Reier v. Dept. of Assessments

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David Reier v. State Department of Assessments and Taxation, No. 29, Sept. Term 2006. APPELLATE PROCEDURE - LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE - DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO PURE QUESTIONS OF FACT STATE PERSONNEL - WRONGFUL TERMINATION - REMEDIES - FULL BACK PAY MAY INCLUDE STATE-OFFERED BENEFITS David Reier, until his termination on 7 October 1996 for asserted misconduct and poor performance, was employed as an assessor in the Carroll Coun ty office of the State Departm ent of As sessments and Taxation (SD AT). As an a ssessor, Reier wa s responsib le for conducting assessments of individual property accounts to determine their fair market value for taxation purposes. Reier was charged, among other responsibilities, with reviewing relevant building permits, updating computer files, and conducting external physical inspections of properties in order to complete assessments assigned to him. Reier s work, like that of all assessors, was subject to audit by supervisors upon its completion. E vents leading up to the audit process in the final months of the 1996 assessmen t cycle lead to Reier s eventu al termin ation. In early August 19 96, th e As sista nt Su perv isor o f As sessmen ts for Carroll Cou nty, Lumen Norris , found a stack of 8 to 10 building permits on top of, or otherwise in close proximity to, a filing cabinet designated for the storag e of such permits. No rris noted this because it served as an indication that they were not being considered, as they should, in the assessment process. Norris identified the misplaced permits by their account numbers as ones linked to properties assigned to Reier. Sho rtly after his discovery, Norris brought the misplaced permits to the attention of the Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll County, Larry White. White decided to use the permits as a sampling of Reier s work for audit purposes. The timeline of the proceeding audit process became the subject of great dispute because of its significance to the determination of the date on which SDAT became aware of the extent of Reier s poor performance and misconduct. The audit revealed excessive errors in R eier s work and evidence that he had derogated his duties as an assessor. After the conclusion of the audit and a conferen ce with Reier as to the au dit results, White terminated Reier. Reier pursued an administrative appeal of his termination to the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (OA H). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presiding over the first OAH hearing on the matter affirmed the timeliness of the terminatio n, finding th at Reier w as given n otice of his termination within 30 days o f the com mencem ent of the in vestigation in accord w ith Maryland Code (1993), State Personnel and Pensions Article, § 11-106(b). Reier sought judicial review of the decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which remanded the case to the OAH for application of the Court of Special Appeals s interpretation of § 11106(b) then just announced in Western Correctional Institute v. Geiger, 130 Md. App. 562, 747 A.2d 697 (2000) (Geiger I). Aggrieved by the Remand Decision rendered by a different ALJ, Reier again sought judicial review in the Circuit Court, which affirmed the ALJ. On appeal to the Court of Special A ppeals (Reier I), the intermediate appellate court remanded the case to the OAH to apply the yet newer ju dicial gloss giv en § 11-1 06(b) in the Court of Appeals s Western Correctional Institute v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 807 A.2d 32 (2000) (Geiger II). The same ALJ undertook this case for a third time and, after rendering factual findings varying as to some key dates from her previous findings regarding when the SDAT was on notice of Reier s misconduct, determined that more than 30 days had passed since the SDAT became aware of facts suffic ient to prom pt an investig ation into R eier s job performance. The ALJ ordered that Reier be reinstated and awarded back pay, consisting solely of lost monetary wages. The Circuit Court affirmed Reier s reinstatement and awarded him benefits as part of his back pay. On appeal by the SDAT, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Reier s reins tatement, co ncluding th at the interme diate appella te court s decision in Reier I and the opinion in Geiger II effectively vacated the factual findings made by the ALJ on the first rem and. The appellate court panel, however, concluded that back pay was limited to monetary wages. Dep t of Taxation v. Reier, 167 Md. App. 559, 893 A.2d 1195 (2006) ( Reier II). The Court of Appeals rejected the SDAT s arguments that the findings of fact made by the ALJ on the first remand, and relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals in Reier I, could not be disturbed under the doctrine of the law of the case. The Court noted that the doctrine, which p revents par ties from re-litig ating issues a lready decided by a higher tribun al, is generally invoked only for decided questions of law, rather than pure questions of fact. Thus, because the ALJ upon the second remand revised only her findings of fact, which had not been relied upon by the intermediate appellate court in any event, the doctrine of the law of the case did not apply here . Instead, the rev ised factua l findings were determined to be within the ambit of the mandate and opinion of Reier I, which had requested a clarification of certain key facts made more significant in light of the new interpretation o f the statutory 30 day notice standard interpreted in Geiger II. The phrase fu ll back pay , as it is used in Maryland Code (1993), State Personnel and Pensions Article, § 11-110(d)(1)(iii), does not explicitly include State-offered benefits such as medical, dental, and life insurance; leave; and retirement credit. Because two reasonab le alternative interpretations of the statute were presented, the Court looked to the legislative history of the law to determine its meaning. The Court determined that adoption of the statute was influenced substantially by a Governor s Task Force Report, which indicated that the word full had significance apart from a deleted set-off provision in an earlier iteration of the bill before enactment. Several factors lead the Court to conclude that full back pay must emb race also Sta te-offered benefits. First, M aryland courts p reviously conflated the provisions of § 11-110(d )(1)(ii) and (iii) to both reins tate and pro vide back pay with ben efits to erroneously terminated employees. Second, the entire State P ersonnel an d Pension Article addresses the pay scheme in a manner that contemplates benefits, such as health care and leave, to be inextricably linked with pay. Third, and contrary to the SDAT s assertion, the Task Force Report belies the notion that § 11-110(d)(1) was written in the disjunctive. Fina lly, it would be unreasonable for the General Assembly to permit recipients of lesser wrongful discipline to be made whole entirely and sim ultaneously de prive wro ngfully terminated employees of their accrued State benefits. Circuit Co urt for Baltim ore Cou nty Case # 03-C-04-5018 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 29 September Term, 2006 DAVID REIER v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION Bell, C.J. Raker *Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: February 5, 2007 * Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conf erence of this case w hile an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. The controversy presented in this case bounced back and forth between the Maryland Office of Adm inistrative He arings (OA H), the Circ uit Court for Baltimore County, and the Court of Special Appeals over the past 10 years. The litigation began as an administrative appeal by D avid Reier from the State Department of Assessments and Taxation s (SDAT) termination of him as an A ssessor III in its Carroll C ounty office. Th e SDA T ceded authority to the OAH to conduct evidentiary hearings and render final administrative decisions in such personnel matters. The initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the OAH assigned to adjudicate Reier s appeal affirmed the validity of the termination upon a finding that Reier was given time ly notice of his term ination within 30 days of the SDAT s discovering the depth of [his] misconduct and performance failure, purs uant to § 11 -106(b) of the State Personnel and Pensions A rticle, Maryland Code (199 3, 2004 Repl. V ol.).1 The Circ uit Court for Baltimore County, on Reier s petition for judicial review of the ALJ s decision, remanded the matter to the O AH. T he court ins tructed the ALJ to reconsider her decision in light of the Court of Special Appeals s newly announced interpretation of § 11-106(b) s 30 day notice requirement found in Western Correctional Institute v. Geiger, 130 Md. App. 562, 747 A.2d 697 (2000) (Geiger I).2 Aggrieved by the Remand Decision rendered by a different 1 Maryland Code (1 993, 200 4 Repl. V ol.), State Personnel and Pensions Article, § 11106(b) requires that a state entity with the authority to hire and fire employe es m ay take disciplinary action towards an employee no later than 30 days after the [entity] acquires know ledge o f the m iscond uct for w hich the disciplin ary action is impo sed. 2 In that case, the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals held tha t a covered state agenc y is prohibited from imposing disciplinary action more than 30 days after it has acquired or, (contin ued...) ALJ, Reier again sought judicial review in the Circuit Co urt, which affirmed th e ALJ s decision. On appeal to the C ourt of Special Appeals (Reier I), that court remanded the case to the OAH to apply the yet newer judicial gloss given the 30 day notice standard announced in this Court s Western Correctional Institute v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 807 A.2d 32 (2000) (Geiger II).3 The same ALJ undertook this case for a third time and, after rendering factual findings varying as to some key dates from her previous findings, determined that m ore than 30 d ays passed between when the SDAT became aware of facts sufficient to prompt an investigation into Reier s job perform ance and the termination. The ALJ thus ordered that Reier be reinstated and awarded back pay, consisting only of lost mone tary wag es. Both the SDAT and Reier turne d again to th e Circuit C ourt: the SDAT disputing the new factual finding that its manage rs in the Car roll County office we re aware of R eier s asserted poor performance for more than 30 days before Reier w as terminate d, and Re ier arguing th at it was error to exclude from the back pay aw ard benef its and the oth er accoutre ments of S tate employm ent. The Circuit Court affirmed Reier s reinstatement and directed that he be awarded benefits 2 (...continued) with the exercise of reason able diligenc e, should h ave acqu ired kno wledge s ufficient to justify taking disciplinary action against the employee. Western Corr. Inst. v. Geiger, 130 Md. App . 562, 566, 747 A .2d 697, 699 (200 0) (Geiger I). 3 We held that viewed in conte xt, § 11-106 g ives the app ointing auth ority 30 days to conduct an investiga tion, meet w ith the employee the investigation identifies as culpable, consider any mitigating circ umstance s, determine the approp riate action and give notice to the employee of the disciplinary action taken. Western Corr. Inst. v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 145-46, 807 A .2d 32, 44 (2000) ( Geiger II). 2 as part of his back pay. On appeal by the SDAT, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Reier s reinstatement, but concluded that back pay was limited to wages and did not include benefits. Dep t of Taxation v. Reier, 167 Md. App. 559, 597, 893 A.2d 1195, 1218 (2006) (Reier II). We are asked, at this point, on c ross-petitions for certiorari, to resolve two questions. We are called upon by the SDAT to decide whether the ALJ, in applying the Geiger II notice standard, erred in reformulating the factual findings concerning the point in time when the SD AT becam e sufficiently aware of R eier s misconduct and poor performance to trigger the statutory investigation and disciplinary action period. We also consider, upon Reier s petitio n, whethe r the phrase full back pay , as it is used in Maryland Code (1993, 2004 Repl. Vol.), State Personnel and Pensions Article, § 11-110(d)(1)(iii), 4 encompasses other State-offe red benef its such as m edical, denta l, and life insurance; leave; and retirement credit. 4 State Personne l and Pensions Article § 11-110, at the time of the instant action, provided , in pertinent pa rt: (d) Additional action by Office of Administrative Hearings; final administrative decision. (1) Except as otherwise provided by this subtitle, the Off ice o f Ad ministrative H earin gs m ay: (i) uphold the disciplinary action; (ii) rescind or modify the disciplinary action taken and restore to the employee any lost time, compensation, status, or benefits; or (iii) order: 1. reinstatement to the position that the employee held at dism issal; 2. full back pay; or 3. both 1 and 2. 3 I. FACTS David Reier, until his termination on 7 October 1996, was employed as an Assessor III for the SD AT of fice in Car roll County. As an assessor, Reier was expected to conduct assessme nts of real property accoun ts , or individu al properties, a ssigned to h im by his superiors, to establish th eir fair market value for taxation purposes. A typical assessment would entail a preliminary review of building permits for each property, editing the computer database corresponding to each property (referr ed to as a Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal ( CAM A )), review ing and no ting comp arable sales data, conducting an external physical inspection of each p roperty, measu ring new improvem ents, and sp eaking w ith the homeowner or appropriate adult occupant of a given property. This process is commonly referred to as an assessor s fieldwork . The SDAT conducts assessments on a triennial cycle, completing assessments or re-assessments of one-third of the State s taxable properties each year of the cycle. The SDAT generally strives to finish this task each year prior to 1 October in anticipation of the assessment notices being dispatched on 1 January of the following year. Bef ore the p rocess is consid ered co mplete , howe ver, local supervisors typically carry out field audits of its assessors for quality control purposes. This auditing process generally does not commence for a given assessor until after the a ssessor repo rts that he or she has completed all of his or her field work for all assigned property accounts. The events leading up to Reier s termination occurred during the final months of the 1996 assessment year. In early August 1996, the Assistant Supervisor of Assessments for 4 Carroll County, Lumen Norris, 5 found a stack of 8 to 10 building permits on top of, or otherwise in close proximity to, a filing cabinet designated for the storage of such permits. This caught N orris s attention because a ssessors ord inarily c ommence their field work by locating and extracting from the cabinet permits linked to their assigned properties by account number so that the p rogress of any new c onstruction may be evalua ted properly. If permits were n ot in their prope r place, f iled in th e cabin et, as was the case here, it may indicate that they were not being considered in the assessment process. Norris identified the misplaced permits by their account numbers as linked to properties assigned to Reier. Shortly after his discovery, Norris brought the misplaced permits to the attention of the Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll County, Larry White, during a discussion about quality control and the pending field audits. White decided to use the permits as a sampling of Re ier s wo rk for a udit pu rposes . The timeline of the particular audit of Reier s work, as one may imagine, is a source of considerable dispute in this record because of its significanc e to the determination of the date on which SDAT became aware of the extent of Reier s asserted poor performance and miscond uct. Because Reier was terminated on 7 October 1996, a finding that the SDAT was aware of Reier s deficient work prior to 7 September 1996 would render the discipline untimely under the Geiger II standard for calculating the 30 day period in which the State as 5 Mr. Norris, evidently, is known also as W illiam F. N orris, Jr., according to the record. Because the ALJ s findings of fact and the brief prepared by the SDAT, Norris s employer, refer to his given name as Lumen , we shall use that name. 5 an employer has to investigate and effectuate discipline. As noted earlier, there was a divergence of findings on this point between the first and second remand hearings at the OAH . We shall e xplore thes e findings in greater detail infra. The remainder of the factual background is uncontested. On 13 September 1996, White met with the State Supervisor of the SDAT, Joseph Szabo, and Personnel Administrator, Emory Rudy, about Reier s performance as an assessor. On 24 September 1996, Assessor Supervisor Gail Trawinski of the Carroll County office reported the findings of her review of Reier s edits 6 of properties that recently had been sold.7 Her initial review uncovered 21 errors in Reier s editing of 68 properties.8 Trawinski s subsequent review of 300 other edits performed by Reier yielded a finding of 87 mistakes. Trawinski communicated her findings to White in late September. Around that same time, the SDAT headquarters dispatched Assessor Man ager, Jo seph W agner, to audit R eier s w ork. Upon a drive-through of the geographical area containing the properties assigned to Reier, Wagner identified 24 properties exhibiting visible, new improvements that had been present for more than one m onth. W agner d etermin ed that, of the 24, Reier s fieldwork correctly noted 6 An edit is essen tially an updating of the previous information on the CAMA database, which also affords an opportunity to verify the accuracy of that information. 7 Reviewing the assessments of recently sold properties is of particular importanc e to quality control because it provides a market-based appraisal of the accuracy of the SDAT s assessment methods and valuations. 8 This finding w as comp ared by the SDA T to zero errors found in the editing performed by two other Carroll County assessors who had 22 and 6 properties reviewed, resp ectiv ely. 6 improvem ents on one ac count, inco rrectly noted five, and entirely missed improvements on 18 properties. Satisfied that the audit esta blished thor oughly the pe rvasivenes s and una cceptable frequency of Reier s assessment errors,9 White convened a meeting with Reier on 3 October 1996 to discuss the aud it s findings a nd determ ine the app ropriate sanc tion. White terminated Reier after weighing Reier s previously satisfactory job performance evaluation against the recent audit results and Reier s unsatisfactory explanation of the audit results. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY - A CLOSER EXAMINATION After 10 years of litigation, the procedural history of this case is admittedly protracted. We commence our close review of this history necessarily with the first remand to the OAH because it resulted in the pertinent factual findings later revised in the course of the second remand. OAH Remand D ecision I (8 December 2000) As a result of the Court o f Special A ppeals s de cision in Geiger I, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County remanded Reier s appeal to the OAH for more detailed findings of fact pertaining to the SDAT s actions after the initial discovery of the out-of-place building permits. The court, quoting the standard from Geiger I, requested that the ALJ determine the date by which SDAT . . . in the exercise of reasonable diligen ce, should re asonably 9 Reier had challenged below the adequacy of the SDAT s basis for terminating his employment. Reier does not pursue that contention here. 7 have acquired e nough k nowledge to justify terminating Reier on October 7, 1996. Of specific interest to the court was how long it took Norris to investigate the misplaced permits and discover the miscond uct that they evid enced, as well as whether the review of Reier s work that transpired in early September occurred before 6 September 1996. In response to the Circuit Court s order, ALJ Sondra Spencer conducted a new hearing and accepted a dditional ev idence fro m both p arties, along w ith the record from the initial OAH hearing. The findings of fact in ALJ Spencer s resultant decision, responsive to the Circuit Court order, were as follows: 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. In early August 1996, Lumen Norris, Assistant Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll County, found a stack of 8 to 10 building p ermits on a cabinet. There were no notations of [sic] the permits. The properties reflected on the permits were assigned to the Employee. Mr. Norris discussed the permits with Larry White, Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll Coun ty. Mr. Norris and Mr. White took the permits and went to the properties to determine if work had been performed pursuant to the permits. They discovered that the Employee had been to the properties but had not made any notations on the permits. On September 3, 1996, the Employee completed his fieldwork. As part of a quality control review, once an assessor completes his fieldwo rk, Mr. W hite conducts a random audit of the assessor's work. On Septemb er 9, 1996, M r. White co nducted a field audit of the Emp loyee's comple ted fieldw ork. The a ssessmen ts for 68 properties were reviewed and 21 errors, which affected property valuations, were discovered. Between September 14 and September 30, at least three more audits of the Employee's work were conducted. One of the audits revealed 87 out of a total of 300 8 properties with errors affecting evaluation. Another audit reviewed the fieldwork on 33 properties. Of the 24 properties with changes from previous assessments, the Employee accura tely reflec ted one chang e, incorrectly noted five changes that he id entified[,] an d failed to reflect 18 changes, including decks and additional buildings on the properties. Upon these findings of fact, the ALJ concluded that Reier had not made a prima fac ie showing that the SDAT was on notice of his misconduct to an extent that would justify discipline more than 30 days prior to the actual term ination. Eve n though Norris and White were aware of the misplaced permits and the errors evidenced by Reier s failure to note the relevant real p roperty improvements, ALJ Spencer found that such knowledge did not rise to the level needed to justify terminating Reier s em ployment. 10 Further, because Reier had not complete d his field work at th at time, it was n ot yet incumb ent upon N orris or Wh ite to conduct their aud it of Re ier s wo rk. The ALJ determined that the SDAT was put on notice of Reier s misconduct, to an extent sufficient to trigger commencement of the time period prescribed in § 11-10 6(b), only after N orris and W hite s 9 September 1996 audit of 68 of Reier s assig ned prop ertie s, thu s making the 7 October 199 6 termination time ly. 11 Reier 10 The ALJ explained that the errors pertaining to the non-annotated permits did not necessarily indicate that Reier was not visiting any properties at all, which would have indicated the need for an imm ediate inves tigation. Ra ther, it was only enough information to indicate that Reier may have been performing his duties poorly, which, in the judgment of the ALJ , apparently w ould not have b een signific ant enoug h to prompt a m ore imme diate investigation. 11 The ALJ see med to emphasize the numerical difference between the 8 to 10 per mits initially discovered and the 68 properties audited as a basis for her decision that the discovery (contin ued...) 9 sought jud icial review o f the AL J s decision in the Circuit C ourt. Circuit Court Review (31 December 2001) The Circuit Co urt judge af firmed the ALJ s d ecision in favor of the SDAT under the deferential substantial evidence standa rd of re view. The court dismissed Reier s argument that the discovery of the misplaced permits was sufficient to trigger the 30 day period under § 11-106(b). Com menting on R eier s position, the court stated [w]ere the Court to adopt this approach, State agencies would have to launch a full scale investigation every time a supervisor discovered that an em ployee failed to put away do cuments used by the employee in performing his job. Reier appealed this decision to the Court of Special Appeals. Court of Special Appeals Remand (19 December 2002) The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion filed on 19 December 2002, weighed in on the 30 day notice provision of § 11-106(b), taking into account our opinion in Geiger II. The intermediate appellate co urt identified its task as deciding [w]hen did the [SDAT] acquire kn owledg e sufficien t to order an investigation of the conduct that ultimately resulted in the ter minatio n of [R eier]. The appellate court panel prefaced its review of the procedural history and facts of the case by noting that if the SDAT acquired adequate notice in early August 1996, as alleged by Reier, the termination would have to be rescinded. Obfuscating the court s analysis of the question before it, however, was the fact that 11 (...continued) of the permits was not sufficient to trigger the termination. 10 the chronology set forth [by the ALJ s factual findings] suggests but does not definitively establish that prior to September 3, 1996, Messrs. Norris and White wen t to th e pro perty [sic] mentione d on the m islaid permits and discovered that Reier h ad not note d the improvements on the permits even though he had claimed to have been on the premises. [12] If Norris or White actually had checked Reier s field cards to determine if he had noted any of the improvements after Reier had claimed to have visited the properties, the panel hypothecated, then Reier s supervisors would have possessed, at that point, sufficient knowledge to investigate Reier for deroga tion of h is duties . Because this realization w ould have occurred before Reier reported that his field work was complete on 3 September 1996, the 7 October term ination would have fallen outside of the statutorily prescribed 30 day period for the proper adm inistration of the statutory investigative and disciplinary processes in this case. The Court of Special Appeals ultimately resolved that it could not so conclude because neither the initial ALJ, M . Gayle Haf ner, nor A LJ Spen cer made an explicit determination of when Norris or White examined Reier s field cards. Because of the ambiguous chronology established in the earlier administrative decisions, the appellate court panel noted that the facts as found, when alternatively viewed in a light most f avorable to either party, wo uld allow either party to prevail. The court noted that it was possible to conclude that No rris and White, prior to 3 Sep tember 1996, w ere 12 The reason for this inference is an assumption that the findings of fact were presented in chronological order. Thus, when the ALJ noted the discovery of the permits and the field audit by N orris and Wh ite in the num bered para graph just p rior to the entry reciting that Reier had completed his field work on 3 September 1996, it appeared that the entire permit episode pre-dated Reier s completion of his field work. 11 aware of Reier s omission from the field cards of the improvements described in the misplaced building pe rmits and that Jack Burgesen, another assessor in the Carroll Co unty office, had audited one o f Reier s assigned properties, at White s direction, on 4 Se ptember. Conversely, the record a lso suppo rted a contra ry conclusion that Norris a nd Wh ite only became aware of Reier s deficient performance upon their field inspection of the building permit properties on 9 September 1996. The intermediate appellate court opined that the date that SDA T acquired knowledge sufficient to order an investigation into whether Reier had been properly performing his field work was when the employer discovered (1) that improvements (mentioned on the misplace[d] permits) had been performed and (2) that Reier had visited the premises but had failed to note on SDAT s field cards that the improvements had been completed. The ambiguity of the ALJ s fa ct findings, h oweve r, did not dete rmine w ith certainty when the critical knowledge noted above was acquired by the SDAT . Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a determination by the ALJ whether the SDAT acquired the critical knowledge prior to 7 September 1996, which, if so, wou ld require rescission of Reier s termination. OAH Remand D ecision II (12 April 2004) Upon remand, ALJ Spencer reconsidered the evidence adduced thus far, declining the SDAT s request to supplement the record further with additional testimony on the questions posed by the Court of Special Appeals. The ALJ recited her previous findings of fact from 12 the first remand decision, along with a critical revision of finding number four13 : As a result of the remand order and further review of the record, I find the following additional facts: 11. Mr. Norris found a stack of misplaced permits in August 1996. There were no notations of the permits that the property had been assessed or visited. Upon further checking, Mr. No rris concluded that the properties had been assigned to R eier. 12. After finding the field cards, Mr. No rris pulled the f ield cards to determin e if Reier had been to the properties. The notation on the field cards indicated Reier had been to the properties. 13. Mr. Norris discussed his findings w ith Mr. White. B oth Mr. Norris and Mr. White then went to the properties identified in the permits. 14. Mr. White next instructed Jack Burgeson [sic], another assessor, to reassess the properties. 15. Mr. Burgeson [sic] conducted reassessments on September 4, 1996, September 14, 1996, and September 30, 1996. (footnotes omitted). ALJ Spencer recast the chronology relying on the testimony taken during the 1 7 April 1997 hearing, rath er than testim ony received on 7 M ay at the initial OAH proceeding presided over by ALJ Hafner. She found that the April testimony was more credible and 13 Finding number four, which preceded the finding that Reier had com pleted his fie ld work on 3 Septemb er 1996, stated: Mr. N orris discussed the perm its with Larry White, Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll Co unty. Mr. No rris and M r. White too k the perm its and went to the properties to determine if work had been performed pursuant to the permits. They discovered that the Employee had been to the properties but had not made any notations on the p ermits. 13 accurately reflect[ed] the chrono logy of e vents in this case , 14 which now resolved that the SDAT acquired knowledge sufficient to trigger an investigation of Reier s job performance by 4 September 1996. The judge relied upon Norris s 17 April testimony that, after finding the misplaced permits, he reviewed the corresponding field cards, which led him to discuss the matter with White. The two then visited the properties to which the permits corresponded and discovered that Reier had not noted on th e field cards the comp leted impro vements located on the properties, despite h is indication th at he had v isited the prop erties. This realization prompted White to order Burgesen to reassess those properties, which task Burgesen commenced on 4 September 1996, as evidenc ed by his notation of that date on one of the misplaced permits. ALJ Spencer further noted that Burgesen had to have possessed the field cards to conduct his reassessment of the properties, providing further evidence that the SDAT was cognizant of Reier s poor performance prior to the critical date of 7 Septemb er 19 96. A ccor ding ly, the ALJ rescind ed th e term inati on as unt imel y. ALJ Spencer then considered the question of wh ether State-offered ben efits are contemplated as part of the full back pay remedy provided in § 11-110(d)(1)15 for a rescinded termination. In her view, § 11-110(d)(1) was framed in the disjunctive, thus 14 The ALJ s determination of credibility is ow ing to the fa ct that Wh ite changed his testimony twice during the 7 May hearing as to when he inspected the properties implicated by the misplac ed permits . Before settling on 9 September 1996 as the day he checked the properties, he first testified he saw them on 2 Septem ber, which was a Sta te holiday (Labor Day) , and then that h e visited t hem on 7 Sep temb er, w hich was a we eken d day. 15 Unless otherwise noted, citation s in this opinio n to the M aryland Cod e are all to various provision of the State Personnel and Pensions Article. 14 providing three mutu ally exclusive possible outcomes to an employee s appeal of his or her termination: (1) affirmation of the discipline, (2) rescission or modification of the discipline and the restoration of pay and th e full pano ply of state b enefits , or (3) reinstatem ent, full back pay, or both. T he ALJ thus reason ed that the statu te foreclose d the possib ility of both reinstatement with full b ack p ay and the award of benefits. Accordingly, Reier was reinstated with full ba ck pay, but no t restored w ith lost state ben efits. Both Reier and the SDAT sought judicial review of the decision. Circuit Court Review (18 March 2005) The SDAT assigned error to the ALJ for not permitting the admission of additional evidence on the questions posed by the Court of Special Appeals in Reier I and to the ALJ s revision of her previous findings of fact. Reier, on the other hand, argued that the ALJ incorrectly concluded that State-offered benefits may not accompany an award of full back pay. Finding that the ALJ properly made supplemental findings of fact in response to the Court of Special App eals s specific inquiries, the Circuit Court affirmed the administrative decision concluding Reier s termination to be unlawful. The court also concluded that it would defy logic to construe § 11-110(d)(1) as precluding benefits as part of a full back pay award f or a wron gful termin ation. The S DAT appealed this judgm ent. Court of Special Appeals s Review (3 March 2006) The Court of Special A ppeals aff irmed the re instatemen t of Reier, fin ding that its previous unreported opinion in this case and Geiger II effectively vacated AL J Spencer s 15 original finding s of fac t. Reier II, 167 Md. App. at 591, 893 A.2 d at 1215. T he interme diate appellate court perceived that it was incumbent upon ALJ Spencer to make new factual findings to answer specific questions that would undoubtedly go to the merits of what the Court of Appeals de clared agencies and a ppellate courts should seek in reviewing matters under § 11-106. Id. The new factual determinations were not made in error because new legal principles [were] to be applied to these facts. Reier II, 167 Md. App. at 592, 893 A.2d at 1215. Because the resolution of the case under the Geiger I standard d id not implica te as relevant facts pertaining to when the SDAT became aware of circumstances justifying an investigation of Reier, the resolution of the case under the Geiger II standard necessitated new finding s of fac t. Reier II, 167 M d. App . at 593- 94, 893 A.2d a t 1216. It was within the ALJ s discretion whether to accept further evidence from the SDAT on the questions posed by the Court of Special Appeals s remand opinio n. Reier II, 167 Md. App. at 594-95, 893 A.2d at 1216-17. Fina lly, the appellate court panel reversed the Circuit Court on the issue of benefits, holding that the plain language of § 11-110(d)(1) precluded the award of benefits in addition to full back p ay. The Ge neral Asse mbly drafted the statute to res tore benef its in the event of the rescission or modification of a disciplinary action in subsub subsection (ii), but not in conjunction with full ba ck pay as pro vided in su bsubsub section (iii). The intermediate appellate court reasoned that if the Legislature intende d for ben efits to be av ailable in addition to full back pay, the statute would have been framed more clearly to so provide. 16 Reier II, 167 Md. App. at 597, 893 A.2d at 1218. III. DISCUSSION A. The Revised Factual Findings The SDAT renews here its assignm ent of error to ALJ Spencer s decision for her revision of the timeline findings pertaining to its notice of Reier s deficient performance as an assesso r. Specifically, the SDAT argues initially that the law of the case doctrine forbade the ALJ from revising her previous findings of fact in this regard. The findings of fact made on the first remand to OAH supported ALJ Spencer s conclusion at that time that the SDAT was not on ade quate notice of Reier s misconduct until 9 September 1996. This conclusion, as the SDAT s theory goes, is readily applicable to either the Geiger I or Geiger II standard, without the need for revisiting the fact-finding function. Thus, the ALJ overreached her authority in answering the Court o f Special A ppeals s qu estions of c larification in Reier I by reformulating the timeline of events w hich previously had been affirmed by the Circuit Co urt as supported by substantial evidence. Illustrative of this overreaching, the S DAT o bserves that if the revised finding s were in place for the first remand decision applying the Geiger I standard, the ALJ would have had to come to a different conclusion than was reac hed in relian ce on the f indings of fact actually made in that decision. The SDAT asserts that Reier s termination would have been justified, and the 30 day clock would have begun to run had the SDAT known prior to 4 September 1996 that Reier failed to note and record the improvements evident at the properties he 17 claimed to ha ve visited . Notably, ALJ Spencer did not arrive at that conclusion in her first remand decision, but instead found tha t the SDAT was not awa re sufficiently of Reier s possible misconduct, and thus the 30 day clock w ould not h ave begu n to run, un til 9 September 1996. The SDAT argues that when the Court of Special Appeals in Reier I sustained the finding that Norris and White conducted the audit on 9 September, such became the law of the case and could not be revised at the subsequent administrative hearing on remand to the OAH. Reier counters that the ALJ me rely was answering the q uestions posed by the Co urt of Special Appeals in Reier I because of the ambiguity noted by that court in her findings of fact in the 8 December 2000 remand decision.16 Because it was not entirely clear when the SDAT became aware sufficiently of R eier s misco nduct, the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals remanded the case to th e ALJ f or clarification . Thus, the A LJ did no t exceed h er authority 16 The inter med iate a ppellate court fra med its request for clar ifica tion thus ly: Upon remand, th e ALJ sh all answer th e followin g question: When did SDAT acquire information sufficient to launch an investigation into whether Reier s work performance was negligent, incompetent, and inefficient. The ALJ should also answer the following subsidiary que stions: Did SDA T s agen ts go to the premises (mentioned in the misplaced permits) prior to September 7, 1996, to determine if the improvements mentioned in the permits had been completed? If the answer to that question is yes, did SDAT know prior to September 7, 1996, that Reier had been to the premises (mentioned in the misplaced permits) but had fa iled to note o n the field cards the fact that improvements to the property had been made? 18 in making the findings, revised though they were. The law of th e case doc trine is one of appellate procedure. Scott v. State , 379 Md. 170, 183, 840 A.2d 715, 723 (2004) (quoting Goldstein & Baron Chartered v. Chesley, 375 Md. 244, 253, 825 A.2d 985, 990 (2003)). Under the doctrine, once an appellate court rules upon a question presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts become bound by the ruling, which is considered to be the law of the case. Id. (citing Turne r v. Ho us. Auth ., 364 Md. 24, 32, 770 A.2d 6 71, 676 (2001)). The function of the doctrine is to prevent piecemeal litigation . Fid.-Balt. Nat l Bank & Trust Co. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 217 Md. 367, 371 -72, 142 A .2d 796, 79 8 (1958). T hus, litigants cannot prosecute successive appeals in a case that raises the same questions that have been previously decided by this Court in a former appeal of that same case; and, furthermore, they cannot, on the subsequent appeal of the same case raise any question th at could have been presented in the previous appeal on the then state of the record, a s it existed in the court of original jurisdic tion. If this were not so, any party to a suit could institute as many successive appeals as the fiction of his imagination could produce new reasons to assign as to why his side of the case should prevail, and the litigation would never terminate. Once this Court has ruled upon a que stion properly presented on an a ppeal, or, if the ruling be contrary to a question that could have been raised and argued in that appeal on the then state of the record, as aforesaid, such a ruling becomes the law of the case and is binding on the litigants and the court alike, unless changed or modified after reargument, and neither the questions decided not the ones that could have been raised and decid ed are ava ilable to be raised in a subseque nt appeal. Fid.-Balt. Nat l Bank & Trust Co., 217 M d. at 372, 14 2 A.2d a t 798. It appears to us, however, that the doc trine of the law of the case , in its proper ap plication, con cerns app ellate conclu sions as to ques tions of law, no t pure q uestion s of fac t. Stokes v. Am. A irlines, In c., 19 142 Md. App. 440, 446, 790 A.2d 699, 702 (2002) (citing Turner, 364 Md. at 31-33, 770 A.2d at 676-77 and Hagez v. State, 131 Md. App. 402, 418-19, 749 A.2d 206, 214 -15 (2000)) ( Once an appellate court has answered a question of law in a given case, the issue is settled for all futur e proce edings . ) (emp hasis ad ded), cert. denied, 369 Md. 179, 798 A.2d 552 (2002); see also , e.g, Corby v. McCarthy, 154 Md. App. 446, 480-81, 840 A.2d 188, 208 (2003) ( The important issue o f whether the G uidelines apply in calculating support fo r a destitute adult child is a question of law, which was certainly resolved as to these parties and their child in McCarthy I for purposes of law of the case. ) (emphasis added); Barrett v. Lohmuller Bldg. Co . of Baltimo re City, 151 Md. 133, 139, 134 A. 37, 39 (1926) (quoting 4 Corpus Juris § 3088, p. 1106) ( As a general rule the doctrine of the law of the case applies to all questions of law identica l with th ose on the prio r appea l, and on the sam e facts, and to such questions o nly. The doctrine is rarely, and in a v ery limited class o f cases, app lied to matters of evidence as distinguished from rulings of law, and a decision on appeal on a question of fact does not generally become the law of the case, nor estop the parties on a second trial from showing the true state of the facts. ) (emphas is added); 2A FED. P ROC, L. E D. § 3:793, p. 542 ( The doctrine applies to determinations only of questions of law and not questions of fact. ). A lthough fa ctual determ inations undergirding or m ixed with conclusions of law may become the law of the case,17 pure matters of fact, absent 17 See, e.g., Beane v. Prince George s County , 20 Md. App. 383, 389 n.2, 315 A.2d 777, 780 n.2 (1974) ( T he Court here cited Grant v. Katson, where the findings of fact (contin ued...) 20 commingling with the application of legal principles, have no estoppel effect under the law of the c ase doc trine. Barrett, 151 Md. at 139, 134 A. at 39. The doctrine of the law of the case is inapplicable here. The Co urt of Spe cial Appe als in Reier I reached no definitive conclusion with regard to the point in time at which the SDAT possessed knowledge sufficient to commence an investigation of Reier. In fact, to the extent that the Reier I panel discussed findings o f fact, it specifically stated that it could not render legal conclusions based on the extant fact-finding because of the ambiguity of the factual find ings mad e by the ALJs to that point. This is also true with respect to the legal significance of the date of 9 September 1996, cited by the SDAT as the critical day on which Norris and White conducted a field audit of Reier s misplaced permit properties and discovered the extent of his misconduct sufficient to warrant an investigation. Because of the ordering and phrasing of the ALJ s findings, the Reier I court expressed its misgivings about whether this field audit w as merely of the properties that were the subject of the misplaced permits or a more extensive review of 68 properties.18 Thus, even if the doctrine 17 (...continued) inherent in the jury s general verdict returned at the close of plaintiffs action for continuing trespass arising from alleged excessive concentration and diversion of surface waters, and the conclusion as to liability, were deemed by the court to con stitute the law of the case in a determination of whether ancillary injunctive relief was appropriate. ) (citation omitted). 18 The resolution o f this ambig uity was critical. If the 9 September f ield audit were merely of the subject properties of the permits, the SDA T wou ld have ac quired the re quisite knowledge to terminate Reier within 30 days of his actual termination - making the discipline time ly. On the other hand, had the 9 September audit been of the 68 prope rties, thus implying that the permit properties had been reviewed by the SDAT p rior to 7 September, (contin ued...) 21 of the law of the case were implicated by findings of fact, the Reier I court expressly declined to commit or opine as to any such findings, much less a v ersion supporting the SD AT s position. The SDAT s reliance on Stavely v. Sta te Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 376 Md. 108, 829 A.2d 265 (2003), as support fo r its law of the case argument is misplaced. In Stavely, an ALJ determ ined that an insurer s propose d nonrenewal of an automo bile liability policy was not justified and, therefore, violated Maryland law. 376 Md. at 115, 829 A.2d at 269. The ALJ s legal conclusion was upheld by the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals denied certiorari. Id. Another ALJ presiding over the same case subseque ntly for purposes of determining an award of attorney s fees held, notwithstanding the previous final disposition on the issue, that the insurer was justified in not renewing the Id. policy. Upon subsequent judicial review, the Stavely Court con cluded tha t this revisitation of the nonrenewal justification issue was contrary to the doctrine of the law of the case and/or principles of res judicata . 376 Md. at 116-17, 829 A.2d at 270. The SDAT incorrectly imagines Stavely as presentin g a scenario similar to wh at transpired in the present case. First, as we have noted previously, the doctrine of the law of the case does not a pply here because no legal conclusions were reached by the Reier I court, unlike in Stavely. Second, the sequence of events in Stavely was not complic ated, as here, by an intervening 18 (...continued) the d iscip line w ould have bee n untime ly. 22 change in a legal standard relevant to the disposition of the case, which required a revisitation and reformulation of relevant fact-finding as previously addressed.19 The SDA T, however, claims that the Reier I decision ne ver vacate d any facts although it sought clarification of certain events in the sequence. The SDAT here emphasizes only half of the story. The findings made by the ALJ remained intact to the extent that t he C ourt of S peci al Appeals did no t exp ress doubt as to their precis ion. N otab ly, the intermediate appellate court indicated in Reier I that it was rem anding th e case for the ALJ to answer specific questions regarding the acquisition by the SDAT of knowledge of Reier s poor performance and misconduct precisely because of the imprec ision of certa in factual findings made earlier. The mandate in Reier I vacated the judgments below and instructed the ALJ to conduc t further pro ceedings in conformity with the views set forth in this opinio n, 20 which the ALJ dutifully carried out by answering the questions posed. See Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md. App. 652, 666, 675 A.2d 1003, 1010 (1996) ( [A]ny direction in an order or mandate that proceedings on remand are to be consistent with the opinion 19 The real problem , as the Cou rt of Specia l Appeals noted in Reier I, was that the previous findings of fact were insufficient to answer the new questions posed by the intervening new interpretation of the 30 day notice standard intro duced by Geiger II. It is well settled that the law of the case doctrine does not apply when . . . controlling authority has since made a contrary decision on the law applicable to such issues . . . . Turner v. Hous . Auth., 364 Md. 24 , 34, 770 A.2d 67 1, 677 (2001). 20 The judgm ent wa s vacate d and, th us, beca me vo id. Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 395 n.8, 788 A.2d 609, 614 n.8 (2002) ( To vacate is [t]o render an act void; as, to va cate an entry of record, or a judgme nt. Clearly upon vacating a paternity declaration, it no longer exists or has le gal force. ) ( citation omitte d); Young v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 108 Md. App. 233, 240 , 671 A.2d 515 , 518 (1996). 23 would necessarily require the opinion to be considered as an integral part of the judgm ent. ), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177. Although the opinion in Reier I was silent on the question of whether new or revised f actual findin gs were re quired to sa tisfy its queries, it is presumed that the ALJ po ssessed the discretion to c arry out the ma ndate in whatever manner she best saw fit. See Balducci v. Eberly, 304 Md. 664, 67 0, 500 A.2d 10 42, 1046 (1985 ). We, thus, reject the SDAT s argument that ALJ Spencer overreached her authority by making revised findings. Rather, the revision of the previous findings was amply within the ambit of the remand and fulfilled the tasks set before her by the Reier I mandate and opinion. Because we believe that it was proper to permit Reier and the SDA T to argue the facts and the ALJ to reevaluate them in light of the Geiger II interpretation of the § 11-106(b) notice standard, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals s determination of the untimeliness of Re ier s term ination. Further, ALJ Spencer did not abuse her discretion by advising the parties in a 24 October 2003 letter that she would not accept further evidence proffered by the SDAT prior to oral arguments at the sec ond remand h earing. The AL J s decision to forego th e receipt of p ossible further evidence is entitled to deference and may only be reverse d if found to be arbitrary and capricious.21 We are convinced further that ALJ 21 We have held previously that the arbitrary and capricious standard applies to an administrative agency s decision to reopen a hearing after it had completed the receipt of evidence and be gun de liberatio ns on th e matte r. Spencer v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 530-31, 846 A.2d 341, 350 (2004) (citing Md. State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 557-58, 625 A.2d 914, 922-23 (1993), in turn citing Maryland Code (1984, 1993 R epl. Vol.), State Gov t Article, § 10-215(g)(3)(vi)). It is only logical to apply this same standard to an (contin ued...) 24 Spencer s decision regarding the need for additional evidence was reasonable given the reality that, just prior to the remand, she re-acqu ainted herself with the arguments and voluminous record in this case. Both legally and practically speaking, therefore, ALJ Spencer was in the best position to make the determination of whether further evidence was needed. B. Full B ack Pay an d State-O ffered B enefits Reier s question requires us to determine whether S tate-offered benefits are contemplated in the award of full back pay , as the latter phrase is used in State Personnel and Pensions Article § 11-1 10(d)(1 )(iii). We conduct a de novo review of the ALJ s legal conclusion that benef its are not inclu ded in full back pay as the question is one of statutory interpretation and, ther efor e, a p urely lega l inquiry. Schwartz v. Dep t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 534, 554, 870 A.2d 168, 180 (2005); Charles C ounty Dep t of Soc. Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 295, 855 A.2d 313, 319 (2004); Spencer v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 528-29, 846 A.2d 341, 348-49 (2004 ); Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dep t, 369 Md. 108, 121, 797 A.2d 770, 778 (2002 ). The ultimate objective of our analysis is to extract and effectuate the actual intent of the Legisla ture in en acting th e statute . Deville v. Sta te, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004); Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). This process begins 21 (...continued) agency s decision not to open a proceeding to the receipt of further evidence. 25 with an examination of the plain language of the statute. Section 11-110(d)(1)(iii) does not state expressly whether f ull back pa y embrace s benefits. R eier interprets th e plain language of the statute to include benefits in full back pay for terminations because benefits are permitted for lesser disciplinary sanctions. The SDAT, on the other hand, poin ts out that the organization and structure of § 11-110(d)(1 ) specifically includes benefits as part of the comp ensation fo r lesser discipli nary a ctions not involving a break in service , but makes no mention of benefits as part of full back pay awarded in response to an invalid termination. This, the SDAT argues, indicates that th e Genera l Assemb ly purposefu lly decided to exclude benefits from full back pay as part of the relief available to a employee successful in upsetting his or her termination, w hether on a technicality or otherwise. It strikes us that the co mpeting p arties argum ents presen t two . . . reason able alternative interpretations of the statute, making the statute amb iguous an d subject to a more expansive investigation of the f ield in ou r quest f or legisla tive inten t. Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487 (citing Price, 378 Md. at 387, 835 A.2d at 1226). Therefore, we may employ all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal, Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 4 87, in clud ing legis lativ e history, prior ca se law, a nd statu tory purp ose. Id. (citing Melgar v. State, 355 Md. 339, 347, 734 A.2d 712, 716 (1999)). After so doing, we conclude it more likely so than not that the G eneral As sembly mea nt for the ph rase full back pay in § 11-110(d)(1)(iii) to encompass State-offered benefits, including insurance, leave, status, an d service cre dit. 26 The word full connotes a comprehensive approach to compensation such that it includes all of the incid ents and b enefits of S tate employm ent. 22 As we noted in Geiger II, the State personnel management system underwent a panoptic legislative revision in 1996 on the initiative of Governor Glendening. 371 Md. at 145, 807 A.2d at 44. The Governor established a Task Force to Reform the State Personnel Management System in 1995,23 which produce d on 16 Ja nuary 1996 its final Rep ort to the Go vernor (T ask Force Report) containing findings and recommendations. Geiger II, 371 Md. at 145-46, 807 A.2d at 44-45. This report formed the basis of the subseq uently introduc ed cross-file d bills of H ouse Bill 774 and Senate Bill 466 , later codified as the State Personn el Managem ent System Reform Act of 1996 (Ref orm Act). 24 The Reform Act generally reflect[ed] the Task Force recommendations 25 and was passed in substantially the same form as proposed by the Task Force. Geiger II, 371 Md. at 146, 807 A.2d at 45. Thus, the General Assembly s reliance 22 The word full , itself, is indicative of completeness. W EBSTER S N INTH N EW C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY 497 (1989). It also may be u nderstood to mea n having all distinguishing charac teristics: e njoying a ll author ized righ ts and p rivilege s . Id. Other definitions accord with th is conc eption o f the term . See, e.g., C OMPACT O XFORD E NGLISH D ICTIONARY 642 (2d ed. 1991) ( answering in every respect to a description; possessed of all the qualifications, or entitled to all privileges implied in a designation ); B ALLANTINE S L AW D ICTIONARY 506 (3d ed. 1969) ( ample, complete ; perfect; not wanting in any essential quality ). 23 Geiger II, 371 M d. at 145, 807 A.2d at 44 (citing Executive Order No. 01.01.1995.15). 24 Chapter 347, § 1 of the Acts of 1996. 25 COMAR 19A.96.09. 27 on the Task Force Report serves as guidance for our interpretation of the statute. The original draft of House Bill 774 provided that § 11-110(d)(1)(iii)2 would read full back pay, w ith a deduc tion for interim earnings f rom emp loyment elsew here or am ounts earnable with reaso nable diligen ce, thus pro viding a set-o ff for mitigation of damages accrued by the wrongfully disciplined employee. An amendment was introduced in the House of Delegates to strike the set-off language, in order to have the bill track the Task Force proposal that the OAH may order back pay which will not be reduced by interim earnings from employme nt elsewhere and other earning s that co uld hav e been receive d. Task Force Report 48 (1996). The descriptive word full remained in the statute after elimination of the set-off language, evidencing that full possesses significance independent of the set-off language it had once accompanied. The SDAT essentially asks us to regard full as a meaningless vestige of the deleted set-off lang uage. Our cano ns of statutory interpretation, however, forbid us to construe a statute . . . so that [a] word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 22 4, 909 A .2d 102 0, 1026 (20 06); Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 453, 879 A.2d 1111, 1115 (2005); Mid-Atl. Powe r Supply Ass n v. Pu blic Serv. Comm n, 361 Md. 196, 204, 760 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000); Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge No. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 180, 680 A.2d 1052, 1065 (1996 ); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 M d. 516, 523-24, 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994). We look to the surrounding provisions of § 11-110(d) to harmonize the various provisions of the statute and bestow the 28 intended mean ing to th e word full . Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 168-69, 848 A .2d 642, 649 (200 4); Md. Green Party v. Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 178-79, 832 A.2d 21 4, 244 (2003); Bd. of County Comm rs v. Bell Atl.-Md., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 178, 695 A .2d 171, 180 (199 7). While full is not used elsewhere in § 11-110, it appears in the subsubsubsection immedia tely following the recitation of restored time, compensation, status, and benefits as remedies for a wron gful ter minatio n. State Pers. & Pens. Article § 11-110(d)(1)(ii). Thus, full reasonably could be construed as a blanket word encompassing the list of remedies time, compensation, status, and benefits offered just above it. T his interpretatio n is in accord with related Maryland jurisprudence. Since the Reform Act was codified, Maryland courts have conflated the provisions o f § 11-11 0(d)(1)(ii) and (iii) so as to award both back pay and be nefits. See, e.g., Public Serv. Comm n v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27, 39, 40-41, 882 A.2d 849, 856-57 (2 005) (indic ating that a C ircuit Court had awarded back pay and benefits as well as reinstatement as relief under § 11-110(d )(1)); Dep t of H ealth & Mental Hygiene v. Rynarzewski, 164 Md. App. 252, 254, 883 A.2d 205, 206 (2005) (upholding an ALJ s and Circuit Court s reinstatement of a terminated employee with back pay and b enefits); Dep t Public Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Neal, 160 Md. App. 496, 507, 517, 864 A.2d 287, 293, 299 (2004) (upholding an A LJ s order that an employee s termination be rescinded and the employee be reinstated with full ba ck pay un der § 11 -110(d )(1)(ii) an d (iii)), cert. denied, 386 Md . 181 , 872 A.2d 47 (200 5). W rong fully t erminated State public sector employees 29 generally receiv e benefits in addition to back pay as re medies fo r their improp er dismissal. See, e.g., Dep t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Shrieves, 100 Md. App. 283, 296, 641 A.2d 899, 905 (1994) (stating that a C ircuit Court o rdered a se curity attendant a t a state hospital be reinstated with bac k pay and an y lost benefits ); Sheriff of Baltimore City v. Abshire, 44 Md. App. 256, 257, 408 A.2d 398, 399 (1979) (indicating that the Secretary of Personnel of Maryland ordered a deputy sheriff to be returned to duty with full back pay and benefits after finding the charges f or dismissing the deputy lacked proper support). Furthermore, the entire State Personne l and Pens ions Article, w hich we c onsider in its entirety to harmonize the applica ble statu tes, Mayor & Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316-17, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006) (citing Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 65-66 , 862 A.2d 419, 429 -30 (2004 )), seems to contemp late that benefits are intertwined inextricably with State employee pay. Section 2502 establishes the State Employee Health Program, which State employees are permitted to join by virtue of § 2-507(a) in order to receive a subsidy from the State for health care insurance. While on le ave w ith pay, § 9-103 p rovides tha t State emp loyees do no t lose their health insurance s ubsidy and c ontinue to accrue sen iority and leave based o n the employee s regular hours. Conversely, when a State em ployee is in a lea ve withou t pay status with regard to his employment[,] no deductions occur, no subsidies are provided and no leave or retirement credit accrues. Corr. Pre-Release Sys. v. Whittington, 119 Md. App. 436, 439, 705 A.2d 78 , 80 (1998 ). The State P ersonnel an d Pension s Article also g rants State 30 employees paid annu al,26 personal, 27 and sick28 leave com mensura te with certain formulas based upon the e mployee s len gth of service or start date. What is more, under §§ 9-304 and 305, unused annual leave may be redeemed for compen sation at the em ployee s regu lar rate of pay, further linking leave with pay. Also, when setting or amending State employment pay rates, § 8-104(b) requires th e Secretary of the Depa rtment of B udget and Manag ement to consid er, inter alia, the benefits offered to employees. The SDA T argues that the statute s use of o r in structuring the categories of relief available under the statute mandates a disjunctive reading of § 11-1 10(d)(1). 29 As support 26 State Pers. & Pens. A rticle § 9-301(a). 27 State Pers. & Pens. A rticle § 9-401(a)(1). 28 State Pers. & Pens. A rticle § 9-501(a). 29 To illustrate the evolution of § 11-110(d)(1) in terms of its alleged disjunctive nature, we reproduce, with added emphasis, the section in its two relevant iterations: the Task Force Report and then § 11-110(d)(1) as codified in 1996. Task Force R eport: 3. The Office of Adm inistrative Hearings: a) May uph old the discip linary action; or b) Except as otherwise provided by this Title, may rescind or modify the disciplinary action and restore to the employee or former employee, as appropriate, any lost time, comp ensation, statu s or benef its; and/or c) May order reinstatement to the position a former employee held when the former employee was dismissed or, if this is impractical, to a compara ble position w ithin the agenc y; and/or d) May order back pay which w ill not be redu ced by interim earnings from employment elsewhere and other earnings (contin ued...) 31 for its argument, the S DAT points spec ifically to the incom patible scen ario of simu ltaneously upholding discipline under (d)(1)(i) and rescinding it under (d)(1)(ii). The SDAT further claims that the General A ssembly intentio nally spurned the Task F orce Rep ort s propo sal to use and/or linking the possible actions available to the OAH as listed in (d)(1) by enacting the statute with the typically disjunctive word or separating the remedies. While it is true that or is re ad typical ly as a disju nctive, see, e.g., County Council of Prince G eorge s County v. Dutcher, 365 Md. 399, 418, 780 A.2d 1137, 1149 (2001); Schlossberg v. Citizens Bank of Md., 341 Md. 650, 657, 672 A.2d 625, 628 (1996), such is not always the case. The term or may be read in the conjunctive when the contex t reasonably su pports the inference that such a construction is necessary to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. We have stated previously that [i]t is well settled that the terms and and or may be used interchang eably when it is reasonable and logical to do so. Little Store, Inc . v. State, 295 29 (...continued) that could have been received. Section 11-110(d)(1) as codified in 1996: (d) Additional action by Office of Administrative Hearings; final administrative decision. (1) Except as otherwise provided by this subtitle, the Off ice o f Ad ministrative H earin gs m ay: (i) uphold the disciplinary action; (ii) rescind or modify the disciplinary action taken and restore to the employee any lost time, compensation, status, or benefits; or (iii) order: 1. reinstatement to the position that the employee held at dism issal; 2. full back p ay; or 3. both 1 and 2. 32 Md. 158, 163, 453 A.2d 1215, 1218 (1983); see also Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 303 Md. 280, 286, 493 A.2d 341, 344 (1985) (stating that c ourts have the authority to construe the word and to mean or as required by context in order to comply with the clear legislative inten t); N ORMAN J. S INGER, 1A SUTHERLAND S TATUTES AND S TATUTORY C ONSTRUCTION, § 21:14 (6th ed. 2002). The reasonably inferred intent of the General Assemb ly here was to permit (d)(1)(ii) and (iii) to be conjunctive options. In addition to the cases cited supra conflating the remed ies of (d)(1)(ii) a nd (iii), the langu age used in the Task Force Report was follo wed sub stantially by the Gen eral Assem bly. The Task Force R eport, in its proposals that ultimately became (d)(1), separated s ubsubsu bsections (i) a nd (ii) with an or and subsub subsections (ii) and (iii) with an and/or . We read this proposed language as evidence of the intent of the Legislature to permit either or both the rescission of a disciplinary action or the reinstatement of a dism issed emp loyee and/or full back p ay. 30 Moreover, the SDAT s attempt to distinguish the two subsubsubsections by limiting the reach of (d)(1)(iii) to break in service type disciplinary actions and (d)(1)(ii) to all lesser disciplinary actions is contrary to the disciplinary scheme outlined in § 11-104. Terminations clearly are included as a form of disciplinary action under § 11-104(6), along with the fu ll compliment of lesser actio ns. Thus, it is no t reasonable to parse term inations from other forms of discipline in the terms o f § 11-11 0(d)(1)(ii) w hen it states that the OAH may 30 In accordance with our assessment of the General Assem bly s intent as manifested by the Task F orce Rep ort, it is clear that an ALJ ca nnot orde r that discipline b e both uph eld and rescinded. 33 rescind or modify the disciplinary action taken . (Empha sis added). The SDAT s attempt to segregate terminations from lesser forms of discipline w ould result further in an illogical and manifestly unfair administration of remedies for wrongful termination s. The SD AT s co nstruction o f (d)(1) wo uld allow f or the aw ard of ben efits to the recipients of erroneously-imposed less severe discipline, such as suspensions or the forfeiture of leave, but necessarily wou ld preclude the awa rd of benef its to those terminated wro ngfully, the most severe administrative punishment. We do not perceive that the General Assemb ly purposefully chose to restore fully the time, compensation, status, and benefits lost by those wrongfully disciplined who suffer consequences of a lesser magnitud e as a result of their discipline and deny that same extent of relief to tho se who h ave born e erroneou sly the ultimate employment sanction. Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005) (quoting Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994) ( Our interpretation of a sta tute should seek to avo id construc tions that are illog ical, unreasonable, or inconsisten t with com mon sen se. ); Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 M d. 514, 550 , 814 A.2d 469, 490 (2002) ( [ A]bsurd results in the interpretive analysis of a statute are to be shunned. ); Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129, 135, 747 A.2d 625, 628 (2000) ( If, on the o ther hand, th e languag e is susceptible to more than one meaning and is therefore ambiguous, we consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactm ent, and, in those circumstan ces, in seekin g to ascertain 34 legislative intent, we consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construc tion which avoids an illogical or un reasonab le result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense. ) (citations omitted ); Lewis v. Sta te, 348 Md. 648, 654, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998) ( W e interpret the m eaning an d effect o f the langu age in light of the objectives and purposes of the provision ena cted. Such an interpretation must be reason able an d cons onant w ith logic and co mmo n sense . In addition, we se ek to avoid construing a statute in a manner that leads to an illogical or untenable outcome. ) (citations omitted); Armstea d v. State, 342 M d. 38, 56 , 673 A .2d 221 , 229 (1996) ( In reading [statutory] language, we apply common sense to avoid illogical or unreasonable constructions . . . . ); Dickerso n v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991) (quoting D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 11 79-80 (19 90), in turn quoting NORMAN J. S INGER, 2A S UTHERLAND S TATUTORY C ONSTRUCTION, § 45.12 (4th ed.1984)) ( In fact, unreasonableness of the result produced by one amo ng alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of anothe r which w ould produce a reasonab le result. ); State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416 , 422, 348 A.2d 2 75, 279 (1975) ( In construing statutes, therefo re, results that are unreason able, illogical or in consistent w ith common sense should be avoided w henever p ossible con sistent with the statutory language, with the real legislativ e intention p revailing ov er the intention indicated by the literal meaning. ); see also N ORMAN J. S INGER, 2A SUTHERLAND S TATUTES AND S TATUTORY C ONSTRUCTION, § 45.12 (6th ed. 2000) ( It has been called a golde n rule of statutory 35 interpretation that, when one of se veral possible interpreta tions produ ces an un reasonab le result, that is a reason for rejecting that interpretatio n in favor o f another w hich wo uld produce a reasonab le result. ). There is no better illustration of the necessity to reject an untenable reading of a statute to avoid absurd results than the SDAT s construction of § 11110(d)(1) in the instant case. Over ten years have elapsed since Reier was terminated by the SDAT, during which time he has been deprived of his accrued State-offe red benef its. It is wholly unreasonable that the Gen eral Assembly wou ld intend an employee in R eier s position to be deprived of entitled benefits while permitting an employee suspended for one day be made entirely whole. Our assessme nt of the inten t of the Ge neral Asse mbly in Reier s case is con sistent with that body s most recent ame ndment to § 11-1 10(d)(1)(iii),31 apparently en acted in 31 Chapter 553, § 1 of the Acts of 2006. The cross-filed bills of Senate Bill 1080 and House Bill 1726 were passed by both chambers in early April 2006. Senate Bill 1080 became law without the signa ture of Gov ernor Eh rlich on 26 M ay 2006, in ac cordance with Maryland Constitution Article 2, § 17(c). As a result of the new law, § 11-110(d)(1) now reads as follows: (d) Additional action by Office of Administrative Hearings; final administrative decision. (1) Except as otherwise provided by this subtitle, the Off ice o f Ad ministrative H earin gs m ay: (i) uphold the disciplinary action; (ii) rescind or modify the disciplinary action taken and restore to the employee any lost time, compensation, status, or benefits; or (iii) order: 1. reinstatement to the position that the employee held at dism issal; 2. fu ll bac k pay and ben efits; or (contin ued...) 36 reaction to the Court of Spe cial Appeals s decision in Reier II. Although the subsequent amendment . . . of a statute is not controlling as to the meaning of the prior law, Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 698 n.2, 668 A.2d 1, 5 n.2 (1995) (quoting Am. Recovery Co. v. Dep t of Health, 306 Md. 12, 18, 506 A.2d 1171, 1174 (1986)), subsequent legislation can be consulted to determine legislative intent. Nesbit v. Gov t Employees Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 78, 854 A.2d 879, 886-87 (2004) (citing Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 385-387, 614 A.2d 590, 593 -94 (1992 )); see also Swarthmore Co. v. Comptroller, 38 Md. App. 366, 373, 381 A.2d 27, 30 (1977) ( [A] subseque nt statute purporting to declare the intent of an earlier one might be of great weight in assisting a court when in doubt. ) (quoting United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 480, 43 S. Ct. 197, 199, 67 L . Ed. 358, 361 (192 3)). Senator Delores Kelley introduced Senate Bill 1080 on 8 March 2006, just three legislative working days after Reier II was filed on 3 March 2006. In Senator Kelley s testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on 23 March 2006, she specifically indicated that her sponsorship of the bill was motivated by the intent to codify decades of practice by administrative law judges of rescinding wrongful terminations or suspen sions and re storing bac k pay with benefits. Th is practice, she noted, was disturbed by the Reier II decision which held that the Legislature could not have intended full back pay to comprise both wages and benefits. The 31 (...continued) 3. both 1 and 2 (emph asis add ed). 37 Committee favorably reported the bill the next day and it was passed on its third reading on the follow ing day. Senator Kelley, we note, served as a member on the same Senate Finance Committee that considered the Refo rm Act in 1996, containing the o riginal § 11-110(d)(1), as the 200 6 amend ment. Having resolved th at Reier w as eligible for full back pay, including State-offered benefits, further proceedings will be necessary to identify more precisely which benefits and amounts Reier may receive. At this juncture it is only determinable from the record that Reier was not a member of the State Employee Health Program and not receiving a subsidy for health insurance under that program at the time that he was terminated.32 Thus, he cannot receive reimbursements from the State for its share of the medical expenses he may have incurred since h is termin ation ha d he be en a m embe r of the P rogram . See Whitlow v . City of Birmingham, 689 So.2d 10 7, 109 (A la. Civ. Ap p. 1996) (h olding that a reinstated pu blic employee would not have received the dollar amount of the City s contributions to her health insurance coverage , but rather she would have received the benefit of those contributions-continued h ealth insurance coverag e ). 32 Reier completed an open enrollment form on 24 October 1995 and elected to cancel his existing health care benefits with the State and evidently chose to pursue coverage under a CO BRA policy. 38 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDG MEN T OF TH E CIRC UIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AND REMAND THE C ASE TO THE C IRCUIT COURT FOR REMAND TO THE M ARYLAND OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR FURTHER P R O C E E D IN G S CONS ISTENT WITH T HIS OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. 39

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