State Superintendent of Schools. The request shall include a description of the desired outcome and an explanation of why the waiver is necessary and justifiable under the circumstances. Although normally the term appeal m eans [a] proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsider ed by a highe r authority, Black s Law Dictionary 105 (8th Ed. 20 04), Section 9-106, which governs the waiver process, cannot provide for local boards of education to entertain waiver provisions of State laws and regulations, because, as the City Board conceded at oral argument before this C ourt, local sch ool board s have no authority to waive State laws and regulations, only local regulations. This is because the State Board of 30 Education has primary jurisdicti on ove r all State educa tional pr ovision s. See Clinton v. Bd of Educ. of How ard Cou nty, 315 Md. 666, 675-678, 556 A.2d 273, 277-279 (1989) (holding that the State Board of Education has primary jurisdiction over question regarding th e interpretation and application of provisions of the Education Article); Hubbard, 305 Md. at 786, 506 A.2d at 6 30 ( Prim ary jurisdiction is a jud icially created rule d esigned to coordinate the allocation of functions between courts and administrative bodies. ), quoting Md. Nat l Capital Park & Planning Comm n v. Wash. Nat l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 601, 386 A.2d 1216, 1225-26 (1978). The legislative history of the Maryland Public Schools Act of 2003 also reflects this ten et. In 1997, the State Board of Education published its Guidelines For Use By Local School Systems In C onsidering Charter S chool A pplications, which recognized that different entities at the federa l, State and loc al level opera te to govern public charter schools: Public charter schools are subject to any federal, state, and local policies, regulations, and statutes that affect traditional elementary and secondary public schools unless the policies, regulations, and statutes are waived by the governing autho rity. For example, local education authorities may waive certain local policies, procedures, regulations, or practices fo r any public school under their jurisdiction. The State Board of Education and State Superintendent of Schools may waive certain policies, procedures, or regulations, a nd they also ha ve some flexibility to waive certain federal regulations under the federal Education Flexibility Act. Waivers from local regulations could be accomplished as part of the negotiated charter, while other waivers may be obta ined from the proper a uthorities in cooperation with the local board. Guidelines For Use By Local School Systems In Considering Charter School Applications 31 1, 5 (July 1997). In 1999, A Task Force on Public Charter Schools reported on its findings, which incorporated the suggestion of the State Board s Guideline s, subsequ ently leading to the genesis two public charter school bills were proposed; House Bill 116, which incorporated the recom mendatio ns of the T ask Force , and Sena te Bill 761, which differed substantially in the treatme nt of waivers. Senate Bill 761 simply provided that [A] WAIVER OF HEALTH OR SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY MAY NOT BE G RANTED , whereas House Bill 116 provided in Section 9-108: (A) (1) THE STATE BOARD MAY GRANT A W AIVER TO A PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL FROM SPECIFIC STATE EDUCATION REG ULATIONS AND R EQUIREMENTS. (2) THE COUNTY BOARD M AY GRANT A WAIVER TO A PUBL IC CHARTER SCHO OL FROM SPECIFIC LOCAL EDUCATIONAL REGULATIONS AN D REQUIREMEN TS. (B) A PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL MAY BE GRANTED A WAIVER UNDER SUBSECTION (A) OF TH IS SECTIO N IF THE SCHOOL DEMONSTRATES THAT A WAIVER WILL A D V A N C E THE E DUCA TIO N A L G O A L S A ND OBJECTIVES OF THE SCHOOL. (C) THE STATE BOARD OR A COUNTY BOARD MAY NOT WAIVE A REGULATION OR REQUIREMENT PERTAINING TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS OR THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF A STUDENT. Senate Bill 7 61, Edu catio nal O pportunity and Family Investm ent Pro gram A ct of 19 99, (Regular Session 1999) & House Bill 116, Education Pubic Charter Schools (Regular Session 1999). Neither bill was enacted. Sub sequ ently, in 2003, Senate Bill 75, the Public Charter School Act, was 32 introduced , Section 9-1 09 of w hich prov ided that: (A) (1) THE STATE BOARD MAY GRA NT A WAIVER TO A PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL FROM SPECIFIC STATE EDUCATION REG ULATIONS AND R EQUIREMENTS. (2) THE COUNTY BOARD M AY GRANT A WAIVER TO A PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL FROM SPECIFIC LOCAL EDUCATION REG ULATIONS AND R EQUIREMENTS. (B) A PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL MAY BE GRANTED A WAIVER UNDER SUBSECTION (A) OF TH IS SECTIO N IF THE SCHOOL DEMONSTRATES THAT A WAIVER WILL A D V A N C E T H E E D U C A T I O N A L G O A L S A ND OBJECTIVES OF THE SCHOOL. (C) THE STATE BOARD OR A COUNTY BOARD MAY NOT WAIVE A REGULATION OR REQUIREMENT RELATING TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS OR THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF A STUDENT. Senate Bill 75, The Pub lic Charter School A ct (Third Reading, Mar. 31, 2003). Between the first and final reading, the waiver provisions were moved to Section 9-106 and amended to provide that a waiver of the requirements under subsection (a) of this section may be sought through an appeal to the State Board. Section 9-106 (b). Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 75, Delegate John R. Leopold asked the Attorney General to opine on the appeal language found in Section 9-106 (b), and the Assistant Attorney General Rich ard E. Israel responded: Although [Section 9-106 (b)] refers to taking an appeal to the State Board, the re is no refer ence to a public authority, such as a county board of education, from which an appeal would be taken. *** It is generally provided that a public c harter scho ol is to comp ly 33 with the provision of laws and regulations which govern other public schoo ls. However, subject to certain exceptions, a waiver of these requirements may be sought through an appeal to the State Board. You have asked whether the County Board must first rule or whether the State Board considers th e matters first. A review of the legislative history reveals that the provision applying the laws and regulations which govern public scho ols and which may be waived by an appea l to the State Board was adopted by the Senate on the recommendation of the S enate Education, Health, and Environmen tal Affairs Committee. The Committee s floor re port . . . [makes] no reference in the waiver provision to the public authority from which an appeal is taken. Although Baltimore City and 15 of the 23 counties have home rule, the State has preempted the field of education. Thus, the only law on education is State law and the reference in Senate Bill 75 to a w aiver of law s must nec essarily mean S tate law. Under current State law, the State Board of Education and respective county boards of education have the authority to adopt regulations. T hus, the refe rence in Se nate Bill 75 to a waiver of regulations w ould include State boa rd regulations as well as county board regulations. Although disputes over county board regulations are decided by the County Superinten dent of S chools w ith an appe al to the County Board and then the Sta te Board, it has been understood that disputes concerning State statutes and State Board regulations of general application are matters to be dec ided by th e State B oard. A County Board would not have a role in deciding on the requested waiver. Letter from Richard E. Israel, Assistant Attorney General, to John R. Leopold, House Delegate (April 25, 2003) (emphas is added) (c itations omitted ). Althoug h we take into consideration the advice of the Assistant Attorney General, we are not bound by it, nor do we af ford it a ny enhan ced w eight. Pub. Serv. Comm n of Md v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27, 57 n. 18, 882 A.2d 849, 867 n. 18 (200 5); Drew v. First Guar. Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 332, 34 842 A .2d 1, 9 ( 2003) . We think it is clear, nevertheless, based upon the dichotomy of State and local regulators governing public charter schools today, and having explored the legislative history of the M aryland Pub lic Charter S chool A ct, that waive r applications submitted p ursuant to Section 9-106 (b) implicating S tate law or re gulations m ust be subm itted directly to the State Board of Education; the word appeal in Sectio n 9-10 6 (b) is, th en, a m isnom er. See Murrell v. Mayor of Balt., 376 Md. 170, 185, 829 A.2d 548, 557 (2003), quoting Kant v. Montgomery County , 365 Md. 269, 274, 778 A.2d 384, 387 (2001) ( Although § 12-302 (a) refers to a circuit court exercising appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency or local legislative body, the word appellate is a misnom er in this context ). Because this case implicates waivers of Sections 4-103 (a), 6-201, and 9-108 (a), which are State laws, th e City Bo ard had no auth ority to con sider an y applicat ion. C. The Unions Right to Intervene The next issue we are called upon to determine is whether the Unions had standing to challenge the State Board s waiver decisions. Patterson Park contends that the Unio ns were not necessary parties to the waiver process because the requested waivers did not effect positions covered by the Baltimore City public school employees collective bargaining agreements, only positions not currentl y offered by the Baltimore City Public School System such as that of a karate teacher, as distinguished from the positions effected in Baltimore Teachers Union v. Maryland State Board of Education, 379 Md. at 192, 840 A.2d at 728. 35 The Circuit Court held that the Unions were necessary parties to the waiver proceedings because the pro ceedin gs mod ified ex isting co llective b argainin g agree ments. Although we agree with the C ircuit Court th at the Unio ns had stan ding to interv ene, we d isagree w ith its determination that the Unions were necessary parties to the waiver application process because they modified existing collective bargaining agreements; the Unions had standing to intervene because the requested Section 9-108 (a) waivers had the potential to create a competin g labor po ol and also to reduce the Unions c ollecting barg aining unit. 18 We had the oppor tunity to explore s tanding pre requisites spe cifically with reg ard to decisions issued by the State Board of Education in Baltimore Teachers Union. In that case, the State Board of E ducation enacted re gulations for the reconstitution of schools that consistently fail to meet the prescribed student performance standards. Part of the reconstitution plan enabled the State B oard to dele gate contro l and man agemen t over pub lic schools to third parties. Pursuant to these new regulations, the State Board and the Baltimore City Board of School C omm issio ners ente red into a five -year contract with a com pany, Edison Schools, Inc., under which Edison was to assume operation and management of three Baltimore City public schools, serving as the employer of all employees hired for the . . . schools with the power to hire, assign, discipline, and dismiss all personnel hired at the schoo ls. Id. at 197, 840 A.2d at 731. The Baltimo re Teachers Union, American Federation 18 The current collective bargaining agreement was not included in the record, so that we ca nnot determ ine wheth er actual mo dification w ould result. 36 of Teachers, Local 340, and the AFL-CIO filed a complaint challenging the reconstitution regulations and the Edison contract to which the State B oard and the City Board responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The circuit court ruled that the Unions had standing, and we affirmed, underscoring that the Unions, as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for the employees of the Baltimore City Public School System, possessed statutory rights an d fiduciary du ties to negotia te for, and to act in the best interests of, the public school employees. Id. at 199, 840 A.2d at 732. We further explicated that, by removing three public schools from the Union s charge, the Edison co ntract not on ly interjected a competing labor pool with the Unions bargaining unit, but also reduced the size and scope of the Un ion s ba rgainin g unit. Id. Thus, we held that the Unions had standing to challenge the reconstitution. In this case, wa ivers were sought fo r Section 9- 108 (a), w hich prov ides that employees of public charter schools are public school employees, and are entitled to the benefits of any existing collective bargaining agreements. Pursuant to our jurisprudence in Baltimore Teachers Union, the Unions had a statutory and fiduciary duty to represent the Baltimore City public school employees in the waiver proceedings because the waivers created the potential for a com peting labo r pool with in those pu blic charter schools, and also because the waivers had the potential of limiting the scope of the Unions bargaining unit. Therefore, the Unions p ossessed a sufficient in terest in the proceedings to satisfy standing requireme nts and the State B oard erred by not giving p roper notice or opportu nity to be heard in the waiver 37 procee dings. D. Denial of Midtown Academy s Application for Waivers of Sections 4-103 (a) and 6201 Fina lly, we address M idtown Acad emy s contention that the State Bo ard should have granted its requested waivers of Section 4-103 (a) and 6-201, which require that the county superintendent nominate for appointment all principals, teachers and clerical personnel for the public charter school. As we stated earlier, the Legislature has vested the State Board of Education with the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education. Heister, 392 Md. at 153, 896 A.2d at 350, quoting Wilson v. B d of Educ . of Montg omery C ounty, 234 Md. 561, 565, 200 A.2d 67, 69 (1964). The State Boa rd s decision was with in its authority and was not in consistent w ith law. Accordingly, we shall affirm the State Board s denial of those waivers.19 For the reasons herein set forth, we shall vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and remand th is case to that c ourt with ins tructions to va cate the order of the State Board of Education and remand the case to the State Board of Education for further proceedings consistent with our holding. JUDGMENT OF TH E CIRCU IT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO CIRCU IT COURT FOR BALTIMORE 19 We note that the C ircuit Court d id not set forth its reasoning for affirming the State Board s denial of Midtown Academy s Sections 4-103 (a) and 6-201 requested waivers. 38 CITY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE ORDER OF MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE BOARD FO R FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN C O N FO R M AN C E W I T H T H IS O P I N I O N ; P A T TERS O N P A RK PUBLIC CHA RTE R SC HO OL, I NC., THE MID TOW N AC ADE MY , INC ., AND THE MAYOR AND CITY COUN CIL OF BALTIMORE EACH TO PAY ON E-THIRD OF COST S. 39

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