Morgan State v. Walker
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Morgan State v. Walker, No. 74, September Term, 2006 HEADNOTE: TORTS NEGLIGEN CE DEFENS ES ASSUM PTION OF RISK W hen an individual voluntarily proceeds in the face of danger and traverses back and forth on a parking lot that she knows to be icy, she assumes the risk of her behavior. The individual s conduct is examined by an objective standard. Because the danger was obv ious and th e evidenc e as to her voluntarine ss is uncon troverted, he r assumpti on of risk is a matter of law and is not a question for a jury. In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ity Case No. 24-C04002929 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 74 September Term, 2006 ____________________________________ Morga n State Un iversity v. Pamela R. Walker ___________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, A lan M. (R etired, Spec ially Assigned), JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ____________________________________ Filed: March 15, 2007 This case arises from a slip and fall incident. Pamela Walker ( Respondent ) went to visit her daug hter at Mo rgan State U niversity ( MSU ) after a heavy snowstorm, and, after driving onto a sno w and ice covered p arking lot, walked across the ice, fell and fractured her leg. Respondent instituted a personal injury action against MSU, arguing that it was negligent in failing to remove the snow from the parking lot. The Circuit Court determined that despite MSU s negligence, as a matter of law, Respondent assumed the risk of her injuries and granted sum mary judgmen t in favor of MSU . The Co urt of Spe cial Appe als reversed, holding that the voluntariness of Respondent s actions was a jury question. We conclude that, when Respondent walked across the parking lot with knowledge that the lot was covered with ice and snow, she assumed the risk of her injuries, as a matter of law, under the circumstances. The voluntariness of the plaintiff s conduct in an assumption of the risk analysis is measured by an objective standard. Because the uncontroverted evidence demons trated that Re sponden t knowin gly and voluntarily walked across the icy parking lot, the Circuit Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of MSU. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute. It snowed approximately 22 inches in Baltimore, Maryland between February 16-18, 2003. MSU was closed through February 19, 2003 because of the snowfall. At that time, Respondent s daughter was a residential student at MSU. Carnegie Express, a company that MSU had hired to remove the snow, performed snow remo val services on Febru ary 16 and 17. On February 18, MSU informed Carnegie Express th at MSU would c omplete th e snow re moval pro cess and th at Carneg ie Expre ss did n ot have to do so . At or around 8:00 a.m. on February 24, 2003, Respondent drove approximately one hour from her home in Upper Marlboro to visit her daughter at MSU. Respondent stated that she needed to bring her d aughter m oney becau se her dau ghter did not have an ATM card and needed money for gas and other things. Respond ent arrived at MSU s campus with the intention of parking in parking lo t T, the lot in front of her daughter s dormitory. The parking lot is an elevated lot. Respondent explained that she, therefore, did not notice the ice and snow until she was already on top of it. She testified that once she pulled into the parking lot she noticed that she was driving on crunchy ice and snow. Respondent found a parking spot near the en trance to the dormitory and parke d withou t looking fo r a spot in another portion of the lo t. She explained that the only spots closer to the e ntrance were handicapped spaces. Respondent testified that she didn t think of danger, she just thought doggone, they didn t clean this parking lot. She also testified that she had no other choice , aside f rom tha t parkin g lot, as to where to park her car. Respondent parked and exited her car. She noticed snow and ice on the ground between her car and the entrance to the do rmitory. She theref ore held on to the cars ne xt to her as she walked to reach her daughter s building. Respondent s daughter testified that, like the parking lot, the driveway and steps in front of her dormitory had not been cleared. Respondent testified that she held onto the railing when walking on the steps and walked -2- very slowly. She also noted that she h ad on Timbe rland boots and stated I m ean I don t have any problem s with walking or anything like that. Actually I m a dare devil to be honest with you. Sh e reached her daug hter s dorm itory without inc ident. Respondent visited with her daughter for approximately one hour. On her way back to her car, she w alked slowly and tapped ea ch car, wh ile looking d own at the ground to make sure that [she] didn t slip and fall. She saw snow and ice on the ground as she was walking and testified that she was trying to be safe. When Respondent reached her vehicle, she lost her footing, fell to the ground and fractured her leg, an injury that she claims has cost her app roxima tely $50,0 00 in m edical b ills and lo st earnin gs. Responden t instituted a personal injury action against MSU in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging ne gligent failu re to clear the parking lot of snow and ice, and negligent hiring, training and supervision, on the basis that MSU s employees failed to clear adequate ly the snow and ice in the parkin g lot. 1 The Circuit Cou rt granted summary judgment for MSU bas ed on the th eory that, as a ma tter of law, R esponde nt voluntarily assumed the risk of her injuries by walking on the snow and ice. Respondent appealed to the Court of Special App eals. In an unreported op inion, the intermediate appellate cou rt reversed the Circuit Court, holding that, under the circumstances, the jury should decide whether Respondent s decision to park in the lot and walk on the snow and ice was 1 Respondent also sued Carnegie Express. The Circuit Co urt granted C arnegie Express s motion for summary judgment. The intermediate appellate court affirmed that portion of the Circuit Court s judgment. The propriety of that ruling is not before us. -3- volu ntary. MSU filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court, which we granted.2 Morgan State v. Walker, 395 Md. 420 , 910 A.2d 106 1 (2006). DISCUSSION MSU contends that the Circuit Co urt correctly applied an objective stan dard wh en it determined that Respondent acted voluntarily when she chose to park in parking lot T and enter her daughter s dormitory, despite the ice and snow on the ground. MSU states that the evidence established unequivocally that [Respondent] was fully informed of the existence of ice and snow on the parking lot and fully understood the risk of slipping and falling and, therefore, voluntarily assumed the risk. M SU argu es further tha t the intermed iate appellate court erred in concluding that the issue of voluntariness was a jury question because that court erroneously substituted a subjective test for the proper objective standard regarding the voluntariness of [Respondent] s option to turn around and go home without visiting her daugh ter. MSU lastly avers that the Court of Special Appeals erred in co nsidering MSU s negligence because any duty owed by MSU w as superseded by Res pondent s voluntary 2 MSU presented th e followin g question in its petition for writ of certio rari: In rejecting the tr ial court s determination that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff s choice to park on the University s ice and snow covered parking lot was voluntary because she knew and understood the risk of walking on ice and snow and had the alternative of leaving the parking lot, returning home or looking elsewhere for suitable parking, did the Court o f Special A ppeals depart from the established standards of voluntariness as to the assumption of risk defense? -4- assum ption o f the risk . Respondent counters that the determination of her voluntariness does not involve an exploration of her subjective state of mind but a weighing of objective, factual evidence to be presented at trial. She contends that this evidence includes whether: the parking lot was fully covered with snow eight days after the snow storm, the lot was open for students and their guests, M SU pos ted warn ings, Resp ondent sa w the dangerous condition before entering the lot, there existed a less dangerous, accessible route to the building, and turning around and going back home would have presented less risk than parking close to the door and walking to the dormitory. Respondent argues that a jury should decide whether she voluntarily assumed the risk of h er injury, based on the answers to those questions. Respondent also conten ds that her d aughter w as a busine ss invitee of MSU and MSU therefore had a legal duty to provide a safe premises, and that, as her daughter s visitor, Respondent was owed the same legal duty from MSU as her daughter. Lastly, Respondent avers that [a]ccepting [MSU] s position would subvert good public policy w ith bad tort law. Respondent s Assum ption of the Risk We agree with MSU and the Circuit Court that the question of voluntariness, in the context of an assumption of the risk analysis, is measured by an objective standard. Therefore, when the uncontro verted evid ence dem onstrated tha t Respon dent know ingly and voluntarily walked across a snow and ice covered parking lot and injured herself, she -5- assumed the risk of her injuries as a matter of law. The Circuit Court was therefore correct to grant M SU s mo tion for s umm ary judgm ent a nd not send th e questio n to the ju ry. Assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense in a neglig ence a ction. Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418 , 421, 226 A.2d 2 73, 275 (1967). The two leading cases on this issue are ADM P ship v. M artin, 348 Md. 84, 702 A.2d 730 (1997), and Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 59 2 A.2d 1119 ( 1991) . In ADM P ship, 348 Md. at 90-92, 702 A.2d at 734-35, we set forth the principles of an assumption of the risk analysis: In Maryland, it is well settled that in order to establish the defense of assumption of risk, the defendant must show that the plaintiff: (1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger. * * * * The doctrine of assumption of risk rests upon an intentional and voluntary exposure to a known danger and, therefore, consent on the part of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward [her] and to take [her] chances from harm from a particul ar risk. * * * * Assumption of risk me ans volun tary incurring th at of an accident which may not occur, and which the person assuming the risk may be careful to avoid a fter starting. Thus , if established, it functions as a complete bar to recovery because it is a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accide nt occu rs. * * * * In determining whether a plaintiff had knowledge and -6- appreciation of the risk, an objective standard must be applied and a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk whic h must have been obv ious to h im. Thus, when it is clear that a person of normal intelligence in the position of the plaintiff must have understood the danger, the issue is f or the co urt. * * * * Moreover, there are certain risks which anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate: the danger of slipping on ice, of falling through unguarded openings, of lifting heavy ob jects . . . and do ubtless m any othe rs. Concerning whether a plaintiff has voluntarily exposed him or herself to the risk of a known danger, there must be some manifestation of consent to relieve the defendant of the obligati on of r easona ble con duct. The risk will not be taken to be assumed if it appears from [the plaintiff s] words, or from the facts of the situation, that he does not in fact con sent to relieve the defendant of the obligation to protect him. Nevertheless, if the plaintiff proceeds to enter voluntarily into a situation which exposes him to the risk, notwithstanding any protests, his conduct w ill normally indica te that he does not stand on his objection, and has consented, however reluctantly, to accept the risk and look ou t for him self. (citations omitted). In ADM P ship, 348 Md. at 88, 702 A.2d at 733, Keen Martin was employed as a delivery person. On the morning after a snowstorm, she was assigned by her employer to deliver blueprints to a business. She arrived at the business and noticed snow and ice in the parkin g lot surr oundin g the bu ilding. Martin testified that she feared losing her job if she did not com plete the task fo r her em ployer. ADM P ship, 348 Md. at 89, 702 A.2d at 733. To deliver the blueprints, Martin exited her vehicle and walked to the building; she -7- slipped, but caught herself and avoided falling. She made it to the building and delivered the blueprints. She then left the building and walked back to her vehicle along the same path that she had entered ; howe ver, M artin slipp ed and fell, injur ing her back. Martin filed a personal injury action against the owners of the building, ADM Partnership. The partnership argued that it was not liable because Martin assumed the risk of her injuries wh en she w alked acro ss the icy parking lot. Martin ar gued that sh e did not assume the risk because she did not walk onto the ice voluntarily; she had to walk on the ice or she would lose her job. The trial court applied an objective standard, stating that [e]verybody knows that walking on ice is slippery . . . the assumption of the risk is [when ,] with that knowledge[,] an individual assumes that she can walk on that ice and does so. ADM P ship, 348 Md. at 90, 702 A.2d at 733 (citations omitted). The trial court found that Martin assum ed the ris k as a m atter of la w. ADM P ship, 348 Md. at 90, 702 A.2d at 734. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that there existed questions of fact for the jury to decide; specifically whether Martin s beliefs that she would lose her job if she did not walk on the ice and complete the d elivery rendered her actions inv oluntary. This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, rejecting that court s conclusion that Martin s actions were rendere d involuntary because she was acting at the instruction of her employer. ADM P ship, 348 M d. at 94- 95, 702 A.2d a t 736. We determined that despite her employer s instructions, Martin still retained a choice of whether to walk across the ice, after she realized that it woul d be da ngerou s. ADM P ship, 348 Md. at 102-03, 702 A.2d at 740. -8- We held that w hen M artin chose to w alk across th e ice, she did so know ingly and volu ntarily and the refore a ssume d the risk as a ma tter of law . Similarly, in Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278, 592 A.2d at 1120, Frances McNeal arrived at a hotel shortly after four inches of snow had fallen. She noticed that the area in front of the main entrance to the hotel had been cleared of ice and snow, but observed that the rest of the parking lot had n ot. Nonetheless, she requested a hotel room closest to an exit because she had a lot of p aperw ork to c arry from her car t o her ro om. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278, 592 A.2d at 1120-21. The room that McNeal was given was accessible from the main lobby, but she chose to d rive her car a way from the main e ntrance to a different entrance that was closer to her room so that she c ould move he r paperwork with gr eater ea se. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278, 592 A.2d at 1121. McNeal parked on packed ice and snow and noticed that the area was slippery. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278-79, 592 A.2d at 1121. She removed her cat and some belongings from her car and entered the hote l witho ut incide nt. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 279, 592 A.2d at 1121. On the way back to her car, however, she slipped and fell, breaking her ank le. McNeal sued, allegin g poor maintenance of the park ing lot and n egligent failu re to warn her of th e cond ition. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 276, 592 A.2d at 1120. A jury returned a verdict for McN eal. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Although the argument was properly preserved , the intermed iate appellate c ourt did no t address whether McNeal assumed the risk of her injuries. We reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appea ls -9- and held th at, as a matter o f law, M cNeal ass umed the risk of her in juries. We e xplained: The test of whether the plaintiff knows of, and appreciates, the risk involved in a particular situation is an objective one, Gibson, 245 M d. at 421, 22 6 A.2d a t 275, a nd ordinarily is a question to be res olved b y the jury. Id.; Kahlenberg v. Goldstein , 290 Md. 477, 494-95, 431 A.2d 76, 86 (1981). Thus, the doctrine of assumption of risk will not be applied unless the undisputed evidence and all permissible inferences therefrom clearly establish that the risk of danger was fully known to and understood by the plaintiff. Kasten Constr. Co. v. Evans, 260 Md. 5 36, 544 , 273 A .2d 90, 9 4 (197 1). On the other hand, wh en it is clear that a person of normal intelligence in the position of the plaintiff must have understood the danger, th e issue is for the c ourt. Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275 (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 55 at 310 (2nd ed.)). See also Evans v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 224 Md. 234, 167 A.2d 591 (1961). In Gibson, the obvious danger identified was the possible physical effects on a man [of the plaintiff's] age of the effort to lift . . . or drag [a heavy fuel hose] through the snow. 245 Md. at 422, 226 A.2d at 275-76. The danger of slipping on ice was identified in Prosser as one of the risks which any one of adult age must be taken to apprec iate. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 283-84, 592 A.2d at 1123. In examining McNeal s actions, we stated that [i]t is clear, on this reco rd, that Mc Neal took an inform ed chanc e. Fully aware of the danger posed by an ice and snow covered parking lot and sidewalk , she volun tarily chose to park and traverse it . . . . Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288, 592 A.2d at 1125. We therefore concluded that McNeal assumed the risk of her own injuries and that she did so as a matter of law. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288-89, 592 A.2d at 1126. Hence, her voluntariness was not a quest ion for the jury. -10- In accordance with the test most clearly articulated in ADM P ship, and our reasoning and holding in Schroyer, it is clear that Respondent had knowledge of the risk of danger of walking across the snowy and icy parking lot and appreciated that risk. The issue, therefore, is whether she vo luntarily confronted the risk of that dang er. See AD M P sh ip, 348 Md. at 90-91, 702 A.2d at 734. In addition, as explained supra, these three factors are analyzed by an objectiv e stand ard. See ADM P ship, 348 Md. at 91, 702 A.2d at 73 4; Schroyer, 323 Md. at 283, 592 A.2d at 1123; see also Gibson, 245 Md. at 421 , 226 A.2d at 275 (stating that [i]n determining whether a plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of the risk, an objective standard must be ap plied and a plaintiff w ill not be heard to say that he [or she] did not comprehend a risk which mu st have been obv ious to him [or her] ). Responden t s own testimony made clear that she w as aware of the sno w and ice in the parking lot. She testified that as soon as she drove into the parking lot, she noticed that she was driving on crunchy ice and snow. She stated further that she thought, doggone, they didn t clean this parking lot. Responden t s behavior demon strates that she was also aw are of the risk, and appreciated the risk, of danger of walking on snow and ice. She explained that she walked very slowly, held onto the cars as she walked, and held onto the railing as she walked slowly up the step s. In addition, Respondent explained that she looked down at the ground to mak e sure that [she] didn t slip and fall. M oreover, as w e stated in bo th ADM P ship and Schroyer, [t]he danger of slipping on ice . . . [is] one of the risks which any one of adult age m ust be taken to apprecia te. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 284, 592 A.2d at 1123; -11- ADM P ship, 348 M d. at 92, 7 02 A.2 d at 734 (citation s omitte d). Nothing in the record suggests that Respondent was forced against her will to confront the risk of danger of walking on the snow and ice, such that her behavior could be classified as involuntarily. After hearing the crunch of ice and snow under her tires and acknowledging that MSU had not removed the ice and snow from the parking lot, she proceeded to get out of her car and visit with her daug hter. Respondent s motivation stemmed from the fact that she believed that her daughter needed money. In accordance with our prior holdings, Responden t s actions would be considered involuntary only if she lacked the free w ill to avoid the situa tion. See ADM P ship, 348 Md. at 94-95, 702 A.2d at 736 (holding that Martin proceeded voluntarily in the face of danger despite the fact that she thought she wou ld lose her job if she did not deliver the blueprints); Gibson, 246 Md. at 422, 225 A.2d at 276 (stating that even though Gibson was told that he could not have fuel oil in his house if he did not pull the oil hose from the truck to his house, Gibson acted voluntarily because he still had the choice to accep t or reject the fu el oil); Burke v. Williams, 244 Md. 154, 158, 223 A.2d 187, 189 (1966) (concluding that appellant acted voluntary when he walked on the slipp ery, poorly constructed walkway because he was not forced against his will to do so). Therefore, the fact that Respondent wanted to bring her daughter money for gas does not rend er he r acti ons i nvoluntary. Respondent argues that Schroyer is not apposite here because in Schroyer, McNeal had other alternative paths upon which to walk and, in the case sub judice, Respondent states -12- that she did not have an y other reasonable alternative paths from her car to her daughter s dorm itory. We disagree with this interpretation of Schroyer. Our holding in Schroyer was not based u pon the existen ce of o ther alter natives . Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288, 592 A.2d at 1125. Our conclusion was based upon the fact that McNeal knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk when she walked across the parking lot. That McNeal could have parked near the entranc e and w alked on th e cleared p ortion of the parking lot merely provided additional support fo r our conc lusion in Schroyer. Moreover, Respondent had alternatives in this case - as soon as she heard the ice underneath her tires, she could have turned her car around and gone home or arranged an alternative plan by which to get her d aughter mon ey, instead of volun tarily proceeding in the face of danger by leaving her car and traversing across ic e and sn ow. Schroyer is therefore dispositive. As we have stated in ea rlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict. ADM P ship, 348 Md. at 103, 702 A.2d at 740 (quoting Burke, 244 Md. at 158, 223 A.2d at 189; citing Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288-89, 592 A.2d at 1126; Gibson, 245 M d. at 422, 22 6 A.2d a t 276; Evans, 224 Md. at 239, 167 A.2d at 594; Finkelstein v. Vulcan Rail Co., 224 Md. 439, 441, 168 A.2d 393, 394 (1961 )). We therefore reverse the portion of the judgment of the Court of Special A ppeals that v acated the C ircuit Court s grant of summary judgment in favor of MSU. -13- Relevancy of MSU s Negligence Respondent argues that several questions need to be answered to assess correctly whether Respondent voluntarily walked across the icy parking lot, a nd that, the jury should then determine whether she assumed the risk of her injuries based on the answers to those questions. We di sagree . Many of the questions posed by Respondent examine whether MSU was neglige nt in its fa ilure to c lear the p arking lot of sn ow an d ice. In an assumption of the risk ana lysis, how ever, the defen dant s o r a third p arty s neg ligence is irreleva nt. We can assume, for the sake of argument, that Respondent is correct and that MSU was negligent in failing to clea r the parking lot and wa lkways of sn ow and ice. This assumption does not change our analysis or our conclusio n. As this C ourt has pre viously explained the assumption of the risk defense exists independently of the conduct of another person, whether the defendant or a third party. Therefore, the existence of a defendant s duty is not an issue because that speaks to the defendant s negligenc e, which is not req uired to establish assumption of risk. ADM P ship, 348 M d. at 102, 70 2 A.2d a t 740. Simila rly, in Schroyer, 323 Md. at 282, 592 A.2d at 1123, we explained that in an assumption of the risk analysis, by virtue of the plaintiff s voluntary actions, any duty the defendant owed the plaintiff to act reasonably for the plaintiff s safety is superseded by the plaintiff s willingness to take a chance. We have also explained that [t]he defense of assumption of risk consent to relieve the defendant of toward him, and to take his chances risk. Such consent may be found . . -14- rests upon the plaintiff s an obligation of conduct of harm from a particular . by implication from the conduct of the parties. When the plaintiff enters volu ntarily into a relation or situation involving obvious danger, he may be taken to assume the risk, and to relieve the defendant of responsibility. Such implied assumption of risk requires knowledge and appreciation of the risk, and a voluntary choice to enco unter it. P rosser, Torts, § 55, p. 303 (2d ed. 195 5). Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275. Respondent also argues that Rountree v. Lerner Dev. Co., 52 Md. App. 281, 447 A.2d 902 (1982), is apposite here. She contends that MSU owed a duty to her daughter because her daughter was a business invitee of MSU and that MSU therefore owed Respondent the same duty, because Respondent was her daughter s guest. In that case, Ginger Rountree exited her apartment building thro ugh the on ly available me ans of eg ress in order to go to work. Rountree, 52 Md. App. at 283, 447 A.2d at 903. It had snowed the night before and the stairs were icy and slippery. She w ent to wor k late to allow time for the ice to thaw and despite her w alkin g slo wly and caref ully, still fell on the step s and in jured h erself. Rountree, 52 Md. A pp. at 283-8 4, 447 A .2d at 903-04. She sued the owner and operator of her apartment comp lex. Rountree, 52 Md . App. at 28 2, 447 A .2d at 902. T he intermediate appellate court determined that Ms. R ountree did not assume the risk of her injuries because she had a right to leave her ap artment to g o to work , and that the la ck of a rea sonable alternative route cr eated a jury ques tion as to the volu ntarines s of he r condu ct. Rountree, 52 Md. A pp. at 28 5-86, 4 47 A.2 d at 904 -05. -15- We decline to adopt the reasoning of Rountree because it is inapplicable here.3 The present case does not involve a situation where Respondent s daughter (a tenant) was trapped inside her dormitory because of ice and sn ow, a nd, w hile t rying to lea ve th e dormito ry, slipped and fe ll on the i ce. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED AND CASE R E M A N D E D T O T H AT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO 3 See also Odenton Dev. Co. v. Lamy, 320 Md. 33, 57 5 A.2d 1235 (1990), where we declined to adopt Rountree. In Lamy, Bernice Lamy attempted to step over a mound of snow to put her groceries in her car and fell, injuring herself. Lamy, 320 Md. at 36, 575 A.2d at 1236. She sued the ow ner and operator of the grocery store. Lamy, 320 Md. at 36-37, 575 A.2d at 1 236. At tr ial, th e jud ge su bmitted t he fo llow ing instru ction s to th e jury: The defense of assumption of the risk rests upon the Plaintiff 's consent to relieve the Defendant of obligation of conduct tow ard the Plaintiff and to take his chances of harm from a particular risk . . . suc h consen t may b e fou nd by implication from the conduct of the party. When a Plaintiff enters voluntarily into a situation involving obvious danger, the Plaintiff may be taken to assume the risk and re lieve the D efen dant of respo nsib ility. Such implied assumption of risk involves knowledge and appreciation of the risk an d voluntary ch oice to enco unter it. Lamy, 320 Md. at 43, 575 A.2d at 1239-40. The respondent argued that the jury should have been told that if it determined that there existed no alternative safe routes of exit out of the grocery store, then it co uld not find that the respondent assumed the risk because she had a right of egre ss as a b usiness invitee. Lamy, 320 Md. at 42, 575 A.2d at 1239. She argued that Rountree was d ispositiv e to the a nalysis of her cas e. The trial court rejected that jury instruction and we determ ined that the trial court did not err in doing so. Lamy, 320 Md. at 43, 575 A.2d at 1240. We stated explicitly that the respondent s reliance on Rountree [wa]s misplaced and that there existed no error in the trial court s instructions because the record demonstrated that the respondent knew of the conditions, was aw are of the a lternatives to stepping over snow to get to her car, and that she voluntarily chose to put the groceries in her car in the mann er that sh e did. Lamy, 320 M d. at 43- 44, 575 A.2d a t 1239- 40. -16- AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY. RESPONDENT TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS. -17-
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