American Powerlifting v. Cotillo
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America n Powe rlifting Associa tion et al. v. Co tillo, No. 6, September Term, 2007 HEAD NOTE : TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK - Where a voluntary participant in a sports activity suffers an injury that is a foreseeable risk of participation, in that activity, his claim is barred by assumption of the risk. Any factual dispute as to the petitioners negligenc e in failing to p revent injury to th e respond ent is irrelevant with respect to the issue of respondent s assumption of the risk. The petitioners m ere neglige nce, witho ut any indication of reckless or intentiona l conduct, will not support a claim of enhanced risk suff icient to negate the responde nt-plaintiff s assumption of the risk of his own injuries. In the Cir cuit C ourt for C alve rt Co unty No. 04-00050 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 6 September Term, 2007 ____________________________________ AMERICAN POWERLIFTING ASSOCIATION, ET AL. v. CHRISTOPHER COTILLO ___________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, A lan M. (R etired, Spec ially Assigned) Cathell, D ale R. (Retire d, Specially Assigned), JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ____________________________________ Filed: October 16, 2007 This matter arises f rom a civil ac tion filed in the Circuit Court for Calvert County by the respondent, Christopher Cotillo, against the petitioners, collectively, William Duncan, the American Powerlifting Association ( the APA ), and the Board of Ed ucation of Calvert County ( the Board ), for injuries M r. Cotillo sustained while participating in a powerlifting competition. Mr. Cotillo asserted various negligence claims, and both sides filed moti ons for summary judgment. The Circuit Court granted the petitioners m otions for summ ary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk of his injuries. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in part and revers ed in part, holding tha t summar y judgment w as proper a s to all claims exc ept the claim that the spotters were negligently trained. The petitioners ask this Court to decide whether the Circuit C ourt erred in finding that Mr. Cotillo s claim, that the spotters were negligently instructed, was barred by assumption of the risk, in light of the trial court s additional determination that Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk of injury during a lift, and that Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk that the spotters wo uld fail to prote ct him in the eve nt of a f ailed lift. We shall hold that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Cotillo assumed the usual and foreseeable risks of the sport when he voluntarily entered a powerlifting competition, and therefore summary judgme nt was appropriate. Th ere is no genu ine dispute that the immediate cause of the respondent s injury was his attempt to qualify by bench pressing 530 pou nds. As a re sult, whether any of the petitioners were negligent in failing to prevent the respondent s injury is of no con sequenc e. Furtherm ore, any dispute of fact as to whether the spotters were negligent is immaterial because their mere negligence is insufficient to support a finding of enhanced risk. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On Novem ber 8, 2003 , Mr. Cotillo , a powerli fter with ten years of experience, was injured during the 2003 Southern Maryland Open Bench Press & Deadlift Meet ( the M eet ), when he attempted to lift 530 pounds. The Meet was sanctioned by the APA, and held at Patuxent High School, which operates under the jurisdiction of the Board. It was organized by Mr. Duncan, the faculty sponsor of Patuxent High School s weightlifting club, and Sco tt Taylor, APA president. Before the Meet, the lifters were info rmed that th ey could use their own spotters.1 Mr. Cotillo did not exercise this option,2 electing instead to use the spotters provided by the organizers of the M eet. Mr. Duncan recruited Chris Smith and Chris Blair, Patuxent High School students, to ac t as spotters du ring the M eet. At the tim e of the M eet, Mr. Smith was fifteen years old, approximately five feet and eight to ten inches tall, and 180 pou nds. Mr. Blair, at the time of the Meet, was fourteen years old, approximately six feet tall, and 1 Spotters are present during weightlifting com petitions, just as th ey often are in practice, to assist a partic ipant in the even t of a failed lif t. Generally, one spotter is positioned on each end of the lift bar, and each spotter keeps his hands within inches of the bar so that, if the participant is having difficulty with the bar or is in danger of dropping the bar, the spotters can act quickly to take the bar from the participant. If a spotter touches the bar for any reason, that lift is disqualified. 2 Membe rs of Mr. Cotillo s gym participated in the Meet and were available, on his request, to serve as spotters for his lifts. Such a practice is not uncommon at meets. -2- weighed 260 pounds. Both spotters had some weightlifting experience. On the mornin g of the M eet, Mr. D uncan sp oke with the spotters an d told them that, while they sho uld keep th eir hands clo se to the bar, th ey could not to uch the ba r because it would disqualify the lift. Mr. Taylor further instructed the spotters that if th e lifter were to hesitate, without making any downward motion with the bar, they should wait for the referee s instruction to grab the bar. If the lifter were to hesitate and the bar were to come down, Mr. Taylor in structed the sp otters that they sho uld not w ait for the referee s instruction, but instead grab the bar. During the Meet, Mr. Cotillo wore a Karin s Xtreme Power double denim bench shirt, which allowed him to lift approximately 150 pounds more than he could have without the shirt. The spotters were positioned on either side of the bar, and Mr. Duncan was positioned in the middle. Mr. Cotillo s first two lifts in the Meet, using the spotters, were uneventf ul. On his third lift, Mr. Cotillo was attempting to lift 530 p ounds. M r. Cotillo brought the bar down without any trouble. A s he b egan to lif t it, he had som e dif ficu lty, 3 at which point Mr. Blair testified th at he bega n to move his own hands closer to the bar. The judge instructed the spotters to grab the bar, but as the spotters closed in, the bar came down, striking Mr. Cotillo in the jaw. The entirety of these ev ents happened w ithin a matter of seconds. As a result of the incident, Mr. Cotillo suffered a shattered jaw, a laceration, and 3 During Mr. Cotillo s third lift, Mr. Duncan he ard Mr. Cotillo s shirt tear. Mr. C otillo stated that he did not know that his Karin s Xtreme Power double denim bench shirt had ripped un til after his failed lift attempt. -3- dama ge to se veral tee th, requ iring trea tment. On January 15, 2004, the respon dent filed a complaint in the C ircuit Court for Calvert Cou nty. In his amended complain t, Mr. Cotillo asserted various claims of negligence against Mr. Duncan, the APA, and the Board.4 Each of the parties filed motions for summary judgment and on February 3, 2006, the cou rt denied the respondent s motion and granted the petition ers mo tions, on the gro unds th at Mr. C otillo ass umed the risk o f his inju ries. Mr. Cotillo filed an appeal with the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Special Appeals held that summary judgment was properly entered on all claims except the negligence claim grounded in allegations of improper preparatory instruction of the spotters. T he interme diate appella te court reasoned that because Mr. Cotillo did not know the spotters were improperly trained,5 and because their improper training presented an enhanced risk not normally incident to the sport, Mr. Cotillo could not have assumed the risk. Cotillo v. Duncan, 172 Md. App. 29, 54, 912 A.2d 72, 86-87 (2006 ). 4 The APA an d the Board filed a third party complaint against K arins Xtreme Pow er, LLC, the manufacturer of the double denim be nch shirt, alleg ing that the sh irt Mr. Cotillo wore was defective. The third party complaint was subsequently dismissed. 5 The respondent contends that the spotters were told not to touch the bar until they were signaled by the judge. The spotters were also instructed that if they touched the bar during the lift, that lift would be disqualified. The C ourt of Specia l Appeals noted that it was unclear from the record whether the spotters were imp roperly trained, b ut resolved all reasonab le inferences in the respondent s favor for purposes of reviewing the grant of summary judgment. Cotillo v. Duncan, 172 Md. App. 29, 54 n.13, 912 A.2d 72, 87 n.13 (2006). -4- The AP A and th e Board f iled petitions fo r writ of certio rari in this Court, which we granted.6 America n Powe rlifting v. Cotillo, 398 M d. 313, 9 20 A.2 d 1058 (2007 ). DISCUSSION I. Parties Ar gumen ts The petitioners argue that the Cou rt of Special Appe als erred by holding that Mr. Cotillo could not have assumed the risk that the spotters would be negligently trained. They 6 The petitioner APA presented the following question in its petition for writ of certiorari: In light of the holding that Christopher Cotillo ( Cotillo ) assumed the risk as a matter of law of being injured by the bar during a lift, assumed the risk as a matter of law tha t the spotters w ould fail to protect h im in the event of a failed lift and assumed the risk as a matter of law that the spotters would be negligently positioned, did the Tria l Court err in finding that Cotillo s c laims for ne gligent instruc tion of the spotters were barred? The petitioner Board presented the following questions in its petition for writ of certiorari: 1. Whether the Court of Special Appea ls Opinion is inconsisten t with well-established Maryland la w on ass umption o f risk and that doctrine s independence from a defendant s alleged negligence. 2. Whether the Court of Special Appeals failed to consider (a) the video footage of the event; an d (b) the C ircuit Court s determination that no causation exists because reasonable persons could not differ in concluding that the speed at which the 530 lbs. bar came crashing down made prevention of the injuries impossible by human spotters. 3. Whether the Court of Special Appeals Opinion, from a public policy standpoin t, jeopardizes the existence of sports programs and other extracurricular activities in the State, including those funded and operated by public and independent schools. -5- contend that the doctrine of assumption of the risk operates independently from the law of negligence, and therefore it is irrelevant whether they may have been negligent in training the spotters. The petitioners reason that holding otherwise would create a problem of circular logic, enabling plaintiffs to escape an assumption of the risk defense by claiming that they could n ot have anticipa ted the d efend ants ne gligenc e. The petitioners furthe r argue that th e Court of Special A ppeals erred by failing to consider the video footage of the event, which the Circuit Court considered and was part of the record submitted to the Court of Special Appeals. The respondent argues that the petitioners were negligent in training the spotters, and that their negligent training presented an enhanced risk to Mr. Cotillo that he could not have assumed. The respondent contends that he could not have assumed the particular risk that the spotters would be n egligently trained because assum ption of the risk requires that M r. Cotillo have particular knowledge of the risks he assumes, and he had no prior knowledge of the tr aining th e spotte rs receiv ed bef ore he e ncoun tered the risk. Further, the responde nt contends that the alleged n egligent training of the spotters enhanced the risk to Mr. Cotillo, and that this increased risk was not a risk inherent in the sport. Because the respondent believes that this increased risk creates a dispute as to whether Mr. Cotillo kno wingly and voluntarily confronted a particular risk, he argues that summary -6- judgment was inappropriate.7 Fina lly, the respondent contends that the Court of Special Appeals properly considered the video footage of the incident, and that further in terpretation o f the video is a matter for the trier of fac t. II. Standard of Review We are asked in the case sub judice to review the Circuit C ourt s entry of summary judgment and we do so de novo. Educational Testing Serv. v. Hildebrant, 399 Md. 128, 139, 923 A.2d 34, 40 (2007). In a review of a grant of sum mary judgment, our tw o-part analysis determines first whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact, and then wheth er the m oving p arty is entitle d to jud gmen t as a ma tter of law . Id. Where a dispute regarding a fact can have no impact on the outcome of the case, it is not a dispute of materia l fact su ch that it c an prev ent a gra nt of su mmar y judgm ent. Miller v. Ba y City Property Owners Ass n, Inc., 393 Md. 620, 631, 903 A.2d 938, 945 (2006). For purposes of reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we construe the facts before this Court in the light mo st favo rable to t he non -movin g party. Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 155, 816 A.2d 930, 93 3 (200 3). 7 In his brief, the respondent contends that the Local Government Tort Claims Act, Md. Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§5-301 et seq. of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, applies to this case. The petitioner APA also discusses the financial consequences of holding school boards ac countable for sports inju ries in its petition for w rit of certiorari. Because we hold here that Mr. Cotillo s claims are b arred by assum ption of the risk, it is unnece ssary to decide whether the Local Government Tort Claims Act applies to the case sub judice. -7- III. Assumption of the Risk Assumption of th e risk is a doctrine w here by a plaint iff w ho in tenti onally and voluntarily exposes himself to a known risk, effectively, consents to relieve the defendant of liability for those ris ks to w hich the plaintiff expos es hims elf. ADM Partnersh ip v. Martin , 348 Md. 84, 91, 702 A.2d 730, 734 (1997) (quoting Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 243, 262 A.2d 549, 554 (1970 )). Assumption of the risk is a defense that comp letely bars any recovery by the plain tiff. Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 640, 751 A.2d 481, 488 (2000). The doctrine negates the issue of a defendant s negligence by virtue of a plaintiff s previous abandonment of his or he r right to maintain an action if an acc ident oc curs. McQuiggan v. Boy Scouts of Am., 73 Md. App. 705, 710, 536 A.2d 137, 139 (1988) (citing Pfaff v. Yacht Basin Co., 58 Md. App. 348, 473 A.2d 479 (1984)). In Maryland, there are three requireme nts that the defendant must prove to establish the defense of assumption of the risk: (1) the plaintiff had know ledge of the risk of dan ger; (2) the plaintiff appreciated that risk; and (3) the plain tiff volu ntarily con fronted the risk o f dang er. ADM Partnersh ip, 348 Md. at 90-91, 702 A.2d at 734. In determining whether a plaintiff had the requisite knowledge, an objectiv e stand ard is ap plied. Crews, 358 Md. at 644, 751 A.2d at 490. Although the determination as to whether a plaintiff has assumed a risk will often be a question for the jury, where it is clear that any person of normal intelligence in his position must have understood the danger, the issue must be decided by the court. Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421, 226 A.2d 273, 275 (1967) (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Laws of T orts § -8- 55 at 310 ( 2nd ed.)); see also Crews, 358 Md. at 644, 751 A.2d at 490. The question of whether the plaintiff had the requisite knowledge and appreciation of the risk in order to assume the risk is determined by an objectiv e stand ard. Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 27 5. By this standard, a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to him. Id. In this case, Mr. Cotillo knew and apprec iated the risk of d anger, a nd volu ntarily con fronted that risk. At the time of his injury, Mr. Cotillo had been powerlifting for approximately 10 years. Prior to the Meet, he had successfully competed in several competitions at the local, national and international level, while setting several records in the process. Mr. Cotillo had also signed docume nts at past competitions containing waivers, which indicated the risks of participating in powerlifting, including the risk of equip ment malfunction.8 These facts show that Mr. Cotillo w as awa re of the risk of in jury by partic ipating i n a pow erlifting comp etition. Not only did Mr. Cotillo have direct knowledge of the inherent risks of powerlifting, but it is clear to any pe rson of no rmal intelligen ce that one o f the risks inheren t in powerlifting is that the bar m ay fall and injure the participant. That this is clear to any person of normal intelligence is evidenced by the fact that the nature of the sport is to attempt to lift great amounts of weight above the lifter s body. If the participant were to fail to lift the weight, the obvious conclusion is that gravity would cause the bar to come down on the 8 There is some dispute between the parties as to whether Mr. Cotillo signed a waiver as a condition to participate in the Meet at issue. -9- person beneath it. The apparent necessity of spotters in the sport only reinforces the inescapab le conclusion that there is a risk that the bar might fall and injure the participan t. We find persu asive the rea soning of the court in Lee v. Maloney, 692 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591-92 (N.Y. S up. Ct. 1 999), aff d, 704 N .Y.S.2d 729 (N .Y. Ap p. Div. 2 000), concluding that the risk of a lif t bar falling and striking a partic ipant in a w eightlifting co mpetition is perfectly obvious, from the nature of the activity itself. Id. In Lee, a weightlifter was injured in com petition during an attem pt to ben ch pres s 565 p ounds . Id. at 591. Mr. L ee claimed that the spotter was negligent for failing to catch the bar in a timely manner that would have p revente d injury en tirely. Id. As an experienced weightlifter, with 14 years of experience, Mr. Lee was familiar with the rules of the sport and the safety precautions that were comm only take n. Id. The court determined, as a matter of law, that Mr. Lee voluntarily assumed the risk of injury by participating in the weightlifting competition, including the risk that the s potter m ay fail to ca tch the b ar quick ly enoug h to pre vent inju ry. Id. In sports, there are some risks, as for example the risk of injury if one is hit by a baseball driven on a line, which are so far a ma tter o f com mon knowledge in the com mun ity, that in the absence of some satisfactory explanation a denial of such knowledge simply is not to be believed. Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, & David G. Owen, P ROSSER & K EETON ON T ORTS § 68, at 488 (5 th ed. 1984). F urthermo re, volunta ry participants in sports activities may be held to have consented, by their participation, to those injury-ca using eve nts which are known , apparent, or reasonab ly forese eable c onseq uence s of the ir particip ation. -10- Conway v. Deer Park Union Free School Dist. N o. 7, 651 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was appropriate because the plaintiff, an e xperience d softball pla yer who ha d previou sly observed a sewer lid in the vicin ity, assumed the risk of injury of slipping on that sewer lid while running for a fly ball). Although a sporting event participant does not consent to all possible injuries, he consents to the foreseeable dangers that are an integral part o f the sport as it is typically playe d. Kelly v. McCarrick, 155 Md. App. 82, 97, 841 A .2d 869, 87 7 (2004) (h olding that a softball player assumed the risk of injury from colliding with another player). Such risks, that are inherent to a particular sport, are all forseeable consequences of participating in that sport, and as they are obvious to a person of normal intelligence, voluntary participants in those sports assume those inherent risks. Due to the nature of sports injuries, a participant also assumes the risk that other participants may be n egligen t. See M cQuig gan, 73 Md . App. at 71 2, 536 A .2d at 140; see also Pfister v. Shu sta, 167 Ill.2 d 417, 420, 657 N.E.2d 1 013, 1015 (199 5) ( voluntary participants in contact sports are not liable for injuries caused b y simple negligent conduct ); Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410, 420 (Ind. Ct. Ap p. 2001) ( [V]olun tary participants in sports activities assume the inherent and foreseeable da ngers of the activity and cannot recover for injury unless it can be established that the other participant either intentionally caused injury or engaged in conduct so reckless as to be totally outsid e the range of ordinar y activity involved in the sport. ). In the case sub judice, Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk that the spotters -11- may have negligently failed to catch the bar because he knew that type of injury was foreseeable, he appreciated that risk, and he voluntarily accepted that risk by participating in the powerlifting competition. Therefore, we agree that the Court of Special Appeals was correct when it concluded that Mr. Cotillo did assume the risk of injury when he participated in a powerlifting competition. IV. Assumption of the Risk and Causation The respondent argues that even if he did assume the risks inherent to the sport, he did not assume the enhanced risk that arose as a result of the alleged neg ligent training of the spotters. This analysis is m isguided b ecause it fo cuses on th e wrong risk. In order to properly determine which risk is relevant or material to the assumption of the risk analysis, we must look to the immediate cause of the injur y. See Imbraguglio v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 358 Md. 194, 214, 747 A.2d 662, 673 (2000) (finding that the relevant issue is whether the p etitioner assum ed the ris k that w as the im media te cause of his d eath). See also Wertheim v. U.S. Tennis Ass n, 150 A.D.2d 157, 540 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that a linesman s injuries from being hit by a tennis ball were not the proximate result of the Tennis Association s failure to protect him, and since the risk of being hit by a ten nis ball w as obv ious, the linesma n assum ed the ris k of inju ry). Viewing the eviden ce in the light m ost favora ble to the no n-movin g party, in this case the respon dent, w e can a ssume , arguendo, that the spotters were n egligen tly trained. Even granted that assumption, there is no genuine dispute that the immediate ca use of Mr. C otillo s -12- injuries was his own failure to lift the weight successfully. The relevant question, therefore, is whether Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk of injury when he tried to lift a 530 pound weight. We hold, as a matter of law, that he did. As we recently noted, the defense of assumptio n of the risk operates ind ependen tly of the con duct of anothe r person . Morgan State University v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 521, 919 A.2d 21, 28 (2007). The very nature of an assumption of the risk defense is that by virtue of the plaintiff's voluntary actions, any duty the defendant owed the plaintiff to ac t reasonably for the plaintiff's safety is supersed ed b y the plain tiff's willi ngnes s to take a chan ce. Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 M d. 275, 282 , 592 A.2d 1119, 11 23 (1991 ). As in Morga n State University , we can assume for the sake of argument that the AP A was n egligent in fa iling to prevent Mr. C otillo s in jury. Morgan State University, 397 M d. at 521 . Nevertheless, just as a similar assumption did not change the analysis in Morga n State Un iversity, it does not change our analysis in the case sub judice. Id. That the petitioners may have been negligent in failing to prevent an injury is irrelevant where the respondent suffered the very type of injury that any person of norm al intelligence w ould expect might result from the plaintiff s actions. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is not whether Mr. Cotillo could have anticipated that the spotters would be negligently trained, but whether he could anticipate the risk that the lift bar would fall and injure him. We hold as a matter of law that he did. V. Enhanced Risk The respondent s reliance on the theory that the alleged negligent training of the -13- spotters enhanced the risk is similarly misplaced. Of course, a plaintiff only assumes those risks that are inherent in the activity in w hich he is enga ged. Crews, 358 Md. at 653, 751 A.2d at 495. Specifically, every risk is not necessarily assumed by one who works in a dangerous place or at a dangerous occupation. He assumes only those risks which might reasonab ly be expected to exist, and, if b y some action of the def endant, an unusual danger arises, that is not so assumed. Bull S.S. Lines v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 526, 77 A.2d 142, 146 (1950). In the case sub judice, the respondent argues that the instructions given to th e spotters prior to the Meet presented an enhance d risk of inju ry, and since M r. Cotillo did not know about those instructions, he could not have assumed the enhanced risk that the instructions posed. We reject that position, because mere allegations of negligence, without more, even if genuinely in dispute, are not of consequence to the assumption of the risk analysis. Even assuming that the petitioners w ere negligent in training the spotters, the theory of enhance d risk conte mplates rec kless or inten tional cond uct; therefore, any disputes of fact regarding the petitioners negligence are immaterial to this analysis. In Kelly, the Court of Special Appeals held that, in the context of a voluntary sporting event, the doctrine of assumption of the ri sk barre d a neg ligent in struction and train ing claim . Kelly, 155 Md. App. at 115, 841 A.2d at 888. In dicta, the Court o f Special A ppeals noted that it was not addressing injury resulting from an intentional or reckless act. Kelly, 155 Md. App. at 100, 841 A.2d at 879. Thus, the court recognized that the enhanced risk argument contemplates -14- conduct that is intentiona l or reckless. See id. We also find persuasive the reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions, which have also held that, in the context of sports-related injuries, the enhanced risk doctrine contem plates in tentiona l or reck less con duct. See, e.g. Kiley v. Patterson, 763 A.2d 583, 586 (R.I. 2000) (adopting the heightened recklessne ss-orintentional-misconduct standard in an action by a second baseman as a result of injuries sustained in a collision with a base run ner); Wertheim , 150 A.D.2d at 158, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 445 ( Generally the enhanced risk doctrine in sports injury cases involves fact patterns where a co-participa nt engage s in reckless c onduct ca using injury to an other particip ant. ); see also Stanley L. Grazis, A nnotatio n, Liability of Participant in Team Athletic Competition for Injury to or Death of Another Participant, 55 A.L.R .5th 529, 53 7 (1998) ( Generally, cou rts have found that the duty of care owed by participants in team athletic events to each other is measured not by ordinary negligence standards, but by willfulness or recklessness standards because of considerations of the participants' assumption of risk or their consenting to an invasion of perso nal interests or rights by taking part in the subject contest. ). While the respondent in the case sub judice appears to argue in his brief that the present case fits within this line of cases, by implying that there may have been intentional or reckless behavior by the petitioners, he offered no evidence to support that implication. Moreover, we find no support for any allegations of intentional or reckless behavior in this record. Furthermore, mere allegations which do not show facts in detail and with precision are insufficien t to prevent the entry of summary judgment. Lynx v. Ordnance Prods., 273 -15- Md. 1, 7-8, 3 27 A.2 d 502, 5 09 (1974). As such, we conclude that any alleged improper training of the spo tters did not po se an enh anced risk to Mr. Cotillo, because the risk of injury was one that was obvious and foreseeable, and not an unusual d anger. On the contrary, to be injured by the weight and the lift bar is a risk of injury resulting from the type of physical contact that is an integral part of the sport as it is typically played. Kelly, 155 Md. App. at 97, 841 A.2d at 877. Because there was no intentional or reckless conduct, there was no enhanced risk. Therefore, there is no genu ine dispute o f material fa ct that Mr. C otillo assumed the risk of injury from the lift bar when he participated in a powerlifting competition. VI. Video Evidence We cannot find supp ort for the petitioners contention that the Court of Special Appea ls did not consider the video evidence that was part of the record in the case sub judice. Although the Court of Special App eals did not discu ss the conte nts of the vid eo, it did reference the video se veral times in its opinion. That the cou rt did not discu ss the conte nts of the video is not evidence that it failed to consider it, and without more, we cannot say that the Court of Specia l Appeals erred by failing to consider the video footage. The video depicts the failed lift and the spotters response. There may be some dispute as to whether the video dep icts any evidence of negligence on the part of the spotters stemming from their training. Any such disputes are immaterial, because, as we have discussed previously, an enhanced risk requires reck less or in tentiona l condu ct. See Kelly , 155 Md. App. at 100. -16- There is no dispute that the video fails to depict any reckless or intentional conduct, and therefore, any dispute as to the vide o s interpretatio n is immate rial to determining whether the spo tters enh anced the risk o f Mr. C otillo s in juries. CONCLUSION By voluntarily participating in a powerlifting competition, Mr. Cotillo assumed the risks that are the us ual and fo reseeable consequences of participation in weightlifting. The petitioners alleged neg ligence in fa iling to preve nt the injury is not m aterial because Mr. Cotillo assumed the foreseeable risk of injury from a failed lift. Furthermore, any factual dispute as to whether the spotters were negligent is of no con sequence becau se mere allegations of negligence, rather than a llegations of reckless or intentional con duct, are insufficient to find that the spotters enh anced the risk of M r. Cotillo s injuries. Therefore, we hold that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in its holding that Mr. Cotillo assumed the risk of his injuries when he voluntarily participated in a powerlifting comp etition. The Court of Special Appeals erred, however, in holding that Mr. Cotillo did not assume the risk that the spotters would be negligently trained or instructed. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT O F S P E C I A L A P P E A LS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CALVERT COUNTY. -17- RESPONDENT TO PAY THE COST IN THIS COUR T AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APP EAL S. -18-
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