Clipper v. Sprenger

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Clipper Windpower, Inc., et al. v. Paul C. Sprenger, et al., No. 136, September Term, 2005. Opinion by Bell, C.J. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION - REHEARINGS - JUDICIAL REVIEW - PARTY IN INTEREST In order to seek rehearing under PUC § 3-114, the requesting entity must be a party in interest, and only parties in interest may seek a rehearing. To become a party to the proceeding, pursuant to PUC § 3-106, the requesting entity must have properly intervened. The right to judicial review of orders and decisions of the Commission, however, is available to a broader spectrum of entities, providing that the review is timely requested, i.e., one may, pursuant to PUC § 3-202(a), seek judicial review if they are a party or person in interest . . . dissatisfied by a final decision or order of the Commission . . . and do so in a timely fashion. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 136 September Term, 2005 Clipper W indpow er, Inc., et al. v. Paul C. S prenger, et a l. Bell, C. J. Raker *Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Bell, C. J. Filed: June 8, 2007 *Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. This case arises out of a dispute over the construction of a wind turbine facility in Garrett County, Maryland. On March 26, 2003, the Public Service Commission (the Commission ), one of the petitioners, entered a final order (Order No. 78354) granting Clipper Windpower, Inc. ( Clipper ), the other petitioner (collectively the petitioners ), a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity ( CPCN ) for the construction of a 101 megawatt ( MW ) wind turbine facility. On April 24, 2003, by letter signed by Eric Tribbey, on behalf of, and as its representative, Friends of Backbone Mountain ( Friends ) requested a rehearing.1 That request was denied (Order No. 78617). Thereafter, Tribbey, one of the respondents, acting on his own behalf, filed a petition in the Circuit Court for 1 Maryland Code (1998), § 3-114 of the Public Utility Companies Article, governing rehearings, provides: § 3-114. Rehearing. (a) Scope of rehearing. On rehe aring, the Com miss ion m ay: (1) consider f acts not presented in the original hearing, including facts arising after the date of the original hearing; and (2) ab rogate, c hange , or mod ify the orig inal ord er by new order. (b) Effect of rehearing. Except as otherwise ordered b y the Commission, the rehearing o r application f or the rehea ring does n ot: (1) stay the enforcement of an order of the Commission; or (2) excuse a person affected by the order from complying with the terms of the order. (c) Application for rehearing. (1) A party in interest may apply to the Commission for rehearing within 30 days a fter s ervice of a fin al order o n the party. (2) The Com miss ion m ay: (i) act on the application; and (ii) rehear a fin al order or conduct further proceedings on its own motion after the filing of a proposed order, as the Commission considers ne cess ary. (3) If a rehearin g is granted on an application under this subsection, the Commission shall decide the case w ithing 30 da ys after the case is finally submi tted on r ehearin g. Baltimore City for judicial review2 of both orders (Case No. 24-C-036366). This action for judicial review was consolidated with the judicial review action initiated by Paul C. Sprenger, Russell W. Bounds, and Troy Gnegy, the other respondents (collectively the respondents ), who also filed petitions for judicial review (Case No. 24-C-036325). Clipper and the Commission each filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the respondents petitions for judicial review were untimely.3 The Circuit Court agreed and, therefore, dismissed the actions for judicial review. The respondents noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in an unreported opinion, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court. We granted the petitions for writ of certiorari filed by both Clipper and the Commission, Clipper Windpower v. Sprenger, 391 Md. 577, 894 A.2d 545 (2006), to 2 Maryland Code (1998), § 3-202(a) of the Public Utility Companies Article provides the right to judicial review of orders and decisions of the Commission: § 3-202. Right to judicial review of orders and decisions. (a) In general. Ex cept for the staff of the Comm ission, a party or p erson in interest, including the People s Counsel, that is dissatisfied by a final decision or order of the Commission may seek judicial review of the dec ision or orde r as provide d in this sub title. 3 Maryland Rule 7-203 provides, as relevant, the time requirements for filing an action for judicial review: Rule 7-203. Time for filing action. (a) Generally. Ex cept as othe rwise prov ided in this Rule o r by statute , a petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of: (1) the date of the orde r or action of which re view is sou ght; (2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or (3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency s order or action, if notice was required b y law to be received by the petitioner. -2- address: Whether PUC § 3-114(c) limits the right to request reh earing solely to a party in interest that h as properly intervened as such in the Comm ission s proceedings, and is thus d istinguishab le from PUC § 3-202(a) which provides a right to judicial review to a party or person in interest . . . dissatisfied by a final decision or order of the Commission . . . ? [4] While, to be sure, the rig ht to judicial review of orders a nd decision s of the C ommissio n is available to a party or person in interest . . . dissatisfied by a final decision or order of the Commission . . ., PUC § 3-202(a), 5 we conclude that only a party in interest may seek rehearing under PUC § 3-114. To be a party in interest, if the requestor was not a party, the requestor must have intervened properly, pursuant to PUC § 3-106,6 thus becoming a 4 Clipper offers two questions for review: 1.Whe ther PUC § 3-106 a nd PUC § 3-114 re quire a pers on to interve ne in a Commission proceeding in order to be considered a party in interest who may request rehearing of a Commission decision and thereby stay the time for filing a Petition for R eview in th e Circuit C ourt? 2.Whether a request for rehearing of a Commission decision made on behalf of an entity by its representative may also be deemed as a request made by the representative himself, in his individual capacity, such that the representative may himself petition the Circuit C ourt for judicial review of the Commission s decision? We believe that the Commission has more accurately and clearly formulated the issue. 5 The respondents question whether notice properly was effected in the administrative proceedings in this case. We will not address the argument, however. It was not raised in a petition for certiorari or before the Court of Special Appeals and the intermediate appellate court did not decide it. 6 Maryland Code (1998), § 3-106 of the Public Utility Companies Article provides: § 3-106. Same Intervention. (a) Application. If a person timely files, the person may apply to intervene in a (continued...) -3- party to the proceeding. I. On August 26, 2002, Clipper filed an application with the Commission seeking authorization to build a wind turbine fac ility for the purpo se of gen erating electric ity. As required, Clipper notified the public, by publishing a notice in both The Republican and The Cumberland Times-News, generally circulated newspapers in Garrett County, on the successive weeks of September 26, 2002, September 30, 2002, October 3, 2002, and October 6, 2002, of its application to build the facility, and the date, time, and location of a scheduled pre-hearing conference. The wind turbine facility was to be composed of up to 67 individual turbines. Each turbine would consist of a free-standing tower approximately 262 feet in height. A rotor, having a diameter not in excess of 262 feet (80m) (39m blades), would be attached to the tower. The maximum combined height would be approximately 394 ft (120 m) with one blade in the vertical position. Clipper s executive summary of its proposal for the facility 6 (...continued) proceeding before the Commission. (b) Decision. The Commission shall grant leave to intervene unless the Comm ission conc ludes that: (1) the parties to the proceeding adequately represent the interest of the person seeking to intervene; or (2) the issue s that the perso n seeks to ra ise are irreleva nt or imma terial. (c) Rights of intervenor. (1) An intervenor has all the rights of a party to a proceeding. (2) In a procee ding befo re the Com mission, an individual who is an intervenor may represent himself or herself. -4- implied that some, but not all, of the turbines would be of that size and stated that all 67 turbines may not need to be built depending upon factors . . . not identified prior to [the] start of construction. In addition to the tower and the blade, each turbine would consist of a foundation anchoring it to the ground and a transformer that would collect the power from the turbines and transfer it to a substation thro ugh an unde rground electrical collection system. All-weather gravel service roads would b e built from existing hardtop roads and the cables associated with the electrical collection system were to be buried alongside such service roads. The total project area would cover approximately 10.8 miles and would be constructed on Backbone Mountain extending from Wild Turkey Rock at an elevation of 3,228 ft (984 m) above sea level southwestward to Allegheny Heigh ts at 3,20 0 ft (97 5 m). Although three other sites were surveyed, Allegheny Heights was selected because of wind resource potential and favorable site characteristics (primarily contiguous, well-exposed areas an d prox imity to thre e transm ission lin es). 7 An adjudicatory hearing regarding Clipper s proposal, at which attendance was high, standing room only, was held. C lipper, the Department of Natural Resources s Power Plant Research Program, the staff of the Commission, and the Office of People s Counsel were the named parties to the proceeding. Pursuant to PUC § 3-106, four individual 7 It appears that access to the project area via improved hardtop roads was also a factor in choosing this particular site over others. -5- members of the public intervened and were granted party status.8 Among those in attendance were respondents Eric Tribbey and Russell Bounds, who also testified. A lthough b oth Tribbey and Bo unds sub mitted citizen c ommen t letters following the conclusion of the hearing, neither they, nor Friends, sought to intervene. The hearing examiner issued a proposed order that contained and recommended settlement conditions to which all o f the parties had agreed, which the Commission subsequently adopted. It issued a final order (Order No. 78354) approving Clipper s plan. Trib bey, then, w riting on behalf of Friends, submitted a letter to the Commission requesting a rehearing.9 The Commission, by Order No. 78617, denied the request, 8 They were Chandler S. Robbins, Ajax Eastman, D. Daniel Boone, and Jon E. Boone. None of these individuals is a party to the present action. 9 In its entirety, the letter stated that: Dear PSC, This is a formal request for a rehearing on case # 8938 regarding placement of 400-foot tall windmills along the ridgeline of Backbone Mountain in Garrett County. I represent the Friends of Backbone Mountain a growing group of over 100 Garrett County citizens as a party of interest. This is a formal request for a rehearing on the decision regarding siting wind projects along the ridgeline of Backbone Mountain. The group requests a moratorium on construction of wind projects in Garrett County until enforceable siting criteria can be enforced. The group does not oppose alternative energy source projects but insists on reference to the Garrett County Development Plan and appropriate consideration to the overall impact of a project of this magnitude. Please reference your guidelines concerning economics, aesthetics and historic sites under title 7-207 e and 2'. Please postpone the approval of the certificate of public convenience and necessity until additional attention is given to siting plans regarding extremely large omnipresent structures such as the ones proposed in case #8938. (continued...) -6- explaining : This matter comes before the Public Service Commission ( Comm ission ) as a result of a series of filings made by entities that did not appear as parties in the above-captioned proceeding. On April 24, 2003, the Friends of Backbone Mountain ( Friends ) filed a pro se formal request for rehearing in this case. O n April 25, 2003, Citizens for Responsible Wind Power ( Citizens ) also filed a pro se formal request for rehearing in this case. A third pro se formal request for rehearing in this matter was filed on April 28, 2003, by The Garrett Coun ty Historic al Socie ty ( Garre tt Histor ical ). . . . Friends made an additional filin g, by Counsel, on June 27, 2003. This June 27 th filing includes two doc uments: (1) an Ap plication to Intervene, and (2) a Supplement to Request for Rehearing and Application to Reopen for Further Evidence . . . . On August 5, 2003, Counsel for Paul C. Sprenger filed an Application to Intervene and a Motion for Reconsideration and for Modification of the Order of the Public Service Commission ( Sprenger Motion ). This Au gust 5 th filing includes four exhibits ( Sprenger Exhibits A, B, C, and D ). None of the actual parties to the case have raised any objection to the C omm ission s Order No. 78 354, iss ued on Marc h 26, 20 03. The Comm ission denie s all four requ ests. Public Utility Companies ( PUC ) Article §3-114(c)(1) restricts the rig ht to apply for re hearing to parties: A party in interest may apply to the Com mission fo r rehearing w ithin 30 days after service of a final order on the party. [Emphasis added.] Since none of the four entities requesting rehearing were parties to the proceeding, none qualify to request rehe aring. Additiona lly, the filing made on behalf of Friends on June 27, 2003 , is not a filing provided for either under PUC § 3-114 or Code of Maryland Regulations ( COMAR ) § 20.07.02.08,[10] both of which 9 (...continued) The letter was signed, Sincerely, Eric Tribbey Representative, Friends of Backbone Mountain. 10 COMAR § 20.07.02.08 states: .08 Rehearings. A. Applications for reopening a cause after final submission, or for rehearing after final order, shall be made by petition in writing, stating specifically the grounds upon which the application is based. B. If the application is to reopen the cause for further evidence, the nature and purpose of the evidence shall be stated, and may not be (continued...) -7- contemp late a single, co mprehen sive rehe aring applica tion by a party. Friends June 27th filing is also well beyond the thirty-day period during which parties may request rehearing. Spre nger s filings are still further beyond the thirty-day period during which parties may request rehearing. Clipper complied with all of the procedu ral elements of the Ce rtificate of Public Convenience and Necessity ( CPCN ) process, including the provisions of COMAR § 20.79.01.03, and also complied with the Hearing Examiner s direction to advertise the pre -hearing co nference and the pu blic hearings in local Garrett County newspapers. The four entities requesting rehearing had sufficient notice and opportunity to intervene as parties; since they did n ot, they do not hav e stand ing to re quest re hearing . . . . . . . as already stated, Clipper properly advertised the pre-hearing conference and the public hearings in local Garrett County newspapers, thus providing sufficient notice to enable p rompt and timely interventio n. This is no t a question of whether Friends could have intervened sooner in the process, but rather an issue of whether Friends attempted to intervene during the process at all. The Commission finds that the attempted intervention is outside the process, and cannot be granted since the proceeding closed prior to the attemp ted inter vention . Order No. 78617 (internal footnotes omitted). Thus, the Commission concluded that Friends 10 (...continued) merely cumulative. C. If the application is for a rehearing, the petition shall specify the findings of fact or of law claimed to be erroneous, together with a brief statement of the ground of the alleged error. D. A petition seeking to reverse or modify a decision, order, or requirement of the Commission shall: (1) Fully set forth the facts, circumstances, and consequences relied upon; and (2) Allege: (a) The facts and circumstances which have arisen after the hearing or order which justify the reversal or modification; or (b) The consequences resulting from compliance with the decision, order, or requirement which justify or entitle the applicant to the reversal or modification. -8- was not a party in interest under PUC § 3-114 because it had not properly intervened under PUC § 3-106. The Commission also determined that it already had fully considered the issues presented for rehearing in the original p roceeding s and it wa s not neces sary to readdress them or to ad dress them further. 11 Thereafter, as we have seen, Tribbey, on his own behalf, and not on behalf of Friends, filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission s Order No. 78617, and, on the same day, a separate petition for judicial review of the Commission s Order was filed by the responde nts Spren ger, Bounds, and Gnegy. The actions having been consolidated, the petitioners each filed a motion to dismiss the p etitions as untim ely. Before the Circuit Co urt, the respondents did not contend that they were parties to the proc eeding, just that they were 11 Specifically, Order No. 78617 stated: Further, the avian impact, which Friends states is its primary concern . . . , was thoroughly considered during the proceeding and was satisfactorily addressed in the settlement. Moreover, in respect to the requirement that the certificate of public convenience and necessity be postponed pending additional attention being given to siting plans, the order stated that: The settlement in this case already provides for the consideration of new data points over a chosen interval of time, since it includes provisions for objective, three-year post-construction studies of bird mortality, a requirement and study period that satisfied the settling parties concerned about bird safety. (Condition 17.) As a part of the approved settlement agreement, bird safety advocates will participate in the selection of the independent consultant that will conduct the three-year study. (Condition 17.) The settlement also contains provisions authorizing DNR to make determinations of excessive avian mortality, and to require that a plan for reducing mortality be prepared by Clipper Windpower, Inc. (Condition 18.) Additionally, as a part of the settlement, restrictions designed to mitigate the risk of avian harm have been placed upon the lighting of the wind turbines. (Condition 16.) -9- persons in intere st. 12 Tribbey argued, in addition, that although Friends w as not a pa rty in interest, its application for rehearing tolled the time for filing a petition for judicial review. The Circuit Court dismissed both actions, ruling that none of the respondents had filed a timely request for rehearing and that their petitions for judicial review were similarly untimely. It explained: The [respondents] in these cases concede that judicial review is sought on ly under Section 3-202 of the Public Utility Compan[ies] Article. Under that section a party or person in interest may seek judicial review of a decision or order of the Co mmission. This court assumes without deciding that the [respo ndents ] are pe rsons in interest. The issue then is whether the petitions for judicial r evie w w ere ti mely. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 7-203(a)(1), the petitions had to be filed within 30 days after the date of the order or action for which review is sought. I believe that was March 26th, 2003 . In these case s the petitions w ere not filed u ntil some five months later. So, unless the time for filing was stayed, the petitions were u ntimely. Neither of the [respondents] filed a timely request for re-hearing before the Commissioner. Mr. Sprenger filed a request, but it was not time ly. Even if it had been timely, however, the statute restricts petitions for rehearing before the Commission to parties in interest. T hat is the plain language of Section 3-114(c). Accordingly, the time for the [respond ents] to seek judicial review purs uant to 3-202 , was 30 d ays from M arch 26th , 2003. That date w as not met. The [respond ents ] attemp t to, what I w ould call, piggyback on the arguably timely filing s of others to stay a deadline is of no ava il. First, there is no legal support under the Public Utility Compan[ies] A[rticle] for the [respondents ] position that the timely filing of a petition for re-hearing by one party stays the time for filing judicial review by another. Moreover, none of 12 Specifically, the court asked respondents counsel, You re not claiming that either of the [respondents] here was a party to the proceedings? To which respondents counsel replied, No, I m not. Respondents claimed that they were persons in interest. -10- the entities that filed a request for re-hearing were parties in interest, so the [respondents ] attempts at re-hearing were - - I m sorry. Those parties attempts, those entities attempts at re-hearing were like the [respondents ] a nullity. Although Friends request for rehearing may have bee n timely filed, its req uest was in valid because Friends was not a party in interest and, thus, was not entitled to a rehearing under PUC § 3-114. Thereafter, the respondents appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in an unreported opinion, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court. In holding that the judicial review action should not have been dismissed as untimely, the intermediate appellate cou rt reasoned: As stated above, § 3-114 provides a party in interest with the right to apply for a rehearing. We are persuaded that this term was placed into the statute in order to reduce the number of requests for rehearing that the Commission must deal w ith. The Co urt of Ap peals has made it clear that one may become a party to an administrative proceeding rather easily. Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E., 375 Md. 59, 72[, 825 A.2d 388, 395] (2003) (quoting Sugarloaf v. Department of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 286[, 686 A.2d 605, 613] (1996)). We conclude that a person who has become a party to a Commission proceedin g is not entitled to a pply for a rehearing unless the order entered as a result of that proceeding has personally and specifically affected [him or her] in a way different f rom . . . the public generally. Sugarloaf v. Dept. of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 288[, 686 A.2d 605, 614] (1996) (quoting DuBay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180, 185[, 213 A.2d 487, 489-90] (1965)). As an adjoining landowner, Mr. Tribbey was a party in interest to the Commission proceeding because (1) his participation in the proceeding made him a party, and (2) as an adjoining landowner to the property where the turbines will be placed, the Commission s order has personally and specifically affected h im -11- in a wa y differe nt from the wa y that orde r affec ts the ge neral pu blic, [13] and that Tribbey s request for rehearing was made in both his in dividual cap acity and in his capacity as a representative of Friends of Backbone Mountain. The court concluded that it would be exa lting form over substance to hypothesize that Mr. Tribbey made the request for a rehearing solely as a representative of the Friends of Backbone Mountain. On this premise, the court held that, as a result of the timely request for rehearing filed by M r. Trib bey, all of the appellants had 30 days from August 8, 2003 to file their actions for judicial r eview of the C omm ission s Marc h 26, 20 03 ord er. II. We review, in this case, a decision by the Commission, an administrative agency.14 Though couched in terms of a formal judicial review, we do not even actually reach that stage of the proceedings. Petitions for judicial review were filed by the respondents, but only after the Commission had denied Friends application for rehearing. It is the denial of that application, encapsulated in Order No. 78617, upon which the resolution of this case 13 The court then held that Mr. Sprenger was not a party in interest to the proceeding because he was not a party to the procee ding. Moreo ver, none o f the respo ndents w ould be a party in interest because none was personally and specifically affected in a way differe nt from the pub lic gene rally. 14 Although the Commission is a state administrative agency, it is not subject to the Contested Cases subtitle of the State Administrative Procedure Act. Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.) § 10-203 (a)(3)(vi) of the State Government Article. Consequently, a certain amount of specialized jurisprudence has evolved concerning matters before the Commission, due also to the unique statutory provisions in the PUC. One must be wary, therefore, in the too quick application of case law that has grown from the interpretation and application of the State Administrative Procedure Act. See infra at 20-23. -12- primarily rests. Our scope of judicial review of an action by the Public Service Commission is dictated by PUC § 3-203.15 Moreover, we shall not overturn a factual decision by the Public Service Commission unless it proves to be unlawful or unreasonable. Town of Easton v. Public Service Comm'n of Maryland, 838 A.2d 1225, 379 Md. 21 (2003); Office of People's Counsel v. Maryland Public Service Comm'n, 733 A.2d 996, 355 Md. 1 (1999). Our review in the instant case is of the Commission s interpretation and application of provisions of the Public Utility Companies Article; thus, our review is de novo. III. The outcome of this case essentially hinges on the timeliness of the respondents petitions for judicial review. That, in turn, depends on whether the respondents were parties or persons entitled to seek rehearing and, if so, whether they timely applied for that rehearing. We hold that the respondents were not parties entitled to seek rehearing and, 15 Maryland Code (1998), § 3-203 of the Public Utility Companies Article, governing rehearings, provides: Every final decision, order, or regulation of the Commission is prima facie correct and shall be affirmed unless clearly shown to be: (1) unconstitutional; (2) outside the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission; (3) made on unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or capricious; (5) affected by other error of law; or (6) if the subject of review is an order entered in a contested proceeding after a hearing, unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. -13- therefore, they did not timely apply for rehearing. It follows, as well, that they did not petition for judicial review timely. We shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. In addressing the issues this case presents, we are required to construe various provisions of the Public Utility Companies Article. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Centre Ins. Co. v. J.T.W., 397 Md. 71, 79, 916 A.2d 235, 239 (2007); Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006). Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute. Id. [A]nd ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology. Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 916 A.2d at 395 (quoting Kushell v. Dep t of Natural Resources, 385 Md. 563, 576, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005) (citing Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004)); see Centre Ins., 397 Md. at 79, 916 A.2d at 239. We stated in Kushell that: In construing the plain language, [a] court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced by the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003); County Council v. Dutcher, 365 Md. 399, 416-417, 780 A.2d 1137, 1147 (2001). Statutory text should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory. Collins[v. State], 383 Md. [684,] 691, 861 A.2d [727,] 732 (quoting James v. Butler, 378 Md. 683, 696, 838 A.2d 1180, 1187 (2003)). The plain language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation. Rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect. Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487; Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist, 380 Md. 195, 204, 844 A.2d 406, 411 (2004). -14- If statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the statute as it is written. Collins, 383 Md. at 688-89, 861 A.2d at 730. If there is no ambiguity in that language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent, external rules of construction, for the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004) (quoting Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002)). Kushell, 385 Md. at 576-77, 870 A.2d at 193-94. See Centre Ins., 397 Md. at 79-80, 916 A.2d at 240; Chow, 393 Md. at 443-44, 903 A.2d at 395. The Public Utility Companies Article prescribes the procedures and the requirements for a person or entity to participate in proceedings before the Commission. PUC § 3-114 provides for the rehearing of a final order issued by the Commission. It states that [a] party in interest may apply to the Commission for rehearing within 30 days after service of a final order on the party. PUC § 3-114(c) (emphasis added). Inherent in the language of this provision is that one must be a party to the proceeding in order to be able to apply for rehearing. An entity must be a party in interest and may apply within 30 days after service of a final order on the party. PUC § 3-114(c) (emphasis added). PUC § 3-106 prescribes the method by which a person may become a party. If a person timely files, the person may apply to intervene in a proceeding before the Commission. PUC § 3-106(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore, [a]n intervenor has all the rights of a party to a proceeding. PUC § 3-106(c) (emphasis added). PUC § 3-202 addresses judicial review of decisions and orders of the Commission. -15- It states, in pertinent part: Except for the staff of the Commission, a party or person in interest . . . that is dissatisfied by a final decision or order of the Commission may seek judicial review of the decision or order as provided in this subtitle. PUC § 3-202(a) (emphasis added). Maryland Rule 7-20316 provides that: Except as otherw ise provide d in this Rule or by statute, a petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of: (1) the date of the orde r or action of which re view is sou ght; (2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or (3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency s order or action, if notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner. Thus, for a petition for judicial review of an order issued by the Commission to be timely, it must be filed by a party or person in interest within 30 days of the date of the final decision or order. In the case sub judice, that order was Order No. 78354, issued on March 26, 2003, which granted Clipper permission to build the wind turbine facility. Therefore, for the petitions in this case to have been timely filed, they would have had to have been filed by April 25, 2003. Applying for rehearing under PUC § 3-114(c) is separate and distinct from seeking judicial review under PUC § 3-202(a). To apply for rehearing, an entity must be a party in interest, PUC § 3-114(c), whereas, either a party or person in interest may seek judicial 16 Judicial review of actions of the Commission is governed by the Maryland Rules regulating administrative agency action review by the courts. Renehan v. Public Serv. Comm n, 231 Md. 59, 188 A.2d 566 (1963). -16- review of a final order under PUC § 3-202(a). (Emphasis added). The respondents contend that a person in interest is the same as a party in interest. We do not agree and believe, in fact, that this is clearly not the case. The language in all of the relevant sections of the Public Utility Companies Article is unambiguous. Construing party in interest and person in interest as having the same meaning renders one or the other superfluous or nugatory. See Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 916 A.2d at 395 (holding that when analyzing a statute, we look at the statutory scheme as a whole and harmonize the provisions so that each may be given effect.); Kushell, 385 Md. at 577, 870 A.2d at 193 (holding that [s]tatutory text should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory. ) (citing Collins, 383 Md. at 691, 861 A.2d at 732 (quoting Butler, 378 Md. at 696, 838 A.2d at 1187))). The respondents in addition assert that the legislative history of the Public Utility Companies Article lends credence to their argument. We need not, however, look beyond the plain and unambiguous language of the statute as written. Kushell, 385 Md. at 577, 870 A.2d at 194 (citing Collins, 383 Md. at 688-89, 861 A.2d at 730). We are satisfied that the current version is plainly and unambiguously written. Thus, we shall not delve into an analysis and interpretation of the prior versions of the Public Utility Companies Article, which the Legislature has amended and repealed over the years. A. The Commission s initial Order No. 78354 was issued on March 26, 2003. Friends applied, through Tribbey, for rehearing on April 24, 2003. The application was made within -17- 30 days, as required by PUC § 3-114(c). Because, as indicated, Friends never intervened,17 and, so, never became a party pursuant to PUC § 3-106, its application for rehearing was neither effective nor proper, as only a party in interest may apply to the Commission for rehearing. The Commission, in its August 8, 2003, Order No. 78617, denied Friends request for rehearing. The Commission correctly interpreted PUC § 3-114(c)(1) as restrict[ing] the right to apply for rehearing to parties . . . . The order further stated that, Since none of the . . . entities requesting rehearing were parties to the proceeding, none qualify to request rehearing. The Circuit Court concurred with this finding, stating that none of the entities that filed a request for re-hearing were parties in interest. We agree with the Commission and Circuit Court. An entity must be a party in interest in order to be entitled to apply for rehearing. PUC § 3-114(c)(1) (emphasis added). To be a party in interest, the entity must first have acquired the status of party by having timely sought, and been granted, the right to intervene. PUC § 3-106(a). A party in interest, in context and as used in PUC § 3-114 (c) (1), actually is a more restrictive term than party. The Court of Special Appeals held that Friends was not a party in interest because it was [not] personally and specifically affected in a way different from the public generally. Under the circumstances of this case, 17 Apparently, Friends did file an application to intervene on June 27, 2003. That application, however, was filed well after the proceedings before the Commission had closed and the final order had been issued on March 26, 2003. It was not timely. PUC § 3-106. -18- as we explain infra, that was the wrong standard. Friends was never a party to the proceedings. It simply never sought to intervene in a timely manner. That should have concluded the matter. The intermediate appellate court nevertheless determined that the respondent Tribbey, although purporting to act on behalf of Friends as the organization s representative, also, and at the same time, personally filed for rehearing. The court stated that the request for rehearing was made in both his individual capacity and in his capacity as a representative of Friends. Thus, despite the absence of any indication that Tribbey intended that result, that court, refusing to exalt[] form over substance to hypothesize that Mr. Tribbey made the request for a rehearing solely as a representative of the Friends of Backbone Mountain, attributed the timeliness of Friends application which the court had determined did not itself satisfy the requirements of PUC § 3-114 to Tribbey, which it also recognized to be filing in his individual capacity. It followed from this interpretation that Tribbey had timely requested rehearing and, because he had, all of the respondents were beneficiaries; they had 30 days from August 8, 2003 to file their actions for judicial review of the Commission s March 26, 2003 order. We do not agree with this analysis. The decision of the Court of Special Appeals rested on two points: (1) that Tribbey, acting on behalf of Friends as its representative, was also personally applying for rehearing, and (2) that Tribbey himself was a party in interest. Whether Tribbey s actions as a representative of Friends also qualify as his personal application for rehearing is a matter -19- that we need not and do not reach. Tribbey simply was not a party in interest under PUC § 3-114(c). He did not intervene and, consequently, never became a party. Therefore, whether he timely filed for rehearing is irrelevant. The Court of Special Appeals determination that Tribbey was a party in interest was premised on his being an adjoining landowner, to the property where the turbines will be placed and his participation in the proceeding. The latter, it said, made him a party, and ... as an adjoining landowner to the property where the turbines will be placed, the Commission s order has personally and specifically affected him in a way different from the way that order affects the general public. The intermediate appellate court relied on our cases, see, e.g., Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E., 375 Md. 59, 72, 825 A.2d 388, 395 (2003) (quoting Sugarloaf v. Department of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 286, 686 A.2d 605, 613 (1996)), DuBay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180, 184, 213 A.2d 487, 489 (1965), which it construes as ma[king] it clear that one may become a party to an administrative proceeding rather easily. In Sugarloaf, an action before the Maryland Department of the Environment, we addressed the distinction between the standing necessary to be a party to an administrative proceeding and the standing necessary to petition for judicial review of an administrative decision. 344 Md. at 285-86, 686 A.2d at 613 ( The cases in this Court, and the language of the Administrative Procedure Act itself, § 10-222(a)(1) of the State Government Article, recognize a distinction between standing to be a party to an administrative proceeding and standing to bring an action in court for judicial review of an administrative decision. ). We -20- held that a person may properly be a party at an agency hearing under Maryland s relatively lenient standards for administrative standing but may not have standing in court to challenge an adverse agency decision. Id. (citing Maryland-Nat l v. Smith, 333 Md. 3, 11, 633 A.2d 855, 859 (1993); see Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596, 611614, 612 A.2d 241, 248-50 (1992)). The Sugarloaf Court relevantly stated that: The requirements for administrative standing under Maryland law are not very strict. 18 Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 286, 686 A.2d at 613. See Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E., 375 Md. 59, 72, 825 A.2d 388, 395 (2003). This is the language that the Court of Special Appeals found compelling. Immediately following that statement, however, we qualified it: Absent a 18 It should be noted that Sugarloaf v. Department of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 686 A.2d 605 (1996), Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E., 375 Md. 59, 825 A.2d 388 (2003), and DuBay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180, 213 A.2d 487 (1965), the cases relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals, dealt with administrative actions in the context of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as codified in Maryland Code, Title 10 of the State Government Article. As Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-203(a)(3)(vi) of the State Government Article makes clear, the APA does not apply to the Public Service Commission. We discu ssed this issue in Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Association v. Public Service Commission, 361 Md. 196, 760 A.2d 1087 (2000): [T]he Public Se rvice Com mission an d its proceedings have been exempted from the requirements of the APA, including the provision governing judicial review. This exclu sion is indicative of an intention on the part of the Legislature to continue the applicability of the unique provisions to which the Public Service Commission is subject, separate from those applicable to agencies to whic h the A PA ap plies. See State Government Article § 10203(3)(vi). Had the Legislature intended that the standard for judicial review of Public Service Commission proceedings be the same as that prescribed for contested cases under the A PA, it is incon ceivable tha t it would have excluded the Pub lic Serv ice Co mmiss ion fro m the A PA . . . . 361 Md. at 214, 760 A.2 d at 1096- 97 (footn ote omitted) . In any event, the Court of Special Appeals, in the case sub judice, did not corre ctly interpret Sugarloaf. -21- statute or a reasonable regulation specifying criteria for administrative standing, one may become a party to an administrative proceeding rather easily. Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 286, 686 A.2d at 613 (emphasis added); Dorsey, 375 Md. at 72, 825 A.2d at 395. The limiting language used by this Court in Sugarloaf, Absent a statute . . . specifying criteria for administrative standing, 344 Md. at 286, 686 A.2d at 613, is important and may not be disregarded. Indeed, its significance was underscored and confirmed when, in Sugarloaf, we also said: Bearing in mind that the format for proceedings before administrative agencies is intentionally designed to be informal so as to encourage citizen participation, we think that absent a reasonable agency or other regulation providing for a more formal method of becoming a party, anyone clearly identifying himself to the agency for the record as having an interest in the outcome of the matter being considered by that agency, thereby becomes a party to the proceedings. 344 Md. at 286-87, 686 A.2d at 613 (quoting Morris v. Howard Res. & Dev. Corp., 278 Md. 417, 423, 365 A.2d 34, 37 (1976) (emphasis added). Finally, in stating its decision, the Sugarloaf Court explained, [i]f there were a statutory provision or a regulation setting forth criteria for administrative standing, the Secretary s request would have been appropriate. 344 Md. at 288, 686 A.2d at 614. In the case sub judice, PUC § 3-106 creates just that type of statutorily provided criteria for becoming a party to an administrative action before the Commission. Therefore, the present factual situation is clearly distinguishable from Sugarloaf. We interpreted PUC § 3-106 in Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Association v. Public -22- Service Commission, 361 Md. 196, 760 A.2d 1087 (2000). There, we stated: The appellant was, as we have seen and the parties to these proceedings also agree, a party before the PSC. Because it moved, and was allowed, to intervene, Maryland Code (1998) § 3-106 of the Public Utility Companies Article, governing intervention in Commission proceedings, is implicated. Because § 3-106 defines the meaning of party, as used in § 3202(a), it and § 3-202(a) must be read together. Section 3-106 provides that a person shall be permitted to intervene if the person makes timely application and the Commission concludes that the interests of that person are not being adequately represented and that the issue or issues the person seeks to raise are neither irrelevant nor immaterial. Thus, to become a party to a proceeding before the Commission, a party must have been determined, by the Commission, to have an interest in the proceeding that is not being adequately represented and that interest, in turn, has been determined not to be frivolous or of no consequence to the proceeding.[19] Once intervention has been granted, the person has all the rights of a party to the proceeding. 361 Md. at 205-06, 760 A.2d at 1092 (emphasis added). So, not only does an entity have timely to apply to intervene as a party, but it is for the Commission to determine whether to grant leave for that entity to intervene. PUC § 3-106(b) states that: The Commission shall grant leave to intervene unless the Commission concludes that: (1) the parties to the proceeding adequately represent the interest of the person seeking to intervene; or (2) the 19 In Mid-Atlantic, 361 Md. 196, 205-06 n.6, 760 A.2d 1087, 1092 n.6 (2000), we stated: The appellees state that the requirements for participating as a party at the administrative level are not very strict, a position, they suggest, with which the Commission agreed, as demonstrated by its order, stating that all entities that requested leave to intervene in these consolidated proceedings were granted party status. Contrary to the position of the appellees and apparently the Commission, the intervention statute seems to require more than a perfunctory review, which perhaps was not done, but with which the Commission is charged nonetheless. (Emphasis added). -23- issues that the person seeks to raise are irrelevant or immaterial. Therefore, while generally it may be rather easy to become a party to many administrative proceedings regulated by the State Administrative Procedure Act, in the case of actions before the Public Service Commission, one must comply with PUC § 3-106. That compliance requires, at a minimum, the timely filing of an application to intervene in a proceeding before the Commission in order to become a party. PUC § 3-106(a). The facts of the instant case show that neither Friends nor Tribbey timely filed an application to intervene. Friends filed to intervene on June 27, 2003, after it had attempted to apply for rehearing and well after it would have been timely to intervene (i.e., prior to the close of proceedings). Failing timely to intervene, Friends was not a party, and, therefore, not a party in interest, when it filed for rehearing on April 24, 2003. Thus, the Commission s denial of Friends application for rehearing was appropriate. Similarly, Tribbey never filed to intervene in his own right and, thus, also never became a party or party in interest. 20 As a result, even if we were to consider Tribbey s representation of Friends to satisfy somehow his own personal filing for rehearing, he still would not have properly filed, as he never intervened to become a party. Because of our determination that neither Friends nor Tribbey was a party to the 20 The fact that Tribbey was an adjoining landowner and was present at the adjudicatory hearing in January of 2003, does not, in and of itself, make him a party. In order to have become a party Tribbey would have had to apply to intervene, pursuant to PUC § 3-106. It is evident that he did not. -24- proceeding,21 neither of them was, or could have been, a party in interest to the proceeding so as to be entitled to apply for rehearing under PUC § 3-114(c). Therefore, there was no proper, timely application for rehearing filed in the present case. B. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that, as a result of the timely request for rehearing filed by Mr. Tribbey, all of the [respondents] had 30 days from August 8, 2003 to file their actions for judicial review of the Commission s March 26, 2003 order. The court recognized that the respondents, other than Tribbey,22 were not parties or parties in interest to the proceeding, stating: We therefore hold that (1) Mr. Sprenger was not a party in interest to the Commission proceeding because he was never a party to that proceeding, and (2) none of the four entities that requested a hearing was a party in interest because none was personally and specifically affected in a way different from the public generally. 23 Furthermore, the intermediate appellate court concluded: For these reasons, the actions for judicial review were untimely unless Mr. Tribbey s request for a rehearing was presented in his individual capacity rather than in his capacity as a representative of an entity that does 21 The respondents expressly acknowledge that they were not parties: Your Appellees [Respondents] have candidly acknowledged that they were denied admission as intervenors. They were not parties to the hearing . We do not claim that they were accepted as parties to the proceeding. 22 This could only be Sprenger, Bounds, and Gnegy. Sprenger filed an application to intervene on August 5, 2003, which was not timely. 23 As stated supra, this is the wrong standard in actions before the PSC. -25- not qualify as a party in interest. As discussed above, Tribbey did not timely or properly apply for rehearing because he was not himself a party or party in interest. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals erred in its determination as to the respondents petitions for judicial review. The respondents did not have 30 days from August 8, 2003 to file their actions for judicial review of the Commission s March 26, 2003 order. 24 Rather, they had 30 days from March 26, 2003. PUC § 3-202(a) provides that a party or person in interest may seek judicial review of a decision or order of the Commission. A person in interest is, by its very terminology, different from a party or a party in interest . Thus, the respondents, as adjoining landowners to the property where the wind turbine facility will be constructed could possibly be persons in interest entitled to seek judicial review of the Commission s March 26, 2003, Order No.78354.25 In order to seek that judicial review, however, Maryland Rule 7- 24 The respondents also argue that Friends application for rehearing stayed the time for filing a petition for judicial review for all entities until the Commission had made its ruling on August 8, 2003. Maryland Code (1998), § 3-204(c) of the Public Utility Companies Article provides: If a rehearing by the Commission is applied for, a proceeding for judicial review may be filed after service of the decision of the Commission that denies the rehearing. This may be true when a proper application (by an entity who has sought and has been permitted to intervene as a party) for rehearing is timely filed. In the instant case, however, as discussed supra, there was no timely application by a party or party in interest for rehearing. Thus, the time for filing a petition for judicial review was not stayed. 25 We need not, and do not, determine at this time whether respondents are or were persons in interest. Even if respondents were actually persons in interest they did not timely file petitions for judicial review. -26- 203(a) requires that a petition be filed within 30 days after the order is issued; that would have been April 25, 2003 in the case at bar. None of the respondents26 filed a petition for judicial review within that time period and, hence, their petitions for judicial review, not being timely, were properly denied. IV. For the aforementioned reasons we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. The respondents failed timely to apply to intervene as parties, PUC § 3-106, before the Commission and, therefore, the pertinent applications for rehearing were not properly submitted by parties in interest. PUC § 3-114(c). As a result, there was no timely application for rehearing. PUC § 3-114(c). Consequently, the time for filing a petition for judicial review of Order No. 78354 was not stayed by Friends application. The final order was issued on March 26, 2003, and any petition for judicial review had to be filed within 30 days of that date. There was no timely petition for judicial review filed in the instant case. The decisions of the Commission and the trial court were correct. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENTS. 26 It is also clearly evident that Friends never filed a petition for judicial review. -27- -28-

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